Omnipotence

[DarkMagician]

Omnipotence: Isn't there a medication for that?

 

[ceo_esq]

Thanks.. I just wanted something concise, with which to address your reply to Robin regarding...

" Essentially it means "God can do anything, except what God can't do". Which makes us all omnipotent. "

I don't see how your definition is intrinsically different from what Robin has said..

"What an omnipotent being can't do" coincides with "what's intrinsically impossible". But this is obviously not the case for subjects other than omnipotent beings - a fact artfully obscured by Robin's (implied) formulation X can do anything except what X can't do. If you consider the propositions X can do anything except what's intrinsically impossible or even X can do anything except what an omnipotent being couldn't do, it's clear that the definition of omnipotence doesn't result in everyone being omnipotent.

The presumed fact, just observed, that "what an omnipotent being can't do" coincides with "what's intrinsically impossible", doesn't mean that the intrinsically impossible is defined in a circular fashion. We can recognize intrinsic impossibilities as such logically; we don't identify them by reference to whether or not God could make them happen or not.

Robin appears to be suggesting, in the last point, that the traditional understanding of omnipotence is compromised by arbitrarily defined limits. I disagree. But I'll let him/her respond before pursuing this further, because I may be misunderstanding the basis of his/her objections.

 

[Robin]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
The presumed fact, just observed, that "what an omnipotent being can't do" coincides with "what's intrinsically impossible", doesn't mean that the intrinsically impossible is defined in a circular fashion. We can recognize intrinsic impossibilities as such logically; we don't identify them by reference to whether or not God could make them happen or not.

Intrinsic possibility is sometimes simply a semantic impossibility like a four sided triangle. But we often recognise intrinsic impossibilities in terms of mutual exclusions - "If God can do X then God can't do Y and if God can do Y then God can't do X". Some have tried to lump this in with the semantic impossibilities, but it is not.

In this case the intrinsic impossibility is not X and it is not Y, it is X and Y. So that leaves the question - which of X or Y can God do?

My example was that X="Create an unbreakable object" and Y="Break any object". The immediate reaction was that X was the impossibility given Y, or put another way "God can create an unbreakable object" is a meaningless statement because God can break any object.

My question is, why not the other way around? It would be just as logical to say that "God can break any object" is a meaningless statement given that God can create an unbreakable object.

Then it just comes down to your understanding of the nature of God. As I said previously God needs to be able to say "I have made this and it cannot be broken" if God's relationship to man is to mean anything. But it is possible to imagine a culture where God as destroyer is more important than God the creator.

Also if intrinsic impossibility is defined as something that contradicts the nature of God (as St Thomas of Aquinas does) then we can simply define the properties that we believe God has and then everything else becomes an intrinsic impossibility. As I have shown it is possible to argue that more than one omnipotent being can exist using the intrinsic impossibility formula.

 

[Robin]

I did not first see this previous post, so the answers are out of order

Originally posted by ceo_esq
One may suppose, however, that an omnipotent God could create a rock and decree irreversibly that it should forever be maintained in place. This hypothetical state of affairs is illuminated by the Scholastic distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinaria alluded to in the article you linked in the initial post.

This is not a case of the rock's nature defeating God's omnipotence; it's a case of God freely choosing to bind his own agency with respect to the rock.

This sounds like a quibble. In essence you are saying that God cannot create an unliftable rock but can create a rock and then make it unliftable. The important thing is that God can perform some actions, the result of which is a rock which God cannot lift. That he freely chose is irrelevant and is in fact implied by the original paradox.

My first aim was to show that the 'rock' paradox was not, as many have claimed, a semantic problem like married bachelors and four-sided triangles. They say that God, by definition can lift any rock so a rock unliftable by God is a meaningless concept.

This ignores the fact that it is the definition that we are debating, so the definition forms part of the conclusion and cannot be used as a premise.

I think I have sufficiently shown that a rock, unliftable by God can be a meaningful concept. And if so then God no longer has the absolute ability to lift anything.

Let's make this clear. In potentia ordinaria we can admit that God can take a course of action that will mean that he will exercise one power and choose not to exercise another which might contradict the first action. No problem there. But the action of creating permanence transcends the boundary between ordinaria and absoluta in that it invalidates another absolute power.

For one thing, if God were unable, in his infinite volition, to so circumscribe his abilities (in the potentia ordinaria sense), the negative implications for God's omnipotence would be far more serious.

It might be argued that the ability to circumscribe his abilities might be seen as intrinsically impossible. A being who's abilities are limited cannot be said to be omnipotent, even if the being himself created those limits. God cannot deprive himself of a power and still remain omnipotent.

 

[Robin]

So it is impossible to conceive of a greatest possible god, since you can always conceive of a greater one.

This sounds pretty reasonable until you actually try to do it. If you do (ponder, for example, whether there are conceivably successive magnitudes of ever-greater omniscience), I think you'll find that there are actually non-arbitrary conceptual limits to the properties traditionally ascribed to a supreme being.[/quote]
Beerina is right in that if we attempt the impossible task of imagining God we end up imagining instead something that it is possible for us to comprehend. In which case we can always imagine something greater if we really try.

Well can you imagine omniscience? If I try imagining perceiving the universe in 4 dimensions I end up picturing something that looks like a giant pide.

 

[Ossai]

ceo_esq

To reiterate my earlier point, in philosophical discourse, the prevailing understanding of the term "omnipotent" is "all powerful except for that which is intrinsically impossible".

Which still makes omnipotent an meaningless term.

"What an omnipotent being can't do" coincides with "what's intrinsically impossible". But this is obviously not the case for subjects other than omnipotent beings - a fact artfully obscured by Robin's (implied) formulation X can do anything except what X can't do. If you consider the propositions X can do anything except what's intrinsically impossible or even X can do anything except what an omnipotent being couldn't do, it's clear that the definition of omnipotence doesn't result in everyone being omnipotent.

Sorry, but it means exactly that. All that is required is to condense/stretch/warp the meaning of intrinsically impossible. Once we’ve done that god is nothing more than a egoistical dictator.

Ossai

 

[stamenflicker]

Also if intrinsic impossibility is defined as something that contradicts the nature of God (as St Thomas of Aquinas does) then we can simply define the properties that we believe God has and then everything else becomes an intrinsic impossibility. As I have shown it is possible to argue that more than one omnipotent being can exist using the intrinsic impossibility formula.

This isn't exactly true if you chose to remain in the realm of logic, i.e. generic omnipotence. Betrand Russell ran into the same problems with the concept of infinity. But there can be multiple types of infinity that we define, there is still only one generic infinity that is a logical reality if you accept particular preconditions. No one is arguing that infinity is a meaningless concept, after all the benefits of the generic pre-supposed infinity has numerous benefits in spite of a handful of real illogical absurdities.

Example: Infinity minus three is infinity. Infinity plus three is infinity. Infinity squared is infinity.

However within the mathematics of sets, we can make use of infinity. But again, we have to first define some intrinsic values from which to make sense of it.

Which still makes omnipotent an meaningless term.

It is only as meaningless as infinity. To reject one, you need to logically reject the other.

Stamen

 

[Skeptical Greg]

Isn't it kind of ridiculous for us to be quibbling over what ' omnipotent ' means, as if the meaning of this word will determine whether or not a/God/s exist ?

 

[stamenflicker]

Isn't it kind of ridiculous for us to be quibbling over what ' omnipotent ' means, as if the meaning of this word will determine whether or not a/God/s exist ?

Yes.

Flick

 

[ReFLeX]

* Suppose a Person X exists and is purportedly omnipotent
* Omnipotent beings must be able to do A (create rocks)
* Omnipotent beings must be able to do B (lift rocks)

* X must be able to do A such that B is not possible otherwise X is not omnipotent.

Do you see the logical conflict here?

No. An unliftable rock, is NOT, as so many have said, a contradictory. A contradiction is A and ~A. An rock is a contradiction if it is both liftable AND unliftable. Properties of omnipotent beings have nothing to do with the rock until the being tries to lift the rock.
Here is some predicate logic to back up Robin:

g = God
r = unliftable rock
Ox = x is omnipotent
Ex = x exists
Px = x is intrinsically possible
Cxy = x can create y
Lxy = x can lift y
(I have to use ">" for the conditional)

1. (x)((Ox·Py) > Cxy) |Premise
2. (x)((Ox·Ey) > Lxy) |Premise
3. (x)~Lxr |Premise
4. Pr |Premise
5. Cxy > Ey |Premise
-> 6. Og | AIP
| 7. ((Og·Py) > Cgy) |U.I. 1
| 8. ((Og·Ey) > Lgy) |U.I. 2
| 9. Og·Pr |Conj. 4, 6
| 10. Cgr |M. P. 7, 9
| 11. Er |M.P. 5,10
| 12. Og·Er |Conj. 6, 11
| 13. Lgr |M.P. 8, 12
| 14. ~Lgr |U.I. 3
| 15. Lgr·~Lgr | Conj. 13, 14
---16. ~Og| IP 6-15


1. (x)((Ox·Py) > Cxy) |Premise
For all x and all y, if x is omnipotent and y is intrinsically possible then x can create y.

2. (x)((Ox·Ey) > Lxy) |Premise
For all x and all y, if x is omnipotent and y exists then x can lift y.

3. (x)~Lxr |Premise
An unliftable rock (r) cannot be lifted.

4. Pr |Premise
An unliftable rock is intrinsically possible (What properties of the rock make this untrue?
intrinsic: Of or relating to the essential nature of a thing; inherent )

5. Cxy > Ey |Premise
If x creates y then y exists.

6. Og | Assumption: Indirect Proof
(Indirect proof means you assume the opposite of what you want to prove (~A) and then derive a contradiction (B·~B) which then implies (A).)

7. ((Og·Py) > Cgy) |Universtal Instantiation 1
If God is omnipotent and y is intrinsically possible then God can create y.

8. ((Og·Ey) > Lgy) |U.I. 2
If God is omnipotent and y exists then God can lift y.

9. Og·Pr |Conjunction 4, 6
God is omnipotent and an unliftable rock is intrinsically possible.

10. Cgr |Modus Ponens 7, 9
God creates an unliftable rock.

11. Er |M.P. 5,10
The rock now exists.

12. Og·Er |Conj. 6, 11
God is omnipotent and the rock exists.

13. Lgr |M.P. 8, 12
God lifts the unliftable rock. (Note: this isn't a contradiction yet).

14. ~Lgr |U.I. 3
God cannot lift the unliftable rock.

15. Lgr·~Lgr | Conj. 13, 14
God cannot lift the unliftable rock and lifts the unliftable rock.

16. ~Og| Indirect Proof 6-15
God is not "omnipotent."

A few things: Indirect Proof is a completely logically valid way of arriving at a conclusion. Also, this argument can be tweaked by flagging "g" to prove ~(�_x)Ox, that is, no entity is omnipotent. However I took logic almost two semesters ago and forget how to use E.G. without looking it up (I spent enough time on this already)... Which brings me to the fact that I may have made a mistake with the name of quantifier logic rules, but the internal logic does work. I had to mangle the argument because of the "intrinsically impossible" clause.
However, if you remove premise 4 and all reference to intrinsically impossible the argument still refutes omnipotence defined without the extra clause, that I'm sure of.
And you may disagree with this completely of course.

edit: fixing inconsistent notation

 

[ReFLeX]

Isn't it kind of ridiculous for us to be quibbling over what ' omnipotent ' means, as if the meaning of this word will determine whether or not a/God/s exist ?

Or is it naive to think any philosophical debate on this forum determines something concrete outside of it?

...no less than arguing the definition of omnipotence as it refers to the Christian god.

 

[ceo_esq]

I only have a few minutes today so I might have to return to this later.

It might be argued that the ability to circumscribe his abilities might be seen as intrinsically impossible. A being who's abilities are limited cannot be said to be omnipotent, even if the being himself created those limits. God cannot deprive himself of a power and still remain omnipotent.

I disagree here. A being unable voluntarily to bind his own power could not be described as omnipotent; accordingly, I think it must be admitted that an omnipotent God would be capable of doing so. This is why I suggested that the only force capable of binding an omnipotent being's power without, without simultaneously posing a challenge to that being's omnipotence, would be the omnipotent will itself. This seems unobjectionable to me. At any rate it seems to be part of how the prevailing understanding of meaning of "omnipotence" has evolved in Western intellectual history and usage.

Isn't it kind of ridiculous for us to be quibbling over what ' omnipotent ' means, as if the meaning of this word will determine whether or not a/God/s exist ? Isn't it kind of ridiculous for us to be quibbling over what ' omnipotent ' means, as if the meaning of this word will determine whether or not a/God/s exist ?

Well, frankly, it does have some implications for the Problem of Evil. But even if that weren't true, I don't think it's necessarily less worth exploring than the meaning of any other philosophical term of art.

 

[ReFLeX]

Is this intelligible?

An omnipotent God is capable of all things which would not imply a limit to its own capabilities.

This saves omnipotence from the unliftable rock objection, but is it a truism for all beings? I think it is where "we are all omnipotent" comes from. Humans cannot fly. But to point out that activity that we are incapable of implies a limit to our capabilities. So we have the power to do anything except what we can't do...

 

[Robin]

Originally posted by stamenflicker
It is only as meaningless as infinity. To reject one, you need to logically reject the other.

But we can deal with infinity mathematically because we have a method (the mathematical field of limits) of doing so rigorously and consistently. If you know of some similar method of resolving the ambiguities posed by intrinsic impossibility please share. The only suggestion we have had so far is:

A good rule of thumb is that the first statement to put limits on an inherently limitless being is the one that doesn't make sense.

Which seems neither rigorous nor consistent. Otherwise the question still remains, if two absolute abilities X and Y form an intrinsic impossibility then which one of X or Y does God have?

Originally posted by ceo_esq
I disagree here. A being unable voluntarily to bind his own power could not be described as omnipotent; accordingly, I think it must be admitted that an omnipotent God would be capable of doing so. This is why I suggested that the only force capable of binding an omnipotent being's power without, without simultaneously posing a challenge to that being's omnipotence, would be the omnipotent will itself.

But once having bound his power to the rock, the being relinquishes volition in the matter. It is not a case of God choosing not to move the rock, having chosen to make the rock unliftable God now cannot move it in a real and absolute sense. But if what you say is true, why is the paradox even contentious? Why do all theologians not simply respond, "Yes, God can create a rock that He cannot lift and No, he cannot then lift the rock"? All the paradox is asking is if God can impose limits on His own power.

But instead we get the argument about how a rock that God cannot lift is a meaningless statement. I think I have shown that this argument invokes the petitio principii fallacy in that the definition of omnipotence is used as an argument about the definition of omnipotence.

Originally posted by ceo_esq
(From Ossai) Which still makes omnipotent an meaningless term.

Ossai, you keep saying this, but you don't explain why in any plausible fashion

But I certainly did, several times. I have stated it again in this post - "if two absolute abilities X and Y form an intrinsic impossibility then how do you determine which of X or Y God can do?"

Here is an example. The doctrine of Hell seems to be a clear and unambiguous intrinsic impossibility - how can an omnipotent being which embodies infinite justice mete out infinite punishment for finite offences? Most Christians despise the doctrine but many still defend it and they often do so with a competing intrinsic impossibility involving free will.

But why is the first intrinsic impossibility trumped by the second? It seems to me that the flexibility allowed by the clause allows even an absurd doctrine like Hell to be justified. It is the Catch 22 of theology.

 

[Robin]

Is this intelligible?

An omnipotent God is capable of all things which would not imply a limit to its own capabilities.

This saves omnipotence from the unliftable rock objection, but is it a truism for all beings? I think it is where "we are all omnipotent" comes from. Humans cannot fly. But to point out that activity that we are incapable of implies a limit to our capabilities. So we have the power to do anything except what we can't do...

Also as ceo_esq has suggested, limiting its own capabilities might be one of it's abilities.

And if there was a God then it would be more important, theologically speaking, that he could create the unliftable rock than that he could lift any rock.

Incidentally, thanks for the PL formalisation - I am still digesting.

 

[Robin]

Isn't it kind of ridiculous for us to be quibbling over what ' omnipotent ' means, as if the meaning of this word will determine whether or not a/God/s exist ?

It is Robin's first rule of theology that any argument that claims to prove or disprove the existence of God is useful only for the practice it provides in spotting logical flaws.

But is proving or disproving God the only purpose of theological debate?

 

[Kopji]

I dunno. I don't need unliftable rocks.

I would easily be convinced by a being that could do the intrinsically possible acts of walking on water, raising the dead, healing lepers, having donkeys talk, or having wild bears maim 40 or so smart mouth little kids.

 

[ReFLeX]

Maybe YOU don't need them, but I do.
...at least one, to win bar bets with.

 

[stamenflicker]

But we can deal with infinity mathematically because we have a method (the mathematical field of limits) of doing so rigorously and consistently. If you know of some similar method of resolving the ambiguities posed by intrinsic impossibility please share.

Intrinsic impossiblity is the result of semantics, pure and simple. It is the same method applied to infinity, only because the problem is language it can't look exactly the same nor can it be repeatable. It is basically taking a meaningless concept and making it work for you. In a sense it is a rule change. Is there something about this you find displeasing, I don't understand why one would take the liberty in one area but not another. Maybe I've misunderstood you.

Stamen

 

[stamenflicker]

Robin,

I thought of a better way to explain where I'm coming from. Math is the language of numbers and it has its own sets of intrinsic impossibilities. For example, 1+1 is not going to equal 13, at least not without generate a new set of rules.

Language too has its own set of rules. They can't look exactly like math's rules, but they are there as any linguist will tell you. One of those "rules" is that intrinsically impossible language constructions are non-sensical. Just like 1 + 1 = 13 is nonsensical in the mathmatical language.

The moment you begin to accept assertions like 1 + 1 = 13, you immediately have to construct new rules to make sense of it. So, infinity + infinity = 13 infinities is non-sensical apart from set mathematics (which in essense is only a new set of rules for the game).

It would be like me saying to you, ok now unbreakable objects can now break because I just added this special new dimension of reality where they can.

Stamen