NORAD Tapes

[Reheat]

Gumboot, I'm not familiar with current practices regarding Scrambles. You have said that the SD (Major Fox) talked directly to the Fighters for the Scramble. Since that is done via UHF which is line of sight, how does he do that? Do they have relays now? In years past the Scramble information was passed to a Duty Officer at the unit who then passed the info to the Fighters. Of course, as soon as they know there is a Scramble order coming in the pilots are notified and begin their response. They either go to the aircraft and get the info while taxiing or if in the cockpit they get a go light and start engines or engine and get the Scramble info while taxiing again. The point is they don't wait for the full Scramble message before acting.

The first time they talked to the Region was after airborne and commencing the Intercept after hand off from the ATC unit, of course. Has that changed?

 

[gumboot]

You, of course, are correct about the Operation and Exercise. However, I need a clarification. I understood that some of the tapes are from Cheyenne Mountain, is that true or not? Are they ONLY from NEADS?

To be honest I don't know. The labeling on the files is not obvious to those not in the know. Some are pretty clear - the ones saying MCC being relating to the Mission Crew Commander and the ones with ID being the ID Techs, but perhaps someone had provide names for all of the tracks?

MCC Op - Mission Crew Commander
MCC TK - Mission Crew Commander
TT Op (x2) - (Tactical Trackers?)
TT TK (x3) - (Tactical Trackers?)
ACWO TK
AST Op
AST TK
SD2 Op
SD2 TK
AICC
Emerg-AICC
ID Op - ID Techs
ID TK - ID Techs
ID2 Op - ID Techs
ID2 TK - ID Techs

Not sure what "Ops" and "TK" refers to - perhaps communications to the Ops Floor and communications to outside the Ops floor.

So anyone want to take a stab? I'm guessing somewhere in there we'll have outside phonelines, such as to Boston ARTCC as well as comms in the Battle Cab and of course the Weapons Team (led by Major "Foxy" Fox). Anyone familiar with the abbreviations may be able to shed some light.

Once I have all 18 tracks downloaded I might see if I can match them all up in sound editing software to make a single approx 6hr recording.

-Gumboot

 

[gumboot]

Gumboot, I'm not familiar with current practices regarding Scrambles. You have said that the SD (Major Fox) talked directly to the Fighters for the Scramble. Since that is done via UHF which is line of sight, how does he do that? Do they have relays now? In years past the Scramble information was passed to a Duty Officer at the unit who then passed the info to the Fighters. Of course, as soon as they know there is a Scramble order coming in the pilots are notified and begin their response. They either go to the aircraft and get the info while taxiing or if in the cockpit they get a go light and start engines or engine and get the Scramble info while taxiing again. The point is they don't wait for the full Scramble message before acting.

The first time they talked to the Region was after airborne and commencing the Intercept after hand off from the ATC unit, of course. Has that changed?

The actual scramble orders would be issued to the Duty Officer at the base, not to the pilots themselves. A-Train wanted to know, through their flight, who was in control of the pilots. I explained that NEADS were. In the NORAD tapes the pilots can be heard numerous times communicating directly with Major Fox. This is not to say that NEADS staff personally told them to take off - the pilots are scrambled by the light on the alert barn turning from red to green, which in turn is done by staff at the base.

The stuff we have so far from the Vanity Fair article suggests the pilots dialed in to communicate with NEADS once approaching the Z-point:

9:34:12
NAVY A.T.C.: You’ve got [the fighters] moving east in airspace. Now you want ‘em to go to Baltimore?
HUCKABONE: Yes, sir. We’re not gonna take ‘em in Whiskey 386 [military training airspace over the ocean].
NAVY A.T.C.: O.K., once he goes to Baltimore, what are we supposed to do?
HUCKABONE: Have him contact us on auxiliary frequency 2-3-4 decimal 6. Instead of taking handoffs to us and us handing ‘em back, just tell Center they’ve got to go to Baltimore.
NAVY A.T.C.: All right, man. Stand by. We’ll get back to you.
CITINO: What do you mean, “We’ll get back to you”? Just do it!
HUCKABONE: I’m gonna choke that guy!
CITINO: Be very professional, Huck.
HUCKABONE: O.K.
CITINO: All right, Huck. Let’s get our act together here.

-Gumboot

 

[Dumb All Over]

At one point, there is much confusion about a plane coming from Canada. They believed it was another hijacked plane and said it was heading for Washington. Later, they figured this information was false.

 

[gumboot]

At one point, there is much confusion about a plane coming from Canada. They believed it was another hijacked plane and said it was heading for Washington. Later, they figured this information was false.

The day was full of false alarms. IIRC there were eleven hijacking reports fielded to NEADS in the first 90 minutes of the attack.

-Gumboot

 

[Reheat]

To be honest I don't know. The labeling on the files is not obvious to those not in the know. Some are pretty clear - the ones saying MCC being relating to the Mission Crew Commander and the ones with ID being the ID Techs, but perhaps someone had provide names for all of the tracks?

MCC Op - Mission Crew Commander
MCC TK - Mission Crew Commander
TT Op (x2) - (Tactical Trackers?)
TT TK (x3) - (Tactical Trackers?)
ACWO TK
AST Op
AST TK
SD2 Op
SD2 TK
AICC
Emerg-AICC
ID Op - ID Techs
ID TK - ID Techs
ID2 Op - ID Techs
ID2 TK - ID Techs

Not sure what "Ops" and "TK" refers to - perhaps communications to the Ops Floor and communications to outside the Ops floor.

So anyone want to take a stab? I'm guessing somewhere in there we'll have outside phonelines, such as to Boston ARTCC as well as comms in the Battle Cab and of course the Weapons Team (led by Major "Foxy" Fox). Anyone familiar with the abbreviations may be able to shed some light.

Once I have all 18 tracks downloaded I might see if I can match them all up in sound editing software to make a single approx 6hr recording.

-Gumboot

Those are references to Communication POSITIONS not people. I can only guess at a few that you haven't guessed already.... Some of those would be referring to Telephone lines and others to UHF or VHF Radio lines. I'll look at it some more and add later if the light bulb works........

ACWO - AirCraft Weapons Officer?
SD - Senior Director
AICC - Air Intercept Control Console?

That's all for now. I am familiar with the system in which only Officers (not Enlisted) controlled the fighters. However, the only Officers who seem to be in the area are Maj Nasypany and Maj Fox with Col Marr in the Battle Cab.

Apparently, the Guard operates differently than the active USAF did which doesn't surprise me at all.

 

[Dumb All Over]

Can anybody tell me what the terms "Huntress" and "Giant Killer" refer to?

 

[Reheat]

The actual scramble orders would be issued to the Duty Officer at the base, not to the pilots themselves.

Yes, that checks with what I thought.

A-Train wanted to know, through their flight, who was in control of the pilots. I explained that NEADS were. In the NORAD tapes the pilots can be heard numerous times communicating directly with Major Fox. This is not to say that NEADS staff personally told them to take off - the pilots are scrambled by the light on the alert barn turning from red to green, which in turn is done by staff at the base.

Yes, I agree. They do have more than one radio, but wouldn't always be within range of communicating with NEADS (at lower altitude, for example). There are UHF relays along the coast, but they are not always within direct communications range of those except at a higher altitude.

Of course, NEADS is in control of the Fighters, but that may be done indirectly via the ATC facility controlling the affected airspace. We must keep in mind that the ATC facility MUST deconflict the Fighters with other traffic until they can clear the sky for them (if needed).

The stuff we have so far from the Vanity Fair article suggests the pilots dialed in to communicate with NEADS once approaching the Z-point:

That is going to vary depending entirely on the circumstances. If the route is clear with no conflicting traffic the ATC facility could turn the Fighters over to NEADS at any time they felt it was safe to do so. The reverse is true also, if the situation is URGENT, NEADS could take control at any time and everyone ducks and hopes the "big sky" theory works.

Also, remember that this situation was very different than any previous one. The Fighters normally intercept traffic over the Atlantic (where there is little or no traffic) and not over the land mass of the US. On 9/11 everyone (ATC and NORAD) were just handling it as it unfolded. I think they did a commendable job.

 

[Reheat]

Can anybody tell me what the terms "Huntress" and "Giant Killer" refer to?

Huntress was NEADS. Giant Killer was the Navy ATC facility controlling the area over the Atlantic. That entire area up and down the coast has numerous Warning Areas and MOA's all owned by the Navy.

 

[Reheat]

The day was full of false alarms. IIRC there were eleven hijacking reports fielded to NEADS in the first 90 minutes of the attack.

-Gumboot

It's important to note that THOSE WERE NOT DUE TO FALSE TRACKS ON NEADS RADAR, they were coming from the FAA.

 

[Calcas]

This thread is a goldmine of information.

The relevant parts should turn into a sticky when all is said and done.

 

[gumboot]

Yes, that checks with what I thought.



Yes, I agree. They do have more than one radio, but wouldn't always be within range of communicating with NEADS (at lower altitude, for example). There are UHF relays along the coast, but they are not always within direct communications range of those except at a higher altitude.

Of course, NEADS is in control of the Fighters, but that may be done indirectly via the ATC facility controlling the affected airspace. We must keep in mind that the ATC facility MUST deconflict the Fighters with other traffic until they can clear the sky for them (if needed).



That is going to vary depending entirely on the circumstances. If the route is clear with no conflicting traffic the ATC facility could turn the Fighters over to NEADS at any time they felt it was safe to do so. The reverse is true also, if the situation is URGENT, NEADS could take control at any time and everyone ducks and hopes the "big sky" theory works.

Also, remember that this situation was very different than any previous one. The Fighters normally intercept traffic over the Atlantic (where there is little or no traffic) and not over the land mass of the US. On 9/11 everyone (ATC and NORAD) were just handling it as it unfolded. I think they did a commendable job.

Quite right. The distiction CTers like A-Train can't seem to grasp is the difference between who controls the fighters and who controls the airspace. Except in military areas, the airspace itself is controlled by the FAA, but the actual fighters are controlled by NEADS. Of course that can cause conflict, such as when NEADS send the Otis fighters north of New York but the FAA refused them entry into NY Airspace due to fear of a collision with airliners. Of course at that time AA11 had hit, and NEADS didn't know about UA175.

Later, with the Langley fighters NEADS put a bit more pressure on the FAA to clear the fighters through to Washington DC ASAP.

The main point is, until NORAD implemented SCATANA later in the day, it was always going to be a bit of push and shove between NEADS and the FAA as far as allocating airspace already packed with airliners to the fighters.

Frankly, given the four erratic hijack flights, the grounding of all traffic, and the fighters from both NORAD and independent airfields (like Andrews AFB) it's a miracle there were no mid-air collisions that day.

-Gumboot

 

[gumboot]

It's important to note that THOSE WERE NOT DUE TO FALSE TRACKS ON NEADS RADAR, they were coming from the FAA.

Absolutely. It's a demonstration of how chaotic and confusing such a situation is. Suddenly every communication drop out, wrong transponder code, or unscheduled change of heading (things which no doubt happened dozens of times every day due to technical gliches and what have you) became a potential suicide weapon.

Add to that the ever increasing information lag and the gradual overload of the system, like a snowball growing in size, and you appreciate how difficult the task was for both the FAA and NORAD.

-Gumboot

 

[Reheat]

Frankly, given the four erratic hijack flights, the grounding of all traffic, and the fighters from both NORAD and independent airfields (like Andrews AFB) it's a miracle there were no mid-air collisions that day.

-Gumboot

Absolutely agree. It is amazing that all of those Airline Flights recovered so quickly without incident. Heck, the Fighters are accustomed to looking outside for traffic, but Airline pilots are not. Once the sky was clear the Fighters didn't really need the FAA anymore as they can deconflict themselves.

The clear skies and quiet comm traffic was a blessing I'm sure, but I suspect there were a lot of bruised hands from banging on canopy rails (perhaps even a few tears) once they realize what had happened and that they were unable to stop it.

 

[LashL]

This thread is a goldmine of information.

It sure is. Many thanks to all of you who have shared your insight, knowledge and expertise.

And I join others in also saying thanks to Dylan for his role in obtaining the data and sharing it on the internet.

 

[Gravy]

By the way, a book is due out in 2008 about air defense and airline issues on 9/11. The author is Lynn Spencer, an airline pilot. She's done extensive interviews with people involved. Should be a fascinating read. http://www.cleartheskies.com/index.html

 

[Cheap Shot]

Frankly, given the four erratic hijack flights, the grounding of all traffic, and the fighters from both NORAD and independent airfields (like Andrews AFB) it's a miracle there were no mid-air collisions that day.-Gumboot

Thats what makes this one of the worst days in avaition history, and also one of the best. Give credit to the military and ATC that day, and to our brothers to the North.

Also if you have any questions ATC wise you need answered regarding these tapes feel free to ask, and I'll see if I can help.

 

[A-Train]

The actual scramble orders would be issued to the Duty Officer at the base, not to the pilots themselves. A-Train wanted to know, through their flight, who was in control of the pilots. I explained that NEADS were. In the NORAD tapes the pilots can be heard numerous times communicating directly with Major Fox. This is not to say that NEADS staff personally told them to take off - the pilots are scrambled by the light on the alert barn turning from red to green, which in turn is done by staff at the base.

You're correct. In the Vanity Fair piece you can hear Fox talking to the fighters-- but that is after 10:00AM, well after questionable time frame when the Langley jets could have intercepted AAL77 but were instead directed east over the Atlantic.

The crux of my question is who was talking to the fighters when they were out over the Atlantic, and who directed them there. It is clear that at that moment, a Navy controller was talking to them, but NEADS wasn't. The "I'm gonna choke that guy" conversation with Huckabone demonstrates that:

Along with Master Sergeant Steve Citino, another controller who is sitting next to him, Huckabone orders a Navy air traffic controller who is handling the fighters to get them turned around. The Navy controller appears not to understand the urgency of the situation. He responds, “You’ve got [the fighters] moving east in airspace. Now you want ‘em to go to Baltimore?” Huckabone replies yes, and says, “Have him contact us on auxiliary frequency 2-3-4 decimal 6. Instead of taking handoffs to us and us handing ‘em back, just tell Center they’ve got to go to Baltimore.” The Navy controller says, “Stand by. We’ll get back to you.” Citino retorts, “What do you mean, ‘We’ll get back to you’? Just do it!” Huckabone jokes, “I’m gonna choke that guy!”

The Navy controller clearly is talking to the fighters, but he believes it is NEADS who have sent them out east. NEADS is not talking to the fighters, that's why Huckabone gives them the freq to contact them.

My understanding is that fighters are always talking on two channels: one to talk to the controller-- civilian or military-- who controls the airspace they're in; and the other to talk to their military commanders. Why weren't the Langley pilots talking to NEADS from the get go?

This is not a hostile question. I just want to know if there is a capability for NEADS to talk to the fighters while they are on the ground.

 

[A-Train]

Quite right. The distiction CTers like A-Train can't seem to grasp is the difference between who controls the fighters and who controls the airspace.

I understand the distinction quite well. What you don't understand is that fighters pursuing a suspect craft will always have total priority over any number of civilian aircraft. No controller will ever refuse airspace to a fighter in that situation. The usual requirement for 5 miles and a thousand feet will be thrown out the window, and controller will settle for "green between," meaning separation of about a mile or so. A controller would not be punished for a separation error in such an emergency situation; but if he refused clearance to scrambling fighter, he'd be in very deep doo-doo.

This is especially true on a VFR day like Sept. 11, 2001.

I think Reheat even agrees with me on this one:

"The reverse is true also, if the situation is URGENT, NEADS could take control at any time and everyone ducks and hopes the "big sky" theory works." -Reheat

-----------------------------

Except in military areas, the airspace itself is controlled by the FAA, but the actual fighters are controlled by NEADS. Of course that can cause conflict, such as when NEADS send the Otis fighters north of New York but the FAA refused them entry into NY Airspace due to fear of a collision with airliners. Of course at that time AA11 had hit, and NEADS didn't know about UA175.

As I said above, it is unthinkable that the FAA would refuse entry to scrambling fighter in pursuit of a suspect craft. What probably happened is that after the second crash, there were no more hijacked planes near NYC. The fighters probably requested to "cap" the NYC area, to orbit and patrol the airspace. The FAA refused due to traffic. This is a whole different ball of wax than fighters pursuing a suspect craft.

The main point is, until NORAD implemented SCATANA later in the day, it was always going to be a bit of push and shove between NEADS and the FAA as far as allocating airspace already packed with airliners to the fighters.

Nonsense. No push and shove. If the fighters want airspace, they get whatever they want immediately. They have total priority if they want it. It's a big sky out there, and fighter pilots are skilled enough to easily evade any number of slow moving airliners.

 

[Reheat]

I just want to know if there is a capability for NEADS to talk to the fighters while they are on the ground.

No, not directly.