Nazi military goals versus reality.

[Comrade Raptor]

Probably true. However, one could also say that it's a military truism that phrases such as 'all things being equal' or 'on equal terms' are pretty much meaningless, since the entire point of strategy is to set the terms such that they are as far from equal as humanly possible.

Here's a more interesting question: how would von Manstein have done as commander of a Soviet front in, say 1943?

You are correct that strategy is to set the terms that way, yes. Your second question more realistically refines the issue, where instead of creating a false equality as I have we instead put the general on the other side of the fence.

But in answer to your second question, I think Manstein's performance with less than adequate resources and less freedom of action (though this last could be grounds for debate, since Soviet commanders were also on a pretty short chain) would probably give him the edge.

But, it is also true that whatever the merits of a commander he is also at the mercy of the organization and constituency of his forces, factors not necessarily in his sphere of control. Even in 1943 communication within the Red Army was still not up to a wholly satisfactory standard, and this limitation also goes some length to explain why Soviet tactics lacked finesse; it was simply not feasible to engage in detailed, adaptive, complex maneuvers.

So taking this into consideration I will admit that I may be giving Manstein too much credit at the expense of Zhukov or other quality Soviet leaders. Strategy and tactics are, after all, governed by means. In the context of the objectives given to him and the resources provided, Zhukov's methods were probably the correct choice and he produced results.

 

[Doc Daneeka]

Thank you. That's very similar to my own view: that both were excellent generals who did remarkably well within the various limitations that their respective military organisations imposed. I'm not convinced that there's any way to make a good comparison. It's Superman vs. Batman, heh.

 

[Simon39759]

Superman would win.

But then, Captain America did slap Hitler in the face, a feat that always eluded Zhukov...

 

[MG1962]

The memoirs of Guderiand and Halder are quite interesting in this regard. It's fascinating to see them slowly realising how the USSR wasn't quite like France

William L. Shirer's Rise and Fall Of the Third Reich talks about this as well. The German planning division OKW were constantly revising the number of active units upwards, much to the consternation of the Generals and suprise to Hitler

A hypothesis: the obverse of the FUSAG ploy. Instead of creating a fictitious unit in order to confuse German SIGINT, they decided to hide some formations. I'd imagine that this would be much harder to pull off than the FUSAG method, but it's hard to say. Everything was so mixed up inside the city at that point that it might have made good sense to try it. Keep in mind that this was a country that went so far as to build secret prewar highways that weren't on the maps. It seems a reasonable idea to me.

You may well be right. It was during a documentary I saw, made up of interviews with veterans of the Soviet Army. My understanding was these men were never officially recognised, and the units never appeared in any official histories of the Soviet Army....sadly I guess it is now something we will never know

 

[MG1962]

This is more debatable that one might at first think. In terms of military technology it's not at all clear that Germany was superior, in a great many areas. The utter shock that German tankers found when first meeting Soviet designs comes to mind. Me-109 vs. Spitfire. Etc, etc etc.

Yes there has been an enduring myth about German weaponary. In some classes they were well ahead of anything else. The 88mm AA gun is a classic example.

However in terms of armour, the Germans had their backsides handed to them by the French a couple of times during the fall of France. The Soviet KV1 tank was more than capable of stopping anything the Germans could put in the field. In both instances it was tactics rather than equipment that carried the day

One area often overlooked was the very poor logistics showing the Germans had all through the war. In terms of battlefield management they were exceptional soldiers both with talent and courage. But without equipment they were as vunerable as anyone else.

The Germans were especially defective in anti tank guns, the little 38mm and 45mm guns quickly earned the nick name of the door knocker, because all they did against enemy tanks was give away their position by harmlessly tapping on the enemy armour with their shells

 

[shuize]

Well, since we're speaking in hypotheticals, I've always sort of wondered what might have happened had the Germans not wasted as much air power as they did during the Battle of Britain and had it to use during their invasion of the Soviet Union?

Or had they waited a bit longer to get more U-boats into the blockade of Britain. Didn't they go to war with something like 1/3 of the total their navy had planned?

 

[NoZed Avenger]

Well, since we're speaking in hypotheticals, I've always sort of wondered what might have happened had the Germans not wasted as much air power as they did during the Battle of Britain and had it to use during their invasion of the Soviet Union?

Or had they waited a bit longer to get more U-boats into the blockade of Britain. Didn't they go to war with something like 1/3 of the total their navy had planned?

Even worse, for the majority of the war, they weren't even cranking out U-Boats at anywhere near capacity, nor had they or the raider surface vessels recommended by the Navy been given priority.

 

[MG1962]

Well, since we're speaking in hypotheticals, I've always sort of wondered what might have happened had the Germans not wasted as much air power as they did during the Battle of Britain and had it to use during their invasion of the Soviet Union?

Or had they waited a bit longer to get more U-boats into the blockade of Britain. Didn't they go to war with something like 1/3 of the total their navy had planned?

Well Hitler scrapped all the heavy bomber programs for the airforce, so I think long term they would have always been at a disadvantage

And Hitler needed to go when he did because his intended targets were rearming and closing the gap. Waiting would have made Germany stronger, but equally so would the allies

 

[McHrozni]

However in terms of armour, the Germans had their backsides handed to them by the French a couple of times during the fall of France. The Soviet KV1 tank was more than capable of stopping anything the Germans could put in the field. In both instances it was tactics rather than equipment that carried the day

On paper, German tanks of 1940 and 41 were rather weak. They were perhaps somewhat faster than their allied Counterparts, but deficient in armor and weaponry.
However, design-wise, they were well ahead. French tanks, for example, had small turrets, so they could fit more armor to it. Consequently only one man could inhabit it at a time. That man would be either gunner (for aiming firing the gun) or loader (to load the gun before firing) or commadner/observer (to find a target to fire the gun at). Needless to say, this meant finding and engaging a target was a lengthy process, unsuited for mobile warfare.
German Panzer III, the mainstay of German anti-tank tanks of the time, had less armor and a smaller gun, but could fit three men into the turret. Consequently they were able to outfight the French tanks with relative ease.

KV-1 tank was highly effective against the Germans because it could withstand direct hits from German 37mm PaK guns, used by armor and infantry forces. Once the Panzer IIIs were upgunned to 50mm guns (design allowed this as a field modification), they were able to take out the KV-1s, which were quite slow and not very manuverable.
With time, design of Panzer IV showed itself as even more versetile than the III.

All in all, it often was the tactics, but also superior design that allowed Germans to triumph for three years. In time, sheer numbers and supply carried the day, which is good

McHrozni

 

[rjh01]

There are several reasons why Germany lost the war. These included
1. Hitler killed or expelled many great people. Albert Einstein is one famous example. He also got rid of all opposition, which would have included many generals.
2. Hitler was always in charge. The USSR started to win when Stalin gave command to his generals.
3. The USSR had the manpower to lose. Germany with only about 1/4 of the population could not lose so many men.
4. Blood transfusions. If a German solder came into hospital with only minor wounds, but had lost most of his blood he was probably going to die. But an American or British solder would probably live as they could get a blood transfusion from a person who gave blood days or weeks before.
5. Enigma. The British broke the German codes.

The British made huge mistakes too. They put too much effort into 'strategic bombing.' If they had put everything into the Battle of the Atlantic they might have cut a year off the war.

 

[McHrozni]

3. The USSR had the manpower to lose. Germany with only about 1/4 of the population could not lose so many men.

Towards the end of the war, Soviets were fast approaching the limit of their manpower. Surprising, I know. A vital factor was availability of the western allies, with their resources, which drew a substantial portion of Wehrmacht onto themselves - 250,000 tied down in Norway, 250,000 captured in Africa, a million in France ... this adds up to a large force, which could significantly affect the eastern theathre.
That doesn't mean the Soviet manpower (or their sacrifices) weren't vital, just that their manpower by itself wasn't nearly as superior as commonly believed.

5. Enigma. The British broke the German codes.

Poles did, actually, and presented their findings to the British immediately prior to the beginning of the war. The damage that produced could still be avoided, had the Germans knew the weaknesses of the system and how to get around them. Enigma was a superb coding machine, but operational errors, steming from the fact that the German intelligence network was grossly inadequate, made it into a major weakness.

To a large degree German failings were of their own making. With only minor changes, the entire war could've been a lot more disasterus for the Allies. Not in the terms of who'd win the war, Germany would succumb eventually, but Britain and USSR at least would certainly end the war in a much, much weaker position.

McHrozni

 

[timhau]

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Would that have been such a huge problem if it wasn't for their idiotic strive for ideological (and hence, 'racial') purity? They were initially hailed as liberators in many parts of the USSR, but they saw the local population not as a temporary order-keeping tool but as untermenschen. How unreasonable would it be to suggest that they might have had a window of opportunity there somewhere, but when too many locals decide that it's better to go with the devil you know, they were in big trouble.

 

[Eddie Dane]

I think that the results of the war with Finland played a large part in OKW views, really. It would be very hard to be a German general and not thinking along the lines of, "Well, if the bloody Finns could do that much damage, we'll absolutely destroy them!"

I agree there.

If I had observed the Soviets getting their butts kicked in the winter war, I never would heve guessed they would turn into the beast the were in 1943.

 

[rjh01]

<snip>
Poles did, actually, and presented their findings to the British immediately prior to the beginning of the war. <snip>

Your post is 100% correct, however this point does need expanding. The Poles did receive information, rejected by France, that enabled them to break an early version of the cipher. However the Germans in 1939 then made the cipher too hard for the Poles to crack. So they gave the results to the British. The British then developed machines, including the first computer that enabled them to break this more advanced cipher, which is probably by far the best cipher developed up to that time.

 

[shuize]

Well Hitler scrapped all the heavy bomber programs for the airforce, so I think long term they would have always been at a disadvantage

And Hitler needed to go when he did because his intended targets were rearming and closing the gap. Waiting would have made Germany stronger, but equally so would the allies

I understand w/r/t the heavy bombers. But, even so, I bet all those medium bombers and fighters lost in the Battle of Britain would have come in handy in the East. Especially considering how close they came to winning at Stalingrad.

 

[McHrozni]

Your post is 100% correct, however this point does need expanding. The Poles did receive information, rejected by France, that enabled them to break an early version of the cipher. However the Germans in 1939 then made the cipher too hard for the Poles to crack. So they gave the results to the British. The British then developed machines, including the first computer that enabled them to break this more advanced cipher, which is probably by far the best cipher developed up to that time.

Yes, thank you - this would be the essentials of the story

The computers were sadly destroyed after the war.

McHrozni

 

[Eddie Dane]

I understand w/r/t the heavy bombers. But, even so, I bet all those medium bombers and fighters lost in the Battle of Britain would have come in handy in the East. Especially considering how close they came to winning at Stalingrad.

Did they? After the Red Army surrounded them they were pretty much toast, or frozen yoghurt if you want a more appropriate food metaphor.

There was a gigantic army waiting to attack at the other side of the Volga and the German flank was completely exposed. The Germans may have been making progress in the city, but could they avoid being surrounded?

 

[Dragon]

Your post is 100% correct, however this point does need expanding. The Poles did receive information, rejected by France, that enabled them to break an early version of the cipher. However the Germans in 1939 then made the cipher too hard for the Poles to crack. So they gave the results to the British. The British then developed machines, including the first computer that enabled them to break this more advanced cipher, which is probably by far the best cipher developed up to that time.

One small point - the Colossus computer was developed to break the Lorenz code which the Germans used for high-level command/diplomatic communication. The Enigma was broken using the electro-mechanical "Bombes" which, as you say were developed from the earlier work of the Poles.

 

[Dragon]

Back to the topic - was the invasion and conquest of Britain really a goal of the Nazis or did Hitler expect the British to come to an arrangement?

ie allowed to keep the Empire but on condition that they stayed out of Germany's way as they invaded Russia and exterminated the Jews etc.

 

[ComsatAngel2017]

Regards Eddie Dane's first post, RIchard Overy's "Why The Allies Won" is well worth reading for a reflection on your question.

One poster above makes the point about logistics. The Germans were always very weak in this area, consistently, in both Russia and North Africa. It wasn't a priority in staff training, apparently, and where there were dense road networks, rail systems and Luftwaffe superiority, it wasn't too big a problem. However, once outside those criteria, the Wehrmacht was hamstrung, big time.

David French, in "Raising Churchill's Armies", comes to a valid conclusion in his introduction: "The British decided they would be soldiers, not warriors", which applies equally to the Americans. Rather than martial prowess on the battlefield, the Allies emphasised technology and firepower. This contrasts with the oft-expressed German opinion that they were the better fighters; they might have been, but it availed them little on the late-war battleground.