Materialists......

Not exactly. But an explanation would require a post the length of a short history of philosophy.

So you do know what other necessary conditions there are but you won't tell what those are?



By the way I have the scientific proof for materialism but an explanation would require a post the length of a short history of science... Oh yeah, that's convincing.
 
So you do know what other necessary conditions there are but you won't tell what those are?

Not in one short post I won't, no. Nescafe is asking a similar sort of question.

Finding the answer to this problem is a bit like trying to complete a rubik's cube. Finding a coherent explanation of the mind-brain relationship is like trying to get the last corners into the right places. The materialistic solutions all try to get the corners into the right places without disturbing the rest of the cube. The thinking is "The bottom half of the cube is OK (materialistic science works as a unit). I need to get the conciousness corners into the right places, but I mustn't disturb the bottom half of the cube!" This doesn't work, of course. In order to get the last pieces into position you have to accept some disturbance to the partially-completed cube. But finding the right solution requires finding a way to disturb the partially-completed cube in just the right way so that when the corners go into their correct places, the bottom half of the cube simultaneously goes back to its correct state. You have to consider the whole cube together. Similarly, to get to a solution to the problem of consciousness you need to re-think your concept of material - even though this seems to be a backwards step. It's not actually a backwards step, provided the new configuration (of concepts, this time) leaves materialistic science still workinig as a coherent unit, except now situated in a more coherent "bigger picture" - i.e. as part of a completed cube instead of just one half of it, the preservation of which is preventing full completion.

Materialistic science is not wrong - but it's only a partial answer. The fundamental mistake of materialistic theories of mind is to try to incorporate minds within the concepts of the material world when what is needed is a revision of the conceptual context of materialism itself. As I have explained before, it does this because of a confused identity claim between the objects of perception and the perception-independent world. Completing the cube must involve the correction of this confusion and a coherent explanation of how the objects of perception (the ones that look "physical") and the world-as-it-is-in-itself. The biggest problem materialists have, IMO, is summoning up the courage to disturb their belief in materialism in the first place. Because of this, they never get as far as realising that it may be possible to see things in a different way - a way where the findings of materialistic science still make sense within their own context but that this is no longer the primary conceptual context of everything-which-exists. And it's not because people haven't tried to explain it before - two obvious examples are Kant and Bohm, one philosopher, one physicist - and both came up with solutions which are like my rubik's cube example. They both re-situate materialism in a new context.
 
JustGeoff said:
No, it wouldn't. All you can do is copy the whole brain, and this is no use if you want to transfer parts of the data to a different brain.

Well, if the brain can extract specific parts of data on its own, what makes you think that a similar, artificial construct couldn't do it using the same pattern ?

JustGeoff said:
Because I have no other way of explaining the existence of subjectivity. The link between brain and mind appears to be contingent rather than neccesary - there doesn't appear to be any logical reason why minds accompany brain processes.

Well, working from the assumption that the brain produces the mind, this becomes expected and quite logical, actually. Can you think of any other assumption we can work with that has the same quality ?

Brains only explain the content of mind, not the existence of mind. So you need something else to explain why minds exist. Whatever that something else is, that is the extra condition.

Perhaps. So far, however, you have given me no reason to believe that there IS such an extra condition, except your word that it is obvious.

JustGeoff said:
Empirically? I couldn't, not even theoretically. The Turing Test doesn't cut it, because it is itself critically dependent on a subjective human judgement ("Do I believe this is a human?"), and there's no other way of doing it. The fact that the machine couldn't be concious and the fact that we couldn't empirically determine it, even if it was, are linked.

I'll grant you that we can't, for now, "detect" consciousness, and that we may never be able to. But since we haven't established what consciousness is, it seems incorrect to state that machines can't be conscious. Or are you just saying that the specific machine-man mentioned in the Turing test isn't conscious ?

But the real problem here is there is a level of abstraction missing. In the case of the brain itself, the connections are manifest at the physical level of reality. In the case of the A.I. copy, those connections are merely virtual - so there is a fundamental difference between the two. The only way you could create an artificial consciousness is by copying the brain itself - by actually making another physical brain.

What to you mean by "virtual" ?
 
Perhaps if I extract a finite-state automaton from a neural network, I could learn about the neural network in a more discrete manner.

~~ Paul
 
It's 4. You are looking for solutions which preserve your current understanding of "material". The correct explanation for consciousness requires the correct understanding of what matter is. It is this which must change.

Curious. I'm not sure matter "is" anything. Except that it exists and acts in a certain way.
 
The fundamental mistake of materialistic theories of mind is to try to incorporate minds within the concepts of the material world when what is needed is a revision of the conceptual context of materialism itself.

Well, I can agree somewhat with the rubik cube analogy, but this is somewhat confusing.

You seem to be claiming that you know something beyond the materialistic universe exists. I assume, however, that you don't have actual proof of this. If it's only the above-vaunted personal experience, then how can anyone be convinced by your argument ?
 
Materialistic science is not wrong - but it's only a partial answer.
But it is the only way to get any kind of answer that resembles truth. Remember my question;
Are there any "correct" answers in philosophy?
If so, how do you tell if they are correct?
From reading your posts, it appears that none of your non-materialistic answers can be shown to be correct, and you have admitted as much. I submit that an answer which you know cannot be shown to be correct is no answer at all. At the very least, it is an answer that only makes you feel good, not one that advances knowledge in any way.
 
But it is the only way to get any kind of answer that resembles truth. Remember my question;

From reading your posts, it appears that none of your non-materialistic answers can be shown to be correct, and you have admitted as much. I submit that an answer which you know cannot be shown to be correct is no answer at all. At the very least, it is an answer that only makes you feel good, not one that advances knowledge in any way.

Intellectual masturbation?
 
But it is the only way to get any kind of answer that resembles truth. Remember my question;

From reading your posts, it appears that none of your non-materialistic answers can be shown to be correct, and you have admitted as much. I submit that an answer which you know cannot be shown to be correct is no answer at all. At the very least, it is an answer that only makes you feel good, not one that advances knowledge in any way.

Of course. Philosophy doesn't advance knowledge in any way. Whatever you say, Tricky. Looks like I'm wasting my time studying it. :)
 
Well, I can agree somewhat with the rubik cube analogy, but this is somewhat confusing.

You seem to be claiming that you know something beyond the materialistic universe exists. I assume, however, that you don't have actual proof of this. If it's only the above-vaunted personal experience, then how can anyone be convinced by your argument ?

Let's keep with the cube analogy. I'm trying to get people to stop asking the wrong question. "What exists beyond the physical world?" is the wrong question. The correct questions are "What is the nature of the existence of the physical world?" or "What do we really mean by physical?" You are asking me "What shall we add to the physical world?" In other words, you are trying to get me to specify something you can build upon your current materialistic conception of reality. I cannot do this, because I was never suggesting this is possible. It's not possible, because to do so can only lead to substance dualism, and substance dualism is not the answer. Instead, I am suggesting that people step back from materialism and try to find a new context for it. Instead of adding to the materialist picture I want to pick it up, wholesale, and place it in a new context. So nothing gets "added" in the way you envisage. Instead, I'm trying to relocate it so it has some foundations instead of just hanging theoretically in mid-air. It's just like the cube. You cannot solve the puzzle without disturbing the bits of it that you already see as completed.

Materialism looks true from our perspective. Whatever the final answer is, materialism is still going to look true from our perspective. What has got to change is the claim that materialism is also true from all other perspectives - specifically from the perspective of "things in themselves". The problem is not that empirical science is failing to analyse and describe the empirical world. The problem is that the empirical world isn't "the world as it is in itself." Instead, it is merely "the world as we experience it." All of the findings of empirical science remain just as true of the world as we experience it, even if we retract the claim that the world as we experience it is the same as the world as it really is.
 
Of course. Philosophy doesn't advance knowledge in any way. Whatever you say, Tricky. Looks like I'm wasting my time studying it. :)

Woo-hoo a philosophy student finally admits it! ;)

Seriously though, stand philosophy's achievements side by side with those of the natural sciences, or even, to plug my own undergraduate course, Economics (and Politics, but I don't think it IS the case for that, I just find it interesting), and I'd say there's no contest.
 
Materialism looks true from our perspective. Whatever the final answer is, materialism is still going to look true from our perspective. What has got to change is the claim that materialism is also true from all other perspectives - specifically from the perspective of "things in themselves". The problem is not that empirical science is failing to analyse and describe the empirical world. The problem is that the empirical world isn't "the world as it is in itself." Instead, it is merely "the world as we experience it." All of the findings of empirical science remain just as true of the world as we experience it, even if we retract the claim that the world as we experience it is the same as the world as it really is.
How can you tell the difference between a perspective which exists, but which you cannot experience, versus a perspective which does not exist?
 
How can you tell the difference between a perspective which exists, but which you cannot experience, versus a perspective which does not exist?

If you are suggesting that perspectives we cannot experience can't exist then you're defending phenomenalism (idealism). Personally, I'd like to assume to that there is such a thing a world which is independent of our experiences. I am having trouble figuring out why you're suggesting there isn't...... :con2:
 
Woo-hoo a philosophy student finally admits it! ;)

Seriously though, stand philosophy's achievements side by side with those of the natural sciences, or even, to plug my own undergraduate course, Economics (and Politics, but I don't think it IS the case for that, I just find it interesting), and I'd say there's no contest.

And you wouldn't be biased at all? :oldroll:
 
Let's keep with the cube analogy. I'm trying to get people to stop asking the wrong question. "What exists beyond the physical world?" is the wrong question.

Of course it's wrong, because it assumes that something exists beyond the physical world.

The correct questions are "What is the nature of the existence of the physical world?" or "What do we really mean by physical?"

Not sure those questions have any meaning, or that any answer to either of them would be meaningful, either.

Instead, I am suggesting that people step back from materialism and try to find a new context for it. Instead of adding to the materialist picture I want to pick it up, wholesale, and place it in a new context.

Great. Why ? What prompts this desire ? Why would we want to do that ?

What has got to change is the claim that materialism is also true from all other perspectives - specifically from the perspective of "things in themselves". The problem is not that empirical science is failing to analyse and describe the empirical world. The problem is that the empirical world isn't "the world as it is in itself." Instead, it is merely "the world as we experience it."

I disagree; otherwise science would be subjective, and far less useful than it really is.
 
If you are suggesting that perspectives we cannot experience can't exist then you're defending phenomenalism (idealism). Personally, I'd like to assume to that there is such a thing a world which is independent of our experiences. I am having trouble figuring out why you're suggesting there isn't...... :con2:

Tricky's not "suggesting" anything. It's a question. I had the same one I had after reading your post.
 
If you are suggesting that perspectives we cannot experience can't exist then you're defending phenomenalism (idealism). Personally, I'd like to assume to that there is such a thing a world which is independent of our experiences. I am having trouble figuring out why you're suggesting there isn't...... :con2:
No, as Arkan_Wolfshade suggested, I'm wondering how you can tell the difference in things which you can't experience versus things which don't exist. To me, that is a very important question. Why isn't it to you? If you can't tell the difference, then wouldn't it bother you a little bit that you spent so much effort in learning about something which you could never even tell if it existed?
 
If you are suggesting that perspectives we cannot experience can't exist then you're defending phenomenalism (idealism).
True for a naive idealist, perhaps.


Personally, I'd like to assume to that there is such a thing a world which is independent of our experiences. I am having trouble figuring out why you're suggesting there isn't...... :con2:
Objective idealists agree there a world independent of your experiences, or mine.

SFAIK, there is just one thing I do have control over -- at least some of the time -- and that is to accept or reject doing specific acts at times suggested by "my" epiphenomenal, compatabalistic, meat-machine.
 

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