Mind the same as brain

[Interesting Ian]

Nobody is going to accept this, Ian. You have set up the ground rules for yourself so that science doesn't apply when you don't like the results, but can give you clues when you do like the results. You've set up that you can use 'correlational' and 'causal' when it suits you,

If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

cherry-pick scientific research when it suits you, and dismiss science when it doesn't.

I dismiss nothing of science. I am a huge fan of science. But maybe I dismiss what some scientists may assert. I do not believe science can solve the mind/body problem. I do not believe that our scientific description of reality characterises our reality per se. I do not believe it has any particular metaphysical implications apart from being suggestive of a "God" (and possibly QM may hint at the vacuousness of the idea of a reality existing in abstraction from our sensory experiences although I don't know), but nevertheless I think science is great.

And you wonder why you're number 3 or so on the "Most Likely to be on an Ignore List" list.

Where is this list? If what you're saying is true this is absolutely appalling and doesn't say much for the people who contribute to these forums.

 

[Interesting Ian]

If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.

 

[Gebeker]

I’m not going to address most of your responses to the formal argument I discussed. The argument I gave, and refuted, was an attempt to guess the specifics of your reasoning, since you seem to be completely unwilling to give us any specifics about your theory of mind. (That’s good debate strategy, but it’s bad science and bad philosophy.)

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It seems that the only way you can say that minds/consciousnesses are an iullusion would be to deny that people actually have any experiences. No-one ever feels hope, depair, redness etc. Metphysical behaviourists/eliminative materialists hold this position as far as I am able to understand these things. Do you also hold this position?

What some people (including me) are suggesting is this:
Our introspective impression is that our consciousness is an entity in its own right, apart from the functions of the brain. However, this is an illusion. I’m not denying that we have minds, and I’m not denying that we have consciousness. What I am saying is that there is no reason to suppose that minds or consciousness exist as independent entities, in the way that rocks, trees, and automobiles exist, or in the way that some people believe that souls exist as entities.

What is this nonsense?? You either are implicitly invoking consciousness when you use the term "mathematical ability", in which case you are simply begging the question, or you're simply referring to a step by step procedure where such step is a logically necessary consequence of the previous step.

Using the term “mathematical ability” does not implicitly consciousness. Do you think that your calculator has consciousness?

Your mention of the calculater implies the latter. But one can see this process go on. Just imagine a mechanical computer with cogs and wheels and what not!

Ok, let’s imagine your mechanical computer with cogs and wheels: what is it that we actually observe? We actually observe the movements of the cogs and wheels and we observe the output (the answer). In the same way, what do we observe in a brain? We observe the activity of single neurons, groups of neurons, and distinct areas of the brain. And, we observe the output. Other than the fact that the observation is much harder to do in the case of a brain, what is the difference? My point is simply that you seem to want to believe* that consciousness is an entity that somehow exists independently of the brain, whereas I would say that consciousness is simply what you get when you have an appropriately wired brain. You assert that something other than a materialistic view of mind is more likely to be right than materialism, yet you give us no evidence or logical argument to justify that position.

*I’m guessing here, because you have been extremely reluctant to give us any details concerning your own theory of mind, or by what line of reasoning you arrived at it.

 

[Gebeker]

If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.

I am a scientist, and I have spoken up already and said so. I have tried my best to explain to you why. We can exert experimental control over those brain events. Thus, it is inappropriate to describe the results of such studies as "correlational".

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event B to be CAUSED by event A, and we can do the following:

1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.

Given all of the above, we are quite justified in concluding that event A causes event B. We may not have proof that event B is *ONLY* caused by event A, but we've shown that it is quite reasonable to believe that event B is solely caused by event A when there is no evidence at all to suggest that anything other than event A is necessary to have event B.

 

[Interesting Ian]

If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I am a scientist, and I have spoken up already and said so. I have tried my best to explain to you why. We can exert experimental control over those brain events. Thus, it is inappropriate to describe the results of such studies as "correlational".


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event B to be CAUSED by event A, and we can do the following:

1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.

Given all of the above, we are quite justified in concluding that event A causes event B. We may not have proof that event B is *ONLY* caused by event A, but we've shown that it is quite reasonable to believe that event B is solely caused by event A when there is no evidence at all to suggest that anything other than event A is

Gebeker. I am quite happy with your definition of causality since I believe it is up to scientists to define what it means. Well, as long as they don't indulge in stupidities such as declaring that causality represents an innate power in nature!

It seems that there are 2 meanings to causality then, the one i gave and the one you've provided. I think your definition of causality is highly dodgy though, and it certainly doesn't help you one iota in claiming that the brain is the origin of consciousness. No need for you to respond at this juncture though because you've already given your arguments which I have yet to respond to. I'm afraid I won't be able to get round to responding to you today though.

Edited to add:

Oh just one thing I feel it might be useful to correct. I am not a dualist. I am a subjective idealist. I believe that what we refer to as "material reality" is a manifestion of mind or minds (its existence is ontologically dependent on minds).

 

[BillHoyt]

If any scientist in this forum disagrees that it would strictly speaking be illegitimate to describe the relationship between brain events and mental events as a causal relationship, when we merely have correlations between brain events and mental events, then let him speak up and say so.

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

II,

Knowledge of causation does not require either theory or knowledge of mechanism. John Stuart Mills long ago established the basic rules that move us from correlation to causation. They are:


1. The cause and effect have to be related,

2. The cause has to precede the effect in time; and

3. No plausible alternative explanation of the effect is reasonable.


To elaborate on number 3, Mills established these basic methods, at the heart of so much modern science:

1. Method of Agreement - the effect is present when the cause is present,

2. Method of Differences - the effect is absent absent the cause; and

3. Method of Concomitant Variation - when both 1 and 2 (above) are observed, causal inference is strengthened because certain other interpretations of the covariation between cause and effect can be ruled out.

With Mills now in mind, go back over Gebecker's last post.

Cheers,

 

[Gebeker]

Oh just one thing I feel it might be useful to correct. I am not a dualist. I am a subjective idealist. I believe that what we refer to as "material reality" is a manifestion of mind or minds (its existence is ontologically dependent on minds).

Thanks, Ian. This is helpful. I've been thinking that you were a dualist. When you have time, could I get you to give me (preferably in a formal argument) what you think the arguments are in favor of subjective idealism? I'm somewhat familiar with such arguments already, but I don't want to waste your time by refuting a formal argument that you wouldn't make.

Take your time. I've been spending more time on this than I should, so I may be away from the thread for a day or two anyway.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Let's put it in a more formal manner. If we judge event A and event B to be logically distinct, and A is inevitably followed by B, but there is a lack of any theories accounting for this, would this be technically speaking a causal relationship? Or would it merely be an interesting correlation which might turn out to be causal? Stimpy?

In your hypothetical example, I would say that is correlation which could be causal. But I do not think that this is a reasonable characterization of the current state of research with respect to consciousness.

If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.

How would you know?

You have flat out stated that you "have absolutely zero interest in research design", and "have no interest in correlational studies". This would suggest to me that you are poorly qualified to be making assessments about the scientific research in this, or any other area of research. On one hand you are asserting that you have no interest in the kind of research that people are claiming shows a causal relationship between brain activity and consciousness, but on the other hand you are confidently asserting that there is no causal relationship, and that the research does not indicate such a relationship, even when people who are knowledgable about the research say otherwise.

There is nothing wrong with having an opinion about something. But boldly asserting that opinion when you don't have the knowledge to back it up is pretty presumptuous. And stating that you have no interest in learning about it, in spite of your insistence on authoritatively stating your opinion about it, is just plain willful ignorance.

Dr. Stupid

 

[metacristi]

Gebeker

Well, no one can give a complete explanation for consciousness. At this point, all we can do is make statements about which ideas are most likely to be right.

Well the problem is that this 'no one' include the materialistic approach as a whole too of how consciousness arise not only individuals.The reality is that we do not know,no hypothesis really has the edge.Nothing disprove yet conclusively the 'extended materialism' position for example [the soul is seen as material too but interacting very faintly with 'usual' matter we can 'measure'].Even dualism is a strong contender.So that we [you and me] can make safely contradictory statements which are however totally compatible with the observed reality as a matter of belief.The fact that you prefer tradition to nonconformism is irrelevant in such cases.Tradition is never a proof.

We **KNOW** that the brain is necessary for human consciousness, and we KNOW that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and consciousness.

Yes we know.So what?This does not 'confirm' materialism as being superior to the other approaches nor can it qualify as an experimental falsification of dualism or of 'extended materialism'.
At most you could try to prove that dualism or the extended materialist positions are incoherent logically [not the case] or that they are incompatible with the observed facts [which you tried in fact].

All hypotheses have 'holes' in understanding the conscious experience.In fact nothing makes materialism superior to other acceptable positions in the key problems regarding consciousness,in the light of known facts.The most important for me at least [apart from 'qualia'] is why should emergent properties due to computational complexity produce consciousness?From all evidence we have no emergent phenomenon that becomes conscious:water for example is an emergent phenomenon:its properties cannot be deduced from the properties of H and O atoms,in fact all matter at macroscopic level is an emergent phenomenon of quantum level and so on.
In fact the materialistic approach is prefered as the main 'working hypothesis' in the virtue of the parsimony principle and yes of tradition [materialism has always worked so far].Or we all know very well that Ockham's Razor or the tradition argument cannot count as proofs.At most they indicate the order of preferences in the frame of reference given by the scientific method.
Still all other coherent hypotheses,compatible with all observed facts,are not proved inferior.The assumption that materialism can explain consciousness is still only an axiom in spite of 'confirming' it everyday in a wide range of physical domains...

However, we have no evidence at all that anything nonphysical is required. Therefore, the materialistic view of mind is more likely to be right than dualism.

The absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence.To think otherwise means to commit the Ad Ignorantiam fallacy.For example a system of axioms containing God [defined merely as the creator of universe] as an extra axiom beyond those of science is not at all inferior in spite of the fact that 'God hypothesis' plays no fruitful role in our scientific theories...or that it could virtually 'explain' everything...they are equally valid.

Your conclusion is hasty.Why is materialism 'more likely' to be right?I see no reason to assume that apart from tradition.You should be very careful here,to prove that materialism is superior you should prove false all other competing hypotheses,idealism on the first place-in fact this is a problem for the science as a whole.You lose your time by trying in vain to prove them incompatible with current evidence regarding consciousness,one can easily find such arguments for materialism itself...

It's not quite that simple. To understand why, I would ask you this: why do you assign a very low probability to my unicorn hypothesis? I assign a very low probability to dualism for the same reason.

I don't understand.What 'same reason'?There is no necessary connection between let's say the 'God hypothesis' and the 'unicorn hypothesis'.Besides there is an abyss between a simple opinion and a positive claim.
What you did was to assume that all alternative hypotheses attempting to explain consciousness were already proved inferior to materialism based on observed evidence.Not a valid inference as I argued above.
You made an [unjustified] positive statement,a claim,of having 'objective knowledge' or I presented only a subjective opinion witohut claiming anything.You assigned an 'objective' probability,I only a 'subjective' probability.A huge difference.

 

[Interesting Ian]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



How would you know?

Because scientific research cannot acheive the miraculous. In supposing it can you are misunderstanding the nature of science; what its legimate area of concern is. There is nothing, nor could there ever be anything about the physical facts of the world (ie those facts discernable from a third person perspective) which suggest or imply phenomenal consciousness. I''m afraid that scientific research is simply not relevant pal.

You have flat out stated that you "have absolutely zero interest in research design", and "have no interest in correlational studies". This would suggest to me that you are poorly qualified to be making assessments about the scientific research in this, or any other area of research.

I do not need to make an assessment of the scientific research since it cannot acheive that which is impossible.

On one hand you are asserting that you have no interest in the kind of research that people are claiming shows a causal relationship between brain activity and consciousness,

Such a "causal" relationship, in the sense that Gebeker has defined it, is an irrelevance.

but on the other hand you are confidently asserting that there is no causal relationship, and that the research does not indicate such a relationship, even when people who are knowledgable about the research say otherwise.

If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different. But I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible?? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory? If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.

 

[BillHoyt]

If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different. I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible?? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory? If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.

Pretzel logic. You need to toss in some salt, II. If there is a causal relationship you would assert it is, in principle, impossible? Let's see now, how twisted can we get on epistemology here?

"No! No, I will not look through the telescope. That is the devil's instrument. I don't care if you think you see another planet out there!"

"No! No, I will not acknowledge scientifc findings that demonstrate a causal relationship between mind and brain. It is only a correlation! A causal relationship is, in principle, impossible."

Anybody else here done with this twit? Or does the twit wish to re-work his "logic?"

Cheers,

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different. I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible?? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory? If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


BillHoyt
Pretzel logic. You need to toss in some salt, II. If there is a causal relationship you would assert it is, in principle, impossible? Let's see now, how twisted can we get on epistemology here?

"No! No, I will not look through the telescope. That is the devil's instrument. I don't care if you think you see another planet out there!"

"No! No, I will not acknowledge scientifc findings that demonstrate a causal relationship between mind and brain. It is only a correlation! A causal relationship is, in principle, impossible."

Anybody else here done with this twit? Or does the twit wish to re-work his "logic?"

If there is some error in the paragraph of mine you have quoted above, then please state what it is rather than go off on a tangent.

Edited to add: Maybe you're misunderstanding what I'm saying. Try putting a "But" at the start of my second sentence sa that it now says:

"But I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible". ( I shall edit my original post)

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Because the conclusion does not follow from the research.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How would you know?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because scientific research cannot acheive the miraculous. In supposing it can you are misunderstanding the nature of science;

Nobody is suggesting that science can accomplish the miraculous.

what its legimate area of concern is. There is nothing, nor could there ever be anything about the physical facts of the world (ie those facts discernable from a third person perspective) which suggest or imply phenomenal consciousness. I''m afraid that scientific research is simply not relevant pal.

You have claimed this many, many times. What you have never done is given any good reason why anybody should believe it is true, much less any actual evidence that it is true. What, are we just supposed to take your word for it?

You have flat out stated that you "have absolutely zero interest in research design", and "have no interest in correlational studies". This would suggest to me that you are poorly qualified to be making assessments about the scientific research in this, or any other area of research.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I do not need to make an assessment of the scientific research since it cannot acheive that which is impossible.

This is nothing more than a metaphysical assumption you have made. Which makes more sense? To assume that a particular endeavor is impossible, and never even try, or to assume that it is possible until such time as it is demonstrated not to be?

Give us a good reason to believe it is impossible. I am not so pessimistic as to simply assume it is a-priori.

On one hand you are asserting that you have no interest in the kind of research that people are claiming shows a causal relationship between brain activity and consciousness,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Such a "causal" relationship, in the sense that Gebeker has defined it, is an irrelevance.

How so? You apparently want to hold research on consciousness to a higher (and impossible) standard than other things. Why? Do you not realize that it is, in general, impossible to prove causation in the strict sense? The best we can do is show that a causal relationship is the most parsimonious explanation for the observed correlations. In the case of consciousness, the scientific evidence, which you so blissfully ignore, clearly demonstrates that a causal relationship between brain activity and phenomenal consciousness is the most parsimonious explanation for the observed correlations. That is how science works.

but on the other hand you are confidently asserting that there is no causal relationship, and that the research does not indicate such a relationship, even when people who are knowledgable about the research say otherwise.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If there is a causal relationship as the physicist would define it then this is completely different.

I am puzzled as to what you think a physicists definition of causality would be. Although the definition Gebeker provided was a bit oversimplified, it is essentially the standard used throughout science. The conditions he outlined are exactly the type of conditions under which a causal relationship is the most parsimonious explanation.

I would assert that such a causal relationship is in principle impossible. How can any scientific research get around that which is in principle impossible??

You can assert that until you are blue in the face. Can't you wrap your mind around the fact that many very intelligent and knowledgable people simply don't agree with this assertion?

If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous, then how can it play a fruitful role in any theory?

It can't. But since it clearly is causally efficacious, as evidenced by the fact that its very existence has caused us to be having this discussion, the point is moot.

If on the other hand phenomenal consciousness is logically entailed by third person physical processes, then this isn't a causal relationship. For A to cause B, A and B can neither be numerically identical, nor can A logically entail B. A causal relationship betweeen "A" and "B" implies a natural relationship rather than a logical relationship.

What's your point? The hypothesis supported by materialists is that consciousness is a physical process of the brain. The causal relationship being posited is not "brain causes mind", but rather "alterations to the brain cause effects on mental states". The causal relationships are evidence in support of the theory. They constitute such supporting evidence because the existence of such causal relationships is predicted by the theory, and because the theory is falsifiable.

Thus according to the theory, consciousness is logically entailed by physical brain activity, and a causal relationship exists between physical influences on the brain and changes to mental states.

Now why, exactly, do you claim that this scenario is impossible? Other than the fact that you believe it is?

Dr. Stupid

 

[BillHoyt]

Ian: "If there is some error in the paragraph of mine you have quoted above, then please state what it is rather than go off on a tangent."

Stimpy: "I am puzzled as to what you think a physicists definition of causality would be. Although the definition Gebeker provided was a bit oversimplified, it is essentially the standard used throughout science. The conditions he outlined are exactly the type of conditions under which a causal relationship is the most parsimonious explanation."

I'll also cite my post on Mills as well as Gebeker's description of the same. It is time, Ian, for you to do some reading. Go back through what Gebeker, Stimpy and I have written.

Cheers,

 

[Interesting Ian]

Haven't got time to respond to people at this moment, but could we get rid of a source of confusion?

All the materialists are conflating the 2 distinct definitions of causation that have been given, namely my own and Gebeker's.

Now what I require to know is if the materialists are denying there is any such distinction?

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:

1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.

Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?

Thanks.

 

[BillHoyt]

Haven't got time to respond to people at this moment, but could we get rid of a source of confusion?

All the materialists are conflating the 2 distinct definitions of causation that have been given, namely my own and Gebeker's.

Now what I require to know is if the materialists are denying there is any such distinction?

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:



Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?

Thanks.

Gebeker described causation in scientific terms. You are trying to run us down the epiphenomenality road.

Cheers,

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?

I recognize that there is a distinction. I also recognize that you are talking about two different things.

First there is the issue of whether scientific research demonstrates that there is a causal relationship between brain activity and mental states. According to both definitions, there is.

Second, there is the question of whether phenomenal consciousness is causally efficacious. With respect to that, I have a couple of points.

1) We know that phenomenal consciousness exist.

2) The very fact that we know it exists demonstrates that it is causally efficacious.

What you listed is essentially the criteria necessary for us to say that A causes B. That is more specific than just saying that A is causally efficacious. Likewise, what Gedeker listed is simply the criteria by which the criteria you listed are met.

We know that some sort of causal relationship exists between phenomenal consciousness and brain activity exists. Furthermore, we know that phenomenal consciousness does have some sort of causal effect on the brain. At this point it is simply a question of determining what those relationships are. In other words, producing a complete theory to describe the phenomena. Pretending that phenomenal consciousness is not causally efficacious serves no purpose.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Guest]

 

[BillyJoe]

UCE,

I can see that you have a merry-go-round going round and round and round.....
But why it it also jerking up and down......

(stop it man or you'll go blind)

 

[Interesting Ian]

To remind you of the notion of causality that I provided. I mentioned that an event or existent is causally efficaceous if it plays a fruitful role in some successful theory describing the world or part of the world.

However Gebeker prvided what I consider a different definition of causality. He said that causal relationship between event A and event B pertains if:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Experimentally alter event A and observe the effects on event B. We then observe consistent, reliable effects on event B.

2. Experimentally remove event A. When we do this, we observe that event B goes away.

3. Measure event A very precisely, and show that event B can be predicted with great accuracy based on event A.

4. Find a case where event B is absent, and restore it by altering event A.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now note I am not quarrrelling with his definition of causality. I do however maintain it is different from my own. Are people denying there is any such distinction?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I recognize that there is a distinction. I also recognize that you are talking about two different things.

Good! Would it also not be the case that the definition of causality that I've supplied tends to be the one understood in the hard sciences, and the one that Gebeker has supplied the one understood in the soft sciences?

First there is the issue of whether scientific research demonstrates that there is a causal relationship between brain activity and mental states. According to both definitions, there is.

This is a blatant lie. The only way phenomenological consciousness could play a fruitful role in our successful theories would be to identify it with its neural correlates. But this then begs the question! You cannot argue for materialism by assuming its correctness at the outset! If one presumes at the outset that an elephant is one and the same thing as a banana then it need not be surprising that one's conclusion is that an elephant is one and the same thing as a banana.

Second, there is the question of whether phenomenal consciousness is causally efficacious. With respect to that, I have a couple of points.

1) We know that phenomenal consciousness exist.

2) The very fact that we know it exists demonstrates that it is causally efficacious.

This does not follow. There is nothing inherently absurd about something existing yet being causally inefficaceous. Of course I do believe that phenomenal consciousness is causally efficaceous. I'm not even convinced that epiphenomenalism is intelligible. But I don't think that diminishes at all David Chalmers arguments against materialism. I mean I get the impression that his arguments are really addressing the intelligibility of materialism rather than a postive argument for property dualism
(at least from what I've read).