Mind the same as brain

[Interesting Ian]

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.
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How would you know?
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Because scientific research cannot acheive the miraculous. In supposing it can you are misunderstanding the nature of science;
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Nobody is suggesting that science can accomplish the miraculous.


quote:
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what its legimate area of concern is. There is nothing, nor could there ever be anything about the physical facts of the world (ie those facts discernable from a third person perspective) which suggest or imply phenomenal consciousness. I''m afraid that scientific research is simply not relevant pal.
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You have claimed this many, many times. What you have never done is given any good reason why anybody should believe it is true, much less any actual evidence that it is true. What, are we just supposed to take your word for it?

If phenomenal consciousness cannot be detected from a third person perspective then how do you propose it can be subsumed under any scientific theory? The only way you could do so is by begging the question and assuming that phenomenal conscousness is identical to certain physical processes (ie by presupposing materilism to be true). As I have said this is like supposing that A is really B, even though they appear to be qualitatively utterly different, and even though you have absolutely no evidence that A is B, apart from a correlation between the 2 (and scientists playing semantic games and describing the relationship as "causal" rather than correllational doesn't impress me. Indeed we couldn't say that A causes B if A and B are one and the same thing!)

But if you think you can independently subsume phenomenal consciousness in some scientific theory of the world without it being question begging (eg first of all we must assume elephants and bananas denote one and the very same type of object!), then go do so.

Forgive me for my scepticism, but I highly suspect that you will come back and simply presuppose the correctness of materialism. This is all you have ever done in the past, and this is the reason why your "arguments" are utterly without any merit.

 

[BillHoyt]

Forgive me for my scepticism, but I highly suspect that you will come back and simply presuppose the correctness of materialism. This is all you have ever done in the past, and this is the reason why your "arguments" are utterly without any merit.

Forgive me for my scepticism, but I highly suspect that you will come back and simply refuse to look at the research. This is all you have ever done in the past, you have made it abundantly clear you feel this is perfectly valid, and this is the reason why your "arguments" are utterly without any merit.

Do you not understand that Mills' rules for establishing causality are the SOP for scientific inquiry?

Cheers,

 

[Interesting Ian]

Forgive me for my scepticism, but I highly suspect that you will come back and simply refuse to look at the research. This is all you have ever done in the past, you have made it abundantly clear you feel this is perfectly valid, and this is the reason why your "arguments" are utterly without any merit.

Do you not understand that Mills' rules for establishing causality are the SOP for scientific inquiry?

Cheers,

Who gives a flying f*ck??? I want someone, anyone to demonstrate to me that phenomenal consciousness is a material phenomenon. Alternatively explain how consciousness might be subsumed in some scientific theory.

 

[BillHoyt]

Who gives a flying f*ck??? I want someone, anyone to demonstrate to me that phenomenal consciousness is a material phenomenon. Alternatively explain how consciousness might be subsumed in some scientific theory.

You asked the question, sir, about causality. I answered it. Cut the crap, read the answer.

Cheers,

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I recognize that there is a distinction. I also recognize that you are talking about two different things.
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Good! Would it also not be the case that the definition of causality that I've supplied tends to be the one understood in the hard sciences, and the one that Gebeker has supplied the one understood in the soft sciences?

No. As I already mentioned, I would say that what Gebeker listed is the actual experimental method by which the definition you listed is realized.

First there is the issue of whether scientific research demonstrates that there is a causal relationship between brain activity and mental states. According to both definitions, there is.
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This is a blatant lie. The only way phenomenological consciousness could play a fruitful role in our successful theories would be to identify it with its neural correlates. But this then begs the question!

This isn't begging the question, it is how science works. You construct a falsifiable theory, and then you test it. The theory that phenomenal consciousness is, in fact, a set of brain processes, is falsifiable, and has been extensively tested.

You cannot argue for materialism by assuming its correctness at the outset!

That is not what is being done. Materialism only claims that consciousness, like any other thing that actually exists, is physical. The scientific theory is that the physical mechanism is brain activity. That scientific theory has substantial supporting evidence.

If you want formal proof that the assumptions of the scientific method are valid, you aren't going to get it. At best we can say that the axioms of science are consistent with all observations, and that if they weren't true then there would be no reason to expect our observations to be consistent with them. That is how scientific evidence works.

If one presumes at the outset that an elephant is one and the same thing as a banana then it need not be surprising that one's conclusion is that an elephant is one and the same thing as a banana.

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊. If I presume that an elephant and a banana are the same thing, then I can show that this leads to a contradiction, which demonstrates that my assumption was wrong. All you have to do to falsify the scientific theory that phenomenal consciousness is a brain process, is show that such an assumption leads to a contradiction (either a logical contradiction, or a contradiction between the predictions of the theory, and observation). You have not done so.

Second, there is the question of whether phenomenal consciousness is causally efficacious. With respect to that, I have a couple of points.

1) We know that phenomenal consciousness exist.

2) The very fact that we know it exists demonstrates that it is causally efficacious.
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This does not follow. There is nothing inherently absurd about something existing yet being causally inefficaceous.

No, what is absurd is the notion of us knowing that this causally inefficacious thing exists. If it were truly causally inefficacious, then we would have no way of knowing it exists at all!

Of course I do believe that phenomenal consciousness is causally efficaceous. I'm not even convinced that epiphenomenalism is intelligible. But I don't think that diminishes at all David Chalmers arguments against materialism.

It completely destroys them, since his entire argument is that epiphenomenalism is true, and epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with materialism.

I mean I get the impression that his arguments are really addressing the intelligibility of materialism rather than a postive argument for property dualism
(at least from what I've read).

I disagree. He never really addresses materialism at all, other than to say that materialism requires that phenomenal consciousness be causally efficacious. From what I have seen, his argument is not that materialism is internally inconsistent, but rather that one of its axioms is false.

If phenomenal consciousness cannot be detected from a third person perspective then how do you propose it can be subsumed under any scientific theory?

I do not believe that this is the case. I think that, at least in principle, it can be detected from a third person perspective. In particular, I would say that if we had complete knowledge of the functioning of the brain, and sufficient computing power, that in principle, we could logically deduce the existence of phenomenal consciousness, as well as all of its characteristics, from those physical facts.

The only way you could do so is by begging the question and assuming that phenomenal conscousness is identical to certain physical processes (ie by presupposing materilism to be true).

As I said before, this is not begging the question, because the goal is not to prove materialism true. Obviously I have to assume that materialism is true before I can apply the scientific method to a problem (and keep in mind that I am defining materialism to be nothing more than the philosophical framework of the scientific method).

You may find this difficult to believe, but the question of whether materialism is true or not is a complete non-issue for scientists. We have to assume it is in order to do our jobs.

As I have said this is like supposing that A is really B, even though they appear to be qualitatively utterly different, and even though you have absolutely no evidence that A is B, apart from a correlation between the 2 (and scientists playing semantic games and describing the relationship as "causal" rather than correllational doesn't impress me. Indeed we couldn't say that A causes B if A and B are one and the same thing!)

This is a complete misinterpretation of the actual research involved, and the actual arguments being used by the scientists in question. This should come as no surprise though, given that you have already stated that you have no interest in actually understanding any of it.

Forgive me for my scepticism, but I highly suspect that you will come back and simply presuppose the correctness of materialism. This is all you have ever done in the past, and this is the reason why your "arguments" are utterly without any merit.

If I was trying to prove materialism true, you would be correct. But I am not. All I can do is say that materialism is logically self-consistent, that it has not been falsified, and that it is very successful in describing our observations.

Who gives a flying f*ck??? I want someone, anyone to demonstrate to me that phenomenal consciousness is a material phenomenon.

Tough ◊◊◊◊. That cannot be demonstrated. I can't even demonstrate that lightning is a "material phenomenon". All I can do is assume that it is, and then attempt to use the scientific method to describe it.

Can you demonstrate that it is not a material phenomenon? Didn't think so. Can you provide a non-physical explanation for it that doesn't just amount to unverifiable speculation? Didn't think so.

Alternatively explain how consciousness might be subsumed in some scientific theory.

That I have done. See above.

Dr. Stupid

 

[BillHoyt]

No. As I already mentioned, I would say that what Gebeker listed is the actual experimental method by which the definition you listed is realized.

Now we have Gebeker, Hoyt & Cat all singing the same song. I suggest, II, that you look again at the Mills post. This is the basis for research designed to determine causation.

After reviewing the Mills post, look again at some of the evidence cited by Gebeker. Then go to more primary sources to see the mounting evidence behind the claim that the brain causes mind. This evidence is voluminous, and includes:

o psychotropic drug actions affecting memory and personality,
o psychosurgery effects, with evidence of clear locality as well as personality effects,
o perceptual consciousness studies that have repeatedly demonstrated far more than stimulus-response effects,
o brain localization of many more of our "mind" functions, including sight, hearing, speech processing, emotional responses, and even moral/ethical behavior.

I'm sorry that this offends you, but the fact is we are remarkable and remarkably complex organic machines. But organic machines we indeed are.

Now comes the hard part. Cite your counter-evidence. EVIDENCE, please. You know the drill, which is, of course, why you attempted to poison the well earlier.


Cheers,

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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I recognize that there is a distinction. I also recognize that you are talking about two different things.
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Good! Would it also not be the case that the definition of causality that I've supplied tends to be the one understood in the hard sciences, and the one that Gebeker has supplied the one understood in the soft sciences?
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No. As I already mentioned, I would say that what Gebeker listed is the actual experimental method by which the definition you listed is realized.

You're seriously expecting me to believe that physicists declare a causal relationship even though they are unable to dream up a theory connecting A and B? I find this hard to believe.

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First there is the issue of whether scientific research demonstrates that there is a causal relationship between brain activity and mental states. According to both definitions, there is.
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This is a blatant lie. The only way phenomenological consciousness could play a fruitful role in our successful theories would be to identify it with its neural correlates. But this then begs the question!
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This isn't begging the question, it is how science works.

Try to understand the basic elements of reasoning. And what the flying f*ck has science got to do with materialism? Science if anything is suggestive of idealism.

You construct a falsifiable theory, and then you test it.

But you do not have a theory. Declaring an elephant is really a banana is not a theory! How many times have I explained it is wholly a philosophical issue rather than a scientific one??

The theory that phenomenal consciousness is, in fact, a set of brain processes, is falsifiable, and has been extensively tested.

No No You cannot test for it How many times do I have to explain to you and other materialists then science in principle can never ever give any evidence for materialism?

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You cannot argue for materialism by assuming its correctness at the outset!
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That is not what is being done. Materialism only claims that consciousness, like any other thing that actually exists, is physical.

A term which you have never defined apart from asserting there is a objective reality.

The scientific theory is that the physical mechanism is brain activity. That scientific theory has substantial supporting evidence.

What do you mean?? You're saying phenomenal consciousness is identical or is logically necessitated by brain activity??

But I've already explained that there is no evidence. It is abundantly evident that neither you, or any of the other materialists can give any justification for subscribing to materialism.

If you want formal proof that the assumptions of the scientific method are valid,

Science has s*d all to do with f*cking metaphysics!You're a waste of space pal. It is evident that you keep presuppoing the correctness of materialism in all your arguments.


You really are an incredibly stupid person, do you realise that? I applaud you for labelling yourself "Dr Stupid".

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If one presumes at the outset that an elephant is one and the same thing as a banana then it need not be surprising that one's conclusion is that an elephant is one and the same thing as a banana.
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊. If I presume that an elephant and a banana are the same thing, then I can show that this leads to a contradiction, which demonstrates that my assumption was wrong.

Go on then! Show how it leads to a contradiction.

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Second, there is the question of whether phenomenal consciousness is causally efficacious. With respect to that, I have a couple of points.

1) We know that phenomenal consciousness exist.

2) The very fact that we know it exists demonstrates that it is causally efficacious.
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This does not follow. There is nothing inherently absurd about something existing yet being causally inefficaceous.
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No, what is absurd is the notion of us knowing that this causally inefficacious thing exists. If it were truly causally inefficacious, then we would have no way of knowing it exists at all!

We know the existence of phenomenal consciousness because we directly experience it. We have unmediated access.

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Of course I do believe that phenomenal consciousness is causally efficaceous. I'm not even convinced that epiphenomenalism is intelligible. But I don't think that diminishes at all David Chalmers arguments against materialism.
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It completely destroys them, since his entire argument is that epiphenomenalism is true, and epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with materialism.

Yeah, what an excellent appraisal of his arguments

quote:
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If phenomenal consciousness cannot be detected from a third person perspective then how do you propose it can be subsumed under any scientific theory?
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I do not believe that this is the case. I think that, at least in principle, it can be detected from a third person perspective. In particular, I would say that if we had complete knowledge of the functioning of the brain, and sufficient computing power, that in principle, we could logically deduce the existence of phenomenal consciousness, as well as all of its characteristics, from those physical facts.


quote:
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The only way you could do so is by begging the question and assuming that phenomenal conscousness is identical to certain physical processes (ie by presupposing materilism to be true).
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As I said before, this is not begging the question, because the goal is not to prove materialism true. Obviously I have to assume that materialism is true before I can apply the scientific method to a problem

Why why why?? What the f*ck has materialism have to do with science?? Another scientist could just as well say "Obviously I have to assume that subjective idealism is true before I can apply the scientific method to a problem". Science is science is science. It does not require you to adopt a particualr metaphysical position. I find it appalling that you as a scientist do not realise this.

You may find this difficult to believe, but the question of whether materialism is true or not is a complete non-issue for scientists. We have to assume it is in order to do our jobs.

I see. So scientists have to subscribe to a clearly unitelligible metaphysic in order to do their jobs. Well, that doesn't say much for scientists then does it? It explains though why they all seem such dumbf*cks.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Now we have Gebeker, Hoyt & Cat all singing the same song. I suggest, II, that you look again at the Mills post. This is the basis for research designed to determine causation.

After reviewing the Mills post, look again at some of the evidence cited by Gebeker. Then go to more primary sources to see the mounting evidence behind the claim that the brain causes mind.

I'm not denying that brain "causes" mind dumbf*ck. The brain is necessary, but not sufficient to explain minds. I merely deny that the mind has its origin in the brain. The operations of the brain influences, but maybe not wholly determines the state of our minds at any particular instant. But providing you don't identify the essential self with a specific mind state, this doesn't have any implications for the essential self. What I am denying is materialism. I would aslo assert that subjective idealism is the most reasonable position (the self is non-physical with what we label the material world being an attribute of consciousness).

But what is the point? I could keep on and on and on about how vastly more reasonable my position is, but do the materialists take any notice of my arguments?

Do they f*ck!

 

[BillHoyt]

I see. So scientists have to subscribe to a clearly unitelligible metaphysic in order to do their jobs. Well, that doesn't say much for scientists then does it? It explains though why they all seem such dumbf*cks.

Sad, isn't it, folks? Let's see if we can get him to reduce the profanity and stay on-topic.

II,

Stimpy was rather clear here. Scientists don't make metaphysical assumptions. We've all been down this road before, but you keep stolidly insisting on some imagined presumptions of science. I refer you back to the Epistemology thread of long ago in which the basic axioms of science were laid out. I also refer you to Goedel's incompleteness theorem which demonstrates, quite clearly, that no logical system can exist with unprovable axioms.

The difference between scientists and a certain segment of philosophers is that we accept that this is true, that we work to minimize our axioms and we continue to test them against reality. We realized, long ago, that the philosophical quest for knowledge was wrong-headed. We can't think our way to truth about nature. We can work with nature, probe nature, and have nature reveal its secrets to us. That's it. Very pragmatic. Very provisional.

We don't care about metaphysics. It doesn't get us to truth about nature.

Cheers,

 

[BillHoyt]

I'm not denying that brain "causes" mind dumbf*ck. The brain is necessary, but not sufficient to explain minds. I merely deny that the mind has its origin in the brain. The operations of the brain influences, but maybe not wholly determines the state of our minds at any particular instant. But providing you don't identify the essential self with a specific mind state, this doesn't have any implications for the essential self. What I am denying is materialism. I would aslo assert that subjective idealism is the most reasonable position (the self is non-physical with what we label the material world being an attribute of consciousness).

But what is the point? I could keep on and on and on about how vastly more reasonable my position is, but do the materialists take any notice of my arguments?

Do they f*ck!

Excuse me, sir, did you or did you not ask about causality? Please try to stay sober during these discussions. It is pathetic when you can't follow your own discussion threads.

And, yes, I have read, over and over again, your puerile TV analogy. If you prefer to think your programming comes from the BBC, then so be it. But you need to realize your argument is absolutely contrary to Occam's razor. We have the brain, and the mind. We have clear evidence mental processes are dependent on the brain. You wish to multiply entities by presuming there must be some ineffable fairy dust behind it. Marshall the evidence that demands we introduce the fairy dust.


Cheers,

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No. As I already mentioned, I would say that what Gebeker listed is the actual experimental method by which the definition you listed is realized.
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You're seriously expecting me to believe that physicists declare a causal relationship even though they are unable to dream up a theory connecting A and B? I find this hard to believe.

That isn't what I said. A more accurate statement would be that what Gebeker listed is the experimental method by which the hypothesis that a causal relationship between A and B exists, is tested. The point being that at this level, it need not be a complete mechanistic theory connected A and B. The theory being tested could be simply that a certain type of causal relationship exists, and then a more complete theory can be built from there, as more information becomes available.

Comprehensive theories that completely describe a set of phenomena, are the product of the scientific process. They don't just spring out of the mind of a scientist fully developed. They are built, from the ground up, starting with the isolation of observed correlations into specific causal relationships. That is one step in the process.

This isn't begging the question, it is how science works.
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Try to understand the basic elements of reasoning. And what the flying f*ck has science got to do with materialism?

I have already told you that when I say materialism, I mean nothing more than the philosophical framework upon which the scientific method is based. That is what science has got to do with materialism.

Science if anything is suggestive of idealism.

Science is in no way suggestive of idealism. Science is not suggestive of any metaphysical position.

You construct a falsifiable theory, and then you test it.
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But you do not have a theory. Declaring an elephant is really a banana is not a theory!

On the contrary, it is an easily falsified claim. The fact that it is, in fact, false, just means that it is a falsified theory.

How many times have I explained it is wholly a philosophical issue rather than a scientific one??

That would be zero. You have asserted this many times, but you have never offered anything more than the assertion.

The theory that phenomenal consciousness is, in fact, a set of brain processes, is falsifiable, and has been extensively tested.
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No No You cannot test for it How many times do I have to explain to you and other materialists then science in principle can never ever give any evidence for materialism?

First of all, as I have told you many times, the theory that consciousness is a set of brain processes is not a materialistic assumption. Materialism assumes only that it is physical. Secondly, you can assert that science does not provide supporting evidence for materialism, but I have explained before exactly how it does so. If you cannot address those points, then quit whining about it.

And for the umpteenth time, I am not talking about ontological materialism. I am talking about scientific materialism, which is nothing more than the philosophical basis of the scientific method. Are you just going to continue to ignore this point forever?

That is not what is being done. Materialism only claims that consciousness, like any other thing that actually exists, is physical.
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A term which you have never defined apart from asserting there is a objective reality.

That is simply not true.

The scientific theory is that the physical mechanism is brain activity. That scientific theory has substantial supporting evidence.
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What do you mean?? You're saying phenomenal consciousness is identical or is logically necessitated by brain activity??

I am saying that phenomenal consciousness is a set of brain processes.

But I've already explained that there is no evidence.

No, you have asserted this, and blindly dismissed any evidence that we present, without so much as attempting to understand it.

It is abundantly evident that neither you, or any of the other materialists can give any justification for subscribing to materialism.

The only thing that is abundantly evident is that you either are not listening to what we are saying, or you are too dense to understand it.

If you want formal proof that the assumptions of the scientific method are valid,
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Science has s*d all to do with f*cking metaphysics!You're a waste of space pal. It is evident that you keep presuppoing the correctness of materialism in all your arguments.

I haven't said jack squat about metaphysics. Scientific materialism is an epistemological position, not a metaphysical one. I have no interest in metaphysics whatsoever.

You really are an incredibly stupid person, do you realise that? I applaud you for labelling yourself "Dr Stupid".

You're entitled to your opinion. That doesn't change the fact that it is wrong.

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊. If I presume that an elephant and a banana are the same thing, then I can show that this leads to a contradiction, which demonstrates that my assumption was wrong.
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Go on then! Show how it leads to a contradiction.

Simple. An elephant is a large mammal, and a banana is not.

No, what is absurd is the notion of us knowing that this causally inefficacious thing exists. If it were truly causally inefficacious, then we would have no way of knowing it exists at all!
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We know the existence of phenomenal consciousness because we directly experience it. We have unmediated access.

Exactly. That is how it is causally efficacious. It affects our mental states, which in turn affect our behavior.

As I said before, this is not begging the question, because the goal is not to prove materialism true. Obviously I have to assume that materialism is true before I can apply the scientific method to a problem
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Why why why?? What the f*ck has materialism have to do with science??

Because materialism is nothing more than the philosophical basis of the scientific method. Remember, I am not talking about ontological materialism, nor am I talking about metaphysics.

Another scientist could just as well say "Obviously I have to assume that subjective idealism is true before I can apply the scientific method to a problem".

Obviously not, since the logical validity of the scientific method does not depend on the axioms of subjective idealism being true.

Science is science is science. It does not require you to adopt a particualr metaphysical position. I find it appalling that you as a scientist do not realise this.

I do realize it, which is exactly why I do not adopt a metaphysical position. Why do you keep insisting that I do?

You may find this difficult to believe, but the question of whether materialism is true or not is a complete non-issue for scientists. We have to assume it is in order to do our jobs.
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I see. So scientists have to subscribe to a clearly unitelligible metaphysic in order to do their jobs. Well, that doesn't say much for scientists then does it? It explains though why they all seem such dumbf*cks.

No they subscribe to an epistemological framework. Metaphysics is nonsense. You can continue to insist that I am an ontological materialist until you are blue in the face. It just makes you look like an idiot.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Try to understand the basic elements of reasoning. And what the flying f*ck has science got to do with materialism?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I have already told you that when I say materialism, I mean nothing more than the philosophical framework upon which the scientific method is based. That is what science has got to do with materialism.

If this were the case that then your "materialism" doesn't imply a reality external to our qualia, it doesn't imply an ontologically self-subsistant reality and it wouldn't even imply that other people are conscious!

There is no philosophical framework upon which science rests apart from the idea that nature is uniform, that different people will perceptually perceive much the same thing under similar circumstances, and that empirical reality can be described utilizing theories written in the language of mathematics.

Now could you please could your nose out of my discusion with Gebeke?. We have nothing to discuss. You're an idiot.

 

[LucyR]

Now could you please could your nose out of my discusion with Gebeke?. We have nothing to discuss. You're an idiot.

Ian,

Why do you call Stimpson J. Cat an idiot?

What he wrote may be wrong - I don't know I haven't been following this thread - but I have read enough of his posts to be pretty sure he's not an idiot.

 

[Mercutio]

...and this thread started so politely. Now, the only joy I get out of it is that BillHoyt's signature file names IntI's response to *me* as the April 2003 logic prize winner. I'm so honored.

Oh, and IntI, if you want a compromise that allows you to address science without leaving the comfort of your philosophical armchair, try William James's Pragmatism. Seriously. It would be worth your while, and perhaps put an end to what cool hand luke called a "failure to communicate."

...or you could dismiss it if you have absolutely zero interest in other points of view...

 

[Thumper]

So, let me see if I understand this discussion...

According to II, science cannot speak about the mind because it is not matter.

This means that the brain and the mind are different. So, there we have the answer to the original question.

Another thing I've noticed through the years (jeez, I sound wizened ) is that the bigger and more obscure the words used in an argument, the less the people really understand each other. This is due to two complementing factors: 1) obscure words are poorly defined. 2) people who use them tend to use them solely because they think they sound cool.

Back to the brain-mind connection... the brain is the hardware. the mind is the software. software cannot be discerned except in the operation of the program, and in looking at the miniscule changes at the processor level. If we continue this analogy a little further, Bill Gates is going to take over our minds.

And now for something completely different...

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I have already told you that when I say materialism, I mean nothing more than the philosophical framework upon which the scientific method is based. That is what science has got to do with materialism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If this were the case that then your "materialism" doesn't imply a reality external to our qualia,

I have already explained, several times, why it does. Your only response to these explanations has been to claim that reality doesn't actually have to be more than just our qualia, as long as it behaves in all respects as though it were. This is pure metaphysical nonsense. The fact that science would work even if its axioms were wrong, so long as they were wrong in just the right way, is nothing more than an indication that the alternative you are proposing is unfalsifiable nonsense.

it doesn't imply an ontologically self-subsistant reality

I have already told you that it does not. I am not endorsing an ontological anything! I am not talking about a reality that is ontologically independent of qualia. I am talking about epistemology.

and it wouldn't even imply that other people are conscious!

It doesn't. I have repeatedly explained this to you as well. The fact that other people are conscious is not an assumption of materialism. Once you accept that the scientific method is valid, the claim that other people are conscious, just like you, is just the most parsimonious explanation for the available evidence.

There is no philosophical framework upon which science rests apart from the idea that nature is uniform, that different people will perceptually perceive much the same thing under similar circumstances, and that empirical reality can be described utilizing theories written in the language of mathematics.

You are wrong. The above is not quite enough. I have already explained that the existence of subjective bias means that in order for science to work, there must be some way to control for it. All of the methods for controlling for subjective bias are dependent on the assumption that reality is objective.

Now could you please could your nose out of my discusion with Gebeke?. We have nothing to discuss. You're an idiot.

Why do you insist on repeatedly misrepresenting my position, and then calling me an idiot for believing stuff I don't even believe. Do you have any idea at all how childish and foolish your behavior makes you appear?

Anyway, if you don't want any further discussion with me, then simply stop responding to me. My past several posts in this thread have been nothing more than responses to comments and questions you directed at me. With respect to your argument with Gebeker, I seem to recall that you responded to one of his posts by asking me if I agreed with it. How does this constitute me "nosing in"?

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

So, let me see if I understand this discussion...

According to II, science cannot speak about the mind because it is not matter.

This means that the brain and the mind are different. So, there we have the answer to the original question.

I've been through this with Stimpy on many an occasion. He simply doesn't have the capacity to understand. I haven't just declared that the mind is not a physical thing. I have justified my position on many an occassion. For example, below is what I said about 2 months ago.

Well let me address the reason why I think materialism is unintelligible. What we need to do is take a look at materialism to see if it is internally consistant. Now the particular question I would like to address is why should we suppose that other peoples bodies are "inhabited" by conscious minds (or why phenomenal consciousness is associated with brains). Your argument no doubt will be that materialism stipulates this to be so; it is an axiomatic premise of materialism. But this makes your definition of materialism an arbitrary one. A metaphysic which glosses over awkward facts. Allow me to explain.

It seems to me that materialism should stipulate that the physical exhausts reality. That once we have completely described the Universe in physical terms then we have said all that can be said about the Universe or reality.

But what is the physical? It seems to me that it should be everything, that, at least in principle, can be observed by anyone with appropriate faculties and suitable instruments. In other words all that is objective exists, or to put it another way, all that is discernable from the third person perspective exists. This will also include things which can only be indirectly seen (although strictly speaking I reject the direct/indirect dichotomy). This then includes such entities as electrons, because although they can only be "indirectly" seen they nevertheless play fruitful roles in our theories describing the world ie we need to hypothesise electrons in order to explain certain aspects of reality.

Now there is something peculiar about conscious experience which marks it off from all other existents. It is simply this. It cannot be observed or detected by anyone with appropriate faculties and/or suitable instruments! Thus according to my prior definition of the physical it is not a physical existent. Thus I may have toothache to take an arbitrary example. But you cannot observe that toothache, all you can obseve is the effects of the toothache, the grimace of pain for example. Conscious experiences in other words are irreducibly private.

Now you will no doubt say that by observing the grimace, or at least by observing the neurons fire, then you are observing the toothache since materialism holds that the toothache and its neural correlates are one and the same thing, or at least aspects of the same thing. But an objective examination of this toothache will necessarily leave out the subjective irreducibly sensation of pain. The actually sensation of pain does not figure into the physical facts about the pain according to our prior definition of the physical. Nor can we infer the sensation of pain since, unlike an electron, the (phenomenological) pain does not play a part in any
description of our behaviour. The pain per se cannot play a part because pain per se is not part of the objective publically accessible realm. Only the neural correlates of the pain can play any fruitful role in our theories.

In short then either a materialist has to concede his metaphysic is internally inconsistent, or he must arbitrarily include phenomenological consciousness within his world picture. But if he opts for the latter then the whole prima facie plausibility of his world view crumbles away. No longer can he say that for something to exist it must be in principle be directly observable or play a fruitful role in some theory about the world, because this then necessarily precludes phenomenological consciousness. He
has to expand the notion of the physical to even include things that cannot be directly or even indirectly detected, even in principle!

This is what materialism entails and is just one of many reasons why we should reject this metaphysic.

 

[Gebeker]

The reality is that we do not know,no hypothesis really has the edge.Nothing disprove yet conclusively the 'extended materialism' position for example [the soul is seen as material too but interacting very faintly with 'usual' matter we can 'measure'].Even dualism is a strong contender.

No, dualism is not a strong contender, in my opinion. While it may not be possible to disprove dualism at this time (as I've stated), the inability to disprove a hypothesis does not mean that it is a strong contender. A hypothesis that has absolutely no evidence at all in favor of it is hardly a strong contender. On the other hand, a materialistic theory of mind makes many falsifiable predictions (damage to the brain should cause predictable deficits in consciousness/mind, electrically stimulating the brain should cause changes in mental experience, pharmacological manipulations should cause predictable effects on consciousness/mind, fMRI should demonstrate consistent patterns of brain activity associated with particular cognitive states, restoration of normal brain activity in an unconscious person should restore consciousness, etc, etc, etc).

If these predictions were disconfirmed, materialism would be dead. On the other hand, disconfirmation of these predictions would not falisify dualism (or idealism) at all. Imagine, for example, if it were discovered that damage to the mind doesn't affect mental states. In that case, a dualist would be unconcerned -- he could simply claim that the nonphysical, spiritual, whatever made up for the loss of brain tissue. An idealist could simply say that God had an "idea" of a functioning mind, despite the loss of brain tissue.

So that we [you and me] can make safely contradictory statements which are however totally compatible with the observed reality as a matter of belief.The fact that you prefer tradition to nonconformism is irrelevant in such cases.Tradition is never a proof.

Again, you seem to want to claim that an inability to prove one's position means that the alternatives are on equal footing. I believe that this is a logical fallacy. As I've explained above, materialism is superior to idealism or dualism because it continues to survive, despite the fact that it makes testable, falsifiable predictions.

Yes we know.So what?This does not 'confirm' materialism as being superior to the other approaches nor can it qualify as an experimental falsification of dualism or of 'extended materialism'.

First of all, I never claimed that the evidence I've presented falsifies dualism. In fact, I've repeatedly stated that it doesn't. Secondly, I would ask you what **WOULD** be an experimental falsification of dualsim?

At most you could try to prove that dualism or the extended materialist positions are incoherent logically [not the case] or that they are incompatible with the observed facts [which you tried in fact].

I have shown why dualism is illogical (Occam's razor). As to the second part of your sentence, I have made no such claim. I have simply argued that the available evidence strongly supports materialism (for reasons explained above), and offers no support for idealism or dualism. I have never, ever, EVER claimed that dualism or idealism have been disproven.

All hypotheses have 'holes' in understanding the conscious experience.In fact nothing makes materialism superior to other acceptable positions in the key problems regarding consciousness,in the light of known facts.The most important for me at least [apart from 'qualia'] is why should emergent properties due to computational complexity produce consciousness?

We don't know. We do, however, have evidence that it does (see above).

From all evidence we have no emergent phenomenon that becomes conscious....

This is circular reasoning. You believe (with no evidence to support this position) that a purely physical system could not become conscious, and to support that position you claim that "no emergent phenomenon becomes conscious. That's the very definition of circular reasoning. [/quote]

In fact the materialistic approach is prefered as the main 'working hypothesis' in the virtue of the parsimony principle and yes of tradition [materialism has always worked so far].Or we all know very well that Ockham's Razor or the tradition argument cannot count as proofs.At most they indicate the order of preferences in the frame of reference given by the scientific method.
Still all other coherent hypotheses,compatible with all observed facts,are not proved inferior.The assumption that materialism can explain consciousness is still only an axiom in spite of 'confirming' it everyday in a wide range of physical domains...

Again, there is a logical fallacy in your reasoning. If I claim that the universe was created 10 minutes ago by a magical unicorn named Skeezle, you can't disprove my hypothesis. It can explain all available data perfectly well. Yet, is my magical unicorn hypothesis on equal footing with evolution? Of course not. An inability to disprove a hypothesis does not mean that it is on equal footing with the best available hypothesis.

Your conclusion is hasty.Why is materialism 'more likely' to be right?

Occam's razor, plus the fact that materialism (unlike idealism or dualism) makes falsifiable predictions, and continues to survive, despite the fact that neuroscientists around the world test those predictions every day.

I don't understand.What 'same reason'?There is no necessary connection between let's say the 'God hypothesis' and the 'unicorn hypothesis'.Besides there is an abyss between a simple opinion and a positive claim.

There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support dualism. None. Not a single shred of evidence. Dualism is unneccessarily complex from an ontological standpoint. Similarly, my unicorn hypothesis has absolutely no evidence at all to support it, and it is unneccessarily complex, from an ontological standpoint. Neither dualism, nor the unicorn hypothesis can be disproven. (In fact, neither one is falsifiable, even in principle, which is good enough reason alone to regard them as inferior.)

What you did was to assume that all alternative hypotheses attempting to explain consciousness were already proved inferior to materialism based on observed evidence.Not a valid inference as I argued above.

They are inferior, as I argued above.

 

[Gebeker]

Haven't got time to respond to people at this moment, but could we get rid of a source of confusion?

All the materialists are conflating the 2 distinct definitions of causation that have been given, namely my own and Gebeker's.

Just to rid another source of confusion, here. I have never attempted to define causation here. I have simply outlined a set of conditions under which it is reasonable to conclude that observed phenomenon B is explainable in terms of physical system A.

Now what I require to know is if the materialists are denying there is any such distinction?

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:

"1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A. "

Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?
Thanks.

I can't speak for others, but I am not. However, again, my aim was not to define causality. My goal was to establish a set of conditions (not the only possible set of conditions) under which it is reasonable to conclude that an observed phenomenon, B, is explainable in terms of physical system, A.

 

[Gebeker]

ROFL. Ain't it the truth.