Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

And so you have correctly described it. However, unless you have a definition for "the subject" that is something more sophisticated than "that which a p-zombie lacks", your definition is circular and therefore meaningless. After all, if you were a p-zombie, you would believe you had "the subject" as well, by definition.

(ed. small yet important grammar change)

I don't follow the logic of your argument. The difference between a normal human and a p-zombie is that a p-zombie has no experiences. There is nothing like what it is like to be a p-zombie. It has no mind. It has all the mental experiences of a rock. It is brain processes alone. Brain processes are necessary for minds but insufficient. A metaphysical subject (or something which takes the same role) is also necessary for minds and also insufficient. So "that which a p-zombie lacks" is not quite the correct definition. A p-zombie lacks a mind as well as a metaphysical subject. It would be more correctly definable as "that which a p-zombie requires in order to restore its mind", bearing in mind the p-zombie still needs its brain as well.

For the record, my own position implies that p-zombies are impossible but for a different reason to yours. If the metaphysical subject is universal and singular then it is universally available as a metaphysical subject. Therefore it is available to any potential p-zombies. To put it another way - the metaphysical subject has a necessary sort of existence and the existence of p-zombies is only compatible with the metaphysical subject being contingent. The concept of a p-zombie is perfectly coherent, they are just impossible in reality. This is an important distinction because it means there is a meaningful and intelligable difference between a normal human and a p-zombie even though p-zombies can't actually exist.

 

[nescafe]

Agreed, but this is a weaker claim.

Indeed -- I constructed it that way deliberatly so that it would be compatible with both versions of the conclusion.

Now you have made a much stronger claim by changing the language. Instead of "causally related, somehow" you are now claiming that mind can be defined in terms of the brain processes. This is exactly the claim that the materialist cannot back up. To be consistent with the first three statements you need to restrict this to:

"Changed the mind that is <causally related, however indirectly> to the patterns of brain activity)

Why? A mind that is defined in terms of brain processes is clearly causally related to those brain processes -- the stronger claim made in this formulation of my conclusion is compatible with the premises.

There is no "interactive mechanism".

It may have been bad phrasing on my part -- if the interactions between the brain and "the subject" do not involve information exchange in some form, then how does "the subject" affect brain states and vice versa?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why? A mind that is defined in terms of brain processes is clearly causally related to those brain processes...

True, but it does not follow that a mind which is causally related to brain processes can be completely defined in terms of those processes. It may also be dependent on something else for a full definition.

-- the stronger claim made in this formulation of my conclusion is compatible with the premises.

But the conclusion goes beyond the premises and the reasoning.

It may have been bad phrasing on my part -- if the interactions between the brain and "the subject" do not involve information exchange in some form, then how does "the subject" affect brain states and vice versa?

This is why I brought up the example of quantum entanglement. Do these processes involve "information exchange"?

The subject has no means of storing or exchanging information. Its only means of affecting physical reality, including brain states, is via loading the quantum dice (which is effectively what is happening during entanglement also). It acts by altering the probability of a given quantum outcome in just such a way as to create macrosopic differences in the physical world. The brain is the perfect environment for this to happen. One little change somewhere can trigger widescale changes elsewhere in the brain and ultimately result in different macroscopic outcomes.

I cannot give you a better answer than that. All I can do is make vague suggestions of how it could be conceivable. Actually finding out the nature of the relationship between neuroscience and quantum mechanics must be left to neuroscientists in collaboration with mathematicians and quantum physicists.

 

[chriswl]

There is a whole army of materialist-inspired strawmen though. Nearly all of them are variations on "If you are denying materialism then you must be suggesting cartesian dualism".

But it is clear that we don't actually understand the mental with the same certainty that we understand the physical. There is no equivalent to the physical sciences that applies to the realm of mind. It seems obvious that the physical world behaves in ways that can be precisely understood and the mind does not.

When we find ourselves unable to completely reconcile what we know of the physical world with what we know of the mental world it is reasonable to assume that our conception of one of these things is at fault. But which one? Most likely the one that is poorly understood, I would suggest.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But it is clear that we don't actually understand the mental with the same certainty that we understand the physical.

That depends what you mean by "understand the physical". We understand quite a lot about what what we call physical does. The confusions start when we ask what what we call physical is and how it relates to what we call mental.

There is no equivalent to the physical sciences that applies to the realm of mind.

Exactly. But that does not mean it doesn't exist. There is no "science of consciousness" because consciousness is subjective and science eliminates subjectivity, as I have said over and over again.

It seems obvious that the physical world behaves in ways that can be precisely understood and the mind does not.

Possibly, yes.

When we find ourselves unable to completely reconcile what we know of the physical world with what we know of the mental world it is reasonable to assume that our conception of one of these things is at fault. But which one? Most likely the one that is poorly understood, I would suggest.

That's not safe reasoning. The problem is not reconciling what we know of the physical world with what we know of the mental world. The problem is understanding how these two worlds are related to each other. YOU, and the materialists in general, are unable to reconcile certain facts about minds with certain things which seem to follow from materialism being true. You then put the cart before the horse as follows:

Assumption: Materialism is true
Observation: We can't seem to non-redundantly define what a mind is without contradicting materialism.
Conclusion: There's no such thing as minds.

There is nothing good about this line of reasoning.

Yes, there's something at fault somewhere, but it is not our observation that we do indeed have minds. The fault is the assumption that materialism is true, combined with the false belief that science has shown this to be the case when it has not in fact done anything of the sort.

Here is my suggestion:

Assumption: Materialism may or may not be true.
Observation: We can't seem to non-redundantly define what a mind is without contradicting materialism.
Observation: I do indeed have a mind, regardless of the previous observation.
Conclusion: Materialism isn't true.

The materialist will reject this, usually claiming that "all the scientific evidence suggests materialism is true....." Which turns out to be a totally false statement, leading to the obvious question: "Why does this totally false statement always get trotted out at this exact point in the debate???

 

[chriswl]

That depends what you mean by "understand the physical". We understand quite a lot about what what we call physical does. The confusions start when we ask what what we call physical is and how it relates to what we call mental.

Which of the many meanings of the verb to be are you using when you ask what the physical is?

If we can understand what the physical does why can we not have equivalent knowledge of what the mental does?

Exactly. But that does not mean it doesn't exist. There is no "science of consciousness" because consciousness is subjective and science eliminates subjectivity, as I have said over and over again.

Does this subjectivity really matter? We all seem to be able to agree that we have minds and that we all have the same kinds of minds and we can talk to each other about our subjective experiences. So we have intersubjective agreement just like we do in science.

I'm not suggesting that mind doesn't exist, just that we only poorly understand it. If we understood it properly then maybe the mind-body problem would go away.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Geoff- by "Fix the language" I do not mean "add more definitions".

If language is your only tool, then you need to restructure it so it becomes a tool able to unambiguously analyse the sort of problems you wish to tackle. People who cannot agree what "is "means are unlikely to be able to solve problems by use of language.

I see no evidence at all that any such attempt has been made.

(Heavy sigh).

But we already agreed there is a dearth of evidence for anything here.

It is possible, I suppose, that philosophical discussion of this type really does touch upon genuine profundity. I fear I see no evidence to support this view either.
It looks increasingly to me like children sticking fingers in their ears and chanting "La la la" so they need not hear their mother telling them it's time for bed. The fact that they do not hear does not affect the time.

Can you provide any evidence at all to disprove this (admittedly frustrated) view incorrect? Or is that also impossible?

 

[hammegk]

...
It looks increasingly to me like children sticking fingers in their ears and chanting "La la la" so they need not hear their mother telling them it's time for bed. The fact that they do not hear does not affect the time.

Nor does that act prove the assumption of Materialism=True.

Can you provide any evidence at all to disprove this (admittedly frustrated) view incorrect? Or is that also impossible?

Mu.

We are, after all, discussing philosophy ....

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If language is your only tool, then you need to restructure it so it becomes a tool able to unambiguously analyse the sort of problems you wish to tackle.

That is exactly what Kant "tried to do"/"did".

People who cannot agree what "is "means are unlikely to be able to solve problems by use of language.

"Is" was one of his favourite subjects:

http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/existenceisnotapredicate.html

I see no evidence at all that any such attempt has been made.

Can you provide any evidence at all to disprove this (admittedly frustrated) view incorrect? Or is that also impossible?

http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html

WHETHER the treatment of such knowledge as lies within the
province of reason does or does not follow the secure path of a
science, is easily to be determined from the outcome. For if
after elaborate preparations, frequently renewed, it is brought
to a stop immediately it nears its goal; if often it is com-
pelled to retrace its steps and strike into some new line of
approach; or again, if the various participants are unable to
agree in any common plan of procedure, then we may rest
assured that it is very far from having entered upon the secure
path of a science, and is indeed a merely random groping. In
these circumstances, we shall be rendering a service to reason
should we succeed in discovering the path upon which it can
securely travel, even if, as a result of so doing, much that is
comprised in our original aims, adopted without reflection,
may have to be abandoned as fruitless.

 

[Belz...]

No, we are talking about a metaphysical subject. The "I" itself. The "thing" which observes your mind and isn't actually a "thing", since things are only things for it and it isn't a thing for anything else.

Bolding mine. The "thing" which observes your mind ? Have we changed the argument, now ? The mind is no longer the observer, but is itself observed by the "I" ?

You got it. Neti, neti, neti.

Nor is there evidence for it. So it's hard for anyone to defend that position.

I disagree totally. The subject necessarily is one thing. There is only ever one of them. You cannot be two minds.

Incorrect.

http://www.ebonmusings.org/atheism/ghost.html

People with their brains severed in two effectively have two minds at once, and this leads to very interesting results.

It obviously fixes the problems with materialism. It is the simplest thing you can add to the picture in order to complete it. At this point materialists usually claim that the whole thing is far too complicated to say that, but this is simply not true.

It doesn't solve anything and isn't the simplest explanation if you can't even define what it is and how it explains anything.

 

[Belz...]

No, it does not do any "thinking". Your brain does the thinking. It may be involved somewhere in perception, but not during the sensory or cognitive stages of perception.

Let me get this straight. The "I" does not do any thinking, and MAY be involved in perception, and doesn't have much causal power, if any.

It does not store memories, does not act, does not think. So what DOES it do ?

Observe.

And in order to explain its existence we have to assume a non-random AND non-deterministic process for which there is no evidence. All this for a speculation whose only end result is convincing us that "I" is more than mere brain processes, which flies in the face of all available evidence. We're using assumptions to support assumptions.

I call Occam on this one.

Assumption: Materialism is true
Observation: We can't seem to non-redundantly define what a mind is without contradicting materialism.
Conclusion: There's no such thing as minds.

Perhaps you have a problem with short-term memory.

Materialists don't claim that minds don't exist.

Assumption: Materialism may or may not be true.
Observation: We can't seem to non-redundantly define what a mind is without contradicting materialism.
Observation: I do indeed have a mind, regardless of the previous observation.
Conclusion: Materialism isn't true.

But your first observation is false. We CAN define minds WITHIN materialism. Redundantly ? Well, we can't define atoms without beign somewhat redundant either. Nor can we define chairs without it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Bolding mine. The "thing" which observes your mind ? Have we changed the argument, now ? The mind is no longer the observer, but is itself observed by the "I" ?

No, the argument hasn't changed. This has been my position right from the very start. The mind is not the subject.

Apart from that.....I think it is time wind this thead up, Belz.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It does not store memories, does not act, does not think. So what DOES it do ?

Observe.

Yes, it observes. It also wills.

This thread is going nowhere, Belz. We are like the last two people left at the party when the sun is coming up and there's no alcohol left.

....unless anybody wants to talk about Kant.....

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, it observes. It also wills.

Though we know the brain areas responsible for the will and for perception/observation? Why do we need this extra bit again? You still are not dealing with the level of neurological knowledge that we currently have.

Are you willing to provide definitions and examine those definitions of these words you continue to use -- subject, subjective, mind? Last time I was involved in this you ran away whenever we tried to pin you down on what those words mean.

You guys are still spinning your wheels over this?

 

[Apathia]

No, the argument hasn't changed. This has been my position right from the very start. The mind is not the subject.

Apart from that.....I think it is time wind this thead up, Belz.

Yes, Justgeoff, somebody please pull the plug. This discussion can only come to impasse after impasse because there is ideology involved. Parties are refusing to accept any a priori or arbitrary, for the sake of discussion, common ground. The terms "subject," "subjective," and "mind" have been ruled baseless, irrelevant, and wooish.

Sure, it's the Philosophy and Religion section, but the prefered Philosophy of Skepticism is that there is only one valid way to knowledge: the Scientific Method. There is no other knowledge. "Subjective Knowledge" is an oxymoron.
"Redness" is a process between the the neural coponents of the eye and brain or it is a meaningless word.

For many here Science equals Materialism, Determinism, and Reductionism. It doesn't come without those and they are too integral to it to be questioned.
Noting that these are metaphysical stances brings the discussion to the same halt that the previous poster's asking for a definition of "Subectivity" does.

The flavor of it all is just same kind of discussions between believers and nonbelivers. There are vested psychological interests.

Please pull the plug. It doesn't seem to me anybody is getting anything out of it. But then maybe I'm wrong. Pehaps it has inspired some people to think through their worldview assumptions. I hope so. otherwise it seems to me like road kill.

 

[Belz...]

This thread is going nowhere, Belz. We are like the last two people left at the party when the sun is coming up and there's no alcohol left.

....unless anybody wants to talk about Kant.....

Well, if that means you can't provide a definition or description of that elusive, non-random and non-deterministic "will", then I guess you're right.

Speculation is not my forte.

 

[Belz...]

Yes, it observes. It also wills.

Without causal power, as you yourself have said, "willing" pretty much means "does nothing".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Though we know the brain areas responsible for the will and for perception/observation?

No, we don't know that.

Are you willing to provide definitions and examine those definitions of these words you continue to use -- subject, subjective, mind?

Scientifically-compatible definitions? Or can we discuss Sartre, Heidegger, etc....?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, if that means you can't provide a definition or description of that elusive, non-random and non-deterministic "will", then I guess you're right.

Neti, neti.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Without causal power, as you yourself have said, "willing" pretty much means "does nothing".

Consciousness as an epiphenomena has no causal power. I am not an epiphenomenalist.