My Crazy Idea for How the Mind can Arise from the Brain (The Brain Buffer Conjecture)

[Trakar]

But we know that people in sensory deprivation situations (where sensory input isn't completely cut off, but reduced to almost nothing) don't experience diminished consciousness.

In sensory deprivation situations, we have already formed and programmed systems in place, we are merely cutting off external sources of input. The brain doesn't shut down when we cut off external inputs, and there are still all the internal sensory inputs and internal memories and considerations to be processed and stored.

This also came up in another thread: suppose I take a working brain and put it in a nutrient vat. There's nothing to suggest it would be unconscious, even though it has no sensory input.

if it was a human brain, this does not contradict any of my statements or considerations. It would still possess the evolved neural architecture, a bank of memories and internal processes capable of generating new considerations and memories, and so, at the least, would possess the capacity for conscious experience. If it was a "blank slate" brain (grown in a lab) an argument could be made that it never recieved the programming that an in vivo brain gets maturing within an experiencing human body, so any experience of consciousness it might have would probably be dramatically different from what you or I experience as consciousness. It isn't the experience that creates consciousness, in fact the experience of consciousness according to this line of consideration, is illusory and largely generated as an artifact of short-term memory processing. It is the processing that is at the root of the system with two primary components, the neural network and experiential programming that runs on the network.

And then there's the subjective experience of what it's like to be conscious. For me at least, it can transcend sensory input: my awareness of self, emotional experiences, memories.

this is what I inadequately describe as probable illusion.

Millions of bits of data come in through the senses every second, but we are only aware of a tiny percentage of that. What's choosing what we'll be aware of? Is it conscious?

again the focus isn't on the input, but rather the processing, and the processing isn't limited to external inputs, much of our memory is devoted to internal inputs and the shadings that these internal inputs apply to external inputs.

What I tend to think of as "consciousness" is a much broader and diffuse meta-state, more akin to what some refer to as the "sub-conscious," and tend to think of the seemingly deliberative, decision making ego, as a rationalizing psychological illusion created as our short-term memory processes, blends and stores the internal inputs from this metastate and the external inputs of our senses.

This latter is my integration of the concepts I mentioned, and probably takes leaps not present in the actual concepts used to inspire them, but until I locate the original information I can't actually say what is memory and what is merely derived and springboarded from those researcher's works.

 

[Malerin]

But we know that people in sensory deprivation situations (where sensory input isn't completely cut off, but reduced to almost nothing) don't experience diminished consciousness.

In sensory deprivation situations, we have already formed and programmed systems in place, we are merely cutting off external sources of input. The brain doesn't shut down when we cut off external inputs, and there are still all the internal sensory inputs and internal memories and considerations to be processed and stored.

For a functioning human brain, consciousness isn't dependent on sensory input. That raises an interesting question: could consciousness ever develop from a brain that never had sensory input?

This also came up in another thread: suppose I take a working brain and put it in a nutrient vat. There's nothing to suggest it would be unconscious, even though it has no sensory input.

if it was a human brain, this does not contradict any of my statements or considerations. It would still possess the evolved neural architecture, a bank of memories and internal processes capable of generating new considerations and memories, and so, at the least, would possess the capacity for conscious experience. If it was a "blank slate" brain (grown in a lab) an argument could be made that it never recieved the programming that an in vivo brain gets maturing within an experiencing human body, so any experience of consciousness it might have would probably be dramatically different from what you or I experience as consciousness.

Probably. Are newborns conscious?

It isn't the experience that creates consciousness, in fact the experience of consciousness according to this line of consideration, is illusory and largely generated as an artifact of short-term memory processing.

If the experience of consciousness is illusory, what is behind the illusion? Blackmore thinks its meme propogation. I'm dubious. And where does subjective experience fit in?

 

[Wowbagger]

I'm generally having problems picturing this as a physical buffer with width. Could you explain how this part works? Especially, how the width can be conceived of in terms of more or less conscious, and the definition of "casual influence" as you're using it?

Well, it is not easy explaining this idea, especially not in a manner that both: sounds realistic, AND is still understandable to the average person.

I might have to resort to using the over-simplified analogy, again, for the time being. Hopefully, once we all understand the basic gist, we can move back to placing its concept in a more realistic manner, later.

Picture a clump of brain matter floating in the middle of a bubble of air, which is then surrounded by other brain matter. As I stated before, the floating clump would be where the mind is.

Now picture that clump sort of bouncing around inside the bubble, occasionally knocking into the walls of the outer brain. With each knock against the walls, it could pick up information from the outside: What the body is seeing, feeling, etc. Perhaps bits of memory to use, etc.

But, those moments where it is NOT touching a wall, it basically acts on its own, independently of the rest of the brain. This manifests itself in our sense of the mind being separate from the body.

The larger the bubble is, the less often the mind-portion of the brain will hit the walls. The smaller the bubble, the more often it will. So, in this simple analogy, how strongly our mind is "separate" from the body is correlated with the size of the bubble.

Any questions so far?

If not, then let me try to translate this back into my slightly more realistic Buffer Conjecture:

There is probably not a bubble of air inside the brain. But, within our neural networks, there could be a subset of neurons that become isolated from the rest, to a certain degree, anyway. That level of isolation, I call The Buffer. And, hopefully, you can picture in your mind varying degrees of isolation the subsets of neurons could take from each other. Perhaps "width" is not a great word to measure the isolation. But, I use it for lack of a better one.

The level of conscious sensation we feel would be proportional to the level of isolation that subset of neurons has from the rest of brain. The "wider" that gap of isolation is, the less in contact they would have with each other.

When I talk about "casual influence" I am talking about how effectively the bulk of your brain can make an impact on what the mind portion is doing:
With little or no Buffer between, the impact is direct, the influence is strong. Your mind is soooo much part of the brain, you won't even be awake. Your "mind" is simply another part of the world, and you will have no conscious awareness of anything at all.

With a "wide" or "strong" Buffer between, the impact is either none-at-all, or at most: a very indirect, tiny amount. The influence the rest of the brain (and hence the world) has on your mind will be greatly diminished. Your "mind" is soooo free, it will literally feel like it must be separate from the body, somehow!

It feels like the mind is separate from the body, because in this sense, it kinda is.

Does that help explain anything?

I'm trying to relate to something like, say, how a loud noise robs one's attention, if that applies here (which is a prototype for "influence"), but I just can't get it to fit.

Keep in mind that the Buffer level could change in size at a very rapid rate: Going from thin to wide and back again many, many times per second. (See also my analogy with animated film in the opening post.)

Since the mind portion still interacts with the rest of the brain, many, many times per second, it can still be instantly informed when a loud noise was heard.

Evolution has wired us to pay attention to the direction and source of loud noises. There is no reason why the mind wouldn't do any differently, once it is informed about the noise, even to the point of robbing one's attention to something else.

 

[Trakar]

For a functioning human brain, consciousness isn't dependent on sensory input. That raises an interesting question: could consciousness ever develop from a brain that never had sensory input?

I don't want to hijack the thread so probably best to stick to the OP. I'll comment again when I locate my original referrents. I've no idea if consciousness could develop, or if we'd recognize it as such, even if it did.

Probably. Are newborns conscious?

In my opinion, broadly and generally, but not in the same respect as a mature and experienced system (many aspects of brain development are really not realized until late-twenties early thirties - frontal lobe development).

If the experience of consciousness is illusory, what is behind the illusion? Blackmore thinks its meme propogation. I'm dubious. And where does subjective experience fit in?

I don't know, I'd be inclinced to think it is just a psychological artifact, more coincidental than essential, but that's just my off the cuff consideration.

 

[TmoonII]

Does light have to be present?

 

[Wowbagger]

If the experience of consciousness is illusory, what is behind the illusion?

According to my conjecture, that would be the "mind" sitting behind the buffer zone, away from the rest of the brain.

Does light have to be present?

For what? For vision to work?

Not necessarily. There are reasons why optical illusions regarding color differences work, and there are reasons why hallucinations could emerge in the brain.

But, each of those things is not part of consciousness, and can be traced to other things going on in the brain. You are not "consciously building" a hallucination. The brain reports inaccurate data, and you "consciously experience" that.

Of course, if another part of the brain can figure out that it was a hallucination, or an optical illusion, then you "know" it was inaccurate information. Otherwise, you will be convinced that what you saw must have been real.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Alright, so I guess I have another question, or objection, or question. One of those.

You posit that the separation of one part of the brain from another through this buffer leads to a feeling that you are separated from the world. But I can't see how a physical separation can lead to a feeling that there is a physical separation, unless there's a detector of that separation built into the brain.

The only thing is, you readily admit that it doesn't necessarily take this form, but can be thought of this way, so I'm a bit confused as to what you're claiming.

On the abstract, all I have is that something analogous in representation space to a feeling that you're separated from the world is responsible for your feeling separated from the world. But that abstraction merely crumbles into a non-explanatory tautology.

On the other hand, I could say "there exists something analogous to a separation somewhere in the brain which is sensed and interpreted as a representation of separation in the brain"; slightly better, in that it's an explanation as opposed to a non-explanatory tautology, but it still has the same problem because we're not naming the thing that is doing the explaining.

So is there something I'm missing here, or misrepresenting?

 

[Wowbagger]

Perhaps I am focusing a bit too much on the wrong thing. What we are really after is that "spark" of consciousness awareness that seems to take place, as a unique property of the mind. The actual feeling that one is separated from the body is only a secondary consequence of that.

On the other hand, I could say "there exists something analogous to a separation somewhere in the brain which is sensed and interpreted as a representation of separation in the brain"; slightly better, in that it's an explanation as opposed to a non-explanatory tautology,

Right you are!

but it still has the same problem because we're not naming the thing that is doing the explaining.

I do have a new analogy I can convey to explain it. But, I am not too fond of it. One problem with my conjecture is that I can not seem to avoid resorting to very-limited-use analogies, to get any of its points across. So, please do not read too much into this one, beyond the basic premise I am trying to get across:

Picture one of those board games that contains a die or dice in a pop-up half dome, like Milton Bradley's Trouble game. You push down on the dome, and when you let go, the die "pops" up then lands on a number. It is very difficult to predict which number will land on top (though probably not completely impossible).

The conscious experience, in a sense, would come about in a similar way. At the moment when a buffer forms between the "mind" and the rest of the brain, there is a momentary amount of chaos that ensues: The mind is on a brief free-association rampage, if you will, until it settles down and "focuses" on a single thought: Kind of like the die going through a moment of chaos, before landing on a particular number.
It might not be complete chaos (whatever that means), but it is just enough for the outcome to be somewhat unpredictable and novel to the rest of the world.

And, that "spark" of chaos, and subsequent focus of attention, could be the basis for conscious experience.

After the mind gets connected and reconnected to the rest of the brain a lot, (that is: "After the die gets popped a lot"), a vague model of the mind being separated from the body can be inferred.

You posit that the separation of one part of the brain from another through this buffer leads to a feeling that you are separated from the world. But I can't see how a physical separation can lead to a feeling that there is a physical separation, unless there's a detector of that separation built into the brain.

You would not need a specific detector of separation, any more than you need a specific detector that part of your body went numb (or worse: was cut off). You simply lack the feeling that there is anything there that can feel. (Ignoring phantom limb sensations, for the moment).

The only thing is, you readily admit that it doesn't necessarily take this form, but can be thought of this way, so I'm a bit confused as to what you're claiming.

Another problem with this conjecture is that I do not know enough about brain anatomy and/or physics to make any strong, empirical guesses as to how this buffer can form.

One early idea that came to me:
We know that the dendrites of one cell do not directly touch another. It takes an electro-chemical signal to close the gap. If I did not know any better (and, unfortunately, I might already know better), I would guess that there are moments when the gaps between some neurons and others is wider, than other moments. And, this difference in gap-size, if it were systemic in just the right way, could translate into the Buffer I am describing: One part of the brain would effectively be separate from another. Though, I doubt the answer is that simple, anymore.

The exact form the Buffer takes will have to wait until further insights. But, I hope this conjecture is still useful as an exploration of what the imagination can come up with when answering tough questions, with tough constraints, about consciousness. That was the original intent of this thread, after all!

I will continue to chew on this problem. Perhaps I will come up with better explanations, yet!

 

[punshhh]

Does light have to be present?

Yes, spiritual light

 

[TmoonII]

Yes, spiritual light

If there is a spiritual light, is there a spiritual time? Is it relevant to the Wowbagger's idea?

 

[Wowbagger]

If there is a spiritual light, is there a spiritual time? Is it relevant to the Wowbagger's idea?

I would like to remind everyone that my own ideas do not require a 'spirit' to exist. Hypothetically, they should be able to be worked out entirely with materialistic sciences.

 

[rocketdodger]

This is surely a joke.

 

[dlorde]

This 'buffer' idea sounds vaguely reminiscent of Global Workspace Theory...

 

[Myriad]

The buffer idea also seems to me to have some similarities to the "bicameral mind" conjecture, in which (to employ a comparable level of abstraction and oversimplification) the one-way communication from planning/directing parts of the brain, to the parts that execute those directives (located in separate hemispheres and connected by the corpus callosum), became conscious experience when people learned (via, primarily, culture) to interpret the command stream as an internal narrative.

As far as I can tell, that conjecture has neither gained prominence nor been completely refuted, in cognitive science.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[punshhh]

If there is a spiritual light, is there a spiritual time? Is it relevant to the Wowbagger's idea?

Sorry for my late reply, I became preoccupied in other threads. I am replying to you from a spiritual stand point, which is different to the Wowbagger idea.
However there are similarities.

I don't see any spiritual time, rather a light manifest in the mind as a flame. As the flame quivers a thought is experienced in the mind and the brain.
To me the "buffer" is the difference between normal electro-chemical activity in the brain and the flickering light of the flame. The illumination of which is the self conscious mind.

 

[Wowbagger]

This is surely a joke.

It is a conjecture. All it needs to do is demonstrate what I want it to demonstrate.

This 'buffer' idea sounds vaguely reminiscent of Global Workspace Theory...

Reading the Wiki article, it does seem like the two share a bit in common. Those similarities didn't strike me last time I read about it, for some reason.

I think the elements of momentary chaos and subsequent focus are not apparent in GWT, as far as I can tell.

The buffer idea also seems to me to have some similarities to the "bicameral mind" conjecture, in which (to employ a comparable level of abstraction and oversimplification) the one-way communication from planning/directing parts of the brain, to the parts that execute those directives (located in separate hemispheres and connected by the corpus callosum), became conscious experience when people learned (via, primarily, culture) to interpret the command stream as an internal narrative.

There are definiately some similarities, there, too.

One difference I can spot is that Julian Jaynes focuses on one-way communication being interpreted as a conscious narrative.

My conjecture has two-way communication going on in it, and the "middle-man" section is what is interpreted as a conscious experience.