Split Thread Michael Brown and Katrina

[RandFan]

These are yes or no questions:

¹If you read COL (Ret) Jeff Smith's testimony, he was clearly surprised at the numbers at the Superdome and Convention Center as well. Is he incompetent or obfuscating as well? This is relevant as apparently Brown's surprise is evident that he is incompetent or obfuscating. I am asking if this is true, then do you feel the same about COL (Ret) Jeff Smith, the the Louisiana Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness>

² Do you hold Johnny Bradberry at all responsible? You have not given a simple direct answer to this.

³The questions that you claim I won't answer are ones that you have literally just asked me for the first time.

⁴PS, FEMA is not like your local fire department. Perhaps this is the source of your misunderstanding. Again, please read up on FEMA and its mission and role. I have referred you previously to the testimony of Bill Carwile, Scott Wells, and Phil Parr.

1.) Red herring. Nothing changes based on the answer. I'm willing to grant you whatever premise you want for arguments sake.

2.) Red herring. Nothing changes based on the answer. I'm willing to grant you whatever premise you want for arguments sake.

3.) They aren't the only ones I've asked and not the only ones you will continue to ignore.

4.) Misses the point. The idea of a "contract" without any assets in place to meet a disaster is absurd on its face. Katrina wasn't a necessary object lesson. We didn't need to go through that.

FEMA's job is to succeed. Not fail. It failed.

 

[RandFan]

You seem to be blaming FEMA to the exclusion of the state and local agencies, which is not what the report said. Read your own citations.

I'm happy to blame local officials. I refuse to allow local officials to be scapegoated to excuse the failures of Bush and Co.

ETA: Go back to the first page and you will see that I volunteered on my own that local officials were culpable.

 

[Augustine]

So why don't you tell me which local officials you hold responsible and what actions or lack of actions you hold them responsible for? Because all I've seen in this thread is Brown and Bush. You have mentioned Nagin as much as you mentioned Chertoff and Rice (and still have not explained which ESF you think Rice failed in).

Again, answer the questions, and demonstrate that you hold the local officials to the same standard you hold the federal.

 

[RandFan]

The Topic of the Thread IS Brown and Bush.

Because all I've seen in this thread is Brown and Bush.

I didn't get to pick the thread title so I owe you a bit of slack. However, The topic of the thread is the failure of the Bush Admin to prepare for an emergency that was on the top of FEMA's list.

I'm happy to have a conversation with you and I'll address the rest of your post in a moment. However, let's be crystal clear here, I've talked about Brown and Bush because the thread is about them.

 

[RandFan]

¹You have mentioned Nagin as much as you mentioned Chertoff and Rice (and still have not explained which ESF you think Rice failed in).

Again, answer the questions, and demonstrate that you hold the local officials to the same standard you hold the federal.

1. The point is to indict the Bush admin. It failed in every way possible including "let them eat cake" apathy.
2. A.) "But they did it too" is a tu quoque fallacy. The failures of the subordinates cannot excuse the administration. B.) Perhaps incompetent, perhaps dishonest. Perhaps both. They had access to the same data that NOAA, FEMA report and NWS made clear.

 

[RandFan]

Again, answer the questions, and demonstrate that you hold the local officials to the same standard you hold the federal.

I wish Nagin and others had done serious time. I really do. I certainly think Bush and his cronies should do time. However, let's be honest, from the start the plan was to shift all blame to the locals.

Friday, September 2

ROVE-LED CAMPAIGN TO BLAME LOCAL OFFICIALS BEGINS: “Under the command of President Bush’s two senior political advisers, the White House rolled out a plan…to contain the political damage from the administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina.” President Bush’s comments from the Rose Garden Friday morning formed “the start of this campaign.” [New York Times, 9/5/05]

 

[Augustine]

It's not a tu quoque fallacy; the discussion in this thread has been one of relative responsibility. I have said that I think sunmaster's order of blame is largely correct, with the insertion of Chertoff (or the concept of rolling FEMA under DHS as well as mentioned by sunmaster).

When Rove appears, it is usually a portent that the conversation is preparing to descend into partisan hysterics, but anyway...

Who are "Nagin and others"? Who are "Bush and his cronies"? Who do you hold responsible and why (specifics, not general bumper sticker statements)? No offense, but right now you strike me as Abe Simpson shaking his fist at the sky - just some anger at faces you see on TV, but no real thought behind it. Who at the city level besides Nagin? Why? What did they do or fail to do (again specifically, in terms of their emergency management responsibility)? Who at the state level? (Johnny Bradberry? Jeff Smith? Blanco? Other officials?) Again, why (specifically)? Who at the federal level? Did you read my earlier criticism of Chertoff where I listed specific actions? Can you do something similar - specific actions supported by actual reference to roles as spelled out in National Response Plan, not simplistic assertions? Do you blame anyone at the Corps of Engineers? Who, specifically? Do you blame the FEMA guys on the ground - in Louisiana, it was Bill Lokey, FCO, Scott Wells, Deputy FCO, and Phil Parr, with the emergency response advance team? Do you blame any of the other government agencies with ESF responsibilities? Can you explain again what ESF you think Department of State failed to support?

FEMA's job is to succeed. Not fail. It failed.

Maybe you don't see the irony here. From all your postings, I can see that you dislike Bush and in all likelihood think he is a simple-minded dumbass. So it's ironic that you would then express FEMA's mission in such a simple-minded, dumbass way. I can't say this is the most inane statement I've seen, but it certainly does not impress me as the statement of someone with a nuanced understanding of emergency response, FEMA's role, and the National Response Plan.

 

[RandFan]

It's not a tu quoque fallacy; the discussion in this thread has been one of relative responsibility. I have said that I think sunmaster's order of blame is largely correct, with the insertion of Chertoff (or the concept of rolling FEMA under DHS as well as mentioned by sunmaster).

When Rove appears, it is usually a portent that the conversation is preparing to descend into partisan hysterics, but anyway...

Who are "Nagin and others"? Who are "Bush and his cronies"? Who do you hold responsible and why (specifics, not general bumper sticker statements)? No offense, but right now you strike me as Abe Simpson shaking his fist at the sky - just some anger at faces you see on TV, but no real thought behind it. Who at the city level besides Nagin? Why? What did they do or fail to do (again specifically, in terms of their emergency management responsibility)? Who at the state level? (Johnny Bradberry? Jeff Smith? Blanco? Other officials?) Again, why (specifically)? Who at the federal level? Did you read my earlier criticism of Chertoff where I listed specific actions? Can you do something similar - specific actions supported by actual reference to roles as spelled out in National Response Plan, not simplistic assertions? Do you blame anyone at the Corps of Engineers? Who, specifically? Do you blame the FEMA guys on the ground - in Louisiana, it was Bill Lokey, FCO, Scott Wells, Deputy FCO, and Phil Parr, with the emergency response advance team? Do you blame any of the other government agencies with ESF responsibilities? Can you explain again what ESF you think Department of State failed to support?


Maybe you don't see the irony here. From all your postings, I can see that you dislike Bush and in all likelihood think he is a simple-minded dumbass. So it's ironic that you would then express FEMA's mission in such a simple-minded, dumbass way. I can't say this is the most inane statement I've seen, but it certainly does not impress me as the statement of someone with a nuanced understanding of emergency response, FEMA's role, and the National Response Plan.

I've tried to find something substantive to respond to in your post but I can't. It's one big red herring.

The topic of the thread is Michael Brown and Katrina. Specifically if Brown is criminally negligent. Do you have something substantive we could discuss in support or against the proposition? (IMO) because Brown was appointed by GWB, Bush is ultimately responsible. However, if you want to keep the discussion to Brown then I can do that.

 

[RandFan]

<questions snipped>

I don't mind answering your questions. However, this isn't a one way thing. If you are going to want me to answer your questions then you are going to have to start answering mine.

 

[RandFan]

A.) When did Gov. Blanco request help?

B.) When did Bush respond to Gov Blanco?

I'm waiting.

 

[Augustine]

A.) When did Gov. Blanco request help?

B.) When did Bush respond to Gov Blanco?

If you are referring to Gov. Blanco' requests for military assistance, this information is contained in pages 504-505, discussion pages 505-523, and conclusions 524-526 of the 800-page Senate report you cited earlier. Didn't you know that? Chapter 26, be sure to read the whole thing.

 

[RandFan]

If you are referring to Gov. Blanco' requests for military assistance, this information is contained in pages 504-505, discussion pages 505-523, and conclusions 524-526 of the 800-page Senate report you cited earlier. Didn't you know that? Chapter 26, be sure to read the whole thing.

I know what the answer to the question is. I want you to demonstrate that YOU know what the answer to the question is.

 

[Augustine]

I gave you exact page citations. Seriously?

 

[RandFan]

I gave you exact page citations. Seriously?

Then perhaps you could answer the questions. Here, let me give them to you again.

A.) When did Gov. Blanco request help?

B.) When did Bush respond to Gov Blanco?

FWIW: I've pasted the dates in this thread. That's not the point. I want to know, if YOU know the answers.

Do you? If so, what are they?

 

[Augustine]

Here is the timeline with abbreviated descriptions and key quotes/events.

According to Blanco, she speaks with President Bush on the afternoon of the 29th, informing him that she would need every resource possible from the federal government. She recalls telling him, "We need your help. We need everything you've got." There is no indication that there was ever any greater specificity in the request than this vague statement.

Tuesday, August 30: Governor Blanco asks General Landreneau, Adjutant General of the Louisiana National Guard, to request federal military assistance (p. 508) Blanco’s concern was evacuation.

Tuesday, August 30: General Landreneau speaks to General Honoré and to General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau
According to General Landreneau, he quickly relayed Governor Blanco’s request for military troops to General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and then to General Honoré, who later that day was appointed Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, consisting of all the active-duty military forces in the Gulf Coast region responding to Katrina. Both General Honoré and General Blum, however, stated that General Landreneau first asked them for troops on Wednesday, August 31.

Although the Governor’s timeline indicates that she spoke with General Landreneau regarding the need for troops following her afternoon visit to the Superdome, General Landreneau stated that in a telephone conversation with General Honoré on Tuesday morning he “conveyed the Governor’s desire for federal troops, in particular an Army division headquarters to plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of New Orleans.” General Landreneau stated that on that same day he asked General Blum to help obtain thousands of National Guard troops for relief efforts in Louisiana.
General Honoré recalled that he first spoke with General Landreneau sometime Tuesday evening. Although General Landreneau mentioned the need to evacuate the Superdome, his main concern was the search and rescue efforts, which required helicopters, not ground troops. According to General Honoré, General Landreneau said he had already spoken to General Blum, who had assured him that “a lot of ground capacity was on the way.” General Honoré stated that General Landreneau did not make any “particular request” for a large deployment of federal active-duty troops.
Although General Blum recalled that he spoke with General Landreneau on Tuesday evening, he was unable to recall whether General Landreneau made a specific request for troops at that time.
(p. 509)

Early hours, Wednesday, August 31: Louisiana National Guard Officers discuss with General Landreneau the need for more troops
Colonel Dabadie similarly remembered that General Landreneau agreed with the need for an active “division headquarters” unit – meaning a team of one or two dozen active duty personnel with expertise in planning, command, and logistics – for coordination and execution of evacuation.
7:21 a.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Landreneau asks the National Guard Bureau to expedite the deployment process for National Guard troops from other states
The process that began Wednesday morning resulted in the deployment of over 30,000 National Guard troops within approximately 96 hours. Partially as a result of their rapid deployment, however, most of the National Guard troops dispatched to Louisiana through this process did not know what their mission would be or where it would be performed until they arrived in Louisiana. The deployment process was “P for plenty,” according to General Vaughn. “There was not a lot of preciseness.”

9:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Honoré meets with General Landreneau and General Jones at the Superdome
General Honoré informed General Landreneau about some of the military assets that were en route, including U.S. Navy ships, but there was no discussion of ground troops at this meeting.
Morning, Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco calls the White House to ask for “significant resources” Again, note the total lack of specificity.
12:43 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: U.S. Senator David Vitter of Louisiana informs Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel to Governor Blanco, of a conversation with Karl Rove, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , regarding Rove’s comments on “federalization”
2:30 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco tells President Bush she does not want “federalization”
Mid-afternoon, Wednesday, August 31: FEMA officials consider federalization
Mid-afternoon, Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco tells FEMA Director Brown and Louisiana Federal Coordinating Officer Lokey she does not want federalization
Blanco money quote “What’s this about you taking over my disaster?” she asked Lokey.

“Let me remind you the state is still sovereign,” a member of the Governor’s staff told Lokey and Brown.

6 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco asks General Honoré to coordinate the evacuation of New Orleans.
In the midst of this discussion, General Graham, Deputy Commander of Fifth U.S. Army, arrived at the EOC, aft er driving seven hours from his headquarters in San Antonio, TX. General Graham brought with him 24 other personnel from Fifth Army headquarters for the purpose of providing support to the DCO in Baton Rouge. Shortly after General Graham joined the discussion about the state’s priorities, General Honoré turned to him and said, “Mark, evacuate the City of New Orleans and the Greater New Orleans area.” “Yes, sir,” General Graham replied.
Again, the principal participants in these conversations expressed differing perceptions and expectations as to the numbers and types of military troops that would be following. Governor Blanco and General Landreneau appear to have been under the impression that General Honoré would use a large number of federal troops to conduct the evacuation; General Honoré believed large numbers of additional active-duty troops were not needed for this mission. At the very least, the persistence of these differing expectations and perceptions amongst these principals appears to indicate a failure in communication among the principals and among the various organizations they represented.
According to the Governor’s timeline, the Governor asked General Honoré “if he brought a large number of soldiers, and learns that he arrived with only a small support staff . The evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has not arrived.”
General Landreneau told the Committee, “The Governor was very clear that she needed troops on the ground, that she needed a federal assistance. … She said she needed – she was using the number 40,000 and she was saying she needed soldiers, she needed boots on the ground.” General Landreneau added, however, that the Governor never specified which type of troops she was seeking. “I don’t recall her ever defining or differentiating between active or National Guard. She wanted the help.”
General Landreneau recalled General Honoré “stating that he was aware that the National Guard EMAC forces were going to be flowing into the state.” “I don’t recall the Governor ever saying that’s not good enough,” General Landreneau stated.
Similarly, General Honoré did not recall the Governor’s making any specific request for more federal ground troops. Nor did General Honoré believe additional federal ground troops were necessary to meet the state’s priorities. “The National Guard was flowing a lot of troops in there. And at the point in time, the priority mission was search and rescue.”
General Honoré believed that for the search-and-rescue mission he needed “thousands of helicopters, not troops,” and that for the Superdome evacuation mission he needed buses.

Based on this assessment of the resources needed to accomplish these missions, General Honoré did not request additional federal ground troops.
Likewise, General Graham did not believe he needed additional troops.

6:05 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Richard Rowe, NORTHCOM, informs General Honoré that Governor Blanco is asking for federal active duty troops
6:23 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Honoré’s staff informs General Rowe there are enough National Guard troops
8:40 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: DOD puts ground troops on alert
Thursday, September 1: President Bush meets with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Blum to discuss the military response
11:46 a.m., Thursday, September 1: General Honoré tells General Rowe National Guard troops are sufficient
1:46 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Honoré urges Marines to “GET HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN”
General Honoré explained to the Committee that he desired the capability that the Marines were bringing which included search-and-rescue helicopters, airspace command and control, and ground troops to assist with search and rescue and delivery of food and water.
1:50 p.m., Thursday, September 1: General Rowe tells General Honoré the official DOD guidance is to use National Guard forces to the fullest extent possible
3:30 p.m., Thursday, September 1: Governor Blanco meets with General Honoré
The Governor’s timeline does not mention this meeting; General Honoré does not recall any request for federal troops at this meeting.
7:45 p.m., Thursday, September 1: Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, urges Governor Blanco to federalize the response
9:20 p.m., Thursday, September 1: General Blum urges Governor Blanco not to federalize the response
Early mid-morning, Friday, September 2: Department of Defense officials discuss how to obtain greater federal control over the response in Louisiana
Late morning, Friday, September 2: President Bush and Governor Blanco discuss the deployment of federal troops
Aboard Air Force One, late Friday morning, September 2: Mayor Nagin recommends the federal government assume control
Aboard Air Force One, late Friday morning, September 2: Governor Blanco asks President Bush for more troops and rejects federalization
Late afternoon, Friday, September 2: Pentagon officials continue to discuss options for assuming greater command of the response.
11:32 p.m., Friday, September 2: White House faxes “dual-hat” proposal to Governor Blanco
8:56 a.m., Saturday, September 3: Governor Blanco telephones White House Chief of Staff Card to reject the dual-hat proposal
11 a.m., Saturday, September 3: The President announces the deployment of 7,200 active-duty forces from the 82nd Airborne, 1st Cavalry, and II Marine Expeditionary Force

What are your questions?

 

[Augustine]

Here are my questions:

If you read COL (Ret) Jeff Smith's testimony, he was clearly surprised at the numbers at the Superdome and Convention Center as well. Is he incompetent or obfuscating as well?

Do you hold Johnny Bradberry at all responsible?

Who are "Nagin and others"?

Who are "Bush and his cronies"?

Who do you hold responsible and why (specifics, not general bumper sticker statements)?

Who at the city level besides Nagin? Why? What did they do or fail to do (again specifically, in terms of their emergency management responsibility)?

Who at the state level? (Johnny Bradberry? Jeff Smith? Blanco? Other officials?) Again, why (specifically)?

Who at the federal level? Did you read my earlier criticism of Chertoff where I listed specific actions? Can you do something similar - specific actions supported by actual reference to roles as spelled out in National Response Plan, not simplistic assertions?

Do you blame anyone at the Corps of Engineers? Who, specifically?

Do you blame the FEMA guys on the ground - in Louisiana, it was Bill Lokey, FCO, Scott Wells, Deputy FCO, and Phil Parr, with the emergency response advance team?

Do you blame any of the other government agencies with ESF responsibilities?
Can you explain at all what ESF you think Department of State failed to support?

Have you ever stopped to notice that all your emergency services are at the city/county level? Why do you think fire, rescue, police, emergency medical services are all local in this manner? When was the last time you called a federal agency as a first responder?

 

[RandFan]

Here are my questions:

Slow your roll. We have a ways to go before we get off topic. This was a national emergency. There was a Federal agency in charge of seeing to it that there was adequate resources to stave off "mortal danger". Was Brown criminally negligent? If not, was he grossly incompetent? Now, if you want to argue about the competency of the underlings performing their duties we can discuss that but the thread is about Brown and his incompetency dealing with Katrina.

Augustine, I'm sincere and would like to have a conversation with you. I understand that you feel that you are responding in good faith. However, to butcher a Hispanic idiom " It itches me here, but you're scratching me there.".

If you feel that I'm hand waving away salient points by ignoring what mirrors a well documented and blatant red herring dreamed up by Karl Rove, then pick an item or a couple of items most salient that you've highlighted and we can discuss whether they excuse the failure of Brown. I've gone through the time line several times and I'm not all impressed with what you obviously think is important.

If you feel that my questions are unfair because they lack context then answer the question and then provide a brief summary of why the questions are unfair and or provide the context (if it's a lot of context provide a couple of examples).

What are your questions?

This isn't helping.

A.) When did Gov. Blanco request help?

B.) When did Bush respond to Gov Blanco?

Here's the problem: Either the enumerated premises below are true or they are not. If they are true then FEMA failed so colossally it's beyond understanding. It doesn't matter about the testimony of the underlings. The proof is in the puding and NOT their self serving testimony. They failed spectacularly. The reality mirrored (in many ways) the warnings given by.... drum roll please.... FEMA

1. FEMA did warn of dire consequences of a Cat 5 hurricane.
2. Katrina WAS a Cat 5 hurricane (at that time it was reasonable to heed FEMA's order.
3. NOA warned of a Mortal Threat.

Should he have known that a hurricane like Katrina could be a threat and therefore actually prepare for it? If so, then what did Brown do?

 

[Augustine]

My roll does not need to be slowed. You need to step up your game and demonstrate you have some knowledge of this incident and emergency response. I answered your questions, you answered none of mine. Answer my questions first.

 

[RandFan]

My roll does not need to be slowed. You need to step up your game and demonstrate you have some knowledge of this incident and emergency response. I answered your questions, you answered none of mine. Answer my questions first.

You've given me a timeline. I didn't ask for that. I've already posted the timeline with the information I'm trying to get from you. I asked a direct question for a specific reason. Either answer the questions directly or I will move on.

BTW: You are asking questions that have been answered over and over again.

If you want me to discuss this with you then you will answer the questions.

 

[carlitos]

5th June 2015, 07:32 PM
Rather than respond to me in five ten minutes with the same misconceptions, why not take some time to read the testimony of the FEMA FCOs and the Louisiana Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness and respond tomorrow or this weekend? Right now your facts are completely wrong.

This was good advice, yet unheeded.

5th June 2015, 07:37 PM #130
RandFan

Right now you are simply gainsaying. Give a beuracrat a chance to explain why he couldn't do his job and he or she will come up with very elaborate reasons for failure.

I think that the questions that Augustine asked are reasonable.