[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Aepervius]

Checking in again with the CliffsNotes version:

Jabba is such a unique and beautiful snowflake that his snowflakiness could never have existed before or could never exist again, therefore 1/infinity=immortality.

I may have had several adult beverages tonight, but that is my understanding of the conversation.

I think we need to establish if you and us are on the same page.





just kidding yeah pretty much summary. To that I would add "And everybody else tells him he is wrong and shows him why, only to be ignored for 180+ ∞ pages".

 

[pakeha]

...Gentlemen maybe we are ready to leave the second of february ?

Possibly it's for the best.
Still, we'll always have the breakfast nook.

xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?

Not much.
Why?
Because of the way sense of self and consciousness are defined.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

I understand that. What I don't understand is why you think the scientific model includes such a thing.
I guess it depends what you mean by "return to life".
If I bake a loaf of banana bread, eat the whole thing, then bake another loaf following the same recipe - following it precisely the same way as I did for the first loaf - has the first loaf returned, or do I have another loaf exactly like it?
What if I make the second loaf before I've eaten the first one? Has the first one returned even though it never went away?

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.
- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.
- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

 

[Akhenaten]

Oh goody. Now we have "identity" to add to the general obfuscation.

 

[jond]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.
- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.
- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

Why have you ignored the many, many responses to your question to Dave? It's all been very clearly explained to you.

 

[Mojo]

As we've agreed,^{[citation needed]} a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain.

FTFY.

 

[Akhenaten]

If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

Seems to be a pretty reasonable assumption when one considers that a perfect replica of a dead brain is nothing more than a second dead brain.

No identities at all happening in that scenario, Jabba.

 

[Sideroxylon]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.
- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.
- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

Read the posts and use your loaf, man.

 

[Mojo]

In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?

I suspect that the results of two bodies occupying the same space would be rather messy.

 

[Mojo]

We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity.

No, you have been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. Everyone else has been telling you that this assumption is wrong.

 

[Mojo]

If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life

Correct. Your identity will be duplicated; a second identity, identical to yours, will be produced. This will not be your identity returned to life, but another identity. Two identical entities are two entities, not one.

 

[JoeMorgue]

As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain.

We've agreed to nothing. Please stop putting words in other people's mouths. It's dishonest.

For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.

Meaningless.

We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity.

Again not "we" haven't. Please stop projecting your delusions onto other people.

If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

No. So "you" assume... wrongly.

But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain.

Yes reality and the thing you keep making up are never going to jive. This is correct.

My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

*Sighs* Again with the "we."

And another hairsplit, now between "idenity" and "sense of self."

Jabba... you are going to die someday. You will, I will, all of us are going to die. And I mean really die. Stop existing. Period. End of discussion.

There's no out, no asterisks, no exception, not "but then..." None. No matter how much you want or need there to be.

Accept it.

 

[Mojo]

My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self…

Now you have an "identity", which is an aspect of your "sense of self",
which is an aspect of your "self", which is an aspect of your "consciousness"...

It's beginning to look like turtles all the way down.

 

[Pixel42]

As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.

A loaf of banana bread has an emergent property of tastiness. That tastiness is duplicated when the loaf is duplicated. But the duplicate is not the original banana loaf, even though it has an identical tastiness, because they have different spacetime co-ordinates.

You are hung up on the notion that consciousness is a special property of brains that has no analogy but it's really no different to any other emergent property, such as the tastiness of food or the wetness of water.

 

[George]

xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?

xtifr,
- I recognize the problem that time and space coordinates bring to my claim of infinity, but I was sort of hoping that no one would consider the issue important enough to bring up...

Were you being flippant when you posted this or were you being completely honest?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Good Morning,Mr. Savage!

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain.

I wonder if you would be so kind as to point out precisely where "we" have "agreed" to any such thing.

A loaf od banana bread is, in fact, usefully analagous to a brain, or a neurosystem--as long as one understands what an analogy can, and cannot, be used to demonstrate.

For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.

For some reason, a loaf of banana bread has an emergent property of cake-structure, and cake-structure naturally involves what we call "fluffy-brown-fragrant-deliciousness", or, at least, the appearance of "fluffy-brown-fragrant-deliciousness", the illusion of being a loaf instead of an assemblage of mashed bananas, spices, leavening, and flour. A neurosystem does not involve this particular emergent property of "fluffy-brown-fragrant-deliciousness". OTH, "fluffy-brown-fragrant-deliciousness" is, in fact, a useful analogy for consciousness, in that none of the ingredients of banana bread exhibits "fluffy-brown-fragrant-deliciousness"; it is instead a property that emerges from a specific set of circumstances involving all of the ingredients of the banana bread, combined and treated in certain ways.

None of the "ingredients" of a neurosytem exhibit, consciousness; it is instead a property that emerges from a specific set of circumstances involving all of the components of the neurosystem, combined and treated in certain ways.

- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity.

No, not really. You may have "assumed" such. Others have pointed out that, although a perfect-enough "replica" or "duplication" or "copy" of your neurosystem is physically impossible, IF such a"duplication" or copy" or "replica" of your neursosytem were made, and activated, at the moment of activation it would exhibit the emergent property of a "replica" or a "duplicate" or a "copy" of the consciousness emergent form your neurosystem, until the instant the experiences of the "copy" or "replica" or "duplicate" diverged in any way from the "original".

The preoblem with your scenario (in addition to its physical impossibility), is that neither of the consciousnesses so emergent would exhibit the slightest semblance of "immortality".

If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

Your wilburing of "assume" seems to indict that you are about to (finally) present evidence to the contrary. Let me pour a cup of coffee.

--I'll be back.
.....................

OK. Fortified with a cup of Tanzanian Peaberry (full city roast), we forge ahead.

- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

How disappointing.

Oh, well.

Your identity/consciousness/observer/PSoS is NOT an "aspect" of your PSoS/soul/consciousness/identity; they appear all to be wilburs for the same emergent property of your neurosystem and its hypothetical duplicate/copy/replica.

"You" would not "return" if your neurosystem were "duplicated" or "copied" or a "replica" were made of it.

OTH, if the duplication or copying or replication were, in hypothetical fact, perfect, neither of the consciousnesses/souls/selfs/identities/PSoSs would be able to tell "which twin was the phony", so to speak. If they were, in fact, identical, they would share the conviction that each was the "real" you.

Two identical loaves of banana bread would, in fact, share the identical property of fluffy-brown-deliciousness.

(sips)

I wonder if we might begin to consider your evidence that the "soul" exists, and is "immortal"?

(sips)

ETA: serially ninja-ed by a host of like-minded posters: mojo, Sideroxlon, JoeBently, Pixel42, and the Mighty Pharaoh.

Good thing I brewed enough for everbody...Ta all 'round.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Read the posts and use your loaf, man.

Well played, sir! Good Form!

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.

I haven't agreed to that at all.

- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.
- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

Your identity isn't an aspect of your sense of self.

 

[John Jones]

I love it. No one will own-up to having agreed with Jabba. It's like he's talking to a mirror.

 

[Slowvehicle]

I love it. No one will own-up to having agreed with Jabba. It's like he's talking to a mirror.

I kniow what you're thinking: "I should have driven the red blue car!"