The only other possible explanation that could account for Norman Mineta’s testimony is to claim that Mineta witnessed a conversation between Cheney and a young man about United 93. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, it would seem possible that the young man and Cheney could have been talking about United 93, which they claim crash landed at 10:03 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania because the passengers tried to overtake the cockpit from the hijackers. This could account for Mineta’s testimony, assuming he was confused on the time of his arrival in the PEOC.
This claim does not however account for the inconsistencies about Cheney’s timeline of when he entered the PEOC (Presidential Emergency Operations Center). It cannot account for the stories by ABC news and the changing account of the Military’s response to AA 77 which included Phantom AA 11. This claim also cannot explain Richard Clarke’s account. The Government’s changing official story of what happened to United 93 is absurd and contradicted by many credible sources, most notably Richard Clarke.
Since day one, there have been suspicions that United 93 was shot down by the U.S. Military because of the fear that it would have been used as a weapon to attack targets on the ground. The 9/11 Commission Report therefore attempted to eliminate any suspicion of this allegation by claiming that military notification of United 93 came after the plane already crashed, and authorization to shoot down hijacked aircrafts came long after United 93 was down.
The first problem with claiming that Mineta overheard a discussion about United 93 is that it crashed approximately 125 miles [61] away from Washington D.C. Therefore, United 93 was never “50 miles out” of the White House, Pentagon, or any other specific target. It certainly was not “30 miles out” or “10 miles out” either.
However, the 9/11 Commission paints a picture of incompetence and confusion that still makes it seem possible that Mineta witnessed the young man and Cheney discussing United 93 or a medevac helicopter or some combination thereof. The argument is quite farfetched and doesn’t make sense with respect to Mineta’s testimony, especially considering it has Cheney giving an order to shoot down a plane that was already down and an order to shoot down a medevac helicopter.
9/11 Commission Report: [62]
At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington . That aircraft was United 93.The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington , not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.217
At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft.218 His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes.219
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment," suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President.220
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two-minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary.221
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania . Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization.222
At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out."223
Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness, "It drops below the radar screen and it's just continually hovering in your imagination; you don't know where it is or what happens to it." Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter.224
Although the 9/11 Commission Report does not address Mineta’s testimony, some defenders of the official theory claim that Mineta witnessed a discussion about Flight 93, not the plane approaching the Pentagon. When looking at the totality of Mineta’s testimony in response to Lee Hamilton’s questions, it does not seem plausible that the plane which was 50, 30 and 10 miles out could have been Flight 93.
9/11 Commission Hearing Testimony: [63]
MR. MINETA: And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away. And so then, at the time we heard about the airplane that went into Pennsylvania , then I thought, "Oh, my God, did we shoot it down?" And then we had to, with the vice president, go through the Pentagon to check that out.
MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.
MR. MINETA: Well, I don't know that specifically, but I do know that the airplanes were scrambled from Langley or from Norfolk , the Norfolk area. But I did not know about the orders specifically other than listening to that other conversation.
MR. HAMILTON: But there very clearly was an order to shoot commercial aircraft down.
MR. MINETA: Subsequently I found that out.
MR. HAMILTON: With respect to Flight 93, what type of information were you and the vice president receiving about that flight?
MR. MINETA: The only information we had at that point was when it crashed.
MR. HAMILTON: I see. You didn't know beforehand about that airplane.
MR. MINETA: I did not.
MR. HAMILTON: And so there was no specific order there to shoot that plane down.
MR. MINETA: No, sir.
Based on the conversation that he overheard between the young man and Cheney, Mineta clearly explained that there were no orders to shoot down United 93 and that “the orders” referred to AA 77. Mineta explained that the first time they heard of United 93, it had already crashed. Mineta makes no mention or reference to the fact that they were tracking and attempting to shoot down United 93 after it already crashed, or that they almost shot down a medevac helicopter.