[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Garrette]

We understand your position. We are also quite certain that it's wrong. Here's why:



As has been pointed out countless times, the sense of self is not a static thing. It is constantly changing, evolving. Thus a replication of your brain would replicate your sense of self at the moment of replication. (Note the critical piece here--AT THE MOMENT OF REPLICATION.) The moment after the replicated brain starts functioning in the new body, it would begin to change as its experiences would be different from yours from that moment forward.

Similarly, if a perfect copy of your brain were recreated from the beginning state (the moment sperm and egg do their thing) your sense of self would not be "reborn", because it would be impossible for the new person to have the exact same experiences that you've had. Thus it's sense of self would not be the same as yours.

There is no contradiction here. Do you understand this?

Jabba, read the highlighted bit over and over, please. Perhaps it will help.

The self you have at the instant of reading this word is not the same self you have at the instant of reading this word. The number of selves you experience during the reading of this message is limited only by Planck time.

In other words: There is something about your self that is not replicated even within you as you are now; there is no need to add the identical copy.

You're not you, Jabba. At least, you're not the same you as when you started reading this.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

Good Morning,Mr. Savage!

I am curious as to what you would call the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

I am curious as to what you think others would call the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

I am curious as to what part of the scientific model, or our current understanding of neuroscience, describes, explains, or admits to the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

I am curious about what you consider to be your best evidence for the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

Please do consider addressing these curiosities.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Except we're not passing in the night. You're sailing your ship repeatedly onto the reef in front of our lighthouse. We're desperately shining the light into your wheelhouse, screaming frantically that you've run aground while you maintain flank speed as the hull rips apart beneath you. Occasionally you step onto your deck, look surprised that there's a lighthouse, and yell for us to join you on your ruined boat because, hey, the rocks have kept you from sinking completely.

I laughed, I cried, I laughed again and then I nominated it

 

[Garrette]

Much obliged.

That'll teach xtifr to rely on body of work instead of occasional wit.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Good Morning,Mr. Savage!

I am curious as to what you would call the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

I am curious as to what you think others would call the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

I am curious as to what part of the scientific model, or our current understanding of neuroscience, describes, explains, or admits to the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

I am curious about what you consider to be your best evidence for the "something about [your] 'self' that would NOT get replicated..."

Please do consider addressing these curiosities.

Go on Jabba, do the honest thing and address the real issues with your proof of immortality rather than this nitpicking side show whereby you project misunderstanding on to every other poster in the thread.

 

[Akhenaten]

Except we're not passing in the night. You're sailing your ship repeatedly onto the reef in front of our lighthouse. We're desperately shining the light into your wheelhouse, screaming frantically that you've run aground while you maintain flank speed as the hull rips apart beneath you. Occasionally you step onto your deck, look surprised that there's a lighthouse, and yell for us to join you on your ruined boat because, hey, the rocks have kept you from sinking completely.

I loves me some good analogy.

Brilliant!

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.

Yes, we know. You're claiming the existence of an immortal soul.

But you have no evidence, no logical explanations and not even a marginally cogent argument to support that claim.

What's new?

That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain.

No, that's just what you're pretending it to be.

You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain.

You would be dead. Forever.

The replica would live, but from the instant of its creation onward it would diverge from the self from which it was copied.

You would still be dead.

Those seem contradictory to me.

Then you need to adjust your seems.

This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

Such is the nature of blind ignorance.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

About 20 minutes ago, Jabba's profile said he was preparing a response to this thread, but now I come to look for it, there's nothing from him. I wonder why

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Of course, no Godless Dave

 

[Slowvehicle]

About 20 minutes ago, Jabba's profile said he was preparing a response to this thread, but now I come to look for it, there's nothing from him. I wonder why

Trying not to be too hasty, I suppose.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Of course, what is 18 months of distraction and obfuscation between friends?

 

[PixyMisa]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

This has been explained to you seven hundred and thirty-six times. You have not made a single meaningful response to any of those explanations. Why should anyone bother to explain it to you again?

 

[Akhenaten]

About 20 minutes ago, Jabba's profile said he was preparing a response to this thread, but now I come to look for it, there's nothing from him. I wonder why

Firstly, let me express some small relief that I'm not the only one who checks these things. As it turns out, other somewhat notorious posters do exactly the same thing.

Secondly, I sometimes like to think that on clicking "Preview Post" and reviewing what he's written, Jabba's arguments don't even make sense to himself and he discards them before retiring to the breakfast nook.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.

I understand that. What I don't understand is why you think the scientific model includes such a thing.

That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

I guess it depends what you mean by "return to life".

If I bake a loaf of banana bread, eat the whole thing, then bake another loaf following the same recipe - following it precisely the same way as I did for the first loaf - has the first loaf returned, or do I have another loaf exactly like it?

What if I make the second loaf before I've eaten the first one? Has the first one returned even though it never went away?

 

[Mojo]

I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.

Then you need to provide some evidence that there is something about your "self" that would NOT get replicated if your brain were replicated.

I suspect that this would be the evidence that Slowvehicle means when he requests "the evidence that the "soul" exists". As he has done on many occasions.

 

[Mojo]

You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me.

If you have two identical entities, there are two of them, not one.

If your brain could somehow be perfectly replicated, the "particular sense of self [that] would be replicated by replicating [your] brain" would be identical to yours, but it would not be yours. It would be another "particular sense of self" identical to yours.

 

[Hokulele]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

The main problem with this is that the "self" or even the "sense of self" is not a thing. It is a process, a property, it emerges from a brain, it does not exist as a separate entity of its own. If you are now claiming that the "sense of self" is a separate thing, you will need to provide evidence for this.

 

[Giordano]

Would a perfect replica of the Mona Lisa be the Mona Lisa?

If the original Mona Lisa was destroyed and a perfect replica made would the replica be the original returned?

ETA:

What distinguishes the original from the replica is its spacetime coordinates. If an object's worldline though spacetime is continuous it is the original; if there are two worldlines there is an original and a replica.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worldline

Brilliant!

 

[Giordano]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

Surprise! You are not wrong here. You are indeed claiming it: we got that long ago the first time you claimed it. You can even believe it, if you wish. But it is not the SM or scientific model, it is your model. No one here agrees with you; they believe the SM. You are free to believe what most others think is an erroneous model (if you want to know why it is erroneous, read the other posts here). But if you want to prove to the others here that you are correct (read your OP again) and the SM model is wrong , you need to prove undisputed proof, and explain why the many criticisms expressed here are incorrect. Repeating your statement yet again will not convince anyone. Simple.

 

[Giordano]

Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain.

Let us start with what you believe is that something that would return in a reincarnation. You have called it "the sense of self," but a reincarnation of me would not have my current sense of self, in that it would believe itself to be someone else, not me. It would not have my memories, things, or appearance. It would not have my likes or dislikes. It might not speak my language. It might not have my same gender. I assume it would not love my wife or children like I do.

So when you think of yourself being reincarnated, what part of you is reincarnated?

Even before you prove that such a thing exists, what do you see that thing to be?