"New" book on Pearl Harbor, attack analysis.

SpitfireIX said:
Done with finals (whew!). I went to the public library yesterday. The good news is, they have the book. The bad news is, it's part of the genealogy collection, which means it's non-circulating. :( Don't ask me what it has to do with genealogy; we have one of the largest genealogy collections in the country, but there are some strange items in it, including Naval Radar by Norman Friedman. :confused: So I'll have to wait until I have a free Saturday to go downtown and read it.
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Just xerox the last three chapters and take them home.
 
I considered trying to read the last three chapters yesterday, but I was there to do some genealogical research, and I was a bit rushed. I'll see how much time I have next time I go.
 
Craig B said:
As I have pointed out before, reasoning of this kind makes no sense. Suppose the IJN destroys the US Pacific Fleet down to the last bosun's whistle: Then the USA builds another one!
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The idea was that, while the U.S. is rebuilding its fleet, Japan is fortifying its possessions. Sufficiently fortified, they hoped, that they would make any subsequent U.S. assault too costly for the U.S. to sustain and thus 'bleed' the Americans to the bargaining table.

Whether such a plan had any realistic chance of succeeding is another matter.
 
Corsair 115 said:
The idea was that, while the U.S. is rebuilding its fleet, Japan is fortifying its possessions. Sufficiently fortified, they hoped, that they would make any subsequent U.S. assault too costly for the U.S. to sustain and thus 'bleed' the Americans to the bargaining table.

Whether such a plan had any realistic chance of succeeding is another matter.
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The Japanese weakness was in logistics. (And, perhaps, rationality.) They "fortified" islands on their new periphery but they didn't have the means to keep them supplied with food, fuel, ammo, and troops. They were essentially one shot affairs, and simply drained the Empire of things they would need to protect the Home Islands.

And, of course, there's the small matter of defending open ocean between the islands with a Navy that been designed and developed to operate close to Japan, making endurance irrelevant. Then they operated in such a manner as to put the location of the GAOB, or "decisive battle" if you will, 2,300 nautical miles from the coast of Honshu. They planned for one war for a decade or more. Then they fought a completely different one without changing their operational systems or providing a functional logistics system.
 
Corsair 115 said:
The idea was that, while the U.S. is rebuilding its fleet, Japan is fortifying its possessions. Sufficiently fortified, they hoped, that they would make any subsequent U.S. assault too costly for the U.S. to sustain and thus 'bleed' the Americans to the bargaining table.

Whether such a plan had any realistic chance of succeeding is another matter.
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Realistically, defensive strategies suck as a means of winning wars, or even of deterring attacks. Fixed defensive positions are only good if you can use them to project power from, or if they allow control of strategic locations - islands in the middle of a rather large ocean can be poor choices if you do not have the ability to base an effective striking force there to allow you to control surrounding sealanes and have the logistics to keep said base supplied. Essentially, a lot of the Pacific War can be seen as seige warfare - isolating the fortified area, cutting off supplies, then assaulting the breach.
 
Border Reiver said:
Realistically, defensive strategies suck as a means of winning wars, or even of deterring attacks. Fixed defensive positions are only good if you can use them to project power from, or if they allow control of strategic locations - islands in the middle of a rather large ocean can be poor choices if you do not have the ability to base an effective striking force there to allow you to control surrounding sealanes and have the logistics to keep said base supplied. Essentially, a lot of the Pacific War can be seen as seige warfare - isolating the fortified area, cutting off supplies, then assaulting the breach.
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The Japanese evidently didn't learn anything from the Maginot Line fiasco.
 
Gawdzilla said:
The Japanese evidently didn't learn anything from the Maginot Line fiasco.
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Siege warfare on land is probably not a good idea, although it sometimes works. But siege warfare at sea? That sounds nuts. Unless it means blockading a fleet in harbour as the Japanese did to the Russians at Port Arthur, and the Royal Navy to the German "High Seas" Fleet at Kiel. But the Japanese had no prospect of doing such a thing because they couldn't even reach the US Coast in strength, let alone bottle up a fleet there.
 
Craig B said:
Siege warfare on land is probably not a good idea, although it sometimes works. But siege warfare at sea? That sounds nuts. Unless it means blockading a fleet in harbour as the Japanese did to the Russians at Port Arthur, and the Royal Navy to the German "High Seas" Fleet at Kiel. But the Japanese had no prospect of doing such a thing because they couldn't even reach the US Coast in strength, let alone bottle up a fleet there.
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Yep. The samurai tradition of "one decisive stroke" wining the fight plays out badly at sea. One stroke, one man, one battle, and the war's is won. Or not. If "not" then things go badly.
 
Gawdzilla said:
The Japanese evidently didn't learn anything from the Maginot Line fiasco.
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Japanese WWII tactics are actually rather distressing for their odd simplicity - go for the strong point and eliminate it, or create a strongpoint and hold it. While the Japanese did make limited use of infiltration, seemingly the use of such tactics was to set things up for the attack on the strong point.
 
Border Reiver said:
Japanese WWII tactics are actually rather distressing for their odd simplicity - go for the strong point and eliminate it, or create a strongpoint and hold it. While the Japanese did make limited use of infiltration, seemingly the use of such tactics was to set things up for the attack on the strong point.
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The irony is stunning.
 
Gawdzilla said:
The Japanese evidently didn't learn anything from the Maginot Line fiasco.
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Wellll...:)
The Maginot Line (almost) worked as intended in that it pushed any German offensive north, into the low countries. What the CinC France failed to do was cover the gap opposite Luxembourg.

Indeed, had the Germans not changed their plan then it would have done exactly what it had been intended to do.
 
Tolls said:
Wellll...:)
The Maginot Line (almost) worked as intended in that it pushed any German offensive north, into the low countries. What the CinC France failed to do was cover the gap opposite Luxembourg.

Indeed, had the Germans not changed their plan then it would have done exactly what it had been intended to do.
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And that was to soak up a huge amount of large caliber Krupp-love. But in the end the Germans would have gotten through.
 
Tolls said:
The war warning was given some 2 weeks prior to the attack, so some attempt should have been made to move out of a peace-time mindset.
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That was probably on the agenda for next weeks staff meeting.:p


Just got the book on Kindle.
 
tsig said:
That was probably on the agenda for next weeks staff meeting.:p
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"Mistakes were made."

On a side note, it's often claimed that Kimmel didn't maintain the proper liaison with Gen. Short. This is wrong mainly because Kimmel was not Short's "opposite number", that would have been RADM. Bloch, Commandant 14th Naval District (COM14th.)
Just got the book on Kindle.
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Have fun.
 
Border Reiver said:
Realistically, defensive strategies suck as a means of winning wars, or even of deterring attacks.
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It wasn't about 'winning' the war in the grander sense of thoroughly defeating the enemy. It was about forcing a negotiated settlement in which the territorial gains would be accepted. Whether such a plan had any chance of succeeding, especially considering the degree to which the Pearl Harbor raid infuriated the American public, is another matter. (And it doesn't seem like it had much of a chance, particularly when considering the issues the huge lizard namesake guy pointed out. :D )
 
Gawdzilla said:
And that was to soak up a huge amount of large caliber Krupp-love. But in the end the Germans would have gotten through.
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The only frontal assault, prior to the breakout in the Ardennes, was an abject failure. And those after the breakout involved heavy casualties against defences that were in the process of being evacuated. Casualties that, had the Germans not found a copy of the orders for the French withdrawal, would have resulted in First Army calling off the offensive.

So, I'm not convinced. Besides, as I said, it did the job of pushing the German offensive north. So it succeeded in its purpose.

Sorry for the derail. Back to the other side of the world...:)
 
Tolls said:
The only frontal assault, prior to the breakout in the Ardennes, was an abject failure. And those after the breakout involved heavy casualties against defences that were in the process of being evacuated. Casualties that, had the Germans not found a copy of the orders for the French withdrawal, would have resulted in First Army calling off the offensive.

So, I'm not convinced. Besides, as I said, it did the job of pushing the German offensive north. So it succeeded in its purpose.

Sorry for the derail. Back to the other side of the world...:)
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The Germans broke into France south of the Maginot Line as well, IIRC.
 
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