Non-Religious Argument Against Abortion

[quixotecoyote]

Did you just necro this thread by reposting the OP as if the entire conversation hadn't happened? What's wrong with you?

That's hilarious! We get dishonest argument recycling all the time, but this is the first time I've seen anyone try to slip the whole unedited OP back in. It's like the perfect mix of dishonest and stupidity.

 

[Mister Agenda]

What makes it wrong to kill me is I don't want to be killed. You don't want to be killed either, and both of us have friends and relatives we don't want killed, so in the interest of not getting killed and not losing loved ones any sooner than we have to, we have agreed not to kill each other. Usually. You start killing people all willy-nilly it endangers the 'lets not kill each other' status quo, and THAT is morally wrong. If you do that, we might have to kill you. Certain exceptions apply (in war, for instance), mainly because our power structure would be threatened by enforcing them. We WANT to have war as an option, just in case we really need it or it becomes convenient, so we can't very well forbid killing the enemy, can we?

 

[IMST]

Did you just necro this thread by reposting the OP as if the entire conversation hadn't happened? What's wrong with you?

Perhaps we are meant to simply redo the thread from the beginning. Is everyone still around?

 

[Sun Countess]

Well, I wasn't around at the beginning of this thread, but I was a fetus at some point, and I don't remember ever fearing death or the loss of future experiences. Is this arguer really equating a fetus's desires and fears to those of an actual human being?

The really tricky question: Which does a fetus fear more, death or speaking in public?

 

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Restatement:

Non-Religious Argument Against Abortion
From, Marquis, Don (April 1989). "Why Abortion is Immoral". The Journal of Philosophy 86 (4): 183-202.
[...]



The Considered Judgment Argument:
[...]

4. The fetus is equally capable of sustaining a loss of future experience.
5. Therefore, death is an equally grave misfortune for the fetus.
6. It is wrong to deliberately inflict a misfortune on a fetus that is as grave as death to people.
7. Therefore, it is wrong to deliberately inflict death on the fetus.

A foetus may cease to be alive without dying, without having a life to lose, without suffering death.

Think of an amputated finger. What loss of future experience can it intelligibly be said to have sustained?

Marquis owes us an argument here.

1. What makes murder the worst of crimes is that it deprives a person of her future experience.
2. If 1, then it is the worst of wrongs to deprive a being capable of future experience of all her future experience.
3. Therefore, it is the worst of wrongs to deprive a being capable of future experience of all her future experience.
4. A fetus is capable of future experience.
5. Therefore, it is the worst of wrongs to deprive a fetus of all her future experience.

Marquis still owes us an argument.

Accordingly, Marquis subscribes to the Future Like Ours Thesis (or FLO for short):

FLO: Killing a human is wrong because it deprives her of “a future like ours.”

And there is the Question getting a real Begging...

 

[Stone Island]

Well, I wasn't around at the beginning of this thread, but I was a fetus at some point, and I don't remember ever fearing death or the loss of future experiences. Is this arguer really equating a fetus's desires and fears to those of an actual human being?

The really tricky question: Which does a fetus fear more, death or speaking in public?

The argument does not rest on a fetus' desires. Indeed, a fetus is not a person, and thus incapable of desire.

Marquis's argument is not an argument from potential. The argument from potential is that since we have rights, and a fetus is potentially like us, we should treat the fetus as having rights. Marquis agrees that that argument fails.

Marquis's argument is not an argument that the fetus is a person, either. Marquis agrees that a fetus is not a person. There are probably non-human animals which meet the characteristics of a person more fully than any fetus.

What Marquis is arguing is that both a fetus, which is not a person, and a person both have the same attribute: that if they were destroyed they would lose the value of their future experiences. Here's the tricky bit: a fetus' and a person's future experiences are both equally potential.

What's that? Let's say it again: your future experiences, my future experiences, Jame Randi's future experiences, and a fetus' future experiences are all equally potential. Chew on that for a bit.

The argument does rest on the assumption that we all agree that taking away our future experiences is a grave harm. Note: there are some people for whom losing their future experiences is not a grave harm. For example, those people may have Stave IV cancer which is causing them a great deal of pain and suffering for which there is no effective treatment. Their future experiences are likely to involve a great deal of suffering. To lose them would not be a grave harm.

If you're going to respond to the argument, please make sure you're responding to the argument.

 

[Sun Countess]

I'm responding to the argument that you posted:

1. According to our considered judgments, what people fear the most about death is the loss of future experience.
2. If 1, then, according to our considered judgments, it is the loss of future experience that fully constitutes death as a grave misfortune to people.
3. Therefore, according to our considered judgments, it is the loss of future experience that fully constitutes death as a grave misfortune to people.
4. The fetus is equally capable of sustaining a loss of future experience.
5. Therefore, death is an equally grave misfortune for the fetus.
6. It is wrong to deliberately inflict a misfortune on a fetus that is as grave as death to people.
7. Therefore, it is wrong to deliberately inflict death on the fetus.

I've bolded the parts where the author of the argument notes that people fear death because of the loss of future experience. If a fetus is not a person, then does the fetus fear death and the loss of future experience? No.

The fetus may be equally capable of sustaining a loss of future experience, but because the fetus has no knowledge, no awareness whatsoever of what life and future experiences are in store for it, how does that "death" equate to the death of an actual person?

If the fetus does not equate to a person, then steps 4 and 5 don't hold any water. Replace "fetus" with "cow" or "chicken" and it's obvious that the argument doesn't hold. If cows and chickens are also not people, then their loss of future experience does not equal to a person's loss of future experience. (And yes, I'm aware there are a few animal rights activists who would argue that the death of a chicken is equal to the death of a human, but that's an argument for another day.)

 

[Stone Island]

The fetus may be equally capable of sustaining a loss of future experience, but because the fetus has no knowledge, no awareness whatsoever of what life and future experiences are in store for it, how does that "death" equate to the death of an actual person?

If the fetus does not equate to a person, then steps 4 and 5 don't hold any water. Replace "fetus" with "cow" or "chicken" and it's obvious that the argument doesn't hold. If cows and chickens are also not people, then their loss of future experience does not equal to a person's loss of future experience. (And yes, I'm aware there are a few animal rights activists who would argue that the death of a chicken is equal to the death of a human, but that's an argument for another day.)

It's the attribute "future like ours" which is what makes killing a fetus a grave harm. If both a fetus and a person have a similar attribute, then it follows they must be treated similarly with regards to that attribute absent some other, relevant consideration.

Marquis would argue that a chicken or a cow do not have futures like ours. They lack the attribute FLO. However, there may be some non-human animals which do have the attribute FLO. It may also be shown that cows and chickens do have a FLO. Killing them, or any other non-human animal with a FLO, would then be doing a grave harm.

 

[Sun Countess]

Then why does Marquis start his argument with "fear of loss of future experiences" which implies an awareness of what may now never be experienced by people facing death? The fetus hasn't developed a sense of fear or awareness, so the argument never gets off the ground. It all hinges on the fear of loss, and that's something the fetus does not ever experience, even if its future could be just like ours. He just throws step 4 out there, like we weren't supposed to notice that he just equated a fetus to a human being. The "grave harm" is not equal because the grave harm is fear and awareness of loss, and not the actual death itself.

 

[Stone Island]

Then why does Marquis start his argument with "fear of loss of future experiences" which implies an awareness of what may now never be experienced by people facing death? The fetus hasn't developed a sense of fear or awareness, so the argument never gets off the ground. It all hinges on the fear of loss, and that's something the fetus does not ever experience, even if its future could be just like ours. He just throws step 4 out there, like we weren't supposed to notice that he just equated a fetus to a human being. The "grave harm" is not equal because the grave harm is fear and awareness of loss, and not the actual death itself.

Please tell me where Marquis makes the argument that it's the fetus' fear that is operative. I'll give you a hint: you're mistaken. The grave harm is a loss of a future like ours.

Our fear, according to our considered judgment, is what tells us that loss of a FLO is a grave harm. If it is a grave harm for us to lose our future experiences, then it is a grave harm for any thing that has future experiences like ours to lose its future experiences, whether it knows this or not.

I could be struck dead by an aneurysm at any moment. I wouldn't fear dying from an aneurysm as the odds of my suffering such a fate are quite low. I would probably be dead before I had any conscious recognition of the process of dying. We would still say that I suffered a great harm because of my loss of future experiences (even if I didn't know I had lost anything because I died so quickly).

I don't think that people who write articles for peer reviewed journals like the Journal of Philosophy just throw things in there as if we aren't supposed to notice. Please argue against the argument, not against Marquis' motives.

 

[Bob Klase]

http://home.myuw.net/himma/phil241/trans7-1.htm
The misfortune of premature death involves a loss of the goods that make life worth living. On Marquis view, “the misfortune of premature death consists of the loss to us of the future goods of consciousness. What are these goods? … The goods of life are whatever we get out of life. The goods of life are those items toward which we take a pro attitude. They are completed projects of which we are proud, the pursuit of our goals, aesthetic enjoyments, friendships, intellectual pursuits, and physical pleasures of various sorts. The goods of life are what make life worth living” (190).

Accordingly, Marquis subscribes to the Future Like Ours Thesis (or FLO for short):

FLO: Killing a human is wrong because it deprives her of “a future like ours.”

Sounds like a good argument to outlaw masturbation and pass laws requiring women to become pregnant every time they ovulate.

 

[Sun Countess]

Marquis doesn't say that it's fetus's fear that is operative. He starts with a person's fear as being operative, then goes on to essentially equate a fetus to a person because they can both suffer the same loss, and ignores the fact that the fetus doesn't see the loss of future experience as an actual loss, because the fetus cannot see anything or fear anything.

Our fear, according to our considered judgment, is what tells us that loss of a FLO is a grave harm. If it is a grave harm for us to lose our future experiences, then it is a grave harm for any thing that has future experiences like ours to lose its future experiences, whether it knows this or not.

I strongly disagree. If a thing doesn't know that it has future experiences to lose, then it doesn't experience the same harm by losing them. We may feel bad for all those poor embryos that never get a chance at life, but the zygote/embryo/fetus does not feel bad.

If I knew that I were going to die in the next year, I'd feel bad that I never got to Paris, or that I never got to hold a grandchild, or whatever, and other people who know me may experience those same feelings of "such a tragedy to die so young, she never got to...." whatever else at my demise. But do I feel bad that fully half of the embryos ever created never got to go to prom or see a sunset? Maybe some people do, but I certainly don't and Marquis's arguments don't convince me in the least. He insists on equating a fetus with a person, by saying that they could have a FLO, but I can't meet him at his starting point.

It's like a theist feeling bad for me because I'm losing out on a future like hers (heaven, angels, eternal life, whathaveyou), and not understanding that I don't see it as a loss at all. The concept of eternal life is not "real" to me (and at least I can understand it in the abstract sense!), and I'm not looking forward to a future like hers. In the same way, a human life/future is not "real" to an unborn fetus. The resultant losses do not equate.

 

[Stone Island]

Sounds like a good argument to outlaw masturbation and pass laws requiring women to become pregnant every time they ovulate.

H. Scott Brill writes,

Marquis, at the end of "Why Abortion Is Immoral," addresses the objection that his argument entails the absurd claim that using contraception is as immoral as killing an adult human, since ova and sperm, like adults, have valuable futures, and contraception deprives them of these futures. The idea here is that the (would-be fertilized) ovum and (would-be fertilizing) sperm separately have a future like ours, which means that contraception actually deprives two beings of a future like ours. In response, Marquis complains: "On this alternative, too many futures are lost. Contraception was supposed to be wrong, because it deprived us of one future of value, not two." (14)

Reading between the lines of this somewhat cryptic response, we get the following argument. Consider these three beings: the (would-be fertilized) ovum, the (would-be fertilizing) sperm, and a future being having valuable experiences like ours. According to the law of transitivity, (15) if the ovum can be identified with the future being and the sperm can be identified with this same future being, then the ovum and sperm are one and the same being. But the ovum and sperm clearly are distinct beings. Therefore, the pre-fertilized ovum and pre-fertilizing sperm cannot be identified with one and the same future being having experiences like ours. Thus contraception does not deprive the ovum and sperm separately of a future like ours. (16) (Marquis adds that since identifying just one of them with this future person would be arbitrary, it follows that neither ovum nor sperm can be identified with the future being.)

 

[Stone Island]

Marquis doesn't say that it's fetus's fear that is operative. He starts with a person's fear as being operative, then goes on to essentially equate a fetus to a person because they can both suffer the same loss, and ignores the fact that the fetus doesn't see the loss of future experience as an actual loss, because the fetus cannot see anything or fear anything.


I strongly disagree. If a thing doesn't know that it has future experiences to lose, then it doesn't experience the same harm by losing them. We may feel bad for all those poor embryos that never get a chance at life, but the zygote/embryo/fetus does not feel bad.

If I knew that I were going to die in the next year, I'd feel bad that I never got to Paris, or that I never got to hold a grandchild, or whatever, and other people who know me may experience those same feelings of "such a tragedy to die so young, she never got to...." whatever else at my demise. But do I feel bad that fully half of the embryos ever created never got to go to prom or see a sunset? Maybe some people do, but I certainly don't and Marquis's arguments don't convince me in the least. He insists on equating a fetus with a person, by saying that they could have a FLO, but I can't meet him at his starting point.

It's like a theist feeling bad for me because I'm losing out on a future like hers (heaven, angels, eternal life, whathaveyou), and not understanding that I don't see it as a loss at all. The concept of eternal life is not "real" to me (and at least I can understand it in the abstract sense!), and I'm not looking forward to a future like hers. In the same way, a human life/future is not "real" to an unborn fetus. The resultant losses do not equate.

Marquis argues that a fetus has a FLO. You seem to agree with this.

Marquis argues that it is a great harm to lose a FLO. The greatest harm of killing (unlawful or otherwise) seems to be the loss of a FLO. Any justification of killing has to be made in the face of a loss of a FLO. You seem to agree with this.

Marquis doesn't equate a fetus with a person. He admits that a fetus is not a person. However, a fetus and a person share a similar characteristic: a FLO.

If it is wrong to take away a person's FLO, why isn't it wrong to take aways a fetus's FLO?

 

[Piero]

Marquis's argument is interesting, but ultimately rubbish. I don't fear death because I'll be deprived of future experience; I fear death because I'm a mammal. When an earthquake strikes (as they so often do in my neck of the woods) I certainly fear for my life, but I have no time to think about my holiday trip to Bahamas. We just have a survival instinct that makes us fear death.

Any useful theory of morals should start from ascertainable facts, not from metaphysical constructs. Arguing that abortion is wrong because it deprives the foetus of a future is nonsense. The foetus is certainly unaware of having a future, and everybody else can talk about the foetus's future, but in fact they are talking about something they know noyhing about.

The only thing that matters is whether the foetus can suffer now. If it can, it is wrong to make it suffer. If it can't, what's the problem?

 

[Sun Countess]

Marquis argues that it is a great harm to lose a FLO. The greatest harm of killing (unlawful or otherwise) seems to be the loss of a FLO. Any justification of killing has to be made in the face of a loss of a FLO. You seem to agree with this.

No, I don't agree with that. Even if I take Marquis's claim that the loss of future experiences is the gravest harm or the greatest fear of death, I don't agree that the fetus losing its "future like ours" is the same as a sentient person losing a "future like ours." I have plans; a fetus does not.

If it is wrong to take away a person's FLO, why isn't it wrong to take aways a fetus's FLO?

Sentience. I'm aware I'm losing future experiences, and the fetus is not.

 

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Marquis doesn't equate a fetus with a person. He admits that a fetus is not a person.

Well, that would be a handsome concession if it were adhered to. But it isn't:

Marquis argues that it is a great harm to lose a FLO. The greatest harm of killing (unlawful or otherwise) seems to be the loss of a FLO.

Harm, in the morally relevant sense, has to be harm to someone. If a foetus becomes a person, it had a FLO. If it doesn't, it didn't.

And only what has a life of its own ( as opposed to being alive) can intelligibly be said to have been killed.

 

[Stone Island]

Any useful theory of morals should start from ascertainable facts, not from metaphysical constructs. Arguing that abortion is wrong because it deprives the foetus of a future is nonsense. The foetus is certainly unaware of having a future, and everybody else can talk about the foetus's future, but in fact they are talking about something they know noyhing about.

Ascertainable fact: according to our considered judgement the harm of death is a loss of future experience. At the moment of death we might not be considering our future, but that doesn't mean that in our considered judgment we cannot ascertain what the actual harm is.

Ascertainable fact: a fetus has a characteristic in common with persons. That characteristic is a future like ours.

Harm, in the morally relevant sense, has to be harm to someone. If a foetus becomes a person, it had a FLO. If it doesn't, it didn't.

Oh, really. A fetus, not a person, has a characteristic in common with persons, a future like ours.

No, I don't agree with that. Even if I take Marquis's claim that the loss of future experiences is the gravest harm or the greatest fear of death, I don't agree that the fetus losing its "future like ours" is the same as a sentient person losing a "future like ours." I have plans; a fetus does not.

Sentience. I'm aware I'm losing future experiences, and the fetus is not.

Sentience has nothing to do with it. Marquis doesn't make use of it. You're reading it into his argument.

I wish someone would actually read both arguments.

 

[Sun Countess]

Sentience has nothing to do with it. Marquis doesn't make use of it. You're reading it into his argument.

No. I'm not reading into his argument; I've been noting its glaring absence from his argument. The biggest flaw of his entire argument is how he won't admit that a fetus and a person are not the same, and do not experience the loss of a future in the same manner.

Ascertainable fact: according to our considered judgement the harm of death is a loss of future experience.

That's really more of an opinion than a fact. Not everybody picked that option in the poll, after all. And I'm certain that they didn't poll any fetuses when they asked what they feared most about death. They probably didn't even ask the people what they thought was the greatest harm of death when it came to fetuses. It was asking people what people fear. It has nothing to do with fetuses, and fetuses and people are not the same.

It may be a non-religious argument against abortion, but it's not a very good one, IMO.

 

[Piero]

Ascertainable fact: according to our considered judgement the harm of death is a loss of future experience. At the moment of death we might not be considering our future, but that doesn't mean that in our considered judgment we cannot ascertain what the actual harm is.

Ascertainable fact: a fetus has a characteristic in common with persons. That characteristic is a future like ours.

Nope. The precise opposite of an ascertainable fact is a fact that hasn't yet occurred. We don't have a future; how could we possibly have something that does not yet exist? What we do have is hopes, i.e. a mental representation of a desirable future state. Since our future is not here yet, we cannot mourn its loss now. When we die, we don't suffer for the loss of our future: we suffer for the loss of our present hopes. A foetus has no hopes, hence cannot be hurt by losing them.

As Sun Countess put it, "it may be a non-religious argument against abortion, but it's not a very good one."