Omnipotence

[Robin]

[Originally posted by new drkittenUnder an alternative interpretation, the good people, of whatever genuinely held religious interpretation, were accepted as "Christ's sheep," irrespective of whether or not they were of the Christian "fold" or not. C.S. Lewis wrote on this as well; his children's book The Last Battle spends nearly a chapter on this issue, in the context of a narrative.

But he is by no means consistent on this matter. For example, early in "Mere Christianity" he goes out of his way to say that pantheists are very literally destined to Hell.

The Archbishop of Sydney was recently criticised for saying that Jews and Muslims were bound for Hell. However if you really believe that someone is heading for eternal torment then surely the polite thing to do is to tell them.

Most religions now de-emphasise Hell, but it is still there in the basement with a white sheet over it. But it is, more than any other religious doctrine, an absurd concept.

 

[drkitten]

I think this demonstrates one of my problems with the 'intrinsically impossible' idea.

Which side of a mutual exclusion wins?

Most theists would say that God cannot create the rock in the first place because 'a rock so heavy that even God can't lift it' is a meaningless concept, but you have shown it is possible to argue that he can create the rock and not lift it because lifting an unliftable rock is a logical impossibility.

Try the paradox with an unbreakable window pane. Can God create such a thing? Could God break it? Obviously not both, but which power would he have?

You're asking a semantic question here -- it should be unsurprising that the answer is a semantic one.

What does "unbreakable" mean? If it means "incapable of being broken, even by a being capable of breaking it," then the the idea of an unbreakable window is obviously nonsensible.

If it means, on the other hand, "incapable of being broken by any finite force," then God is "obviously" capable of exerting infinite force and can therefore break it.

A good rule of thumb is that the first statement to put limits on an inherently limitless being is the one that doesn't make sense.

 

[Robin]

Originally posted by new drkittenYou're asking a semantic question here -- it should be unsurprising that the answer is a semantic one.

Perhaps in terms of the examples but a real question in terms of the nature of God if one exists. If I were to find myself at Judgement Day and saying to God "I hope I wasn't out of line with that 'You don't exist' crack" then it might be fairly important to ask if immutable laws might have a loophole.

What does "unbreakable" mean? If it means "incapable of being broken, even by a being capable of breaking it," then the the idea of an unbreakable window is obviously nonsensible.

But then a being capable of breaking anything, even unbreakable things is also nonsensible.

To say that something is unbreakable means that there does not exist a force capable of breaking it. So the ability to break anything limits the power to make something unbreakable. The power to make something unbreakable limits the power to break anything. One might suppose the power to make unbreakable things would be a more useful attribute for a deity than the negative power to break anything.

If it means, on the other hand, "incapable of being broken by any finite force," then God is "obviously" capable of exerting infinite force and can therefore break it.

No, clearly in a paradox the mutual exclusion is the important part.

A good rule of thumb is that the first statement to put limits on an inherently limitless being is the one that doesn't make sense.

Well I'm not sure how serious you are about that one, so I will leave it.

 

[Robin]

At the risk of just talking to myself, I would like to bring this point home.

Lewis's answer to the rock paradox - that a rock unliftable by God is a meaningless concept - is clearly wrong.

It means that God is unable to make any definite statement about anything. But God needs to be able to say, "I have made this and it can never be broken, not even by Me" and for that statement to be true, otherwise where does humanity stand in relation to God?

So God can say "This rock can never be lifted" and that statement is true because even if God can muster sufficient force to blow the rock away, doing so would mean that God was either wrong or a liar. Clearly on omniscient God can't be wrong. God could lie but this contradicts the part of intrinsic impossibility that goes to the nature of God.

This demonstrates my point about intrinsic impossibility. Most theists accept the Lewis version, but couldn't the second version also be seen as reasonable? Is it not better to have a God that can create permanence rather than a God capable of destroying or moving anything?

So while Aquinas' definition may not involve a contradiction, on the other hand the fact that two opposite and reasonable answers to the rock paradox are possible shows that this definition is not a solid basis on which to make statements about God.

(PS I do not take credit for this argument, but I can't remember where I heard it so I can't cite)

 

[Robin]

Me: To me this is problematical since the intrinsically impossible clause might have different interpretations. For example it does not rule out that there might be more than one omnipotent being since any action where O1 overruled O2 would simply become intrinsically impossible.

new drkitten: One might argue that this second case proves that if an omnipotent being exists, then He is unique. That's basically the same argument that proves that an irresistable force cannot exist in the same universe as an immovable object, yes?

But my point is that the "intrinsically impossible" phrase makes it all OK. O1 and O2 can do anything, but whatever they do can never overrule what the other does.

They are only irresistible force and immoveable object if they disagree.

They can both be omnipotent because anything that overruled the other one would become intrinsically impossible in a universe with two omnipotent entities. In this sense "O1 cannot overrule O2" is no contradiction to omnipotence because "overrule O2" ie "overrule an omnipotent being" would become one of Lewis' meaningless sentences. And "A meaningless sentence does not gain meaning simply because someone chooses to prepend to it the phrase 'O1 can.'". And obviously vice versa.

If some theology contained two omnipotent beings we could easily imagine the theological debates that would ensue - "when the desires of O1 contradict the desires of O2 then neither thing can be done" or perhaps "since O1 and O2 are both omniscient and their desires are ruled by reason, and reason follows from knowledge then they cannot wish any contradictory thing".

It is really possible to say just about anything and find a good argument for it.

 

[RandFan]

!!! !!! !!! Pedant Alert !!! !!! !!!

...then the the idea of an unbreakable window is obviously nonsensible.

Non[sensical] or [In]sensible? Or is there really such a word?

Sorry, just curious.

 

[Robin]

A similar argument applies to most of the various other impossibilities that naive athiests wish to apply to God -- "a married bachelor," "a rock so heavy God cannot lift it," "a four-sided triangle," "a valid proof of a falsehood," etc. are not themselves meaningful.

I just noticed this claim and should point out the misapprehension. The omnipotence paradox was not invented by atheists (naive or otherwise), but by theological scholars to illustrate the nature of omnipotence. I am not aware that it has ever seriously been used as an argument for atheism.

Recently I used the "Can God prove that he is not omnipotent?" question to point out to a naive theist that omnipotence does not mean that the statement "God can X" is necessarily true for all X. I think that most theists would agree with me on the point.

My point is that the scholastic definition of omnipotence does not constitute a definite claim about the nature of God. And I think I have shown a situation in which "a rock that God cannot lift" is a meaningful phrase even if "a rock so heavy God cannot lift it," is not.

 

[Yahweh]

Don't tell me - it has all been argued before, but since this is being argued as a hijack to another post I thought I would give it a home of it's own.

This is the traditional Christian definition of omnipotence:

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11251c.htm
And here is the source for the definition that God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought"
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01546a.htm
So is omnipotence a meaningful concept or not?

The "greater than which nothing greater can be thought" definition is an old concept, it traces back to Anselm's ontological proofs of God:

1. God exists in our understanding. This means that the concept of God resides as an idea in our minds.
2. God is a possible being, and might exist in reality. He is possible because the concept of God does not bear internal contradictions.
3. If something exists exclusively in our understanding and might have existed in reality then it might have been greater. This simply means that something that exists in reality is perfect (or great). Something that is only a concept in our minds could be greater by actually existing.
4. Suppose (theoretically) that God only exists in our understanding and not in reality.
5. If this were true, then it would be possible for God to be greater then he is (follows from premise #3).
6.This would mean that God is a being in which a greater is 6. possible.
7. This is absurd because God, a being in which none greater is possible, is a being in which a greater is possible. Herein lies the contradiction.
8. Thus it follows that it is false for God to only exist in our understanding.
9. Hence God exists in reality as well as our understanding.

The argumentation has actually been parodied to prove the existence of the greatest of all possible islands. Anselm's defense against this parody is summarized by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Saint Anselm as follows:

In order to defend himself against Gaunilo's criticism [that a greatest possible god is absurd as a greater one can always be imagined], Anselm would have to show why Gaunilo's argument about the island is not in fact analogous to his own argument about that than which nothing greater can be thought. Surprisingly, he never does this. His long-winded and indeed somewhat intemperate "Reply to Gaunilo" asserts more than once that the island example fails, but he never explains why it fails. The usual reply given on Anselm's behalf (and indeed often attributed to Anselm himself) is that the notion of a greatest conceivable island is incoherent; however great an island might be, one could always conceive of a greater. This is a lame response, since it is open to Gaunilo to say exactly the same thing about the greatest conceivable being; it is therefore no wonder that Anselm did not say anything of the sort.

At least for me, I'd say: what are the properties that make something great? Alright, now double it.

Or, perhaps I'd say: What properties define greatness? I'd assume that God possess all the greatest virtues - but certain virtues (such as courage) can only be attained through effort of character building and only if a being destructable. However, indestructable deities are "greater" than destructable ones, and courageous deities possess more virtues than non-courageous ones.

Any way you slice it, the real persuasive power behind "greater than that which can be concieved" is internally contradictory, which necessarily falsifies God's existence.

I think the only definition of omnipotence that can be defended at all is the "maximal power" definition, which basically means "a being for which no other being can exceed the overall power". [Insert "argument from evil" here to highlight obvious problems of this kind of omnipotence.]

 

[Beleth]

Yes, and I agreed that I did in this instance also.

In what way have I done so in this instance?

 

[Darat]

Re: Re: Omnipotence

Originally posted by Yahweh (Underline by me)

...snip...

Any way you slice it, the real persuasive power behind "greater than that which can be concieved" is internally contradictory, which necessarily falsifies God's existence.


...snip...

But only if you assume, as one of your staring premises, that "God" is constrained by logic. An “answer” to this conundrum is to assume, as one of your starting premises, that God is omnipotent (i.e. all powerful), to be all powerful means there is nothing that God cannot do, therefore he cannot be constrained by anything therefore logic doesn’t constrain him.

 

[ceo_esq]

Re: Re: Omnipotence

At least for me, I'd say: what are the properties that make something great? Alright, now double it.

In this thread, I attempted to argue that the type of qualities that make for contingent greatness (say, for an island) are different than the type of qualities that make for intrinsic greatness. Among other things, I'm inclined to think that qualities such as omniscience are subject to logical, non-arbitrary limitations (refer to the other thread for more on this). Accordingly, I disagree with the author of the philosophy site you quoted, who said "This is a lame response, since it is open to Gaunilo to say exactly the same thing about the greatest conceivable being[.]" Gaunilo can't say the same thing, and a number of contemporary philosophers have pointed this out.

 

[Ossai]

ceo_esq

The definition to which you apparently adhere is extremely problematic conceptually, which is why it hasn't historically prospered in the philosophy of religion: that an omnipotent being ought also to be able to do anything that is intrinsically impossible.

Which is exactly why there should be another term coined meaning all powerful except for that which is intrinsically impossible.

And going all the way back up the thread to catholic dogma as to the description of god:
· Omnipotent
· Omniscient
· Omni-benevolent
· Impassable
· Infinitely Just
· Infinitely Merciful
· Eternal
· Knowable by Nature
· Omni-present
· Absolutely Perfect
· Absolute Immutability
· The First Efficient Cause
Omni-benevolent, Infinitely Just and Infinitely Merciful – how can all three descriptions fit?
Omnipotent is just the attribute most easily shown to be illogical. In order to use it, religious philosophers have to include a sub-clause; except for that which is intrinsically impossible. Yet if an alien or other entity were described as omnipotent the sub-clause would be dropped.

For example, what does it actually mean to suggest that God ought to be able, for example, to create a married bachelor?

Nuns – ‘brides of Christ’ – in the popular vernacular in my location – yet I’ve never meet a married nun.

Ossai

 

[ceo_esq]

ceo_esq
Which is exactly why there should be another term coined meaning all powerful except for that which is intrinsically impossible.

To reiterate my earlier point, in philosophical discourse, the prevailing understanding of the term "omnipotent" is "all powerful except for that which is intrinsically impossible". Particularly thanks to Aquinas, there has never been a time when the English word "omnipotent" (at least as a term of art in philosophical theology) has been widely understood to mean in its primary sense "all powerful including that which is intrinsically impossible." So perhaps another term should be could for that. (The problem with that, of course, is that the new term might untimately risk being as meaningless as terms for intrinsically impossible things like "square triangles".)

You're not the only person for whom the predominant, Thomistic sense of "omnipotent" offends their intuitive notion of what omnipotent really ought to have meant. However, the battle to decide the prevailing meaning of the word "omnipotent" was more or less settled even before the advent of modern English, so I think we ought to accept the outcome of that battle as the baseline for our interpretations. If you want to use "omnipotent" in a different sense, all you have to do is specify when you are doing so in order to avoid misunderstandings.

In order to use it, religious philosophers have to include a sub-clause; except for that which is intrinsically impossible. Yet if an alien or other entity were described as omnipotent the sub-clause would be dropped.

I've been trying to convey the idea that, like it or not, what you perceive as a "sub-clause" is actually part of the prevailing definition of the word. How did it get this way? Because it was widely perceived as a logical necessity in order for the word to be meaningful.

For this reason, I would argue that philosophers discussing an alien or other hypothetically omnipotent entity, they would logically conceive of omnipotence in exactly the same way as for God. (After all, in philosophy of religion, God is usually just shorthand for a hypothetical being possessing omnipotence among other attributes, so whether the being is an extraterrestrial or something else is not important.) As an example, Descartes postulated for argument's sake an omnipotent evil genius but assumed that even such a being could not accomplish the intrinsically impossible (such as causing a non-existent thinker to think).

You seem to worry that the notion of "God" is the object of special pleading by serious philosophers of religion, but you needn't - it's just semantics to them.


* * * * *

I was browsing through the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy a couple of days ago under the entry "Paradoxes of omnipotence". Regarding the question "Can God accomplish the intrinsically impossible?" (I'm going from memory here), the editors noted the objection that the question does not actually imply any set of tasks that God could perform or fail to perform, and thus no answer to the question could possibly have real implications for God's powers. With respect to the question "Can God create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?", it was suggested that even if the answer were "No", that would be merely a logically "harmless consequence" of the twin premises God can create objects of any weight and God can lift objects of any weight. Once again - no meaningful limitation on omnipotence arises from such consequences.

Think of it this way: the ability to do the intrinsically impossible, whatever that means, would not really increase the number of things God could actually do. Because "intrinsically impossible tasks" is kind of a null set, adding them to "intrinsically possible tasks" does not in fact result in any enhancement of a being's powers. Is it any wonder that the word "omnipotent" evolved to reflect this logical reality?

 

[Robin]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
Regarding the question "Can God accomplish the intrinsically impossible?" (I'm going from memory here), the editors noted the objection that the question does not actually imply any set of tasks that God could perform or fail to perform, and thus no answer to the question could possibly have real implications for God's powers. With respect to the question "Can God create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?", it was suggested that even if the answer were "No", that would be merely a logically "harmless consequence" of the twin premises God can create objects of any weight and God can lift objects of any weight. Once again - no meaningful limitation on omnipotence arises from such consequences.

However this, as I have shown, is probably wrong. If you take out "too heavy" the question becomes, "Can God create an object that is unliftable, even by God?" then the answer is clearly yes.

Since God is presumed not mechanical then the issue of weight is obviously not relevant.

Once God has created such an object then it is no longer true that God can lift any object.

Similarly God can create an unbreakable object and if he does so then it is no longer true that God can break anything.

Note also that "an object that God cannot lift" or "an object that God cannot break" are only meaningless if you assume that the powers to move or break anything are intrinsically possible.

As I have said before the paradox is about mutual exclusion. If there are mutually exclusive powers then God cannot have both and you have to decide which he has.

So if a culture values a God that can create and guarantee permanence then God can create the rock but not lift it.

On the other hand another culture may prefer a God that can move and break anything, in which case God would not have the power of creating permanence.

People try to make this paradox about semantics but it really is not except in one important way. The "intrinsically impossible" clause robs the word omnipotence of any fixed meaning.

Essentially it means "God can do anything, except what God can't do". Which makes us all omnipotent.

 

[Beerina]

Don't tell me - it has all been argued before, but since this is being argued as a hijack to another post I thought I would give it a home of it's own.

This is the traditional Christian definition of omnipotence:

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11251c.htm
And here is the source for the definition that God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought"
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01546a.htm
So is omnipotence a meaningful concept or not?

It's a fraudulent concept. If a god is an infinite collection of abilities, then, since we know there is no highest infinity, there is always a more powerful god, in theory. If nothing else, there is a god that can beat the crap out of your god. In other words, you propose a god no other god can beat up, and I can immediately conceive of one that can.

(BTW, this infinity stuff is in the transfinite number sequence, not in the "add one" concept of countable numbers. As in the size of counting numbers is the same size as integers, which is the same size as rational numbers (e.g. 2/3), but the real numbers is infinitely larger (i.e. no possible 1-1 mapping), and the reals are the same size as the complex numbers, etc. This sequence extends infinitely, i.e., there are at least a countably infinite number of transfinite infinite sets, each infinitely larger than the previous.)


So it is impossible to conceive of a greatest possible god, since you can always conceive of a greater one.

 

[ceo_esq]

However this, as I have shown, is probably wrong.

I'm inclined to point out that you've shown no such thing. But perhaps I don't see which specific part of "this" you're referring to here.

If you take out "too heavy" the question becomes, "Can God create an object that is unliftable, even by God?" then the answer is clearly yes.

Since God is presumed not mechanical then the issue of weight is obviously not relevant.

Once God has created such an object then it is no longer true that God can lift any object.

Similarly God can create an unbreakable object and if he does so then it is no longer true that God can break anything.

Note also that "an object that God cannot lift" or "an object that God cannot break" are only meaningless if you assume that the powers to move or break anything are intrinsically possible.

As I have said before the paradox is about mutual exclusion. If there are mutually exclusive powers then God cannot have both and you have to decide which he has.

So if a culture values a God that can create and guarantee permanence then God can create the rock but not lift it.

On the other hand another culture may prefer a God that can move and break anything, in which case God would not have the power of creating permanence.

You're moving in a perfectly legitimate direction by removing the focus from the weight of an object in the first paradox. But let's explore the concept of our God-created immovable rock further.

A rock intrinsically possessing infinite resistance to movement seems an impossible notion, as the nature of such a rock would unite two mutually repellent elements (infinitude - if only as to one attribute - and createdness). One may suppose, however, that an omnipotent God could create a rock and decree irreversibly that it should forever be maintained in place. This hypothetical state of affairs is illuminated by the Scholastic distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinaria alluded to in the article you linked in the initial post.

This is not a case of the rock's nature defeating God's omnipotence; it's a case of God freely choosing to bind his own agency with respect to the rock. I think the Scholastic approach to the problem points the way toward resolving the superficial contradiction of powers you've raised, and in a way that makes a great deal of sense. For one thing, if God were unable, in his infinite volition, to so circumscribe his abilities (in the potentia ordinaria sense), the negative implications for God's omnipotence would be far more serious. For another, there is both logical and intuitive appeal to the notion that the only way in which God's (=any omnipotent being's) omnipotence could be bound without thereby being defeated or undermined, is through a voluntary self-limitation of this kind.

People try to make this paradox about semantics but it really is not except in one important way. The "intrinsically impossible" clause robs the word omnipotence of any fixed meaning.

I'm afraid I still disagree, Robin. It would be more accurate to say that the clause is precisely what rescues the word from meaninglessness.

Essentially it means "God can do anything, except what God can't do". Which makes us all omnipotent.

I take it you mean to point out that the proposition X can do anything except what X can't do is valid for any subject X. But this truism is hardly equivalent to the definition of omnipotence.

 

[Skeptical Greg]

I take it you mean to point out that the proposition X can do anything except what X can't do is valid for any subject X. But this truism is hardly equivalent to the definition of omnipotence.

Have you offered your definition ( of omnipotence ) somewhere in this thread?

Can you save me the trouble of looking for it ?

 

[ceo_esq]

Re: Re: Omnipotence

So it is impossible to conceive of a greatest possible god, since you can always conceive of a greater one.

This sounds pretty reasonable until you actually try to do it. If you do (ponder, for example, whether there are conceivably successive magnitudes of ever-greater omniscience), I think you'll find that there are actually non-arbitrary conceptual limits to the properties traditionally ascribed to a supreme being.

 

[ceo_esq]

Have you offered your definition ( of omnipotence ) somewhere in this thread?

Can you save me the trouble of looking for it ?

I don't have any personal definition. In general terms, I accept what I take to be the prevailing philosophical usage over at least the last 7 centuries or so - in a nutshell, the ability to do whatever is not intrinsically impossible. I'm aware that competing usages technically exist - notably, the one that doesn't subtract the intrinsically impossible - but that doesn't seem to me to be a definition that enjoys great currency or, indeed, coherence.

Consider your trouble saved!

 

[Skeptical Greg]

I don't have any personal definition. In general terms, I accept what I take to be the prevailing philosophical usage over at least the last 7 centuries or so - in a nutshell, the ability to do whatever is not intrinsically impossible. I'm aware that competing usages technically exist - notably, the one that doesn't subtract the intrinsically impossible - but that doesn't seem to me to be a definition that enjoys great currency or, indeed, coherence.

Consider your trouble saved!

Thanks.. I just wanted something concise, with which to address your reply to Robin regarding...

" Essentially it means "God can do anything, except what God can't do". Which makes us all omnipotent. "

I don't see how your definition is intrinsically different from what Robin has said..