Materialists......

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why in Ed's Name would I, or Geoff, not take note of the facts modern neuroscience, and all science, provides? Of course we take note, and at least think we understand the implications. What do you not understand about epistemology not providing answers to ontological questions?

I'm not saying the neuroscience will answer the ontological questions.* I'm simply saying that the metaphysical models must take the scientific discoveries into account. There seems to be a reluctance to do that. Perhaps not, and I just haven't noticed philosophers paying attention. For example, it's clear from neuroscience that "consciousness" is not one monolithic process.

~~ Paul

* Because I think they are fundamentally unanswerable anyway.

 

[Mercutio]

There's only one fleeting jumble.

Could you expand on what you mean by this? As I read it, it is quite clearly incorrect. I can see a way in which it may be true, but that way does not support your view.

I'll withhold further comment until you have explained your comment.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I was just reviewing the video of Blackmore's speech at the Skeptic Society meeting last year--she makes a similar point, calling one popular view "materialistic dualism", because the people who hold it claim to be materialists, but still speak of "giving rise to consciousness", the very phrase implying dualism.

I think it's more of a problem with people inferring dualism. When I say that atmospheric processes give rise to the weather, do people run around hollering about dualistic meteorology?

That said, as before, I agree we have to stop using words like mental.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I was just reviewing the video of Blackmore's speech at the Skeptic Society meeting last year--she makes a similar point, calling one popular view "materialistic dualism", because the people who hold it claim to be materialists, but still speak of "giving rise to consciousness", the very phrase implying dualism.

WOW! Hammegk, Mercutio and Geoff are in agreement! You are heading for woodom, Merc.

They are usually called "Cartesian Materialists".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_materialism#A_philosophy_without_adherents.3F

"Giving rise to consciousness" always reminds me of JC rising from the dead. No explanation expected. Just believe it....! Oh yes.

 

[hammegk]

That said, as before, I agree we have to stop using words like mental.

Why not. Just stop thought --- and no, I don't mean in the meditative sense ....

 

[Robin]

Robin,

Okay, I accept your point, but I can't remember where we were in the debate. You didn't assume your conclusion, you just made a claim that was dependent on an IF which I believe is false.

Geoff.

I am unclear what you mean. What you or I believe is true or false makes no difference in a logical argument. I have no opinions one way or the other as to whether consciousness is physical.

My claim is that the argument :

1. A p-zombie has all the physical characteristics of a human being
2. A p-zombie is not conscious

contains the assumption "consciousness is not physical". It clearly, unquestionably, unambiguously does contain that assumption.

We can clearly see this because those statements could only be compatible if consciousness was not physical.

So it cannot go on to conclude "consciousness is not physical".

Again, if you do not believe that my representation of the argument:

The P-zombie argument:
1. The set S has all members that the set T has.
2. It is metaphysically concievable that S does not contain a₁
3. Therefore T does not contain a₁

is accurate, please present your own - or point me to some source where I can see a formal version of the argument.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The argument starts from a metaphysically neutral position, rather than trying to assume materialism. It first establishes that Zombies are logically/conceptually possible. This is regardless of ontology. I do not wish to assume any ontology is true before I approach the conceptual possibilities of zombies. I only ask whether you can distinguish between a brain process and a mind. If you can, then p-zombies are possible.

Distinguish how? By the fact they are two different words? By the fact that the common definitions make them sound different? By the fact that they are two different concepts? Or by the fact that they are two different things?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Could you expand on what you mean by this?

My mind is a fleeting jumble, but only one fleeting jumble. There aren't two fleeting jumbles. It's definately only one jumble. My mind, that is. My jumble obviously isn't your jumble. But you also only have one jumble.

Jumblesale, anyone?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Distinguish how?

Oh no, not again.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

"Giving rise to consciousness" always reminds me of JC rising from the dead. No explanation expected. Just believe it....! Oh yes.

Horsecrap. Almost to a person, the people saying this also say that neuroscience has a tough job ahead of it. Even you say that QM has a job ahead. It's the idealists who tend to say poof! consciousness just is.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Oh no, not again.

Yeah, Geoff, again. Philosophers have been repeating the same thing for 3 millennia and you're impatient after a week.

~~ Paul

 

[nescafe]

Then why didn't your consciousness disappear?

Which definition of consciousness are you talking about here?

1. A narrative center of gravity making up a story about my sensory experiences, perceptions, memories, and actions.
2. Simple self-awareness -- the knowledge that there is a thing having these experiences, thinking these thoughts, having these memories.
3. Awareness -- sensory experiences, memory formation, association, actions triggered by the above three, etc.

If you mean the first one, it was gone.
If you mean the second one, it was still there.
If you mean the third one, it was obviously still there.

You are a Buddhist, yes?

I recognize the impermanence and illusory nature of all things that exist in intersubjective and subjective reality, including thoughts and those peculiar points of view/modes of explanation we call selves.

 

[Mercutio]

My mind is a fleeting jumble, but only one fleeting jumble. There aren't two fleeting jumbles. It's definately only one jumble. My mind, that is. My jumble obviously isn't your jumble. But you also only have one jumble.

Jumblesale, anyone?

Ok...that did not help whatsoever. The problem is not in "how many is one?".

Is it one fleeting jumble simply by virtue of, say, your "mind" being tied to your body, which does not occupy the same space as any other? Or is it one fleeting jumble because you experience a unity of consciousness and not some multiply-processed parallel set of sensory and perceptual data? Or is it one fleeting jumble because your environment has addressed you consistently as one unit? You do not give any clue as to what you mean by one fleeting jumble, other than "not two".

Depending on your answer, there may be much much more to say.

 

[Mercutio]

WOW! Hammegk, Mercutio and Geoff are in agreement! You are heading for woodom, Merc.

There is no reason the two of you might not occasionally be right... Agreeing with me is a very good start...


Of course, you may not really agree with me, but simply believe that you do.

 

[nescafe]

There is only one reality.

ITYM "there is only one noumenal reality." Subjective realities seem to be at least one per subject, and asking how many intersubjective realities there are is not really meaningful without more context.

 

[hammegk]

... Agreeing with me is a very good start...

Perhaps .... perhaps not ...

Of course, you may not really agree with me, but simply believe that you do.

What man has more than his beliefs?

 

[Robin]

Ah, thanks for the clarification. I have already been through this with Paul.

The argument starts from a metaphysically neutral position, rather than trying to assume materialism. It first establishes that Zombies are logically/conceptually possible. This is regardless of ontology. I do not wish to assume any ontology is true before you approach the conceptual possibilities of zombies. I only ask whether you can distinguish between a brain process and a mind. If you can, then p-zombies are possible.

Can you point us to the logic that links:
"a brain process can be distinguished from the mind" to "p-zombies are possible"?

This may be clear in your own mind but please present us these missing steps.

It is clear that "x can be distinguished from y" is not the same as "x can exist without y". They are two different statement.

For example I can distinguish between the number 7 and the set of prime numbers. That does not mean that the set of prime numbers can exist without the number 7.

I can distinguish between a molecule of H₂0 and a body of water (For example an H₂0 molecule does not have waves or ripples. When blown by the wind the molecule does not produce whitecaps).

This does not mean that there could be a set of H₂0 molecules that were physically identical to a lake without them being a lake.

You need to clarify this step.

 

[Mercutio]

Perhaps .... perhaps not ...

*ahem*

What man has more than his beliefs?

Sometimes I wish Iacchus was still here. Who else is there to turn to when one needs an example of an individual whose core beliefs were invariably contradicted by both logic and evidence...

 

[Robin]

The argument starts from a metaphysically neutral position, rather than trying to assume materialism. It first establishes that Zombies are logically/conceptually possible. This is regardless of ontology. I do not wish to assume any ontology is true before you approach the conceptual possibilities of zombies. I only ask whether you can distinguish between a brain process and a mind. If you can, then p-zombies are possible.

Another problem is that you are launching into an argument about the possibility of p-zombies without first defining the term. What precisely do you mean by a p-zombie (which was where the original problem arose)?

 

[hammegk]

*ahem*

Hmmm. I missed the post where I agreed ...

Sometimes I wish Iacchus was still here. Who else is there to turn to when one needs an example of an individual whose core beliefs were invariably contradicted by both logic and evidence...

Yes, the question is which of us is closer to Iacchus in the falsity of his beliefs ...