[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[jt512]

Yes, you're right, and this is where I got sidetracked earlier. The problem is not that P(Jabba) = 1 because Jabba is known to exist; it's that P(Jabba) has not been shown to be relevant to the formula.

Yes. I agree.

 

[jsfisher]

JS, in Bayesian inference for a hypothesis we combine data with the prior probability of the hypothesis to obtain an updated probability for the hypothesis, using Bayes theorm:

P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H) / P(D) ,​

where H is the hypothesis and D is the data. The data, D, is always an event that has already occurred when we perform the analysis. According to you, that implies that P(D)=1, and therefore that P(D|H)=1. But if that were true, then P(H|D) would always equal P(H), which would imply that it is impossible to do Bayesian inference. No amount of data could ever affect our opinion about the plausibility of a hypothesis.

The problem is how Bayesian statistics is being applied to Jabba's immortality case. If the data in question was hair color from a random sample of humans, fine. You could infer things related to human hair color.

Jabba's data is the human existence of a non-random sample of one existing human. You cannot infer much about human existence from his data.

 

[jt512]

The problem is how Bayesian statistics is being applied to Jabba's immortality case. If the data in question was hair color from a random sample of humans, fine. You could infer things related to human hair color.

Jabba's data is the human existence of a non-random sample of one existing human. You cannot infer much about human existence from his data.

I think that's more or less what PixyMisa is saying. But the problem with the data is not that its probability is 1.

 

[George]

- I received another email from Dr. Hoerl. He'll be traveling for a week, and doesn't expect to participate with us for a couple of weeks, but he does sound interested (to me).
- I'd post his email, but he hasn't said yet that I can quote him.

So Dr. Hoerl has informed you of his intent to join this discussion in the near future? Is this correct?

 

[Toontown]

The probability that there will be a face showing when the die has been rolled is 1. Those are easy odds to beat.

Every face on the die brings you?

Are you claiming to be a god?

Gozer?

I do not assume that I am a special snowflake. Nor do I assume that it is relevant that I am a special snowflake.

Right. You don't think you're special. But you think every face on that die brings you.

Clue: if the die analogy means anything at all, it means only one face brings you. That does not make you special. The whole 'specialness' thing you've all been harping on all this time is a canard. You are not special, just prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A.

Once again: being prohibitively unlikely under a given hypothesis does not make you special. The entire 'special snowflake' platitude is a meaningless canard.

I already know this is going to send you off on yet another wild goose chase of misunderstanding. No amount of explanation can prevent that.

Nope. The Universe is finite.

Which universe? According to which obsolete model?

Inflation theory, the leading model, now supported observationally by gravity wave evidence ( there is a thread about it it here), practically demands an infinite multiverse. According to Alan Guth, it is difficult to formulate inflation in a way that does not result in an infinite multiverse.

Which you've already tried to nullify by ludicrously claiming it doesn't exist if you can't interact with it, obtusely failing to understand that you are interacting with it, because you are in it. So I know you know about it. Your attempt to sweep it under the rug is a dead giveaway.

Also answered adequately by a form of the anthropic principle: Only those who exist can ask that question.

That is meaninglessness squared.

Only those who exist can ask any question. And they can only ask valid questions about the existence of things that exist.

Let's go through that again, in a couple of different forms. I want to try to make sure you get this, futile though the attempt may be.

Those who do not exist cannot ask any questions at all. The existence of things that do not exist need not be questioned.

Those who do exist can ask questions. They can ask questions about the existence of things that exist.

Therefore, attempting to invalidate a question by pointing out that those who ask it exist, is absurd.

 

[Toontown]

Then why bother to post only to tell us what you won't post?

To tell you what I will post.

 

[PixyMisa]

Every face on the die brings you?

As has already been explained infinitely many times, this has not been shown to be relevant.

Right. You don't think you're special. But you think every face on that die brings you.

See above.

Clue: if the die analogy means anything at all, it means only one face brings you. That does not make you special. The whole 'specialness' thing you've all been harping on all this time is a canard. You are not special, just prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A.

See above.

Once again: being prohibitively unlikely under a given hypothesis does not make you special. The entire 'special snowflake' platitude is a meaningless canard.

See above.

Since hypothesis A assumes the existence of people, P(someone|A) = 1. Jabba's argument relies on the unstated assumption that he, personally, in his precise configuration, is significant to the argument. We have been waiting for a demonstration of this for over 120 pages.

Which universe? According to which obsolete model?

The observable Universe. Since it's all that we can interact with, it's all that can possible matter.

Which you've already tried to nullify by ludicrously claiming it doesn't exist if you can't interact with it, obtusely failing to understand that you are interacting with it, because you are in it.

You cannot interact with anything beyond the edge of the observable Universe, not ever, not even in principle.

Therefore, attempting to invalidate a question by pointing out that those who ask it exist, is absurd.

No. Once again, you are assuming that it is relevant that you exist rather than any other possible replacement. Since anyone can ask this question, not just you, the anthropic principle is entirely sufficient.

No matter what face of the die comes up, someone exists, and the same question can be asked. Therefore, as far as the question goes, the die has one face.

P(someone) = 1.

 

[Toontown]

My sentience is some arbitrary sentience. There is nothing special about it.

You are criticizing xtifr for not using the fallacy of special pleading.

Your sentience is some arbitrary sentience from my conditional perspective.

From your conditional perspective, your sentience is very special. There are billions like it, but that one is yours.

Nobody else gives a rat's ass who you are, what you are, or what you think. You're just another face in the crowd to all of us. But maybe your mama loves you. I don't know, and don't care.

You care who you are, what you are, and what you think. And maybe your mama cares. I don't.

See the difference?

OK, If we can at long last get over that hump after lo, these many months, then perhaps next you can grasp the concept that your sentience being prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A, from your conditional perspetive, does not make it "special" in a probabilistic sense. Just prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A, from your conditional perspective.

 

[abaddon]

Every face on the die brings you?

Are you claiming to be a god?

Gozer?

You are right. Every die comes up with edge 9 times out of ten.

 

[PixyMisa]

Your sentience is some arbitrary sentience from my conditional perspective.

My sentience is arbitrary from my perspective. It just happens to be mine.

From your conditional perspective, your sentience is very special. There are billions like it, but that one is yours.

That doesn't make it special.

If a die has a billion faces, face 495,192,221 is not special just because it happens to be face 495,192,221, which is what you and Jabba are arguing for.

OK, If we can at long last get over that hump after lo, these many months, then perhaps next you can grasp the concept that your sentience being prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A does not make it "special" in a probabilistic sense. Just prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A.

Jabba's argument depends precisely on this unstated claim of specialness.

Since any sentience could make Jabba's argument, me = someone, so P(me|A) = P(A). Jabba gave P(A) as .99. Do you wish to argue with him on that?

Since when were odds of 0.99 "prohibitively unlikely"?

 

[Toontown]

Since hypothesis A assumes the existence of people, P(someone|A) = 1. Jabba's argument relies on the unstated assumption that he, personally, in his precise configuration, is significant to the argument. We have been waiting for a demonstration of this for over 120 pages.

.......

No. Once again, you are assuming that it is relevant that you exist rather than any other possible replacement. Since anyone can ask this question, not just you, the anthropic principle is entirely sufficient.

No matter what face of the die comes up, someone exists, and the same question can be asked. Therefore, as far as the question goes, the die has one face.

P(someone) = 1.

As jt512 surprisingly tried to explain to you, and you've apparently already forgotten that you agreed:

By your reasoning, it is impossible to empirically test any hypothesis, because P(something) is always 1.

No matter what you see, the probability that you would see (something) is always 1.

 

[Toontown]

My sentience is arbitrary from my perspective. It just happens to be mine.

Incanting "just happens to be" doesn't obscure the conditional non-arbitrariness of it. It is a particular one, the particular one required by hypothesis A to allow you to beat the staggering odds.

That doesn't make it special.

Bingo. As I just finished explaining in the previous post. Not "special" at all. Just prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A.

Since any sentience could make Jabba's argument, me = someone, so P(me|A) = P(A). Jabba gave P(A) as .99. Do you wish to argue with him on that?

So now we're just changing the meaning of the variables willy-nilly?

Changing the variable changes the argument. That's called creating a strawman. In effect, you are denying the validity of the conditional perspective Jabba is using by fiat, without demonstrating why the perspective is invalid.

Anyone can arrive at the same conclusion, yes, if they use the same variable, that being P(me|A).

The fact that everyone can independently arrive at the same conclusion does not make the conclusion wrong. This is not bizarro-world.

Since when were odds of 0.99 "prohibitively unlikely"?

Since inflation froze out in our region of the multiverse, when it became barely possible but prohibitively unlikely, under hypothesis A, that you, specifically, would ever be among that herd of 'someones' you strawed into the formula, thereby conjuring up the bogus 0.99.

 

[PixyMisa]

As jt512 surprisingly tried to explain to you, and you've apparently already forgotten that you agreed

What jt512 said was correct. What you are saying is wrong. This distinction actually matters.

By your reasoning, it is impossible to empirically test any hypothesis, because P(something) is always 1.

That does not follow from what I said in any way.

If you wish to use a probability in an argument, that probability must be shown to be relevant to the argument.

Jabba has not done this.

No matter what you see, the probability that you would see (something) is always 1.

Yes, which is why Jabba's argument immediately fails.

He rolls the billion-face die, and is astonished at the outcome, no matter what the outcome happens to be. But P(outcome) = 1.

There is no way to rescue his argument from this flaw. It is entirely and forever, worthless.

 

[PixyMisa]

Saying "just happens to be" doesn't obscure the conditional non-arbitrariness of it. It is a particular one, the particular one required by hypothesis A to allow you to beat the staggering odds.

As has been demonstrated, those odds are exactly 1.

Bingo.

But you are arguing that it is special. Make up your mind.

So now we're just changing the meaning of the variables willy-nilly?

Just pointing out Jabba's same fatal error for 120 pages. Until and unless Jabba demonstrates that the specific value of the variable me is relevant, P(me) = P(someone).

Changing the variable changes the argument.

That's the point. The argument is broken, because it uses a variable without justifying it.

Does P(Jabba) matter? No, you've just agreed that it's irrelevant. The correct variable is P(someone), and P(someone) = 1.

Anyone can arrive at the same conclusion, yes, if they use the same variable, that being P(me|A).

And P(me|A) = P(someone|A) = 0.99, according to Jabba.

Since the beginning of the universe, when it became barely possible but prohibitively unlikely that you, specifically would ever be among that herd of 'someones' you strawed into the formula.

So you'd be willing to bet me $1000 against my $10 on the flip of a coin?

 

[godless dave]

Your sentience is some arbitrary sentience from my conditional perspective.

From your conditional perspective, your sentience is very special. There are billions like it, but that one is yours.

Nobody else gives a rat's ass who you are, what you are, or what you think. You're just another face in the crowd to all of us. But maybe your mama loves you. I don't know, and don't care.

You care who you are, what you are, and what you think. And maybe your mama cares. I don't.

See the difference?

I see the difference, but I don't see why it's relevant.

OK, If we can at long last get over that hump after lo, these many months, then perhaps next you can grasp the concept that your sentience being prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A, from your conditional perspetive, does not make it "special" in a probabilistic sense. Just prohibitively unlikely under hypothesis A, from your conditional perspective.

Unlikely, not prohibitively unlikely. My conditional perspective does not matter, because I am not a narcissist and I know how to be objective.

If it were prohibitively unlikely from my conditional perspective, it would be prohibitively unlikely from any perspective.

 

[Jabba]

So Dr. Hoerl has informed you of his intent to join this discussion in the near future? Is this correct?

- No. I gave him the thread's address, but so far, he's just agreed to discuss with me. I doubt that he has the time to really get caught up in our on-line dispute.

 

[Slowvehicle]

- No. I gave him the thread's address, but so far, he's just agreed to discuss with me. I doubt that he has the time to really get caught up in our on-line dispute.

Good morning, Mr. Savage.

Have you taken the time to correct the demonstrable untruth you told him about the forum, and the posters here?

 

[Jabba]

Jay,
- I suspect that you have already answered the following question in the negative, but I can't remember that you did. Do you agree that P(me|A) = 1/∞? (I accept that P(me|A) may not be the proper term to use in my attempt to 'prove' immortality -- the proper term might be P(some(non-specific) one|A).)

 

[Akhenaten]

Jay,
- I suspect that you have already answered the following question in the negative, but I can't remember that you did. Do you agree that P(me|A) = 1/∞? (I accept that P(me|A) may not be the proper term to use in my attempt to 'prove' immortality -- the proper term might be P(some(non-specific) one|A).)

The proper term is 'wishful thinking' and it will never 'prove' anything.

 

[Jabba]

- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?