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Mind the same as brain

I'm a little surprised, on this site, that more people aren't questioning the existence of "mind" itself. I'm looking for the specific reference, but I've seen cognitive psychology [one version of the study of the study of the mind] termed "the new spiritualism." Evidence of "mind" is not really different from evidence of "soul" or "spirit" if we take "mind" as any sort of causal but non-physical entity. Minds, and souls, are simply assumed to exist, because we have always thought so, despite an absence of any evidence.

We know (much more than is commonly believed) the processes by which the brain works. We still do not know how the brain interacts with the mind, or which direction (or neither or both) is causal. How can a non-physical entity interact with a physical one, without violating TLOP (and winning a million bucks?)? Nobody can point to the mind, nearly 400 years after Descartes suggested the pineal gland. Such a long search with so little in the way of results? Sounds like parapsychology.
 
Interesting Ian said:
No I'm afraid it's the only word which is appropriate. We cannot declare a causal relationship. This is because the word "causal" ought only to be employed within the context of theories describing the world. Phenomenal consciousness is not implied by the totality of physical facts about the world. It is simply tacked on to the materialist metaphysic.

I don't think you understand what the word “correlational” means. The data I’ve cited is EXPERIMENTAL in nature, ***NOT*** correlational. A correlational study is one in which the researcher looks for relationships between variables that are not under experimental control. Application of pharmacological agents, lesion studies, and electrical stimulation are under the direct control of the experimenter. As such, we can infer causality from such studies. The word “causal” should be applied any time the experimental design is one that allows one to infer causality.

Suppose I conduct a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study of an antidepressant and find that depressed patients show significant improvement in mood when compared with the control group. In this case, the ONLY difference between the two groups is that one had the real drug and the other had the placebo. The whole point of such a rigorous design is to allow the researcher to determine causal relationships.

I would encourage you to take a course on research design. Anyone that is at all familiar with research design will tell you that such studies are experimental, NOT correlational.

As explained it is all correlational.

As explained above, you are mistaken.

Obviously not. You wouldn't talk about the taking of anti-depressants though. It's the physical changes within the brain brought about by anti-depresants which is crucial. So the question then is whether certain physical processes in the brain is one and the same thing as being in a less depressed mood.

Your argument seems to be the following:
1. All things that are physical in nature are (at least in theory) observable.

2. “Mind” is something that isn’t observable, even in theory.

3. Therefore, it must be nonphysical.

4. Physical processes alone cannot give rise to nonphysical phenomena.

5. If mind is nonphysical, then it cannot be solely the result of physical processes.

6. Therefore, consciousness must involve something like a soul.

There are several problems with this argument. First of all, the second premise assumes that the mind is not an illusion. That’s a point that many would disagree with (BillyJoe explained this idea pretty well with his “user illusion” post). So, if you want to “win” with philosophy here, you need to defeat this argument somehow.

Secondly, your fourth premise is clearly wrong if you accept the definition of “physical” given in your first premise. Take something like “mathematical ability”. Does it exist? Sure. Can you directly observe it? Nope. You can observe its effects, of course, just as you can observe the effects of “mind”. But you can’t really observe “mathematical ability”. Does this mean that mathematical ability requires something nonphysical? (Be careful before you say yes, here. Do you really want to have to argue that your calculator only works through some mystical, magical, nonphysical “something”?)

Well you're not quoting what I said. This is ludicrous. Where's the bit I put about modification? The taking of anti depressants does lead to an alleviation of mood. This I do not deny.

Yes, you did deny it. You denied it in this very post, where you claimed (incorrectly) that we can’t infer causality from such studies because they are correlational in nature. If you accept that antidepressants lead to an elevation of mood, then you also must accept that the brain plays a fundamental role in consciousness. So, if we both agree on that, then our only disagreement lies in the fact that you want to claim that something nonphysical is also necessary, whereas I claim that there is no reason to believe that. Thus, the burden of proof is on you here, because your “theory” of mind requires the existence of unproven entities, and mine does not.

What I am denying is that this somehow proves that the mind originates from the brain. I've already explained this. What is wrong with you??

What I am saying is that we have a great deal of evidence showing that the brain plays a fundamental role in consciousness. You have no evidence at all to suggest that anything nonphysical is necessary. I notice that you still have no evidence to show us.

It is not clear to me why it should be I who is required to provide evidence that the self and emotions are not identical or a property of physical processes. I'm taking the default sensible position that emotions are a manifestation of the self, and that this self is not identical to, or is a property of the physical.

As I said above, if you accept that antidepressants elevate mood by acting on the physical structure of the brain, then we both agree that the brain plays a role in consciousness. Thus, my theory of mind involves one entity: brain. Yours requires brain+[unproven nonphysical something]. Logically, the burden of proof should be on you here, because your "theory" of mind requires the existence of unproven entities and mine does not.

I mentioned all the evidence for survival. But really it's not a question of evidence because what we need to consider are competing metaphysical hypotheses. Does it make sense to suppose emotions are identical to, or are entailed by physical processes for example? These are the type of questions you need to address to see if your materialism is intelligible.

I have addressed these questions by citing evidence that clearly shows that the brain plays a very fundamental role in consciousness. I have repeatedly asked you for evidence showing us that consciousness requires something nonphysical, and you have no such evidence to offer.

Yes and it's irrelevant because my metaphysical hypotheses equally accounts for such correlations. Namely the soul operates through the brain, but is appropriately "filtered" by the brain, depending upon its condition, thereby resulting in the mind.

Your hypothesis does not account equally well for such observations. (THEY ARE NOT CORRELATIONS!!!!) My explanation requires only known phenomena (the brain). Your explanation requires the existence of a soul that is necessary for consciousness. Yet, you have offered us absolutely no evidence at all to support this idea. (Remember: even if you are completely convinced that the soul exists, that does nothing to support your position. You hypothesis requires a soul that plays a crucial role in human consciousness . So, you have to not only show us that the soul exists, but you need to also show us evidence that the soul is necessary for consciousness. Good luck on that one, my friend. :) )

Appealing to Occams razor is vacuous because materialists always define the most simple position as the one in accordance with their metaphysic, ie materialism.

I don’t think you understand Occam’s razor. Occam’s razor simply says that, if you have two competing explanations for a given observation, the one that is most likely to be right (all else being equal) is the one that requires the fewest unproven elements. My explanation for consciousness requires only the brain – an element that we both know exists and we both know plays a role in consciousness. So, my theory of mind requires zero unproven elements. Yours requires at least one (the undefined, nonphysical “something” that you seem so reluctant to tell us anything about).

If you applied Occams razor to TV sets you would conclude that the story line of a TV programme has its origin in the TV set's internal components!

Nonsense. If I apply Occam’s razor to TV sets, I conclude that the function of the TV can be explained using known phenomena. Again, you are misunderstanding Occam’s razor. It does **NOT** say that “the simplest explanation is the right one”.

Answered this above and in previous post.

Where? Where have you shown us any evidence at all to support your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical?

I could argue that correlations are equal evidence for my hypothesis. We need the brain to filter out certain perceptions and realities, otherwise I hazard a guess that we wouldn't be able to operate proficiently in this empirical reality.

The evidence I've cited is designed to show that the brain is necessary for consciousness, and that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and consciousness. You want to add something nonphysical. I'm simply challenging you to justify that claim.

You need to understand what "scientific proof" means. It's impossible to have scientific proof for survival. For scientific proof to work you need a theory. A theory which has predictions which subsequent experimentation either fullfills or falsifies.

If you have no theory and no testable predictions, then on what grounds do you expect us to accept your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical? Suppose I decide that human consciousness is really a computer program running on some alien machine somewhere, with a little touch of magic thrown in by an alien wizard named Bob. This absurd “theory” of mind can explain all of the available data, too. (i.e. we think we have physical bodies and brains, but that’s just because the computer program fools us with tricky input) If I can’t provide any evidence to support this silly idea, why should anyone take it seriously?

By the same token, if you can't provide any evidence to support your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical, then why should we take that idea seriously?

The soul can't be identified with the mind because the mind changes all the time whilst presumably the soul would be unchanging. Think about what your mind is now compared to when you were 5 years old. The soul is that which makes you the very same person now, as when you were 5, or drunk, or suffering from Alzheimers etc.

Ok, so if the mind is not equal to soul, then you have to explain the basis for your assumption that the soul must play a role in human consciousness. Why couldn’t a religious person believe that he has a soul that contributes nothing at all to what he currently experiences as “mind”?

But even if materialism is correct, that doesn't mean the mind is an illusion now does it??

Can you prove to us that the mind is NOT an illusion (as described by BillyJoe)?

I believe the self is ontologically self-subsistent.

Do I understand you correctly? Are you saying that our minds have no ultimate origin?
 
The brain has many billions of neurons. Each one of those neurons is a tiny processor that can encode a surprising amount of information. Each one of those neurons makes connections with thousands of others. This is a level of processing power that absolutely defies human comprehension. When faced with something like that, our subjective impressions are highly unreliable. Consider some of the discoveries of relativity or quantum mechanics. The real world can be wildly different from what our subjective impressions tell us.
 
Originally posted by Gebeker:
Can you prove to us that the mind is NOT an illusion (as described by BillyJoe)?

Just want to hold on to this thought.. And perhaps state the obvious.

If the mind is an illusion, then it is an illusion that everyone with a mind is experiencing, and therefore indistinquishable from what we choose to call reality.
 
There is an object. The object supports a number of processes. There is feedback between the processes and the object, which allow some restructuring of the object.
Illusion may be one of the outputs, but there is nothing illusory about either object or process.
fishbob was careful to avoid hardware/software analogies , but the metaphor has some value- for example noone would suggest the process of a running program is an illusion. It may not be REAL in some senses, but it exists all right.
 
Diogenes said:
Originally posted by Gebeker:

Just want to hold on to this thought.. And perhaps state the obvious.

If the mind is an illusion, then it is an illusion that everyone with a mind is experiencing, and therefore indistinquishable from what we choose to call reality.

Well, to some extent this is a matter of semantics. If you read BillyJoe's post, I don't think he means to say that we don't have a mind. I interpreted his post to mean that the mind doesn't exist in the same way that a brain exists, and it doesn't exist in the way that some people believe a soul exists. According to this idea the mind is real, but the illusion is the introspective impression that "mind" is an entity separate from the functions of the brain.

Does "mathematical ability" exist? Sure. Does it exist as a nonphysical entity, with some sort of supernatural component? Nah. A calculator certainly has mathematical ability. Yet, it would be really bizarre to imagine that its mathematical ability is an entity, beyond just being something that comes from a functioning calculator.
 
mercutio
How can a non-physical entity interact with a physical one, without violating TLOP (and winning a million bucks?)? Nobody can point to the mind, nearly 400 years after Descartes suggested the pineal gland
I think that is what is being argued here, that the mind is not some non-physical entity, rather the product of X number of neurons reaching some critical mass that results in consciousness.
 
quote:
I think that is what is being argued here, that the mind is not some non-physical entity, rather the product of X number of neurons reaching some critical mass that results in consciousness.


ok, now define consciousness in a non-mentalistic manner. :cool:

seriously, whether you use the term mind or consciousness, I get the feeling that the going opinion is that it exists in a literal sense. Maybe I'm just used to hearing that argument. Oh, and I don't think it is a particular number of neurons reaching a metaphorical critical mass--rather, it is the development of a language complex enough to speak metaphorically. (bet you saw that coming.)
 
Gebeker
I don't think you understand what the word “correlational” means. The data I’ve cited is EXPERIMENTAL in nature, ***NOT*** correlational. A correlational study is one in which the researcher looks for relationships between variables that are not under experimental control. Application of pharmacological agents, lesion studies, and electrical stimulation are under the direct control of the experimenter. As such, we can infer causality from such studies. The word “causal” should be applied any time the experimental design is one that allows one to infer causality.

Suppose I conduct a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study of an antidepressant and find that depressed patients show significant improvement in mood when compared with the control group. In this case, the ONLY difference between the two groups is that one had the real drug and the other had the placebo. The whole point of such a rigorous design is to allow the researcher to determine causal relationships.

I would encourage you to take a course on research design. Anyone that is at all familiar with research design will tell you that such studies are experimental, NOT correlational.

First things first. I want to make it clear that I have absolutely zero interest in research design, nor have I any interest in correlational studies. Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem, although science may give us clues. I have informed you the relationship between brain events and mental events is correlational rather than causal. Nevertheless you want to describe the relationship as causal. Well fine. But bear in mind that even if a one to one correlation is dicovered between all mental events and brain events, this will not have explained the existence of consciousness whatsoever.

To explain consciousness from the perspective of a materialist based metaphysic, you need to either of one of two things.

a) If you are a reductionist materialist, then you hold that (phenomenal) consciousness is identical to, or is logically entailed by physical facts. Thus you must demonstrate this to be so. Clearly demonstrating correlations or a "causal" relationship between the mental and physical does not do this.

b) You are not a reductionist materialist, in which case, in a suitable sense, you suppose consciousness exists in its own right, although it is ontologically dependent on the physical. In this case you need to explain (phenomenal) consciousness by it being an essential element in some overarching theory. Given that phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficacious (otherwise the physical world isn't closed), I fail to see how it could be so conbsidered to be an essential element.

I suggest to you that it is in principle impossible to account for the existence of consciouness.

Now I'll answer the rest of your post if and when I have time.
 
Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem, although science may give us clues. I have informed you the relationship between brain events and mental events is correlational rather than causal.

Nobody is going to accept this, Ian. You have set up the ground rules for yourself so that science doesn't apply when you don't like the results, but can give you clues when you do like the results. You've set up that you can use 'correlational' and 'causal' when it suits you, cherry-pick scientific research when it suits you, and dismiss science when it doesn't.

And you wonder why you're number 3 or so on the "Most Likely to be on an Ignore List" list. :rolleyes:

Cheers,
 
Interesting Ian said:
Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem.
Better tell Whodini who dini this in the Science forum.

Hal (my dear friend)......
Piss this thread off out of our Science forum will you?
Dump it in that garbage disposal unit euphemistically called R&P.


[Hal]Done.[/Hal]


Thanks Hal (mate).
 
Ian,

To explain consciousness from the perspective of a materialist based metaphysic, you need to either of one of two things.

a) If you are a reductionist materialist, then you hold that (phenomenal) consciousness is identical to, or is logically entailed by physical facts. Thus you must demonstrate this to be so. Clearly demonstrating correlations or a "causal" relationship between the mental and physical does not do this.

Clearly, as a reductionist materialist, I think that phenomenal consciousness can, at least in principle, be shown to be logically entailed by physical facts. What I don't understand is why you are so certain that this is not possible.

A couple of points:

1) You have made it clear that nothing short of being able to formally deduce the existence of phenomenal consciousness from physical facts will convince you that the materialists are correct. Do you really believe that such a deduction is not, even in principle, possible? If not, why not? Where is your evidence that this cannot be done. I remind you that the fact that it has not yet been done does not constitute such evidence, particularly when you consider that we still only know a tiny fraction of the relevant physical facts.

2) Are you aware that consciousness is not unique in this regard? For example, we cannot logically deduce chemical properties from quantum mechanics (yet). would you argue that this somehow implies that chemistry is not reducible to physics?

3) You have asserted, repeatedly, that this is a philosophical issue, and not a scientific one. How do you know? Unless you can prove that phenomenal consciousness can not, even in principle, be reduced to physical facts, you cannot claim that it is not a scientific issue.

It sounds to me like you are asserting that materialism is false, demanding that it be proven true, and then citing the fact that we cannot prove it true as evidence that it is false. Do you not realize that this is a fallacy?

Dr. Stupid
 
Gebeker said:
Your argument seems to be the following:
1. All things that are physical in nature are (at least in theory) observable.

Observable in the sense they play a fruitful role in some successful theory. All our observations, even of everyday mundane objects, implicitly incorporate low level theory.

2. “Mind” is something that isn’t observable, even in theory.

Consciousness or mental events, not mind! Anyway, only if consciousness is not identical, or is a logical necessary function of certain physical processes.

3. Therefore, it must be nonphysical.

4. Physical processes alone cannot give rise to nonphysical phenomena.

Where have I stated "4"?

5. If mind is nonphysical, then it cannot be solely the result of physical processes.

No I haven't stated this. :rolleyes:

6. Therefore, consciousness must involve something like a soul.

I haven't stated this. What I've stated is that it's the best hypothesis given the evidence and overall intelligibility.

There are several problems with this argument. First of all, the second premise assumes that the mind is not an illusion. That’s a point that many would disagree with (BillyJoe explained this idea pretty well with his “user illusion” post). So, if you want to “win” with philosophy here, you need to defeat this argument somehow.

Please be more specific. Are you talking about minds or consciousnesses? If the latter then it's easy to refute your position. In order to declare something is an illusion we must be in a position to declare what it would be like if it were real. For example, if I witness a visual illusion I know that it is an illusion because I would not receive a tactile sensation on attempting to touch it. But what does it mean to say that consciousness is an illusion? An illusion compared to what? The point is we experience things. We experience redness, hope, despair, pain or whatever. What meaning can be attached in saying all these experiences are illusions? And if you're maintaining that these experiences are real, but the mind is an illusion, then again I would say this is meaningless because the mind is just the author or experiencer of all these experiences.

It seems that the only way you can say that minds/consciousnesses are an iullusion would be to deny that people actually have any experiences. No-one ever feels hope, depair, redness etc. Metphysical behaviourists/eliminative materialists hold this position as far as I am able to understand these things. Do you also hold this position?

Secondly, your fourth premise is clearly wrong if you accept the definition of “physical” given in your first premise. Take something like “mathematical ability”. Does it exist? Sure. Can you directly observe it? Nope. You can observe its effects, of course, just as you can observe the effects of “mind”. But you can’t really observe “mathematical ability”. Does this mean that mathematical ability requires something nonphysical? (Be careful before you say yes, here. Do you really want to have to argue that your calculator only works through some mystical, magical, nonphysical “something”?)

What is this nonsense?? :eek: You either are implicitly invoking consciousness when you use the term "mathematical ability", in which case you are simply begging the question, or you're simply referring to a step by step procedure where such step is a logically necessary consequence of the previous step. Your mention of the calculater implies the latter. But one can see this process go on. Just imagine a mechanical computer with cogs and wheels and what not!
 
Interesting Ian said:
First things first. I want to make it clear that I have absolutely zero interest in research design, nor have I any interest in correlational studies.

If you have no interest in research design, then why criticize the conclusions of research?

Get it through your head that this is a philosophical problem, and not at all a scientific problem, although science may give us clues.

I have never disputed that philosophy plays a very important role in this question. My point has always been that science gives us some very important clues.

I have informed you the relationship between brain events and mental events is correlational rather than causal. Nevertheless you want to describe the relationship as causal. Well fine. But bear in mind that even if a one to one correlation is dicovered between all mental events and brain events, this will not have explained the existence of consciousness whatsoever.

You continue to misunderstand the meaning of the term “correlational”, and I suspect that the reason why is that you have no interest in research design (by your own admission). If you have no interest in research design, why is it so hard to believe that you may be misunderstanding the design and conclusions drawn from the scientific studies I’ve cited?

Correlational: Did you know that, if you take a random sample of the population, you will discover that tall people are more likely to get prostate cancer than short people? Thus, there is a correlation between height and risk of prostate cancer. However, this is not because being tall makes you get cancer. The correlation exists because of a third factor (being male). Only males get prostate cancer, and males are taller than females (on the average). In other words, you can’t conclude that a causal relationship exists just because of a correlation.

*NOT* correlational: You give newly discover ed drug “X” to 200 people and a placebo to another 200 people in a randomized, double blind, controlled study. People that took drug X have 5 times the incidence of prostate cancer as people that got the placebo. In this case, we have learned something about the ***CAUSAL*** relationship between drug X and prostate cancer.

Now, when I say that antidepressants ***CAUSE*** a change in people’s mental states, I am quite justified in saying that there is a causal relationship there. Similarly, when a brain surgeon removes specific portions of a person’s brain, and the person shows specific (and predictable) effects on “mind”, I am quite justified in saying that there is a causal relationship there, as well. These observations (plus the others I’ve mentioned) tell us that there is a very strong relationship between brain activity and mental states, and that the brain is necessary for consciousness. Does this absolutely prove that the brain alone is sufficient? No, and I have never claimed that these data provide proof that a materialistic view of mind is correct.

My point is, was, and will continue to be this: We have solid evidence that the brain is necessary for consciousness, and we have strong evidence that there is a (VERY strong) relationship between brain activity and conscious mental states. A great many mental activities (including such higher functions as decision making) are so strongly related to neural activity that they can (under certain conditions, at least) be unfailingly predicted by observing the activity of a single neuron. This tells me that the brain plays an extremely important role in consciousness. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that anything other than the brain is necessary for consciousness. Therefore, Occam’s razor tells us that a materialistic theory of mind is more likely to be right than dualism.

In the rest of your post, you seem to want to shift the burden of proof to me. This is inappropriate, because I have never claimed that we have proof that a materialistic theory of mind is correct. My claim has always been that materialistic theories of mind are more likely to be right (for reasons that I’ve explained repeatedly). In short, dualism is like my invisible unicorn theory. No one can disprove it, but why on earth would anyone believe in it?

I suggest to you that it is in principle impossible to account for the existence of consciouness.

Yes, and that is all you have done: suggest it. You’ve provided no reason at all why we should accept your “suggestion”. :)
 

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