• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

Status
Not open for further replies.
Jabba, the issue is not that we don't understand what you mean by "particular sense of self". The issue is the one I've asked you about twice, most recently in this post:

Jabba said:
- This raises a possibly ineffable question… The specialness that I’m claiming, and to which I’m alluding, is (that) consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object. If that sentence is coherent to you, do you accept it?...
Jabba, while we wait for xtifr to respond, do you think you could explain which part of the scientific model of consciousness supports this claim?
 
- I do understand that first sentence. The second sentence is confusing.

- I don’t mean to say that my perspective is more important than the copy’s perspective. It’s just that I want to be able to talk about my perspective so that I know that you know what I’m talking about. I suspect that you, and our compatriots here, do know what I’m talking about – just that I can’t get you guys to focus on it

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

Is there no end to your hybris?

I, for one, know that about which you are talking; I simply deny that what you are claiming exists has never, in fact, been demonstrated to exist (and claiming to support it by taking an egregious position as explanatory of an impossible hypothetical does not "support" its existence).

I, for one, have focused on that about which you are talking, and have, several times, pointed out the glaring holes in your circular assumptions based upon special pleading.

Each of the copies, youב and youא, would have the identical sense of being the "original", authentic Rich Savage. If the copying were done to the impossible degree you have hypothetically demanded,there would be nothing to distinguish youא from youב, or, for that matter, from you ג. No single one of the copies would have a greater claim to being the "real" one, absent some imperfection in the replication.

BTW, this still has nothing to do with any segment of the OP.

- For now, I’ll just call it “my illusion of my continuous self” -- that illusion to which I and others are referring, when we think of, or speak about, an “afterlife.” It’s the sense of self that we (me and these others) wish not to lapse into eternal oblivion -- but which, the scientific model holds will do exactly that.

Finally! I wonder why you scruple to simply use the word "soul" for this supposed thing that exists independently of your body, and will (evidently, according to your illusion) survive even the heat death of the universe.

Do you realize that each of your copies would have exactly the same characteristics of all the others? If youש had this thing about which you want to speak as comprising the "afterlife", youל would also have the identical "thing".

Now is when you trot out the evidence (I should not need to say, "practical, empirical, non-anecdotal, objective evidence) of 1) the very existence of this "thing"; and, 2) its "immortality".

- I would like to focus on that particular concept, and would like to agree upon a word/term/phrase that would exclusively, and clearly, refer to it.
- Your thoughts?

"Soul" seems to be pretty popular, but I have a suggestion: why not simply assign it a designator, so that you don't get bogged down in trivia?

Call it TTRSHBTA-1.0*. Now describe its characteristics, and provide evidence (you know the drill) of its existence. Once there, we can all discuss how TTRSHBTA-1.0 might actually exist, according to your evidence, and might actually be immortal.

*(That Thing Rich Savage Has Been Talking About, version 1.0)
 
Last edited:
It’s the sense of self that we (me and these others) wish not to lapse into eternal oblivion -- but which, the scientific model holds will do exactly that.

Yes the "scientific models" says that because THAT IS WHAT IS GOING TO ACTUALLY HAPPEN!

I get that you have your silly little "I'll only debate with one 'spokesman' at a time" blinders on and will ignore this but Jesus Christ man how many people have to explain to you in how many different ways exactly how just monumentally wrong you are before it will sink in?

Jabba dude... you're gonna die. Stop wasting the time you do have looking for an out.
 
Last edited:
Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

Is there no end to your hybris?

I, for one, know that about which you are talking; I simply deny that what you are claiming exists has never, in fact, been demonstrated to exist (and claiming to support it by taking an egregious position as explanatory of an impossible hypothetical does not "support" its existence).

I, for one, have focused on that about which you are talking, and have, several times, pointed out the glaring holes in your circular assumptions based upon special pleading.

Each of the copies, youב and youא, would have the identical sense of being the "original", authentic Rich Savage. If the copying were done to the impossible degree you have hypothetically demanded,there would be nothing to distinguish youא from youב, or, for that matter, from you ג. No single one of the copies would have a greater claim to being the "real" one, absent some imperfection in the replication.

BTW, this still has nothing to do with any segment of the OP.



Finally! I wonder why you scruple to simply use the word "soul" for this supposed thing that exists independently of your body, and will (evidently, according to your illusion) survive even the heat death of the universe.

Do you realize that each of your copies would have exactly the same characteristics of all the others? If youש had this thing about which you want to speak as comprising the "afterlife", youל would also have the identical "thing".

Now is when you trot out the evidence (I should not need to say, "practical, empirical, non-anecdotal, objective evidence) of 1) the very existence of this "thing"; and, 2) its "immortality".



"Soul" seems to be pretty popular, but I have a suggestion: why not simply assign it a designator, so that you don't get bogged down in trivia?

Call it TTRSHBTA-1.0*. Now describe its characteristics, and provide evidence (you know the drill) of its existence. Once there, we can all discuss how TTRSHBTA-1.0 might actually exist, according to your evidence, and might actually be immortal.

*(That Thing Rich Savage Has Been Talking About, version 1.0)

Cool use of hebrew letters: how did you get them inserted into your reply?

I like TTRSHBTA, it really uses Jabba's definition as stated in the past and is as specific a definition of what Jabba means as I have seen here. Again, I think he really means spirit or soul, but he would prefer to not use those terms because they are so clear.

I also like the idea of starting a proof with an illusion; that will simply so much of my science!

Beyond that, obviously we still don't understand according to Jabba. Any of us. Maybe if we tried harder?
 
Cool use of hebrew letters: how did you get them inserted into your reply?

I like TTRSHBTA, it really uses Jabba's definition as stated in the past and is as specific a definition of what Jabba means as I have seen here. Again, I think he really means spirit or soul, but he would prefer to not use those terms because they are so clear.

I also like the idea of starting a proof with an illusion; that will simply so much of my science!

Beyond that, obviously we still don't understand according to Jabba. Any of us. Maybe if we tried harder?

If you are using a PC, the character map can be found in your program list (look under "accessories", then "system tools"). Arial has a multitude of options, accents, and diacriticals. Select, copy, paste, and Bøb's thy Nűncle.

I am still looking for a way to include a minuscule "thorn" character...

And do be careful: it's TTRSHBTA 1.0, to distinguish it from tomorrow's offering...
 
TTRSHBTA 1.0. Got it.

I use a Mac, but I can open an alternate keyboard window with foreign letters; I will try that.
 
Beyond that, obviously we still don't understand according to Jabba. Any of us. Maybe if we tried harder?


The claim that anyone who doesn't agree doesn't understand is quite a common "woo" argument. I've seen it frequently from, for example, homoeopaths - if only their critics had done a degree in homoeopathy...

...and if only that impudent little kid had studied tailoring, he'd be able to see how magnificent the emperor's new clothes are.
 
Last edited:
@Jabba,
You passed over my previous post. Perhaps it was too long? Still, I thought the question I posed at the end was of some significance, so please allow me to re-post it here in a simpler form:

While you sleep, an exactly replica of you is assembled. Exact. When your replica awakens, who does the replica think he is?
 
- I don’t mean to say that my perspective is more important than the copy’s perspective. It’s just that I want to be able to talk about my perspective so that I know that you know what I’m talking about. I suspect that you, and our compatriots here, do know what I’m talking about – just that I can’t get you guys to focus on it …

We've been totally focused on it. Possibly too much, since it's not really that relevant. We just don't agree that there's something special, unique, or non-physical about it. It's an emergent property of the brain, and each brain has one. Take away the brain, and there's nothing left to perform consciousness. It's no different from shape or size.

To demonstrate otherwise you have to address my point about location. Which you keep promising to do, but keep not doing. That's not a new and curious objection. That is the objection! It's the point everyone has been trying to make since the beginning of this discussion. And you've finally admitted that it may be relevant, but you still haven't addressed it!

- I would like to focus on that particular concept, and would like to agree upon a word/term/phrase that would exclusively, and clearly, refer to it.
I would like you to stop worrying about what it's called. We all know what you mean. The word "consciousness" will do fine. Choosing another name will not make us agree that it has properties it doesn't have.

I would like you to focus on the point about location distinguishing two otherwise identical objects. Because that is the answer science offers to resolve your apparent dilemma of identical bodies not being the same person. Which is not even slightly a dilemma, because of this incredibly obvious fact that you're still not addressing!

Physics, Jabba, physics! It's time to address the actual world and actual physics.
 
xtifr,

- I do understand that first sentence. The second sentence is confusing.

- I don’t mean to say that my perspective is more important than the copy’s perspective. It’s just that I want to be able to talk about my perspective so that I know that you know what I’m talking about. I suspect that you, and our compatriots here, do know what I’m talking about – just that I can’t get you guys to focus on it …
- For now, I’ll just call it “my illusion of my continuous self” -- that illusion to which I and others are referring, when we think of, or speak about, an “afterlife.” It’s the sense of self that we (me and these others) wish not to lapse into eternal oblivion -- but which, the scientific model holds will do exactly that.

- I would like to focus on that particular concept, and would like to agree upon a word/term/phrase that would exclusively, and clearly, refer to it.
- Your thoughts?

No, Jabba.
Remember what the sense of self is?
Part of an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem?
 
Jabba, the issue is not that we don't understand what you mean by "particular sense of self". The issue is the one I've asked you about twice, most recently in this post:

Originally Posted by Jabba
- This raises a possibly ineffable question… The specialness that I’m claiming, and to which I’m alluding, is (that) consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object. If that sentence is coherent to you, do you accept it?...

Originally Posted by godless dave
Jabba, while we wait for xtifr to respond, do you think you could explain which part of the scientific model of consciousness supports this claim?

Dave,
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs. That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.
- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.
- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.
 
Last edited:
If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.


But, as far as the duplicate were concerned, he would be the same you and he would believe he's been brought back to life.

Once again, "me" is a process, not just a bunch of things. It's like saying that if I add 2 and 2 now and then do it in ten minutes, it's identical addition but not the same addition. It's just nonsense.

You're confusing the process of the brain with the brain itself. You've been doing it since the beginning of the thread, though, so at least your consistent.
 
Originally Posted by Jabba
- This raises a possibly ineffable question… The specialness that I’m claiming, and to which I’m alluding, is (that) consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object. If that sentence is coherent to you, do you accept it?...

Originally Posted by godless dave
Jabba, while we wait for xtifr to respond, do you think you could explain which part of the scientific model of consciousness supports this claim?

Dave,
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs. That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.
- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.
- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.

Still OT.

Also, asked and answered.
 
Derail removed to AAH. doronshadmi, you already have at least one thread in which to discuss your claims, this thread is for discussion of Jabba's claims.
Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: Cuddles
 
Dave,
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs. That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.
- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.
- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.

That doesn't clear anything up. It is trivially obvious that if you duplicate something, you are not recreating the original. I can make multiple identical loaves of banana bread but I can't make the same loaf twice.

Do you have any evidence to support the claim that:

Jabba said:
consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object
 
Last edited:
Originally Posted by Jabba
- This raises a possibly ineffable question… The specialness that I’m claiming, and to which I’m alluding, is (that) consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object. If that sentence is coherent to you, do you accept it?...

Originally Posted by godless dave
Jabba, while we wait for xtifr to respond, do you think you could explain which part of the scientific model of consciousness supports this claim?

Dave,
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs. That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.
- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.
- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.

Very wrong again: please read the other posts if you want to know why.
Hint: as you admit, spatial location/coordinates are the identification tags to which you allude, and are involved, at least at the moment of duplication, in distinguishing "you" from your duplicate. But the chemistry of both will be identical, as will the consciousness and your "illusion of the self."

But since you've posted your theory several times, and we don't agree yet, perhaps you might SAY IT LOUDER next time?
 
Originally Posted by Jabba
- This raises a possibly ineffable question… The specialness that I’m claiming, and to which I’m alluding, is (that) consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object. If that sentence is coherent to you, do you accept it?...

Originally Posted by godless dave
Jabba, while we wait for xtifr to respond, do you think you could explain which part of the scientific model of consciousness supports this claim?

Dave,
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs. That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.
- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.
- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.
As usual, the fallacy in this line of thinking is both obvious and frequently explained. Natheless...

Apply the thinking to a body without the special sense of self, Jabba. If we exactly replicate a body but sans your SSoS, then the replicate is identical but not the same. Does this mean that the right thumbnail of the original is therefore special and had odds of 1 over infinity against having been created? How about one of the teeth, or the entire face?

Apply the same thinking to the loaf of banana bread we have discussed. The replicated loaf will possess an identical aroma to the original, but it will not be the same aroma. Does that mean the aroma is a Special Sense of Aroma that could not statistically have been created.

Take it one final step and have the original you eat the original loaf while the replicant you eats the replicant loaf (and ignore all the physics problems that prevent what I am about to say): The banana bread taste that the original experiences will be identical to but not the same as the banana bread taste experienced by the replicant. Does this mean that the Taste Experience is now a Special Sense of Taste Experience that could not statistically have been created?

You have two internally consistent paths to follow, and only two:

1. The thumbnail, the aroma, and the Taste Experience are not, in fact, special and therefore the Sense of Self is also not special, or

2. The thumbnail, the aroma, and the Taste Experience are special just like the Sense of Self.


In the case of #1, your argument is clearly over.

In the case of #2, you have simply stated the metaphysical equivalent of the new age silliness "You're unique, just like everybody else." In other words, the specialness has become non-special and therefore non-significant (in both standard and statistical usages).

Your logic does not lead where you want it to lead, even if we grant the impossibilities within it.
 
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs.


If you didn't insist on twisting everything that you respond to into Jabbanese at least you'd have a better handle on what it is that you think you're agreeing to.



That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.


You do realise that it's a hypothetical introduced largely as a side issue and has nothing to do with the original topic, don't you?



- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me.


All you're actually doing is attempting to add a stupefying level of complexity to a childishly simple concept.

Two identical things are not the same thing.

An identical copy of something is not that thing living again. It's another thing.



Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.


No, it won't.

It will give another version of you a new life. The old you will be no more.


- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.


That's all you ever do. Post random thoughts and hope against hope that eventually one of them will make sense.

It's kind of like a solo version of the million monkeys/million typewriters thingy, only far less likely to produce a meaningful result.
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom