[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[pakeha]

- I keep a separate log of my posts and the posts that I'm responding to. I use this log to draw my quotes from. The numbering in this log is strictly for my own benefit, and I don't intend to leave them in the post -- they're accidental. I'll try harder to make sure they're removed.

Jabba, didn't you understand that the numbering of the posts can change, according to possible mod actions?

Do you know how to use the multi-quote function?
It takes away all need to have a separate log.

 

[Mojo]

[/derail]

Jabba, can you try to make some progress towards your proof of immortality? In particular, you really ought to try to come up with some evidence that the soul exists, and can survive the death of the body.

 

[Jabba]

7614

Yes, that's what I've been arguing all along.
So where does the 1/∞ come from for the scientific model? What part of the self does not come from the brain?

Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.
- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.
- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

 

[godless dave]

7614Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.
- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

Why wouldn't an exact copy of your brain produce an exact copy of your sense of self?

Do you understand that any brain is going go consider itself as "me"?

 

[Mojo]

Yes, that's what I've been arguing all along.
So where does the 1/∞ come from for the scientific model? What part of the self does not come from the brain?

7614Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.

Do you have any evidence that this part exists?

- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain...

But back here, only a couple of days ago, you appeared to concede that identical brains would produce identical selves:

Dave,
- If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.
- I also think that we agree in this case.

If identical brains produce identical selves, then the self is coming from the brain, including its chemistry.

...If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

No, a second Jabba, identical to you at that point but not actually you, would be brought to life. You would still be dead.

- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma”...

The chemistry of a brain is part of its physics.

...that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

You now seem to be talking about producing an entire duplicate universe, since two objects cannot occupy the same space/time coordinates in the same universe. But another Jabba in another universe would still not be you. It would be another person identical to you.

 

[Garrette]

7614Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.

The part you do not want to cease existing is the part that never began existing. As has been said before, you do not understand what an emergent property is.

And even if it did exist, it will die with the brain.

- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.

Close enough. That's why you can't use one over infinity in the scientific model.

- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

No. As xtifr has repeatedly and clearly explained, the issue here is one of limitations in language not of science.

- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

Whether you "allow" something or not is beside the point. Science, physics, and reality do not wait for you nor bend themselves to your desires. Your foreseen dilemmas are not dilemmas at all, and nonetheless hinge upon a physical impossibility, the significance of which you have twisted completely around in order to keep your wish alive.


You are not the best man in the fight, Jabba. You are out of your depth and have been since the moment you dismissed the C14 dating in the Shroud thread. You ignore most, misunderstand the majority of the remainder, and twist the little that is left. There is no fight. Your hypothesis is wrong; you have not only failed to prove it, you have failed even to define it or to show any understanding of the path you need to take were you actually to attempt to prove it.

 

[Mojo]

It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

And, seriously, how can you still be saying this after all the times that people have told you that two identical objects are two objects, not one?

 

[gabeygoat]

For Jabba, and anyone else really, good podcast on the "self" from science friday last week. The author wrote a book called "Me, Myself, and Why?" that I plan to order from the library. http://www.sciencefriday.com/segment/05/30/2014/what-s-i-and-why.html

 

[Garrette]

And, seriously, how can you still be saying this after all the times that people have told you that two identical objects are two objects, not one?

It is precisely because he has been told that that he thinks he may still be right, not in spite of it. It all hinges on his mistaken belief that the sense of self is an actual thing, separate from the brain that gave rise to it.

Here is Jabba's thinking:

Brain (gives rise to) Consciousness (gives rise to) Self

Duplicate Brain (gives rise to) Not-Same Consciousness (gives rise to) Not-Same Self

Not-Same Self (is not the same as) Self (and so is) Different

Conclusion Since identical physics give rise to Different Selves, Selves are not tied to Physics.


Of course, this is assuming the consequent as we have repeatedly explained, but it does not matter. In one sense, we could say that Jabba is being scrupulously intellectually honest -- wrong, but honest. He is not ignoring the fallacies, he really does not see the fallacies. The belief -- and the need to retain the belief -- are so ingrained, the wiring to question them fundamentally simply does not exist in his brain.

 

[Akhenaten]

- I keep a separate log of my posts and the posts that I'm responding to.

So does the Forum database. It also keeps a record of the posts that you've completely ignored.

Guess what.

I use this log to draw my quotes from.

The evidence supports a completely different source.

The numbering in this log is strictly for my own benefit, and I don't intend to leave them in the post -- they're accidental. I'll try harder to make sure they're removed.

Have you considered replacing them with evidence?

 

[Akhenaten]

7614Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.

And if I'm correct, the part of me that doesn't cease to exist with the death of my brain will become a gigantic golden dragon that raises Atlantis from the unknown depths and from there rules the world for the next 10,000 years.

So far, we have about the same amount of evidence to support our separate fantasies.

- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.

Even without the scientific model.

You're more than welcome to demonstrate otherwise.

- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

Claim what you like. Until you provide some evidence for whatever it is that you're nattering about it doesn't exist outside your (somewhat limited) imagination.

- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life.

Ridiculously implausible hypotheticals aside, what you're trying to describe is in no way, shape or form that which is commonly referred to as "immortality".

But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

Never mind. You can just ignore them as you have all of the other fatal flaws in your childlike hypothesis. Life goes on.

For a bit.

 

[Slowvehicle]

7614Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.
- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.
- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

Mr. Savage:

Why do you act as if we have not been over (and over and over) this before?

Why do you act as if your impossible hypothetical "duplicated brain" has any bearing on "immortality"?

When do you expect to get to evidence?

 

[xtifr]

- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

You mean, each individual has their own separate consciousness, even perfect copies. Yes, yes. Poorly phrased, as you can tell from some of the other responses you got, but I actually think we all agree on this point. (Even though we clearly disagree about its implications.)

- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

I think you may have misunderstood an earlier example of mine. It's not the moment that you began that's significant, but the moment you ceased!

If some powerful, sufficiently-advanced alien were to destroy you and immediately replace you with a perfect copy, in the shortest possible period of time, it would be exactly as if nothing happened.

I'm worried that your use of the word "began" reveals some fundamental and possibly important misunderstanding, and I want to explore that, but I also want to explore those "more dilemmas" you mentioned. I suspect the latter would be more fruitful in the long run, but either one might be useful, so I'll leave it up to you.

 

[Humots]

Dave,
I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.

7614Dave,
“I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.

Jabba, your second statement contradicts your first. If "you" would be brought back to life, then two identical brains are producing the same senses of self.

Your first statement has it right. I thought you were finally beginning to grasp what we have all been saying for months. Then you go and throw it all away.

 

[pakeha]

7614Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.
- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.
- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

Jabba, you've overlooked the fact that a sense of self is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.

 

[Giordano]

avoided death.,

Just to clarify what has been said before: your duplicate would think that they were Jabba, and lived on after the other Jabba was killed. The duplicate would feel that they were Jabba, and had escaped death, thinking the Jabba lying dead at that feet, must have been the duplicate Jabba. There is no way to tell them apart; both believe themselves to be the true Jabba. In a way, they are both the true Jabba. So in a way, one of the two you's has escaped death in your schenario.

 

[Alleyprowler]

Where does the speed go when you stop your car? Where does the flame go when you blow out the candle? Where does the music go when the musician stops playing?

 

[JoeMorgue]

Where does the speed go when you stop your car? Where does the flame go when you blow out the candle? Where does the music go when the musician stops playing?

Seriously it cannot be that hard to grasp the basic concept of a process stopping.

I don't, and possibly never will, understand the philosophical hand wringing over "the sense of self" or "identity" or "consciousness" or what ever current code word for "Soul" is.

Why? Because we understand it just fine when discussing every other process. As said when you blow out a candle no one goes into a crisis of faith over "where the fire went."

Processes stop and when they stop they don't have to "go" anywhere. By any intellectually valid definition your mind is a process. When the process stops the "mind" goes away. Where's the mystery here? What blank are we trying to fill in? What hasn't been answered?

Why is one necessary here, seeing as how "It scares me" and "But I don't want to die" aren't valid intellectual arguments?

 

[abaddon]

Jabba, your second statement contradicts your first. If "you" would be brought back to life, then two identical brains are producing the same senses of self.

Your first statement has it right. I thought you were finally beginning to grasp what we have all been saying for months. Then you go and throw it all away.

Jabba, you've overlooked the fact that a sense of self is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.

avoided death.,

Just to clarify what has been said before: your duplicate would think that they were Jabba, and lived on after the other Jabba was killed. The duplicate would feel that they were Jabba, and had escaped death, thinking the Jabba lying dead at that feet, must have been the duplicate Jabba. There is no way to tell them apart; both believe themselves to be the true Jabba. In a way, they are both the true Jabba. So in a way, one of the two you's has escaped death in your schenario.

Where does the speed go when you stop your car? Where does the flame go when you blow out the candle? Where does the music go when the musician stops playing?

Seriously it cannot be that hard to grasp the basic concept of a process stopping.

I don't, and possibly never will, understand the philosophical hand wringing over "the sense of self" or "identity" or "consciousness" or what ever current code word for "Soul" is.

Why? Because we understand it just fine when discussing every other process. As said when you blow out a candle no one goes into a crisis of faith over "where the fire went."

Processes stop and when they stop they don't have to "go" anywhere. By any intellectually valid definition your mind is a process. When the process stops the "mind" goes away. Where's the mystery here? What blank are we trying to fill in? What hasn't been answered?

Why is one necessary here, seeing as how "It scares me" and "But I don't want to die" aren't valid intellectual arguments?

None of you are the currently anointed LCP. Your questions will thus go without answer.

 

[xtifr]

Ok, I'm going to shock you all, and even myself, by defending Jabba. A bit, anyway. Mostly because I want to see how he's going to overcome my point that separate-but-identical copies are physically distinct, and don't want to waste too much more time on things I actually think may be somewhat settled.

Jabba, your second statement contradicts your first. If "you" would be brought back to life, then two identical brains are producing the same senses of self.

Humots, you left of the "if" part of his second statement. He was actually using that second statement as a sort of reductio ad absurdum. Or at least that's how it reads to me.

Jabba, you've overlooked the fact that a sense of self is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.

He hasn't overlooked it (though I'm not sure he completely understands it). He just doesn't think that's all it is, and is trying to find some way to convince us there's more to it. (And I'm willing to hear his arguments. It's got to be more entertaining than one more go-round on whether a copy is/isn't "you".)

There is no way to tell them apart; both believe themselves to be the true Jabba. In a way, they are both the true Jabba. So in a way, one of the two you's has escaped death in your schenario.

Yes, but subjectively, they're not the same person, and even objectively, it's two different (albeit identical) people. The conclusions he's trying to draw from that fact seem absurd, and all his stuff about how it's not purely chemical/biological is trivially true and doesn't lead to his desired conclusion that it must be some mystical property instead. Still, a perfect copy would indeed be a separate individual.

(Why he thinks we should find this surprising is beyond me, but he seems to.)

Seriously it cannot be that hard to grasp the basic concept of a process stopping.

Yeah, ok, I can't argue with this one.

Still, as I say, I want to see how he responds to my point about copies being physically distinct. He has said several times that it might be (might be!) a problem for his theory, but he thinks he may have an answer, and I'm frankly dying to find out just what that answer might be. I suspect it may reach new levels of absurdity. And since I'm only here for the laughs...