Materialism and Immaterialism

[Interesting Ian]

Of course; I know of the presence of noise in brain neural nets (although I did not knew the origin of this noise, thx for the info). But please note that the visual cortex (for example) performs a set of well defined functions with small error. Yes, the system has a strong stochastic component, but also it is probably highly redundant in order to ensure correct function.

What puzzles me about your post is that you talk about "stochastic rather than deterministic".

If you use "stochastic" in the sense of random, I disagree about this being an important factor of brain working.
If you use "stochastic" in the sense of "noisy", I agree about this being an important factor of brain working. However, note that "noise" is not incompatible with "deterministic"!

Hmmm, I thought he was talking about randomness because of QM. Apart from QM the world is supposed to be completely determined. Chaos theory doesn't make it any less determined if that has anything to do with this word "stochastic".

 

[Interesting Ian]

It is absolutely important, sir. This misunderstanding seems to be at the root here. We cannot predict, except probabilistically, the outcome.

Leaving aside QM, why might that be then, sir??

 

[BillHoyt]

Leaving aside QM, why would that be then, sir??

I'm not adding QM here, sir. I'm not sure why you think I am or am about to. You want to know if knowing all the relevant equations and all the initial conditions is sufficient to predict the outcome. We can know all the relevant equations, but we cannot know all the initial conditions with sufficient accuracy to deterministically predict the outcome.

Now:

o That was not QM there, sir. That was chaos theory.
o The system of equations is deterministic
o The behavior of the system is indistinguishable from stochastic
o Note that you confounded your original question by introducing "omniscience," which is distinct from knowing all the initial conditions and all the relevant equations but includes foreknowledge of the future. That differs substantially from the crux of your question.

 

[BillHoyt]

Hmmm, I thought he was talking about randomness because of QM. Apart from QM the world is supposed to be completely determined. Chaos theory doesn't make it any less determined if that has anything to do with this word "stochastic".

Ian,

This is the point I'm trying to convey. You seem to misunderstand chaos theory here. "Stochastic" is not just a word. In this context, it aptly describes the aggregate behavior of systems of three or more differential equations. They behave randomly, even though we know the underlying equations are deterministic. We cannot deterministically predict the system behavior. We can only do so by using probability.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Peskanov,

What puzzles me about your post is that you talk about "stochastic rather than deterministic".

If you use "stochastic" in the sense of random, I disagree about this being an important factor of brain working.
If you use "stochastic" in the sense of "noisy", I agree about this being an important factor of brain working. However, note that "noise" is not incompatible with "deterministic"!

That is a question of semantics. What you have got is a deterministic system which has noisy inputs. But since the model of the brain consists of both this deterministic component, and the noisy inputs, it is not, strictly speaking, a deterministic model. It is a stochastic dynamical system.


Ian,

Hmmm, I thought he was talking about randomness because of QM. Apart from QM the world is supposed to be completely determined. Chaos theory doesn't make it any less determined if that has anything to do with this word "stochastic".

Ultimately these random effects come from the indeterminate nature of QM. I was simply making a distinction between Quantum indeterminacy, such as atomic decay, and random behavior at the macroscopic level. The reason chaos theory comes into play here, is because when a system is chaotic, any random influences, no matter how tiny, will eventually have a significant effect on the system. This means that even when we are dealing with a macroscopic process, where all of the Quantum indeterminacy is averaged out, and everything seems to function according to deterministic rules, we still cannot make perfect predictions. The idea that we could perfectly predict a chaotic system if we knew everything about it, only works in the limit that we really know absolutely everything. But before we can reach that limit, Quantum indeterminacy, no matter how small its effects may be, will rear its ugly head.

Stochastic means the same thing as random. The term stochastic is often used in physics to refer to dynamical systems which have a degree of randomness in their behavior.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Peskanov]

Ian,

Hmmm, I thought he was talking about randomness because of QM. Apart from QM the world is supposed to be completely determined. Chaos theory doesn't make it any less determined if that has anything to do with this word "stochastic".

Knowing Stimpy's position, I find hard to believe that he thinks the origin of brain's noise is important. Under current materialist view, the important thing about brain's noise is that it is a key factor of brain's activity.
A deterministic process can need noise as a neccesary input for correct performing, however the origin of the noise (deterministic or random) is irrelevant and does not affect the result in a meaningful way.
(BTW, Stimpy cited a thermal origin of the noise, not QM, read his post again)

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

(loki wrote ) : The question is "what is the essence of the monism? Value-neutral, or value-driven?"

( hammegk wrote ) : I can agree with that.

Then what leads you to conclude "value-driven"? What evidence (circumstantial, I presume) do you see that points you towards your current conclusion?

 

[jj]

(BTW, Stimpy cited a thermal origin of the noise, not QM, read his post again)

Hm, in the absense of QM, thermal noise would be a chaotically evolving, but strictly-speaking fully deterministic thing.

That introduces an issue of "at what limit do we have to measure to call a deterministic, chaotic system "deterministic""


That's actually an interesting question, now.

 

[hammegk]

Loki

TLOP and the magic parameters of mass & force that control this universe, life, and thought, are a few; also the fact that order evolves from chaos rather than vice-versa.

 

[Peskanov]

Stimpy,

That is a question of semantics. What you have got is a deterministic system which has noisy inputs. But since the model of the brain consists of both this deterministic component, and the noisy inputs, it is not, strictly speaking, a deterministic model. It is a stochastic dynamical system.

But there is a problem of semantics in game. You can't equal "noisy" and "acausal" inputs.
Do we agree that a deterministic system can be very noisy? Would you still say that this system is partially stochastic?

when a system is chaotic, any random influences, no matter how tiny, will eventually have a significant effect on the system.

I don't think that the brain can be described as a very chaotic system. Remenber that's is quite hierarchical, and it also has a good level of redundancy.

jj,

That introduces an issue of "at what limit do we have to measure to call a deterministic, chaotic system "deterministic"

The real question, I think, is: does it matter?
My feel is that the brain operates "despite" noise and error. It evolved to work under critical condition, and this is the reason it's so tolerant to error.
Would a deterministic model of the brain show a behaviour close to the original? I think it would.
In any case my point to inmaterialists is that a deterministic model can be as unpredictable and (at the same time) consistent as a human.

 

[Jeff Corey]

All this material is immaterial to the original topic. So I will start a newer, kinder topic, vis, "Bound to to be determined."

 

[hammegk]

In any case my point to inmaterialists is that a deterministic model can be as unpredictable and (at the same time) consistent as a human.

Now if humans weren't predictable yet inconsistent .....

The point is if you are "randomly inconsistent" or "randomly unpredictable", some part of the perceived *you* doesn't seem to be operating properly.

Humans seem to be on auto-pilot until one choose to take over some of the highest level controls. Things that have the ability to act ot not act, react or not react, are alive, and don't to me seem "randomly inconsistent" (but lifeless) machinery.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

The point is if you are "randomly inconsistent" or "randomly unpredictable", some part of the perceived *you* doesn't seem to be operating properly.

As if it were possible to be deterministically inconsistent or unpredictable...

What justification do you have for making the claim that something is malfunctioning in a random system?

 

[Interesting Ian]

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If hypothetically someone had in their possession all possible knowledge about you, and how you would react under any given circumstance (or alternatively consider an omniscient God), and therefore could, with 100% accuracy (or very close to it if we consider the intrinsic randomness), would this by definition mean that all your behaviour is "determined" or follows rules?
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Well, since there intrinsic randomness, no. But if, for purposes of the thought experiment, we ignore that, then yes.

How is randomness of any relevance at all to this question regarding free will?? You keep going on and on and on about it all the time, and spectacularly fail to understand that, in the context of the free will problem, determinism + randomness differs not at all in its import from simply determinism. Randomness is simply the other side of the coin from determinism. Invoking randomness doesn't magically make your concept of free will any more free. Indeed, arguably less so.

Anyway, surely merely predicting someones behaviour is insufficient for us to conclude that it unfolds according to some algorithm?

So you do not agree that from the perspective of libertarian free will, it would still be in principle possible to completely (or almost completely) predict what a person will do under any circumstances. Hmmm . . if so . .it's little wonder you think LFW is unintelligible!

 

[BillHoyt]

That introduces an issue of "at what limit do we have to measure to call a deterministic, chaotic system "deterministic""


That's actually an interesting question, now.

It is an interesting question but it has an unexciting answer: measurements won't help. All your measurements at the aggregate level will suggest stochastic. But a reductionist analysis will indicate underlying differential equations. If you can isolate three or more such equations, you have built an excellent case.

The measure-theoretic component enters in by way of explanation of how deterministic equations can give rise to stochastic results. The explanation is that the existence of attractors in the system of equations means small measurement errors result in wildly varying outputs. The measure-theroetic implication is that one must have infinite precision and perfect accuracy in the measurements to guarantee deterministic outcomes.

So now we need to consider again Ian's claim "unpredictable in practice, not in principle" by juxtaposing it against Stimpy's statement: "The idea that we could perfectly predict a chaotic system if we knew everything about it, only works in the limit that we really know absolutely everything. But before we can reach that limit, Quantum indeterminacy, no matter how small its effects may be, will rear its ugly head."

It becomes clear that we are looking at macroscopic phenomena that are the aggregate result of systems of deterministic equations that behave stochastically. It becomes clear that it is not possible, in practice or in principle, to say, with absolute certainty, what you're going to have for breakfast tomorrow. Even if your will is simply the result of systems of differential equations.

To me, what is fascinating is to see the free will- versus- materialism argument decay to the same form as the now-infamous TLOP argument. It is, at root, another fallacy of composition. It runs like this: "But if it is built on deterministic principles, it cannot exhibit stochastic properties." The facade is more occluded, but now the flawed structure is laid bare.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Peskanov,

But there is a problem of semantics in game. You can't equal "noisy" and "acausal" inputs.
Do we agree that a deterministic system can be very noisy? Would you still say that this system is partially stochastic?

If the inputs are deterministic, but acausal, then no, technically the system is not noisy or stochastic. When we are talking about abstract mathematical systems the distinction is meaningfull. When we are talking about physical systems, the distinction is only meaningfull if we can tell the difference. This goes back to what I said before, about those terms only meaningfully applying to mathematical models. Our model may be acuasally deterministic, or it may be stochastic, or it just may involve high-dimensional chaos of a complexity sufficient to make it indistinguishable from a random process. All three can be equally accurate models of the same physical system.

when a system is chaotic, any random influences, no matter how tiny, will eventually have a significant effect on the system.
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I don't think that the brain can be described as a very chaotic system. Remenber that's is quite hierarchical, and it also has a good level of redundancy.

Again, it all depends on the degree of accuracy required. Our current models of brain activity are extremely simplified statistical models of large-scale behavior. They are not accurate models of microscopic neuronal dynamics. Even a single neuron can be chaotic.


Ian,

Well, since there intrinsic randomness, no. But if, for purposes of the thought experiment, we ignore that, then yes.
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How is randomness of any relevance at all to this question regarding free will??

Because, if you contend that your will is "free" because even though you made one choice, you actually could have made another (as opposed to it only seeming that way), then what you are claiming is that your choice was, at least to some degree, arbitrary. That was the whole point of the thought experiment I presented.

You keep going on and on and on about it all the time, and spectacularly fail to understand that, in the context of the free will problem, determinism + randomness differs not at all in its import from simply determinism. Randomness is simply the other side of the coin from determinism. Invoking randomness doesn't magically make your concept of free will any more free. Indeed, arguably less so.

And therein lies the problem. You claim that a deterministic system cannot be free, because its choice was inevitable. You also claim that a random system cannot be free, because its choice was arbitrary. What you do not seem to realize is that there are only two logical possibilities. Either your choice was logically implied by your prior physical and mental state, in which case given those states, it was inevitable, or the choice was not logically implied by those prior states, in which case it was arbitrary.

When you stipulate "free" in that way, all you are really saying is that no logically self-consistent system can be "free".

Anyway, surely merely predicting someones behaviour is insufficient for us to conclude that it unfolds according to some algorithm?

No, saying that the system producing that behevior functions according to logical rules, is sufficient for us to conclude that it unfolds according to some algorithm (either a deterministic or a probabilistic one). If it is your contention that the self does not function according to logical rules, then please say so now, so that we can avoid wasting any more time trying to logically discuss something which is illogical.

So you do not agree that from the perspective of libertarian free will, it would still be in principle possible to completely (or almost completely) predict what a person will do under any circumstances. Hmmm . . if so . .it's little wonder you think LFW is unintelligible!

I think it is unintelligible because you seem to be simultaneously claiming that there is, and is not, a logical reason that we make the choices that we make. That is self-contradictory. Either there is a logical reason, in which case the choice was inevitable, or there is not, in which case the choice was arbitrary. Either way, according to you, the selection mechanism (free-will) was not "free".


Dr.Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

It is an interesting question but it has an unexciting answer: measurements won't help. All your measurements at the aggregate level will suggest stochastic. But a reductionist analysis will indicate underlying differential equations. If you can isolate three or more such equations, you have built an excellent case.

The measure-theoretic component enters in by way of explanation of how deterministic equations can give rise to stochastic results. The explanation is that the existence of attractors in the system of equations means small measurement errors result in wildly varying outputs. The measure-theroetic implication is that one must have infinite precision and perfect accuracy in the measurements to guarantee deterministic outcomes.

So now we need to consider again Ian's claim "unpredictable in practice, not in principle" by juxtaposing it against Stimpy's statement: "The idea that we could perfectly predict a chaotic system if we knew everything about it, only works in the limit that we really know absolutely everything. But before we can reach that limit, Quantum indeterminacy, no matter how small its effects may be, will rear its ugly head."

It becomes clear that we are looking at macroscopic phenomena that are the aggregate result of systems of deterministic equations that behave stochastically. It becomes clear that it is not possible, in practice or in principle, to say, with absolute certainty, what you're going to have for breakfast tomorrow. Even if your will is simply the result of systems of differential equations.

To me, what is fascinating is to see the free will- versus- materialism argument decay to the same form as the now-infamous TLOP argument. It is, at root, another fallacy of composition. It runs like this: "But if it is built on deterministic principles, it cannot exhibit stochastic properties." The facade is more occluded, but now the flawed structure is laid bare.

All completely irrelevant. For a kick off I am now talking about libertarian free will. It is unclear whether it is in principle impossible to have a completely accurate prediction of someones behaviour. And if there is it doesn't matter either. My argument is simply trying to tease out the distinction between compatibilism and libertarianism.

 

[Jeff Corey]

All completely irrelevant. For a kick off I am now talking about libertarian free will. It is unclear whether it is in principle impossible to have a completely accurate prediction of someones behaviour. And if there is it doesn't matter either. My argument is simply trying to tease out the distinction between compatibilism and libertarianism.

Here's a hint. At this time it is as difficult to predict a persons behavior as it is to predict the weather. Maybe more so.
But I would appreciate it if you would provide a clear distinction between compatibilism and libertarianism, since the definitions don't seem to appear in any standard references.
As I understand it, "free will" is the notion that people make choices that are not caused by their history of experience, present situation and contingencies of reinforcement.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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How is randomness of any relevance at all to this question regarding free will??
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Stimp
Because, if you contend that your will is "free" because even though you made one choice, you actually could have made another (as opposed to it only seeming that way), then what you are claiming is that your choice was, at least to some degree, arbitrary. That was the whole point of the thought experiment I presented.

It certainly might not be arbitrary at all! Suppose someone offers me a £1,000,000 completely for free. I can either take it or leave it, no strings attached. Therefore we can guarantee absolutely that I will take it. But I could have not taken it. But this does not at all mean my choice of taking the million was arbitrary!

Now compare this to the Earth orbiting the Sun. We know that it will continue to orbit the Sun. Is this the same type of knowing that I will take the million? Could it cease to orbit the Sun in the same way as I might decline the million? As a determinist (philosophical usage ignores QM) you would have to say the guarantee I will take the million is the same as the guarantee that the Earth will continue to orbit around the Sun. But I say they're different. I can decline the million in a way the Earth cannot decline to continue to orbit the Sun.

So I say successfully predicting someones behaviour does not equal determinism (with the usual caveats about QM. Must I keep putting this caveat in?? It really is completely irrelevant )

II
Anyway, surely merely predicting someones behaviour is insufficient for us to conclude that it unfolds according to some algorithm?
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Stimp
No, saying that the system producing that behevior functions according to logical rules, is sufficient for us to conclude that it unfolds according to some algorithm (either a deterministic or a probabilistic one). If it is your contention that the self does not function according to logical rules, then please say so now, so that we can avoid wasting any more time trying to logically discuss something which is illogical.

I'm not sure what you mean by a rule. Sure, you can say that inevitably a person will take a £million offered to them, no strings attached. More generally if you know someone inside out you can then say what way they will behave (with the possible exceptions of one suddenly deciding to spontaneously wave their limbs around in an apparently arbitrary manner, and such like). So in a sense you can say in a practical sense we behave according to very complex rules. But this is insufficient for determinism. See my point above regarding the Earth orbiting the Sun.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
As a determinist (philosophical usage ignores QM) you would have to say the guarantee I will take the million is the same as the guarantee that the Earth will continue to orbit around the Sun. But I say they're different. I can decline the million in a way the Earth cannot decline to continue to orbit the Sun.

This sounds reasonable only because the word decline, as you are using it, carries the connotation of human choice and free will. Let's eliminate the word and simply ask whether you and the Earth have a strong tendency to do a certain thing, and whether there are exceptions that would cause the opposite action. The answer in both cases is yes.

So in a sense you can say in a practical sense we behave according to very complex rules.

But you are saying that there is something else, because purely rule-based behavior is not free will. What is that something else?

~~ Paul