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[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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- How’s that?

Why do you ask when you ignore most of the answers?
You do this routinely- "How am I doing?" Please don't bother unless you really want to know as to read the answers. For the record, you are doing terribly.
 
This just in:

We can't duplicate people.

Can we ignore the last 1000 posts or so, and get on with "essentially proving immortality using Bayesian statistics?"
 
But first, I need to come up with a couple of better terms for an identical me versus the same me. How about a “me” versus the “ME.”


How about "you" (or in your case, "me" - the entity you refer to in the first person being the same entity that people addressing you refer to in the second person) versus "him"? Because an exact duplicate of you won't be (to you) "me" or (to me) "you", but will be a third person.
 
- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

Please drop the use of ME. When you stick in ME (or, the same me) it's confusing.

Stick to identical me and same me.

Note: If I correctly understand the meaning of "chemical definition", there is a chemical definition exclusive to identical me.

This is where your infinite selves falls apart. Even if you have an infinite amount of time, space and material, you have a finite number of chemical definitions. You (not you personally, Jabba) can keep cranking out new consciousnesses, but after a humungous amount of times you will get an identical me to one already seen.
 
Jabba said:
- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).
Why do you keep ignoring the fact that ME is not an actual thing?


And that an exact duplicate would have exactly the same chemistry and would produce a "self", resulting from that chemisty, that was identical to Jabba's.
 
- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

No.

You have completely ignored all the answers to your hypothetical, the answers you asked for.

Each of the perfectly identical copies would "feel like" it was "you". Even when they began to diverge (as their experiences inevitably diverged), each would still believe it was "you"--and that the other one was the copy.

Each of the (hypothetically) perfectly identical copies would, by any useful definition of the term,be "you"--the consciousness emergent form each of the identically-copied neurosystems; the consciousness(es) defined by the characteristics of the neurosystem(s). The "chemical definition" would be the physical results of the structure of the neurosystem, subjected (as it had been) to the experiences it had undergone.

That neurosystem, in that condition, produced "you". Hypothetically perfectly identical copies of the neurosystem would produce hypothetically perfectly identical copies of "you".

None of the copies, by the way, would exist independently of its own neurosystem, nor survive the moment that neurosytem ceased to function.

Which does nothing in aid of supporting, advancing, or defining any claim of "immortality" in any way.

[/Sounds of Silence]
 
- OK. It appears that part of my problem is that I’ve been trying to ‘prove’ a fact that you guys have been accepting as trivially obvious all along…
- What I need to prove instead is what I perceive to be the elementary deduction stemming from that fact.
- But first, I need to come up with a couple of better terms for an identical me versus the same me. How about a “me” versus the “ME.” You guys claim that it is space/time coordinates that complete the “definition” for ME – or at least, that’s one way of putting it…
- How’s that?

As Slowvehicle has pointed out, the real problem is that you believe that the original "you" and the exactly duplicated "you" have some special non-physical property that makes the original "you" special in some way. But you(1) and you(2) are identical in every way (at time 0) except your physical location. The SM states that both "yous" would have the same sense of self (consciousness, whatever you want to call it today) and both would believe themselves to be "you." There is no non-physical bar coding that distinguishes the 2 "yous." it is precisely as if I made an exact duplicate of any physical object, such as a vase.

But if you believe otherwise, feel free to prove it, Start in your very next post.

I must admit this thread starting out amusing, but now has become very boring and repetitive. Your misunderstanding of the duplication proposal have become especially hopeless. Perhaps if you finally got into your proof of immortality (remember that?) the thread might become interesting again. What do you think?
 
How about "you" (or in your case, "me" - the entity you refer to in the first person being the same entity that people addressing you refer to in the second person) versus "him"? Because an exact duplicate of you won't be (to you) "me" or (to me) "you", but will be a third person.

"You's" on first...?
 
And that an exact duplicate would have exactly the same chemistry and would produce a "self", resulting from that chemisty, that was identical to Jabba's.

The "self" at the exact moment of duplication. From which point the two "selves" would begin to diverge. As has been explained to Jabba ad nasusem.
 
As Slowvehicle has pointed out, the real problem is that you believe that the original "you" and the exactly duplicated "you" have some special non-physical property that makes the original "you" special in some way. But you(1) and you(2) are identical in every way (at time 0) except your physical location.

Quoting because it's a good explanation.
 
- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

We are saying that it is spatial differences that would distinguish you(1) and you(2), not chemical differences. You just stated as much. There is no difference in you(1) and you(2) except the two locations.

Notice that I refuse to agree to your terminology using "ME" to identify the original because I think you intended to twist the rest of the conversation to be ME versus the duplicated (NOT THE "REAL") ME. As pointed out, both you(1) and you(2) are "YOU." Completely, except location. There is no chemical definition exclusive to you, but there is no definition of any property, physical or not, that would make the original exclusively "YOU." Both the original and duplicate are "YOU." There will be 2 YOUs running around.
 
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- OK. It appears that part of my problem is that I’ve been trying to ‘prove’ a fact that you guys have been accepting as trivially obvious all along… [...]

People have pointed that out to you over and over and over for months. Why is it suddenly sinking in now?
 
To help the thread move forward, I suggest we all use the following terminology so that we can get on the same page:


ME = the original 'same' me

me = a duplicate of ME, but not the 'same' me

me = a copy of me with the 'same' PSoS

Me = a replicated me made after I die that has an identical (but not the same) observer

MEme = a chemically identical me without the 'same' self but with a similar indistinguishable consciousness that can't see out of both sets of eyes
 
- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).


Once again, why are you making this harder than it needs to be? By definition, something identical to something else implies that there are more than one somethings. By invoking an identical brain, you are automatically stating that it is not the same brain.

They are identical but separate. This goes whether we are copying brains, VWs, banana bread, or anything else. If I have a widget and an identical widget, the identical widget is not the same widget as the first. This is trivial. It is the very definition of multiple objects.
 
To help the thread move forward, I suggest we all use the following terminology so that we can get on the same page:


ME = the original 'same' me

me = a duplicate of ME, but not the 'same' me

me = a copy of me with the 'same' PSoS

Me = a replicated me made after I die that has an identical (but not the same) observer

MEme = a chemically identical me without the 'same' self but with a similar indistinguishable consciousness that can't see out of both sets of eyes

What about MEבmeא?
 
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