yy2bggggs
Master Poster
- Joined
- Oct 22, 2007
- Messages
- 2,435
I can see two problems with this. I'll attack the first one here.One of the problems of materialism is that you're locked into a response where one of the duplicates must be you (either the original or a copy). There's no mechanism to account for "you" to refer to more than one brain/body because, as you put it: you are your brain (and body). So if you step into a transporter and a dozen identical copies step out the other end, you're stuck with trying to figure out which one is/was you. If you think you're your brain, and your brain is slowly replaced with something functionally equivalent, you're also stuck with trying to figure out when you stop being you.
The first problem I can see with this, is that the problem is artificial. It's not a problem with materialism that it does this thing per se. It's only a problem if you require something not to do this. That we cannot say which is the "original me" after a transporter cloning exercise isn't a problem if, as it turns out, you cannot say which is the "original me" after a transporter exercise. All this does is appeal to some intuitional invariant you're not only invoking, but not mentioning.
Similar to the first problem with your account above, this statement has a problem in that the advantage is artificial. It's not an advantage with soul invoking that it lets you do this per se; it's only an advantage if you require something to do it. That you can make such a mapping between a soul and instantiated incarnations only means that you can make such a mapping. If, as it turns out, the mapping doesn't actually correlate to a meaningful consignment with reality, you'd still be able to make this mapping with a soul based approach, even though it doesn't correlate to reality. Again, the only advantage you've made is that you have appealed to an unmentioned intuitional invariant.One of the advantages of invoking a soul is that it lets "you" refer to the original and all the duplicates, because "you" isn't equivalent to a single brain&body, as you define it to be. "You" refers to a soul, and there's no a priori reason why a soul should be limited to one brain and body.
Another issue with this, however, which also leads to the second problem with your account of materialism, is that there is nothing in materialism per se that even leads to the first assessment, nor anything in a soul based approach that leads to the second. In materialistic considerations, the existence of a physical instantiation of pattern could easily be taken to represent "you"; in a non-corporeal spiritual consideration, the cloning could easily result in multiple souls. Therefore, quite the opposite of what you are saying--there's nothing preventing us from having your intuitional invariants, even if we want to keep them, in a materialistic universe, nor anything guaranteeing them in a spiritual universe. You, in effect, have the same exact problem with either.
And how do you know that this is a correct statement?So to answer the first question, replacing the neurons in my brain wouldn't confer any change in identity because my identity isn't bound up with my brain and physical body in the first place.