Materialists......

OK....

which leaves articulett.....

Aww...I love you too, sweetie. I especially loved it when you called us all "insane elimitive materialist"--in fact, I think you started this thread on that note. And I really loved it when you called yourself the only "realist". And I find it fascinating how you've convinced yourself that materialism is impossible by playing semantic games with philosophical words while insulting everyone who dared to point out your flaws in logic...and I clapped with glee when you called yourself the only logical one. I am especially honored to have been singled out by you...You have been both illuminating and entertaining. But I shall leave you alone now (or I'll try) so you can get back to telling everyone else how insane they are. Afterall, you can't waste your time with me...you surpassed me at 12 and you've got to fulfill your purpose driven life by being the uniter of religion and science. You, afterall, are the wise one--the only one who really knows what is going on in this thread and how very illogical the insane materialists are. Everyone else just can't seem to get it, can they?

"kisses"--from your best cyberpal, articulett :)

P.S. Does this mean I get an "F" in philosophy?
 
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Again, set T=the set of all physical characteristics of a human, set T=a p-zombie and a1 is consciousness. So we have:

1. The set S contains all the members of the set T
2. The set S does not contain a1
3. Therefore T does not contain a1

I just now read your post through instead of just skimming over it.

You are correct when you say that assuming your conclusion is a big no-no in logic, but in this case the problem is not assuming a conclusion. It is that the formulation tries to model an inherently binary relation "x has y" using only unary predicates. It results in mixing different kinds of objects together. In the above one this expresses itself in that you have two different kinds of objects in S: characteristics and "a p-zombie". (Because you defined T to be a p-zombie and later say that S contains it).

The unary way of formulating it essentially means that we end up with an additional assumption that p-zombies exist. Several pages ago I presented one way to formalize the p-zombies using a binary predicate. With that formulation the non-physicality of consciousness is no longer entailed.

So, using the same logic:

1. The set of p-prime numbers contains all the members of the set of prime numbers
2. The set of p-prime numbers does not contain the number 7
3. Therefore 7 is not a prime number.

Note that 3. really is a logical consequence of 1. and 2.

If you go through the trouble of writing out 1. and 2. using the standard predicate calculus representation for natural numbers, multiplication, divisibility, and prime numbers, you end up with an inconsistent set of formulas. And if a set of formulas has no models at all, then any formula is true in all of them, so everything follows from a contradiction.

The difference between your example and Geoff's is that the definition of p-zombies is logically consistent: you can create a structure that satisfies the conditions of the definition.

On the other hand, given the standard definitions of the number theory, your p-primes are self-contradictory. There is nothing to prevent you from defining a variant of number theory where p-primes exist, but since you are not likely to end up with anything useful, it would be quite pointless thing to do.

Note that even though we can create a structure where there are p-zombies, it is a completely different question whether our reality corresponds with such a structure. If a formula is logically consistent, it may still be false in a given structure. My position is that we have no way of knowing anything about reality with absolute certainty that is required for logical proofs. This differs from number theory where we have defined the universe ourself and so we can know its properties.
 
Platonic Idealism and Christain Idealim based upon it dengrates human sexuality. Some shools of Oriental Mysticism make their satan discriminating intelligence. A Materialist who has to treat himself and others as objective material instead of persons because there's no such thing as a person, has painted himself into a sad corner. If your worldview damands you pluck out an eye, emasculate yourself, starve yourself, give your self a mental or spiritual lobotomy. Just don't go there with it. watch out for a fear based position. Someone might believe in the parental God because that gives them a feeling of security. My college Physics professor was a Theist, but he confessed to me that though believing in God gave him some comfort in some ways, he feared belief in supernatural beings because they could interfere with the course of the physical world and leave him without confidence in the laws of nature. A strickly materialistc-reductionistic-deterministic worldview can utterly rule out freak events that inspire woo-woo. It clears the table of all spiritual considerations so one is safe from religion. But be careful of the cost.
be prgmatic, not dogmatic. (I'm not a Theist, I'm not assigning any value to being one. Theists need to grow up.) (Again: in a nutshell, being spiritual is being a compassionate person.)
Be introspective to catch your unawares beliefs. Examine them and use them creatively. Beware anything that cannot be questioned.

Just because the reality of it is that I'm just a piece of meat doesn't mean that I feel that way or that I must treat everyone like such a piece of meat. My actions can be independent of reality. Otherwise, the mere fact that I believe the universe to be deterministic would prevent me from doing anything.

ETA: Spelling.
 
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Articulett,

I know you identify me as "the enemy". But then, lifegazer identifies Hyparxis and Bubo as "the enemy" (perhaps he identifies everybody but himself as "the enemy", I dunno). I am not your enemy, and I think if you calmed down a bit you may find that my position isn't so scary after all, just as lifegazer wouldn't feel threatened by Taoism if he actually tried to understand it instead of seeing it as an obstacle in the way of people agreeing with every strange claim he makes.

I am going to have one more try at meaningful communication with you. I don't identify you as the enemy. I stopped reading your posts because they didn't really have anything to do with a thread that it has taken a great deal of effort to stay on top of, and I didn't want to allow you to side-track me anywhere irrelevant at the same time as trying to navigate several more relevant side-tracks simultaneously.

And I am well aware that justgeoff will not change.

I'd like you to stop making assumptions about me. If you'd read what I've posted in this thread you would know this statement is false. There are a number of people posting here who have known me for several years and they will confirm to you that my views over that time have not been static. I was once a lot more like lifegazer. Before that, I was a bit like Dr Adequate - an atheist/materialist who was 100% confident in both his metaphysical beliefs and in the science which seemed at the time to support them. In the future, I have no doubt I will change some more. Maybe you will, too. We can only hope.

I just enjoy venting...

Well, then you'll understand why I started this thread. I was venting.

However, I think you may be venting at the wrong target. My views are not actually as threatening to you as you seem to think they are. I don't think you really understand what I believe, you just know it isn't confined to science. For you, that appears to be enough for you to identify somebody as an enemy.

I am female, and I grew up in a world where very many men are very confident of their views--I thought there was a reason for this...like maybe they understood something that I didn't (they do love to assert how stupid I am and how arrogant I am to ask questions). The problem was, everyone had very different views--and I just wanted the facts...so I could develop my own views--because everyone is convinced of their rightness it seems, but they don't agree with eachother.

And you don't think that is a problem in your own case?

I am sorry you have had some bad experiences in your childhood. However, I don't think that you should allow them to dominate your interactions with people now you are an adult. I was forced to go to Sunday School at a time when the only thing I was actually interested in was the natural world - astronomy, dinosaurs, etc..... I clearly remember watching Attenborough's "Life on Earth" the first time it was broadcast. I still believe it is the best natural history series ever made, and by the time I'd watched it three times I had just about memorised the whole sequence of evolution, as explained by Sir David. But every Sunday I had to sit there and be told to believe all sorts of bizarre cr*p about Jesus. I had plenty of questions. They had no answers. This in itself had quite a big effect on my development, partly because it left me with a hatred of religion which lasted for more than twenty years but it was worse than that. It destroyed my respect for the opinions and intellectual authority of adults. I was about ten, but I already could see that loads of supposedly-intelligent adults believed stuff that was on about the same level as Father Christmas. As a result, I mistakenly got the impression that I knew more than they did about life in general as well, a mistake it took me many years to identify. Knowing about evolution is one thing. Knowing about life is another - you have to actually live a bit before you can get that. You can see this in the posts of somebody like Tricky, who does not have a particular good knowledge of many of the areas he posts about (IMO) but does display a sort of wisdom which only comes from being on this planet for a few decades. Anyway - what I am trying to tell you is that you need to try to leave the influences of your childhood behind. You can't change them. But don't let them continue to dominate your thinking and your emotions or you will end up a prisoner of your own past.

My field is genetics...

Genetics is good. I like genetics. I've just finished the second year of a philosophy + cognitive science degree and I chose to study evolution as an option. I guessed it would be easy marks, and it was - It was my best mark of the entire year (76%), and has helped shift my overall mark closer to a 1st than a 2.2. It was an interesting course, partly because it was being taught by an interesting person - he is one of a small number of people who is engaged in an attempt to overturn the theory that there is no recombination in mitochondrial DNA, and it looks like he is going to be proved right. This has seriously put the cat among the pigeons in the field of genetics. If mtDNA undergoes recombination, then a whole load of other theories go whoopsie. I'm not trying to say that genetics is easy, but it sure was nice to get back to studying something I could nail down in between the struggles to understand Sartre's existentialism or A.D.Smith's metaphysics course. It's easier to understand. But that doesn't mean Sartre or Smith should be ignored, either. It just takes a bit more effort.

...and this whole dishonest ID debate has made me ultra aware of people passing off BS as "truths".

Yes, but be careful. There are many, many types of BS and types of truth and many, many types of person. Just because the creationists are both silly and dangerous, it does not mean that every other person who makes a non-scientific claim is either silly or dangerous. At the very least, you need to sit down and listen to what they are saying for long enough in order to find out. You have spent most of this thread reacting to me as if I was a creationist. I can only assume that this is because you haven't actually been reading anything I post, because there is nothing in any of my arguments that can be compared to creationism. They contradict science. I don't. At this point, the sort of reaction from you is along the lines of "Chortle! Guffaw!" Which just goes to confirm the claim that you aren't actually interested in finding out what I believe or why I believe it. Or you could just look at some of the other responses to mine in this thread. Sure, there's one or two people (like Belz) who responds a little like you do, but most people here will actually listen to what I have to say, try to understand it, and respond constructively. The result has been, IMO, an interesting and productive thread. It's just a shame you felt the need to continually scribble on it instead of trying to take part in it.

I understand where their ignorance is and where they are lying to others and themselves.

Who are you talking about? Creationists? Or everyone who doesn't believe what you believe? Because it looks like the latter. You seem to have an enormous pigeon-hole called "everyone who believes something which isn't science". Into that hole you put the creationists, and everyone who says something which even vaguely reminds you of them. You then paint all of them with the same brush, and give a generalised assessment of their pyschological reasons for "lying to themselves and others".

Articulett, I can see you have been damaged in the past. I'm sorry about that but it wasn't me who damaged you. Can you try to let go of your fear and your anger? You will find the world a lot less threatening when you do not percieve it to be full of enemies. Look at lifegazer. He's threatened by everyone. You don't want to be like him, so don't be like him.

And I have just developed an extreme distaste for the spreading of ignorance--especially when people use bits and pieces of science and semantics to spin a false truth that they then pass off as "higher truths". It's elitest and divisive--it doesn't serve anyone except the pedant who comes to think of himself as a wise guru while resorting to ad hominen attacks of people who actually have the facts.

And that will be you, yes?

As somebody else has already pointed out - it is you, not me, who is making claims to be in possession of "the truth". You rant against "absolute truth", yet you yourself are the one who seem to be clinging on to the notion that science is the ultimate arbiter of The Truth, as if you letting go would be the the worst disaster imaginable. You already know that extremist religion is no good. Extremist scientism isn't much use either. It's just the replacement of bad dogma with less bad dogma. All dogma is bad, including yours.

In real life I am small and fear true believers of all types because of their imperviousness to logic

So why do you think it is that I have ended up in complete agreement with our resident logician?

This is a typical example of how you continually attack a completely fictitious version of Geoff. It is part of your belief system that anybody who believes non-scientific stuff (including philosophers, apparently) must be completely impervious to logic. You have repeatedly accused me of the same thing. But you've never actually challenged my logic. Robin has, and I responded. But the real logician here is LW, and I am total agreement with everything he has said. Do you think it is a complete accident that this happened, or does it suggest to you that maybe I may have a better grasp of the logical situation than you assumed was the case? Actually think about it, articulett - instead of just giving a knee-jerk reaction. You are not basing your opinions on what I am saying or what is happening in this thread. You are basing them entirely on your own biases and preconcieved notions of "those woo-woo people".

And your statements about being "small and fearful" in real life make some of your reactions more understandable. I am tall and generally fearless (in my interactions with people). But I have seen what many short men do when they get into positions of power. It's called "the napoleon syndrome". They make up for their shortness by relishing their power over others. For the same reason, men with small penises buy flashy cars. You spend most of your time being small and fearful so when you come here you like to be agressive and to try to dominate.

--I rarely speak out, because I fear the consequences.

That is very unfortunate for you. I have never been fearful to speak out. To hell with the consequences.

Anyway, I'm done trying to get through your fear and anger. I am guessing you'll respond to this post with some more knee-jerk quips and attempts to characterise me as a dangerous woo-woo out to corrupt the minds of the innocent. But at least I can say I tried.

:)

Geoff
 
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But I am the Energiser Battery. Here we go again:

What is your definition of physical as you are using it in this premise?

It refers to things which are extended in space and persist over time, and other describable properties of the word which is extended in space and persists over time. Mental things have no location in space (we certainly can't say they are located in ones head - you can search my brain but will not find any euphoria or depression).
 
Well...no, but I can see how you'd think that. In fact, what I mean is that you are doing that, saying "If materialism is false, then materialism is false". Because unless you assume materialism is false, you cannot be sure that 1. and 2. do not contradict each other, and if you can't be sure 1. and 2. are non-contradictory then you can't draw any conclusions that assume both 1. and 2. are true.

Have a :hb: of your own:D. They are ONLY conceptually possible if you KNOW materialism is false.

No, they are conceptually possible regardless of any metaphysical assumption. If materialism is true, then they may not be possible in reality, but that is not the same as being conceptually possible. In order to concieve of a p-zombie, you need no reference to metaphysics whatsoever. All you need is to be able to is this:

1) Imagine a human from the outside - which is easy because that is how every human you've ever known has appeared to you (except yourself).

2) Imagine what it might be like to be that human, what it is like to be that human from the inside, in the same way you experience yourself.

3) Imagine that the human you imagined in (1) doesn't have any (2). This is also easy because you could imagine an android without a mind.

If you can do all three steps, you can concieve of a p-zombie. The temptation to assume materialism is true at step (0) and then claim you can't do (3) is not valid, however tempting it may seem. Neither is it the case that I assume materialism is false at (0). Steps 1, 2 and 3 do not need to be thought about "under materialism" at all. The fact that so many people have been unable to consider 1, 2 and 3 without first declaring materialism to be true is a powerful illustration of the way that metaphysical belief grips their thinking and dominates their understanding of these issues. Materialism is a box in which some people like to constrict their thinking. Sometimes this is a good idea, especially when you are doing certain types of science. But in the context of this debate it's a big no-no. It's a philosophical argument trying to establish whether the possibility of p-zombies leads to a falsification of materialism, and it is deliberately constructed in such a way that it does not need to assume any metaphysics at the outset. If it did so, it would be useless.

OK, later. I can't promise to understand it if he starts using philosophical terms though.

Actually, Nagel is very readable to the non-philosopher. He's a lawyer as well as a philosopher and he knows how to communicate his case effectively.
 
-------------------------------------
You can attach all the instruments you like, but you won't turn any mental predicates into physical ones. What you will do is replace mental ones with physical ones.
-----------------------------------------


What does that mean?

Are you saying that answering a question about the redness of apples involves lots of attributes, some mental and some physical? That's certainly true, and if we dive down into the precise process that occurs when a person answers a question about redness, I think we will find it difficult to locate the mental/physical boundary.

~~ Paul

It means that attaching instruments just gives a means of replacing a mental predicate with a physical one. You can have a machine which monitors your brain and when your dopamine level goes up it raises a flag with the word "happy" written on it. The feelings of happiness are now accompanied by a happy flag. The former is mental, the latter is physical. But you've not physicalised the mental or objectified the subjective. You are still left with a system which contains a bunch of mental properties and a bunch of physical properties. You are yet to provide an example of something which transcends the physical/mental boundary. Please keep trying though. :)
 
Yes...if we would just take the time to read all the crap you posted....

....then you might actually understand my position well enough to be able to attack it? At the moment you are firing your bullets off in all sorts of directions, but none of them are going anywhere near me. You are attacking a sort of generalised preconception of what you think I might be.

Why do you think I will take any notice of a person who clearly doesn't have the first clue what I actually believe? Why would I even interpret their ventings as being directed at anything I believe? Sure, the posts are addressed to me by name, but they don't have anything to do with me or with what I am saying. You are now actually making a public admission of what I concluded a very long time ago - that you aren't actually reading my posts. The result is that, to me, you are a bit like somebody-else's car alarm going off somewhere in the distance. Mildly irritating and not my problem.
 
Geoff said:
It refers to things which are extended in space and persist over time, and other describable properties of the word which is extended in space and persists over time. Mental things have no location in space (we certainly can't say they are located in ones head - you can search my brain but will not find any euphoria or depression).
I think I could find them with a thorough search.

1) Imagine a human from the outside - which is easy because that is how every human you've ever known has appeared to you (except yourself).

2) Imagine what it might be like to be that human, what it is like to be that human from the inside, in the same way you experience yourself.

3) Imagine that the human you imagined in (1) doesn't have any (2). This is also easy because you could imagine an android without a mind.
I can do this, but then I don't think the android would be indistinguishable from a human. Let's take redness: He doesn't experience any. So what happens when I ask him if the tomato is red? I have to assume that he has memorized the fact that a tomato is red, because he isn't deriving that fact on the fly. Now I show him a red object he has never seen and ask him its color. What does he say?

If we analyze this carefully enough, I think we will discover that the only way we can conceive of this android is if consciousness is an epiphenomenon. But then we get into the argument about whether epiphenomenalism makes an sense, given that we can discuss consciousness.

No, I don't think I can conceive of a zombie.

~~ Paul
 
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I think I could find them with a thorough search.


I can do this, but then I don't think the android would be indistinguishable from a human. Let's take redness: He doesn't experience any. So what happens when I ask him if the tomato is red? I have to assume that he has memorized the fact that a tomato is red, because he isn't deriving that fact on the fly. Now I show him a red object he has never seen and ask him its color. What does he say?

If we analyze this carefully enough, I think we will discover that the only way we can conceive of this android is if consciousness if an epiphenomenon. But even then we get into the argument about whether epiphenomenalism makes an sense, given that we can discuss consciousness.

No, I don't think I can conceive of a zombie.

~~ Paul

OK Paul, I think at this point I am just going to agree to disagree with you about the conceivability of Zombies. I don't think we are going to get much further.
 
Geoff said:
It means that attaching instruments just gives a means of replacing a mental predicate with a physical one. You can have a machine which monitors your brain and when your dopamine level goes up it raises a flag with the word "happy" written on it. The feelings of happiness are now accompanied by a happy flag. The former is mental, the latter is physical. But you've not physicalised the mental or objectified the subjective. You are still left with a system which contains a bunch of mental properties and a bunch of physical properties. You are yet to provide an example of something which transcends the physical/mental boundary. Please keep trying though
If I try hard enough and end up with a one-to-one correspondence between the mental and physical predicates, then can I jetison one set of predicates?

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
OK Paul, I think at this point I am just going to agree to disagree with you about the conceivability of Zombies. I don't think we are going to get much further.
Agreed.

So now we agree that conceivability is a difficult job. The article at Stanford admonishes us to beware of this:
We can take it that the relevant notion is ‘ideal conceivability, or conceivability on ideal rational reflection’ (Chalmers 1999, 477; see also his 2002). Roughly, the idea is that the situation in question must be imagined in such a way that arbitrary details can be filled in without any contradiction revealing itself.

But let's say zombies are conceivable. What about the impact on materialism or some other metaphysic? Without assuming materialism, does it make sense to comment on zombies impact on it? I don't see how it could.

~~ Paul
 
Just because the reality of it is that I'm just a piece of meat doesn't mean that I feel that way or that I must treat everyone like such a piece of meat. My actions can be independent of reality. Otherwise, the mere fact that I believe the universe to be deterministic would prevent me from doing anything.

ETA: Spelling.

"My actions can be independent of reality." That would be funny out of context.
In context I agree with you that we can and do participate creatively.
 
"My actions can be independent of reality." That would be funny out of context.
In context I agree with you that we can and do participate creatively.

It's the same with the free will argument. Even if free will doesn't exist objectively, from our point of view we still make decisions, si I don't see why that knowledge would change anything about our day-to-day lives.
 
If I try hard enough and end up with a one-to-one correspondence between the mental and physical predicates, then can I jetison one set of predicates?

~~ Paul

You need to answer that question yourself really. What is for sure is that you'll still have two sets of predicates, it's just that they'll perfectly correspond. I don't personally see how that gets you one millimetre closer to understanding why there are two sets in the first place, and I don't see how it gets you closer to demonstrating there is a blurred boundary between mental and physical. Instead, you'd have eliminated one of them, which isn't the same thing at all.
 
I read the Nagel article. It was worth reading.

~~ Paul

Yes. I think I mentioned before that is was listed on my reading list as essential background reading. Nagel is probably my favourite commentator on this issue, followed by Chalmers.

I'll have a go at answering your other post after I've had my dinner.....
 
OK Paul,

I have found an article : "Zombies versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability".

http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/zombie.html

Here it is with my annotations:

The zombist argues that if we can conceive that zombies are possible, then materialism fails, because it claims that there is nothing over and above the totality of basic physical facts. By this claim materialism is interpreted as a supervenience thesis: Higher level facts supervene on the fundamental ones. If this is so, the mere possibility of zombies presents a counter-example against this supervenience thesis. The general structure of the zombist's argument is, as follows:

(1) Zombies are possible.

(2) If zombies are possible then materialism fails.

(C0) Therefore, materialism fails.

It's that simple. Clearly, the materialist is embarrassed by this argument. It is not that he cannot answer to the zombist’s challenge. He has even more than one objection to it. Still, the zombist has the upper hand in this game: He can offer an easily comprehensible and appealing idea (and we all like simple but powerful ideas) and the only thing the materialist can do is—as it seems—to hover on the details.

All this is quite clear I think, and is an accurate representation of the interactions that have occured in this thread. Perhaps the problem is that the argument is so simple that the materialists can't quite believe their eyes. If Zombies are possible, materialism is false. This was the structure of the argument I supplied and our resident logician has confirmed that this is the case.

Nevertheless, to begin the materialist's game we need to clarify some of the details (more details, more clarification in the next section). Let us begin with the materialist's thesis. The materialist holds, according, at least, to the zombist, the following principle on conscious phenomena:

(MT) All facts of (phenomenal) consciousness logically supervene on

the totality of fundamental (micro-) physical facts.

The thesis, ascribed to him by the zombist, might give the first line of defense to the materialist. He might wonder why he should consider all the possible worlds. He may argue that we can gain important insights even if materialism is restricted to the scope of nomological necessity. The zombist, however, must ascribe such a high standard to his opponent. If the scope of the materialist’s supervenience thesis is narrower, then it is possible that there is some zombie world which is, however, outside of the materialist’s interest. The same can be said—and later we will exploit this fact—about the modal system within which the zombist argues: He needs S5 for the success of his argument.

I was very pleased to find this claim. Yesterday, when LW analysed my own logical position he correctly concluded that it would end up being an argument about which type of modal logic is employed. I agreed with this, and also stated that I guessed that the argument would need the strongest scheme of modal logic (S5) to push it through. If this article is correct, then so was my guess. We need S5.

Imagine that axiom-schema s5 does not hold. According to the Kripke-style semantics, there might be then some possible world which is not accessible from the actual one. It is not impossible then that materialism is true in the actual world and all the worlds accessible from it, nonetheless, some of the worlds, not available from the actual world, are in fact zombie worlds. Summarily, if either S5 or logical supervenience is denied, then MT is not inconsistent with the existence of a zombie world.

So if you deny supervenience (which effectively means you support eliminativism, if you are a materialist) or if you reject S5 modal logic, then zombies aren't inconsistent with materialism. We have reached both those conclusions ourselves.

In this case the zombist should argue more substantially that his zombie world is within the materialist’s interest. Thus, to be fair to the zombist, his claim of logical supervenience will be granted here (though, not without reservation).

The zombist's position, on the other hand, can be described, as follows:

(Z) Zombies, creatures physically indistinguishable from us, are logically possible.

The zombist’s reason for assenting to Z is the Conceivability principle, as follows:

(CT) Conceivability is sufficient for logical possibility.

This premise is, not surprisingly, the materialists' second favorite target.

OK, so I think this is where we are with your question. I've given up hoping you are going to accept what seems to me to be obvious: that there is a clear difference between mental and physical predicates. Once you accept that, concievability must follow. But you have accepted it for the purposes of this discussion so we can continue.

There are well-known theoretical considerations and counter-examples against this presumption. Still, we will grant this point too. Our only focus will be that what are the zombist’s criteria for conceivability.

To summarize, we will accept, and exploit in fact, the zombist's premises, and doing so we will not follow the materialist's usual tracks in refuting the zombist. We do not aim to change the zombist's game, we want to win it.

Sounds like the author is an anti-zombist.....and he's got a trick up his sleeve that was so clever that I really like it, even though it probably stops the zombie argument from completely undermining materialism. It all comes down to the quirk in S5 which the zombist relies on to force the proof.

3. The charge of methodological circularity did not impress or embarrass the zombist. So let us look for something stronger. From the previous sections we can now reconstruct the details of the zombie argument. We can postulate the following three premises which precede the zombist’s first premise ("zombies are possible"):

(1a) The zombie hypothesis contains no explicit contradiction.

(presumption, burden of proof on the materialist).

(1b) Theories containing no explicit contradiction are conceivable. (PNC)

(1c) Conceivable theories are possible. (CT).

(1) Therefore, zombies are possible. (1a-1c)

Now let me recall our former second premise:

(2a) If zombies are possible then MT is false.

(C1) Therefore, MT is false.

This is the point where the zombist stops. We should not, however. As we know, MT is a supervenience thesis, so if there is a counterexample against MT, then MT is not only false, it is necessarily false—at least in S5, on which the zombist relies (as was noted above).

In S5, materialism isn't just shown to be false, it's shown to be neccesarily false. But let's see what happens next:

So we can add now:

(3) If MT is false then MT is necessarily false.

(C2) Therefore, MT is necessarily false.

Now we can "recycle" the zombist’s principles. It’s tautological that

(4) If MT is necessarily false, then it is impossible.

Using (the contraposition of) the zombist's Conceivability principle we can establish that

(5) If MT is impossible then it is inconceivable.

Using his Principle of no explicit contradiction we can add that

(6) If MT is inconceivable, it contains explicit or explicable contradiction.

(C3) Therefore, MT is inconceivable and contains explicit contradiction.

This conclusion, however, does not seem appealing. Materialism, even if it would turn out to be false, seems to be (at least weakly) conceivable. But this is not the point. Rather, we might point out that for concluding (C3) the burden of proof is now on the zombist.

Very clever. :)

We started out with the burden of proof on the materialist. In order to go through, the zombie argument needs S5. The author if this paper is an anti-zombist, but he clearly accepts that a combination of the supervenience thesis (the rejection of eliminativism), the zombie argument and S5 modal logic, materialism is shown to be false. But if the materialist keeps applying S5 to this conclusion he can show that, according to the zombists own arguments, materialism is not only false, but neccesarily false. This has a side-effect that the zombist doesn't want because by the zombists own standards, choice of logic and method for assigning burdens of proof, the burden of proof has now switched to the zombist. The materialist has achieved this by ramming home the zombists line of argument to an ultimate conclusion that the zombist himself has no use for. The S5 logic which he needed earlier has come back to bite him.

The conclusion of the article is as follows.

The zombist, let me put it in this way, tries to make us to believe that his hypothesis, Z, is at a different (quasi-empirical) level, than MT. It is not so, however; the zombist's hypothesis, aimed as a direct refutation of materialism, claims, or should claim, the same ontological/metaphysical position as materialism has. Claiming that there is something over and above the physical facts is as strong a position as claiming that there are no such facts. Alternatively, our conclusion, C4, makes explicit that the zombist is wrong when he pushes the burden of proof to the materialist. He is wrong, since his hypothesis has a logical equivalent, whose burden of proof, according to his own standard, is on himself.

The zombist fails to prove that materialism is untenable. His argument, however, has its own virtues, as I see. First, it supports a skeptical position about the materialist's claim.11 The zombist's hypothesis cannot disprove MT, but it is certainly sufficient to raise reasonable doubts about it. Raising doubts, as we know, requires much less support, and even an unproved hypothesis can do that job. The materialist, being unable to prove that the zombie hypothesis is impossible, has to admit that his position falls short of absolute certainty.

Secondly, the zombie argument has relevant diagnostic value: the answer of different philosophical approaches to the zombie argument can help us to see the consequences of these approaches. On the basis of this and other similar hypotheses we can decide which theories we find appealing and which go against our intuitions.

I can agree with this conclusion. The zombie argument does appear to need S5 but it also seems that S5 can be used to undermine the zombists conclusion by driving it even further and switching the burden of proof. However, anybody currently labouring under the delusion that "all the evidence points to materialism being true" should have been given a wake-up call by this point. Whilst the zombie argument can be pushed to the point it self-destructs, it succeeds in throwing serious doubts on materialism. It just cannot be said to go the last mile and finally kill it off. So it can be marshalled in support of a skeptical attitude towards materialism. Given that most of the people I am arguing are actually 100% certain that materialism is true, this result is good enough for me.

In the end, the whole zombie issue is about establishing without doubt that the way we concieve of the world is dualistic, whether the materialist likes it or not. The one thing I wish you would/could accept more than anything else is the realisation that the dualism inherent in our language is not the result of "the pirates of dualism" but an inevitable consequence of the nature of our existence. Even now, you are trying to claim there is a blurred boundary between mental and physical concepts. I just don't see it. Once you accept that the distinction is both clear and unavoidable then there are any number of ways to use this fact to construct logical arguments against materialism. The zombie argument is one of these, but it looks like its critical dependence on S5 may turn out to be its achilles heel.

NB: This paper has suggested to me that materialism must actually be neccesarily false rather than just false. From the point of view of someone who thinks it may be true this would mean its either true, or its neccesarily false. It can't be false but not neccesarily so.

Anyone who can appreciate a clever game of chess should be able to appreciate this response to the zombie argument.

Isn't philosophy wonderful? ;)

Geoff.
 
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It results in mixing different kinds of objects together. In the above one this expresses itself in that you have two different kinds of objects in S: characteristics and "a p-zombie". (Because you defined T to be a p-zombie and later say that S contains it).
No, it was a typo, S is equivalent to "a p-zombie". The statement "S contains all the member of T" means "a p-zombie has all the physical characteristics of a human". Here is the corrected version.
Set T=the set of all physical characteristics of a human, set S=a p-zombie and a1 is consciousness. So we have:

1. The set S contains all the members of the set T
2. The set S does not contain a1
3. Therefore T does not contain a1
It is simply the first two of Geoff's statements with variables assigned. You can substitute back and get to the original.

Note that 3. really is a logical consequence of 1. and 2.
Yes. Correct conclusion to incorrect premises.
If you go through the trouble of writing out 1. and 2. using the standard predicate calculus representation for natural numbers, multiplication, divisibility, and prime numbers, you end up with an inconsistent set of formulas.
And if you did the same thing but chose 6 instead of 7 you would have a consistent (but tautological) set of formulae.

So the consistency or the inconsistency of the argument depends entirely on the truth or falsity of the conclusion. That is the essense of assuming your conclusion.

If it were possible to perform a similar formalisation of the zombie argument then similarly we would have a consistent or inconsistent argument depending upon the truth or falsity of the conclusion.
The difference between your example and Geoff's is that the definition of p-zombies is logically consistent: you can create a structure that satisfies the conditions of the definition.
No. You need to think about this. Would the definition of a p-zombie be consistent if consciousness was physical?

Answer this one question and you have the key to the whole thing.

If the logical consistency of the definition depends entirely on the truth or falsity of the conclusion then you have assumed your conclusion.

My first two statements are:
Robin said:
1. The set S contains all the members of the set T
2. The set S does not contain a1
They are perfectly consistent just as long as a1 is not in T, but inconsistent if a1 is in T. Therefore you cannot use this definition to prove that A1 is not in T

I simply selected the prime number example to demonstrate the absurdity of the argument.
On the other hand, given the standard definitions of the number theory, your p-primes are self-contradictory.
And if consciousness is physical then the definition of a p-zombie would also be self-contradictory.

Again the definition of a p-zombie is only consistent if the conclusion is true. That is called "assuming your conclusion".
 
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