Nazi military goals versus reality.

[Eddie Dane]

Having read Van Crevelt's Changing Face of War, my view of Nazi military goals has changed. I'm curious what forum members think.

I'd like to pass the moral issue of Nazi strategic goals and focus on the practical side.

My question is this: how could the Nazi's ever believe that their grand plan was realistic?
With the power of hindsight it is painfully clear that there wasn't a chance in hell that the whole plan would work out.

Here's why I think they fell for their own BS:
They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).
The element of surprise. In Russia at least. Though if Stalin hadn't been so pig-headed and had listened to his spies, he could have prepared.
Groupthink. This one puzzles me as Hitler's general staff must have had a number of hard-nosed realists among them. All with a lot more military sense then Hitler.
Hitler. Essentially the same as groupthink, but Hitler set the boundaries.
Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

The factors that I see so clearly as "show stoppers" for the German plans today may not have been obvious to military planners at the time. But come on!
Alliances. Apparently Hitler didn't want war with England and the USA. Did he hope or assume that England wasn't going to act on it's commitments? And if he wasn't sure, how the hell could he embark on such an adventure? Generalplan Ost was an impossibility, even of it was the only front (I think). But with a second front, you'd have to be mad to think it could work.
The size of Russia. Even if the Red Army hadn't gotten it's act together and the Nazi's could have driven the Russians behind the Volga, the troops would still need to be supplied. Even under favorable circumstances their logistics were not up to the task.
Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Quite frankly, I'm surprised that it took so long before the German brass tried to blow Adolf's incompetent ass up.

 

[NWO Sentryman]

well, these can be very interesting for the AH.comers

http://alternatehistory.com/Discussion/index.php

 

[Corsair 115]

Here's why I think they fell for their own BS:
They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).
The element of surprise. In Russia at least. Though if Stalin hadn't been so pig-headed and had listened to his spies, he could have prepared.
Groupthink. This one puzzles me as Hitler's general staff must have had a number of hard-nosed realists among them. All with a lot more military sense then Hitler.
Hitler. Essentially the same as groupthink, but Hitler set the boundaries.
Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

You could add another item to that list: Victory disease. The winning of several battles in quick succession without major difficulty leads one to think their forces will always succeed without much difficulty because easy success is all they've had.

 

[geni]

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Why? Stalin managed it. When you are planning to reduce the majority of the population to slavery if not outright kill them occupation is less of a problem than it might otherwise be. Hilter also liked the example of the british position in India where a fairly small British force was able to keep a fair degree of control.

 

[McHrozni]

The size of Russia. Even if the Red Army hadn't gotten it's act together and the Nazi's could have driven the Russians behind the Volga, the troops would still need to be supplied. Even under favorable circumstances their logistics were not up to the task.

Had the Red Army been forced beyond Volga, the problem would be greatly reduced. The Red Army would be reduced to an essentially infantry force, due to the lack of oil from the Caucasus, while the Wehrmacht would control approximately 30-40% of world oil production. Certainly enough to sustain major mobility.

Holding all that terrain. Did they even consider that? Even in the most rosy scenario the Russians would go for guerrilla tactics. Holding Russia would require the entire male population of Germany to remain in the army to carry out the occupation. Such a situation is not sustainable at all.

Not really a problem, especially if they worked towards that goal from the start. Ukraine was severely impacted by Holodomor a few years earlier, and the people welcomed them as saviors. Many others willingly flocked to their cause, to avoid being put back into the prison that was the USSR. Nationalists and communist hardliners would persist, but they were relatively few. Mass conscription of the Red Army also drew able bodied men away before the area was captured, and moving 20 million workers to the east helped that as well.

Quite frankly, I'm surprised that it took so long before the German brass tried to blow Adolf's incompetent ass up.

His performance as a military leader decreased with time. In 1940, his leadership was ... not impeccable, but rather good, and gave extremely favorable results. 1941 and 42 also saw significant (though against not decisive) victories, especially in Russia. It wasn't until winter of 1942-43 when Wehrmacht began to suffer the first major defeats in the east.

McHrozni

 

[Eddie Dane]

Why? Stalin managed it. When you are planning to reduce the majority of the population to slavery if not outright kill them occupation is less of a problem than it might otherwise be. Hilter also liked the example of the british position in India where a fairly small British force was able to keep a fair degree of control.

Well, this is what I mean.

Big military powers now have the experience that they have trouble holding on to terrain when facing guerrilla tactics (Vietnam, Chinese nationalists vs the communists, Algeria etc).
But the Nazi's had just re-invented war. Combine that with the previous 100 years of history where colonial forces would hold on to vast counties and it may not have been apparent to the Nazi's what they would face.

Also, they destroyed 65% (?) of the Red Army at the beginning of their offensive. That looked like the death blow and they couls reasonably expect the Russian regime to fall apart after such a defeat.

The Russians didn't take long to employ guerrilla tactics though. So on some level it must have been predictable.

Of course all recent examples of guerrilla warfare deal with regular forces trying to hold on to a populated and functioning country. Guerrilla fighters typically hide amongst the population. The Nazi's wanted essentially clear out the population except for agricultural slave labor.

That should have made it easier to hold the terrain.

So, you may be right. Not as stupid as it looks with the power of hindsight.

 

[Simon39759]

I am not sure about your evaluation of Hitler's leadership.
I think the solution is that, initially, Hitler was quite happy to sit back and let his very competent generals be in charge.

When things started to get tough, he started to interfere and use his own 'military genius' more. Also, his paranoia had progressed by then and did not trust his officers as much, especially after several of them got compromised in a series of assassination attempts (that was motivated by both his meddling and the strategic difficulties).
There is also the matter of his personal court of sycophants that reinforced him in his decisions.

Basically, events conspired to his trying to micromanage, which he did with terrible results.

 

[Eddie Dane]

What about the two-front war?

Wasn't it apparent that without complete focus on the Eastern front, Germany had bit off more than it could chew?

Could the Nazi's foresee that the Alliance with Japan could result in the US joining the war in Europe?

 

[Skeptic]

Quite frankly, I'm surprised that it took so long before the German brass tried to blow Adolf's incompetent ass up.

Contrary to post-war claims, the top brass essentially agreed with Hitler on their own superiority, and the hatred and contempt of Jews and Slavs.

Anyway, Goebbles was correct -- for once -- when, after Hitler at long last gave him the emergency powers he demanded for years after the 20th of July, he told his staff: "It takes a bomb under his ass to make Hitler see reason."

 

[Comrade Raptor]

The problem with this approach is that the Germans actually did come very close to pulling it off.

If the balkan sideshow hadn't set back the time-table, or they had ignored Kiev for Moscow, they very well could have taken the city. More than just a prestige victory, it was the center of transport and communications. That would have been decisive.

Then in '42 they could have exploited this advantage and cleared the south and the caucasus. Again, even without taking Moscow they very nearly did (except they passed on a chance to take Stalingrad when it was lightly defended and rather bungled the caucasus adventure).

By '43 they would have had west of the Urals pretty well in hand and been able to transfer surplus materials and units to the other fronts. Bear in mind, as well, that after securing this area from large-scale counter-attack they would not have had such a high loss rate. So not only would they have had surplus units, but they'd have the means to form new units and re-equip existing ones more rapidly.

Considering the fight they put up in the West on what amounts to a shoestring, giving them these extra resources from the East strengthens their capabilities immensely.

Their goals were practical and realistic, this is borne out by the fact that they almost succeeded. They just missed their best opportunities to get it done. They could have knocked Russia out as an effective force well before the American effort was up to steam.

 

[headscratcher4]

If not obvious from my other postings on these subjects, I'm very much influenced of late in my thinking by The Third Reich at War and Hitler's Empire...two farily recent books on the history of the Nazis and WWII.

One thing that interested me was the assertion in Hitler's Empire that while achieving extraordinary quick victories in places like Holland and France, the German invasion of Poland, for example, was while quick not cost free. The two weeks it took Poland to fall...and recall they had a very backward army...and the number of German casulalties suggested some serious weaknesses in both planning and execution of the General Staff...sort of like planning to invade the USSR and not thinking about Winter (or that Napoleon guy).

In addition, the Germans got caught up in the Balkans trying to bail out the Italians and that became a serious burden for Germany that significantly undermined their resources.

And, they completely underestemated not only Stalin but the Russian/Ukranian and slavic people. Once they figured out that they were number two with a bullit after the Jews, their growing resistence as well as strategic and tactical innovativeness spelled doom for the German effort. Yes, Stalin through a lot of bodies at the Germans, but his generals repeatedly out-matched them on the battle field as well. It wasn't just overwhelming force, it was Stalin differing to the generals (so long as they got results) and not interfering, and the generals out-playing their german counterparts.

I think the other thing that has struck me about my recent reading is the conclusion that Germany lost the war pretty early...it wasn't just at the Gates of Moscow or at Stalingrad, but their over-extension, loss of men, lack of resources and planning in the face of a huge enemy and a war on two-fronts basically made the german loss inevitable without some sort of grand knock-out puch...a punch Hitler could never deliver.

 

[Comrade Raptor]

I should also add that the above doesn't even include the advantages they would have gained if they'd mobilized their economy more effectively and begun their rationalization program sooner.

And another critical advantage they would have gained if they'd taken Moscow and cleared west of the Urals would have been enough respite to properly train their forces. The shortage of properly trained units hurt them badly, especially in the air. Given more, and better, Luftwaffe units operating in France in 1944 we'd have a hotly contested airspace. A contested airspace means no free-roaming Jabos picking off columns and preventing movement of armored formations.

So I think the sum of the factors, had they been able to best exploit their opportunities, certainly makes it very possible that their plan could have succeeded. They definitely had the means, they just didn't use them correctly.

 

[Comrade Raptor]

And, they completely underestemated not only Stalin but the Russian/Ukranian and slavic people. Once they figured out that they were number two with a bullit after the Jews, their growing resistence as well as strategic and tactical innovativeness spelled doom for the German effort. Yes, Stalin through a lot of bodies at the Germans, but his generals repeatedly out-matched them on the battle field as well. It wasn't just overwhelming force, it was Stalin differing to the generals (so long as they got results) and not interfering, and the generals out-playing their german counterparts.

Soviet strategy and tactics didn't really develop until 1943. In '41 and '42 they remained very primitive. Indeed, up until the end of the war they tended more towards a brute force approach. By 1943 they were better, but still not really on equal terms (of course we should also bear in mind that as the Russian generals got better, their opposite numbers changed... they weren't fighting the same German generals, and many of the replacements were not the most qualified or the best).

Put Manstein and Zhukov on the field on equal terms and I'd put all my money on Manstein.

 

[NoZed Avenger]

Also, they destroyed 65% (?) of the Red Army at the beginning of their offensive. That looked like the death blow and they couls reasonably expect the Russian regime to fall apart after such a defeat.

I can't speak to the percentages, but the numbers of russian soldiers killed and captured near the beginning was staggering -- in the millions. IIRC, there was a continual feeling from the German leaders that "surely" they had made a huge dent in the number of russians able to fight, and that russia would soon be running out of men. But in the next fight, another ungodly number of russians showed up.

 

[Lukraak_Sisser]

IIRC the german high command plan for the defeat of russia was drawn up with the intention of acting as liberators from communism.
I seem to recall (from randomly remembered books and documetaries, so no links, sorry) that they planned to defeat the red army, consolidate and conscript from the newly conquered regions while setting up friendly cooperation governments.
If Nazi racism hadn't interfered this might very well have worked, but once the SS and einzatsgruppen moved in the wehrmacht suddenly didnt have several hundered kilometers of liberated country, but several hundred kilometers of occupied and hostile country between the front line and germany

 

[MG1962]

What about the two-front war?

Hitler was convinced he had beaten Britian, he just never understood why they did not realise this. So to him it was not a two front war

Wasn't it apparent that without complete focus on the Eastern front, Germany had bit off more than it could chew?

No German inteligence badly miss managed the amount of troops they expected to face. At the start of the war in the East the Germans thought the Russians could muster 120 divisions in the field. In the first 6 months the Germans calculated they had destroyed 105 divisons and it seemed that Russians possibly had as many as 100 divisons still active

Could the Nazi's foresee that the Alliance with Japan could result in the US joining the war in Europe?

No because the Germans always thought the Japanese would attack west through China and into Russia's back door. Stalin also shared this view, and you can see a marked change in Soviet fortunes once the Japanese committed to their course of action, and he could start transfering the massive amount of manpower he had in the East.

 

[MG1962]

I can't speak to the percentages, but the numbers of russian soldiers killed and captured near the beginning was staggering -- in the millions. IIRC, there was a continual feeling from the German leaders that "surely" they had made a huge dent in the number of russians able to fight, and that russia would soon be running out of men. But in the next fight, another ungodly number of russians showed up.

You are correct. It became apparent to the Germans they had no actual clue how big the mapower pool was that the Soviets could draw on.

An interesting sub plot to this was the use of ghost divisons. Apparently in places such as Stalingrad up 6 divisons fought on the Soviet side that offiically did not exist in any Soviet order of battle. I have never heard any explanation for this other than it happened

 

[Doc Daneeka]

Put Manstein and Zhukov on the field on equal terms and I'd put all my money on Manstein.

Probably true. However, one could also say that it's a military truism that phrases such as 'all things being equal' or 'on equal terms' are pretty much meaningless, since the entire point of strategy is to set the terms such that they are as far from equal as humanly possible.

Here's a more interesting question: how would von Manstein have done as commander of a Soviet front in, say 1943?

 

[Doc Daneeka]

You are correct. It became apparent to the Germans they had no actual clue how big the mapower pool was that the Soviets could draw on.

The memoirs of Guderiand and Halder are quite interesting in this regard. It's fascinating to see them slowly realising how the USSR wasn't quite like France

An interesting sub plot to this was the use of ghost divisons. Apparently in places such as Stalingrad up 6 divisons fought on the Soviet side that offiically did not exist in any Soviet order of battle. I have never heard any explanation for this other than it happened

A hypothesis: the obverse of the FUSAG ploy. Instead of creating a fictitious unit in order to confuse German SIGINT, they decided to hide some formations. I'd imagine that this would be much harder to pull off than the FUSAG method, but it's hard to say. Everything was so mixed up inside the city at that point that it might have made good sense to try it. Keep in mind that this was a country that went so far as to build secret prewar highways that weren't on the maps. It seems a reasonable idea to me.

 

[Doc Daneeka]

They had the best army and technology. The German army was superior in every way over all it's enemies (though not combined).

This is more debatable that one might at first think. In terms of military technology it's not at all clear that Germany was superior, in a great many areas. The utter shock that German tankers found when first meeting Soviet designs comes to mind. Me-109 vs. Spitfire. Etc, etc etc.

Racism. Maybe they really believed that Russians couldn't get their house in order. Or maybe one had to pretend to believe that to be in Hitlers inner circle.

I think that the results of the war with Finland played a large part in OKW views, really. It would be very hard to be a German general and not thinking along the lines of, "Well, if the bloody Finns could do that much damage, we'll absolutely destroy them!"