[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Giordano]

7556Dave,
- For the moment, at least, I'm accepting that this sense of a continuous self could be just a process or an illusion. Doesn't that fit with the current consensus scientific model?

Other than "is" should replace "could be" and "and" should replace "or" you are correct.

Now, if you do not agree this is indeed a correct statement, which I suspect is true from your other posts, please provide the evidence for any different model that you may favor.

I must congratulate you on finally accepting a portion of what people have been trying to tell you for months. The consensus scientific model is that, "This sense of a continuous self is an illusion that is an emergent property from a properly functioning physical brain." The sense of self, and any other words you might use, like self or spirit or soul, is not a non-physical entity, but is a physical process. According to the SM.

By the way, you don't plan to get Dave to say yes, and then omit much of the details of this statement when you display his agreement in the next post, as you did before, do you?

 

[Slowvehicle]

By the way, you don't plan to get Dave to say yes, and then omit much of the details of this statement when you display his agreement in the next post, as you did before, do you?

Why of course not, because that would be "dishonest"...

 

[xtifr]

Dave,
- For the moment, at least, I'm accepting that this sense of a continuous self could be just a process or an illusion. Doesn't that fit with the current consensus scientific model?

Two separate things, Jabba! Two separate things!

- Consciousness (the self) is an emergent property of the brain, and

- The feeling of continuity is simply a side effect of the consciousness's ability to access memories stored in a brain.

Both depend totally on the presence of a brain, and cannot be separate from one. Therefore, the probability of either one existing is identical to the probability of the brain on which they depend existing.

Neither one even vaguely meets any reasonable definition of a soul, let alone an eternal one.

So, why do you bring it up?

 

[Loss Leader]

For the moment, at least, I'm accepting that this sense of a continuous self could be just a process or an illusion.

You say you accept this, but I don't think you really do. As easily as you've said this in the past, you've then slipped back to saying that the illusion is a "real illusion" or arguing for a soul. You go on to treat those like concrete things that materially exist, undoing whatever acceptance you claim to be granting.

Come to terms with the fact that a process is not a thing.

 

[John Jones]

7556Dave,
- For the moment, at least, I'm accepting that this sense of a continuous self could be just a process or an illusion. Doesn't that fit with the current consensus scientific model?

And you'll forget this tomorrow, and annoy all your interlocutors by putting words in their mouths again and again and again.

Nothing I've see you say is a part of the Scientific Model!

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- But to me, there is something different between the selves of identical, but separate brains (I'm calling it “identity”) – and, this difference would be there from the very beginning of memory. This thing/process/illusion of identity will remain the same for a lifetime.
- I think that a while back you said that this t/p/i was not an aspect of the self. 1) Is that correct? 2) Do you still believe it? 3) Are “aspect” and “property” the same?

Yes, you have said this several times. And I have asked you several times to explain where the scientific model includes such a thing.

Dave,
- For the moment, at least, I'm accepting that this sense of a continuous self could be just a process or an illusion. Doesn't that fit with the current consensus scientific model?

Two separate things, Jabba! Two separate things!

- Consciousness (the self) is an emergent property of the brain, and

- The feeling of continuity is simply a side effect of the consciousness's ability to access memories stored in a brain.

Both depend totally on the presence of a brain, and cannot be separate from one. Therefore, the probability of either one existing is identical to the probability of the brain on which they depend existing.

Neither one even vaguely meets any reasonable definition of a soul, let alone an eternal one.

So, why do you bring it up?

xtifr,
- Something (in my case) wishes the feeling of continuity to continue. I assume that "thing" is my “self”?

 

[Slowvehicle]

xtifr,
- Something (in my case) wishes the feeling of continuity to continue. I assume that "thing" is my “self”?

...which has what, Mr. Savage, to do at all with you presenting evidence that the "soul" exists, and is "immortal"?

ETA: Happy Birthday!

 

[HighRiser]

Happy birthday, Jabba!

Blowing out the candles on your birthday cake is one of the best times to make wishes, so today may be the day!

 

[Akhenaten]

xtifr,
- Something (in my case) wishes the feeling of continuity to continue. I assume that "thing" is my “self”?

Are you attempting to make a parody of your own argument?

You're on the right track.

 

[godless dave]

Jabba, why do you think two identical brains wouldn't produce two identical senses of self?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Ooo OooOoo!

TIME TRAVEL!?!

What if you go back in time one day and meet yourself?

Would you share "consciousness" with yourself, even? If so, how? If not, why would two "copies" of "you" share "consciousness"?

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, why do you think two identical brains wouldn't produce two identical senses of self?

Dave,
- If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.
- I also think that we agree in this case.

 

[Garrette]

Dave,
- If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.

Yes, exactly. And because they are identical but not the same, the one associated with your brain is not special.

- I also think that we agree in this case.

That identical does not equal same? If that's what you mean, then the agreement comes after months of you avoiding the point.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.
- I also think that we agree in this case.

Yes, that's what I've been arguing all along.

So where does the 1/∞ come from for the scientific model? What part of the self does not come from the brain?

 

[Monza]

Dave,
- If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.
- I also think that we agree in this case.

OK, so it now seems to be understood that two identical things are identical. And they are two things.

You are correct that the sense of self is not the same, same meaning that is one consciousness is not controlling two bodies. The selves are identical, but separate. This is basically the definition of two identical things.

Now that we agree on this, can we please move forward?

 

[Giordano]

xtifr,
- Something (in my case) wishes the feeling of continuity to continue. I assume that "thing" is my “self”?

Okay. What ever you believe is okay with me. You seem to finally realize that the SM says something different from what you propose. As long as you do not claim the SM states what it does not state, and you don't try to prove your beliefs to others using flawed statements, that is fine by me. Are we done here?

Oh, by the way: what exactly is this "thing" this "self" that continues after death? What fulfills your wish to continue? We have established that it is not your memories, or appearance, or preferences, or material goods. What is it that will be reincarnated and will give you this feeling of continuance?

 

[Giordano]

Dave,
- If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self. I just think that they would not produce the same senses of self.
- I also think that we agree in this case.

Oops, we are back to this! Well, at least you realize that the identical brains will produce two identical senses of self. But you seem to mean something different when you use the word "same" compared to what the SM and the other posters here mean when they use that word. Probably something metaphysical. You are wrong if you believe what I suspect is your definition. But I can't explain it better than the other posters did. So just read the posts. Thanks!

Happy birthday, by the way!

Oh, you wouldn't post that Dave agrees with you, but for simplicity, omit the "in this case" would you? Because you have done very similar things previously in this thread.

 

[Mojo]

If I understand your question correctly, I do think that two identical brains would produce two identical senses of self.

Does this mean that you accept that the "sense of self" is defined by the brain?

 

[Loss Leader]

As easily as you've said this in the past, you've then slipped back to saying that the illusion is a "real illusion" or arguing for a soul. You go on to treat those like concrete things that materially exist, undoing whatever acceptance you claim to be granting.

Something (in my case) wishes the feeling of continuity to continue. I assume that "thing" is my “self”?

And back around we go.

 

[xtifr]

xtifr,
- Something (in my case) wishes the feeling of continuity to continue. I assume that "thing" is my “self”?

Technically, the "thing" is the brain. Your legs run; your brain thinks (and wishes).