Interesting Ian
Banned
- Joined
- Feb 9, 2004
- Messages
- 7,675
Interesting Ian said:
Stimp, I would ask you the same question. Why does the Earth orbit the Sun?
Materialism and Immaterialism
- Thread starter Wrath of the Swarm
- Start date
-
- Tags
- immaterialism materialism
Stimp, I would ask you the same question. Why does the Earth orbit the Sun?
Stimpson J. Cat
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2001
- Messages
- 1,949
Ian,
I thought that was what I was doing. I did not think that you would have any trouble understanding what I meant. When it became clear that you were, I clarified. I do not know what more you can reasonably expect.
No, I am afraid not. This appears to be nothing more than empty semantics. If the behavior of objects is constrained by X (in the sense you have used), then X is something which exists, and which has its own behavior. The question then just moves to whether the behavior of X is deterministic or not.
Eventually, this cycle of attributing the behavior of one thing to influences of another, must end (unless you actually want to try to deal with an infinite regression). At some point, whatever it is that is "controlling" everything else, but which is not itself controlled by anything else, can only be said to behave the way it does because it is its nature to do so. Many religious people present this as an argument for a first-mover, but really it is just an argument for applying Occam's razor, and not introducing any controllers when it is unnecessary to do so. But that is beside the point.
We can claim that objects behave the way they do because it is in their nature to do so, or because something else causes them to do so. In the latter case, we must then claim that it is in their nature to respond to the objects that are controlling them, the way they do, so this essentially amounts to the same thing.
To say that the object is free to do anything, but that its behavior can just be described logically after the fact, is self-contradictory. It is possible for the behavior of an object to be arbitrary, but then be described logically after the fact, but that is a separate issue.
The prior thought experiment I gave illustrates this. Like I said, my argument does not just apply to the mind, or to physical systems. It applies to any conceivable logically self-consistent system.
Are you claiming that there is no difference between the abstract existence of the number 5, and the existence of a law that can somehow control an otherwise "free" object? This makes no sense to me. How can you claim that abstract existence is real existence? That renders the term "real" meaningless. By that reasoning, anything which is logically self-consistent, is real.
If by "propensity" of objects to behave in accordance with physical laws, you mean that it is the nature of those objects to behave that way, then we are in agreement, but it is not the physical laws controlling the objects. The objects are just behaving the way thy naturally behave.
Consider a computer running a program. Does the program control the computer (technically speaking)? Clearly not. The computer operates in accordance with its nature. We are able to get the computer to do what we want, because we understand its nature, and give it inputs which we know it is its nature to respond to, in the way that we want it to respond. You could claim then that we are controlling the computer, or more specifically, that our inputs are, but the program is just a description of those inputs. It is a blueprint. It does not control, it just describes.
You misunderstood what I was trying to say. My point is that, while we very well may try to answer the question "why does the Earth orbit the Sun", by saying that it is because there is a gravitational attraction between them, we have not really answered that question at all! What we have done is described the behavior of the Earth and Sun in terms of a mathematical law.
The answer to the actual question is either "because it is the nature of massive objects to behave that way", or "because something else causes them to behave that way". In the latter case, all we do is replace our new question with two more. Now we have "why does this controlling thing behave the way it does?", and "why do the Earth and Sun respond to its influences the way they do?". The answer to the latter question must be "because it is their nature to do so", and the former question just puts us right back where we started.
That is the real point. With respect to the question of determinism, it does not matter how many levels we take this to. Eventually you get to something which is simply acting according to its nature, and not being controlled by anything else. It is either deterministic, or random. Either its nature is to behave according to some logical rules, or its nature is to behave randomly.
I would tend to agree, but I know that I cannot prove that this is so. The brain seems to function according to physical laws too, but you don't seem to think it actually does.
No, I think that the mathematical expressions we use to describe reality (often referred to as physical laws) are just descriptions. I think that the actual way that objects behave (what those mathematical expressions are describing), are properties of those objects.
I also think you are confused about the meaning of "abstract existence". If I say "An integer x exists such that x + 5 = 0", that is a statement of abstract existence. If I say that the laws of physics control objects, that is a statement of objective existence.
No, I am not saying that you could only make that one unique choice. Please read the experiment more carefully.
The how was your choice not inevitable? How is it meaningful to claim that you could have chosen differently, when you assert that under the same conditions, you would have chosen the same?
I phrased this thought experiment this way, because the above scenario about whether repeating the experiment would always give the same results, is the only meaning I can attach to the statement "It could have happened differently". If that is not what you mean, then I do not know what you do mean. It sounds to me like you are simultaneously saying that it is possible that you would choose differently, but also certain that you would not.
Now, if you amended you notion of free-will to be "I could have chosen differently if I had wanted to", this entire problem disappears. That seems to be what you are actually trying to say, in that you are arguing that you were free to choose the way you wanted to, and that because you wanted to make that choice, you did. But then you just have compatiblism.
See above. I think you misunderstood Wrath. It is not that those laws have some independent existence of their own. They are abstract descriptions of the behavior of the objects. The fact that these objects behave that way, is a property of those objects.
As to why these objects behave the way they do, instead of some other way, I do not know. Nobody does. We do not even know if there is a reason why.
Dr. Stupid
I thought that was what I was doing. I did not think that you would have any trouble understanding what I meant. When it became clear that you were, I clarified. I do not know what more you can reasonably expect.
No, I am afraid not. This appears to be nothing more than empty semantics. If the behavior of objects is constrained by X (in the sense you have used), then X is something which exists, and which has its own behavior. The question then just moves to whether the behavior of X is deterministic or not.
Eventually, this cycle of attributing the behavior of one thing to influences of another, must end (unless you actually want to try to deal with an infinite regression). At some point, whatever it is that is "controlling" everything else, but which is not itself controlled by anything else, can only be said to behave the way it does because it is its nature to do so. Many religious people present this as an argument for a first-mover, but really it is just an argument for applying Occam's razor, and not introducing any controllers when it is unnecessary to do so. But that is beside the point.
We can claim that objects behave the way they do because it is in their nature to do so, or because something else causes them to do so. In the latter case, we must then claim that it is in their nature to respond to the objects that are controlling them, the way they do, so this essentially amounts to the same thing.
To say that the object is free to do anything, but that its behavior can just be described logically after the fact, is self-contradictory. It is possible for the behavior of an object to be arbitrary, but then be described logically after the fact, but that is a separate issue.
The prior thought experiment I gave illustrates this. Like I said, my argument does not just apply to the mind, or to physical systems. It applies to any conceivable logically self-consistent system.
Are you claiming that there is no difference between the abstract existence of the number 5, and the existence of a law that can somehow control an otherwise "free" object? This makes no sense to me. How can you claim that abstract existence is real existence? That renders the term "real" meaningless. By that reasoning, anything which is logically self-consistent, is real.
If by "propensity" of objects to behave in accordance with physical laws, you mean that it is the nature of those objects to behave that way, then we are in agreement, but it is not the physical laws controlling the objects. The objects are just behaving the way thy naturally behave.
Consider a computer running a program. Does the program control the computer (technically speaking)? Clearly not. The computer operates in accordance with its nature. We are able to get the computer to do what we want, because we understand its nature, and give it inputs which we know it is its nature to respond to, in the way that we want it to respond. You could claim then that we are controlling the computer, or more specifically, that our inputs are, but the program is just a description of those inputs. It is a blueprint. It does not control, it just describes.
You misunderstood what I was trying to say. My point is that, while we very well may try to answer the question "why does the Earth orbit the Sun", by saying that it is because there is a gravitational attraction between them, we have not really answered that question at all! What we have done is described the behavior of the Earth and Sun in terms of a mathematical law.
The answer to the actual question is either "because it is the nature of massive objects to behave that way", or "because something else causes them to behave that way". In the latter case, all we do is replace our new question with two more. Now we have "why does this controlling thing behave the way it does?", and "why do the Earth and Sun respond to its influences the way they do?". The answer to the latter question must be "because it is their nature to do so", and the former question just puts us right back where we started.
That is the real point. With respect to the question of determinism, it does not matter how many levels we take this to. Eventually you get to something which is simply acting according to its nature, and not being controlled by anything else. It is either deterministic, or random. Either its nature is to behave according to some logical rules, or its nature is to behave randomly.
I would tend to agree, but I know that I cannot prove that this is so. The brain seems to function according to physical laws too, but you don't seem to think it actually does.
but that does not imply that those physical laws are some thing which somehow controls the Earth.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Right, so you definitely think that physical laws are just a description rather than something which abstractly exist?
That's fine if you think that. I just need to be sure before I proceed with my argument
No, I think that the mathematical expressions we use to describe reality (often referred to as physical laws) are just descriptions. I think that the actual way that objects behave (what those mathematical expressions are describing), are properties of those objects.
I also think you are confused about the meaning of "abstract existence". If I say "An integer x exists such that x + 5 = 0", that is a statement of abstract existence. If I say that the laws of physics control objects, that is a statement of objective existence.
No, I am not saying that you could only make that one unique choice. Please read the experiment more carefully.
The how was your choice not inevitable? How is it meaningful to claim that you could have chosen differently, when you assert that under the same conditions, you would have chosen the same?
I phrased this thought experiment this way, because the above scenario about whether repeating the experiment would always give the same results, is the only meaning I can attach to the statement "It could have happened differently". If that is not what you mean, then I do not know what you do mean. It sounds to me like you are simultaneously saying that it is possible that you would choose differently, but also certain that you would not.
Now, if you amended you notion of free-will to be "I could have chosen differently if I had wanted to", this entire problem disappears. That seems to be what you are actually trying to say, in that you are arguing that you were free to choose the way you wanted to, and that because you wanted to make that choice, you did. But then you just have compatiblism.
See above. I think you misunderstood Wrath. It is not that those laws have some independent existence of their own. They are abstract descriptions of the behavior of the objects. The fact that these objects behave that way, is a property of those objects.
As to why these objects behave the way they do, instead of some other way, I do not know. Nobody does. We do not even know if there is a reason why.
Dr. Stupid
Interesting Ian
Banned
- Joined
- Feb 9, 2004
- Messages
- 7,675
Stimp,
First of all we need to be clear about the meaning of the terms we employ. Now, saying that objects behave the way they do because it's 'in their nature' is ambiguous as to whether objects behave as they do because of physical laws, in which case physical laws govern the behaviour of objects, or whether you're simply saying that objects behave the way they do because they just do. In the latter case so called "physical laws" would simply just describe that behaviour. Note that also in the latter case we have not at all established why objects behave the way they do. The Earth doesn't orbit the Sun due to physical laws, nor does it do so because it wants to. So why does the Earth orbit the Sun?? Well, physical laws do not have an existence over and above the description of behaviour, so you cannot say it orbits the Sun because of physical laws. I therefore submit you would simply have to say it is wholly mysterious why it does so. This is in contrast to my metaphysic which holds that nature behaves the way it does because it is simply the behaviour of the metamind, just as a lot of our behaviour is due to our freely exercising minds.
So my position is quite clear, it's your position I am not understanding. You hold that our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth's orbit around the Sun. But the reason why the Earth orbits around the Sun is a wholly mysterious one i.e it is not because it is governed by physical laws nor because it wants to. But this then entails that our behaviour is not due to physical laws, nor because of an intention to behave in a given manner. So why do we behave as we do??
Here you seem to contradict yourself. You seem to be saying that objects are indeed constrained by physical laws. This means that we are also constrained by physical laws thus making a nonsense of your claim that your position is consistent with the thesis that we have free will.
Now in the following exchange you confuse me even more
The very definition of libertarian free will is that I could have made another choice but decided not to. In other words my behaviour does not follow some algorithm. This is like saying the Earth does not follow rules (physical laws) although it can be described by such rules. Likewise, with our behaviour, it might be described by some convoluted rules eg I will inevitably take the £million rather than nothing, or I will choose to do X rather than Y except on those occasions when I'm feeling in a particular mood, and so on. But such rules do not lead or dictate our behaviour. We behave as we do because of our intention to behave in a given manner. I can genuinely choose between competing alternatives. Sure, I will always choose the £1,000,000 rather than nothing, but that says nothing at all about the power or ability of my self to choose nothing. I could have chosen nothing in other words.
Now, I'm not sure if you agree with this, but if you do, and in order for your position to be consistent, you would need to maintain the Earth orbits the Sun because it wants to do so. If the reason why we do what we do is because of certain intentions on our parts, and our behaviour is no different in kind from any other object in the Universe including the Earth, then the Earth also must behave as it does because it wants to do so. Well, I guess that's possible! ;-)
This is absurd. You might as well create some device which can view the past and watch some persons behaviour such as Hitler, and claim that his actions are inevitable because you know what he is going to say and do next! But this is pure silliness. With this sort of "reasoning" Hitlers behaviour could be purely random so that he flails his limbs around arbitrarily, but since we know everything he ever did, you would then be claiming even intrinsically random events are inevitable! LOL
Compatibilism??? Please tell me what my free will is compatible with?? And while you're at it, please tell me what your notion of free will is compatible with? I also want to know that, if some approximation to determinism, is true, what are we being determined by?
I think this says it all! This not only applies to non-sentient objects like the Earth, but also everyone who has ever lived!
I suggest you have serious problems with your metaphysic.
First of all we need to be clear about the meaning of the terms we employ. Now, saying that objects behave the way they do because it's 'in their nature' is ambiguous as to whether objects behave as they do because of physical laws, in which case physical laws govern the behaviour of objects, or whether you're simply saying that objects behave the way they do because they just do. In the latter case so called "physical laws" would simply just describe that behaviour. Note that also in the latter case we have not at all established why objects behave the way they do. The Earth doesn't orbit the Sun due to physical laws, nor does it do so because it wants to. So why does the Earth orbit the Sun?? Well, physical laws do not have an existence over and above the description of behaviour, so you cannot say it orbits the Sun because of physical laws. I therefore submit you would simply have to say it is wholly mysterious why it does so. This is in contrast to my metaphysic which holds that nature behaves the way it does because it is simply the behaviour of the metamind, just as a lot of our behaviour is due to our freely exercising minds.
So my position is quite clear, it's your position I am not understanding. You hold that our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth's orbit around the Sun. But the reason why the Earth orbits around the Sun is a wholly mysterious one i.e it is not because it is governed by physical laws nor because it wants to. But this then entails that our behaviour is not due to physical laws, nor because of an intention to behave in a given manner. So why do we behave as we do??
Here you seem to contradict yourself. You seem to be saying that objects are indeed constrained by physical laws. This means that we are also constrained by physical laws thus making a nonsense of your claim that your position is consistent with the thesis that we have free will.
Now in the following exchange you confuse me even more
The very definition of libertarian free will is that I could have made another choice but decided not to. In other words my behaviour does not follow some algorithm. This is like saying the Earth does not follow rules (physical laws) although it can be described by such rules. Likewise, with our behaviour, it might be described by some convoluted rules eg I will inevitably take the £million rather than nothing, or I will choose to do X rather than Y except on those occasions when I'm feeling in a particular mood, and so on. But such rules do not lead or dictate our behaviour. We behave as we do because of our intention to behave in a given manner. I can genuinely choose between competing alternatives. Sure, I will always choose the £1,000,000 rather than nothing, but that says nothing at all about the power or ability of my self to choose nothing. I could have chosen nothing in other words.
Now, I'm not sure if you agree with this, but if you do, and in order for your position to be consistent, you would need to maintain the Earth orbits the Sun because it wants to do so. If the reason why we do what we do is because of certain intentions on our parts, and our behaviour is no different in kind from any other object in the Universe including the Earth, then the Earth also must behave as it does because it wants to do so. Well, I guess that's possible! ;-)
This is absurd. You might as well create some device which can view the past and watch some persons behaviour such as Hitler, and claim that his actions are inevitable because you know what he is going to say and do next! But this is pure silliness. With this sort of "reasoning" Hitlers behaviour could be purely random so that he flails his limbs around arbitrarily, but since we know everything he ever did, you would then be claiming even intrinsically random events are inevitable! LOL
Compatibilism??? Please tell me what my free will is compatible with?? And while you're at it, please tell me what your notion of free will is compatible with? I also want to know that, if some approximation to determinism, is true, what are we being determined by?
I think this says it all! This not only applies to non-sentient objects like the Earth, but also everyone who has ever lived!
I suggest you have serious problems with your metaphysic.
Stimpson J. Cat
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2001
- Messages
- 1,949
Ian,
Yes. To be more precise, I am saying that I do not know why they do so, nor do I think it is possible to know how they do so. We can only engage in metaphysical speculation.
That solves nothing. Why does the metamind behave they way it does? Why do our minds behave the way they do? Is it just because it is their nature to do so, or is it because something else causes them to do so? If the latter, then why does that thing behave the way it does? And on and on the infinite regression goes.
Confused is right. We don't know, and pretending to know is not going to get us anywhere. But this is beside the point. My point is that regardless of whether our behavior "just is the way it is", or if it is the way it is because something else forces it to be, the fact remains that when you go through the causal cycle, and find whatever it is that is causing everything else, and which behaves the way it does just because it is its nature to do so, then that thing (first mover?) is either deterministic, or random. Either its nature is to behave in a manner consistent with some set of logical rules, or its nature is to behave arbitrarily.
How do you figure? What I am saying is that either objects do behave in accordance with some set of logical rules (for whatever reason), or they behave arbitrarily. To say that they do behave in accordance to logical rules, but are somehow free not to, doesn't actually mean anything, unless you are claiming that it was just chance that they happened to do so. If there was actually a reason for them to do so, then they were not free to not do so. If there was no reason for them to do so, then their behavior was arbitrary, and it was just dumb luck that they did so.
My position is not consistent with the thesis that we have free-will (as you have defined it), but that is not the point. The point is that no logically self-consistent position can be consistent with your conception of free-will. My conception of free-will is perfectly compatible with both determinism and non-determinism.
This does not make sense. Look at what you said:
That intention is part of your prior mental state! If I completely know your prior mental state, then in principle I can employ an algorithm to exactly predict your behavior, and it will always be right. To claim that this is not determinism, is nonsense. To claim that you could choose differently than my prediction, is to assert that my prediction could end up being wrong. If you then concede that my prediction will not ever be wrong, you are just contradicting yourself.
What you could say is that if your mental state had been different, then you might have chosen differently, but then, once again, you just have compatiblism.
Obviously, I do not agree with this. Saying that we make a choice because we want to, is like saying that electrons repel each other because they have opposite charges. It sounds like an explanation, but it is really just a description. You then have to ask why we wanted to do it. And on and on the chain of causality goes. It has to end somewhere. In the materialistic paradigm, it ends by reducing the mental processes to chemical interactions, so essentially we end up with "because that is how matter behaves under those conditions". In your paradigm, where does the chain of causality end? At what point do you have something behaving the way it does, simply because it is its nature to do so? The Metamind? Whatever it may be, either its behavior is consistent with some set of logical rules, or it is arbitrary. You can no longer attribute its behavior to the fact that it "wanted" to do it, because all that is doing is saying that it is not the end of the chain, but is instead causally dependant on whatever it is that caused it to want to do what it did.
I specifically phrased my thought experiment in such a way that this criticism does not apply. I am not talking about looking at the decision, saying that what you did can be mathematically modeled, and then concluding that it was deterministic. I specifically asked you whether, under exactly the same conditions, you would always do the same thing. If you claim that you would, then that is determinism. Saying that your decision was inevitable means nothing more, and nothing less, than that under the same conditions, you would always make that decision.
It is compatible with both determinism, and approximate determinism with noise (which is what the world seems to be).
Who says we have to be determined by anything? Determinism does not mean "determined by something else". It means only that the behavior follows some algorithmic rules. Why it follows those rules, is irrelevant. It makes no difference whether it is compelled to follow those rules by something else, or does so because that is its nature. Nor do we need to know why it follows those rules.
Yes.
What metaphysic? What I have just described is the absence of a metaphysic. I am making no claims about things which I do not, and can not, know.
Dr. Stupid
Yes. To be more precise, I am saying that I do not know why they do so, nor do I think it is possible to know how they do so. We can only engage in metaphysical speculation.
That solves nothing. Why does the metamind behave they way it does? Why do our minds behave the way they do? Is it just because it is their nature to do so, or is it because something else causes them to do so? If the latter, then why does that thing behave the way it does? And on and on the infinite regression goes.
So my position is quite clear, it's your position I am not understanding. You hold that our behaviour is no different in kind from the Earth's orbit around the Sun. But the reason why the Earth orbits around the Sun is a wholly mysterious one i.e it is not because it is governed by physical laws nor because it wants to. But this then entails that our behaviour is not due to physical laws, nor because of an intention to behave in a given manner. So why do we behave as we do??
Confused is right. We don't know, and pretending to know is not going to get us anywhere. But this is beside the point. My point is that regardless of whether our behavior "just is the way it is", or if it is the way it is because something else forces it to be, the fact remains that when you go through the causal cycle, and find whatever it is that is causing everything else, and which behaves the way it does just because it is its nature to do so, then that thing (first mover?) is either deterministic, or random. Either its nature is to behave in a manner consistent with some set of logical rules, or its nature is to behave arbitrarily.
How do you figure? What I am saying is that either objects do behave in accordance with some set of logical rules (for whatever reason), or they behave arbitrarily. To say that they do behave in accordance to logical rules, but are somehow free not to, doesn't actually mean anything, unless you are claiming that it was just chance that they happened to do so. If there was actually a reason for them to do so, then they were not free to not do so. If there was no reason for them to do so, then their behavior was arbitrary, and it was just dumb luck that they did so.
My position is not consistent with the thesis that we have free-will (as you have defined it), but that is not the point. The point is that no logically self-consistent position can be consistent with your conception of free-will. My conception of free-will is perfectly compatible with both determinism and non-determinism.
This does not make sense. Look at what you said:
That intention is part of your prior mental state! If I completely know your prior mental state, then in principle I can employ an algorithm to exactly predict your behavior, and it will always be right. To claim that this is not determinism, is nonsense. To claim that you could choose differently than my prediction, is to assert that my prediction could end up being wrong. If you then concede that my prediction will not ever be wrong, you are just contradicting yourself.
What you could say is that if your mental state had been different, then you might have chosen differently, but then, once again, you just have compatiblism.
Obviously, I do not agree with this. Saying that we make a choice because we want to, is like saying that electrons repel each other because they have opposite charges. It sounds like an explanation, but it is really just a description. You then have to ask why we wanted to do it. And on and on the chain of causality goes. It has to end somewhere. In the materialistic paradigm, it ends by reducing the mental processes to chemical interactions, so essentially we end up with "because that is how matter behaves under those conditions". In your paradigm, where does the chain of causality end? At what point do you have something behaving the way it does, simply because it is its nature to do so? The Metamind? Whatever it may be, either its behavior is consistent with some set of logical rules, or it is arbitrary. You can no longer attribute its behavior to the fact that it "wanted" to do it, because all that is doing is saying that it is not the end of the chain, but is instead causally dependant on whatever it is that caused it to want to do what it did.
I specifically phrased my thought experiment in such a way that this criticism does not apply. I am not talking about looking at the decision, saying that what you did can be mathematically modeled, and then concluding that it was deterministic. I specifically asked you whether, under exactly the same conditions, you would always do the same thing. If you claim that you would, then that is determinism. Saying that your decision was inevitable means nothing more, and nothing less, than that under the same conditions, you would always make that decision.
It is compatible with both determinism, and approximate determinism with noise (which is what the world seems to be).
Who says we have to be determined by anything? Determinism does not mean "determined by something else". It means only that the behavior follows some algorithmic rules. Why it follows those rules, is irrelevant. It makes no difference whether it is compelled to follow those rules by something else, or does so because that is its nature. Nor do we need to know why it follows those rules.
Yes.
What metaphysic? What I have just described is the absence of a metaphysic. I am making no claims about things which I do not, and can not, know.
Dr. Stupid
Stimpson J. Cat
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2001
- Messages
- 1,949
Hammegk,
That is a metaphysical question. It is also meaningless within my framework. The first mover argument tries to approach "why" questions by creating a chain of causality, where physical objects are caused to behave they way they do by some other things, and those things are caused to behave the way they do by other things, and so on, until you reach the first mover, which just behaves the way it does because it is its nature to do so, and which ultimately causes everything else to behave the way they do.
As I explained to Ian, this idea is flawed because even if you hold that physical objects are controlled by something else, you must still acknowledge the fact that this implies that it is their nature to be controlled by whatever is controlling them. In other words, the entire first mover approach misses the real point, which is that objects behave according to their nature, and causality is the result of interaction between objects. It makes no sense to assign a higher ontological status to something which causes an effect, because everything causes effects in everything else, by means of interaction. There is also therefore no reason to introduce a first mover, because it would really only differ from everything else in that all interactions with it are assumed to be one-way.
So basically, I reject that methodology entirely. Instead, I take the scientific approach, which is to not concern myself at all with metaphysical questions that not only cannot be answered, but cannot even be shown to be meaningful. Instead, I concern myself with constructing the best mathematical models for reality that I can, given the tools I have access to (observation and logic). It makes no difference to me whether the best models for the job are deterministic or stochastic. I will use whatever works. It also makes no difference to me whether the observable objects I am modeling are acting entirely based on their natures, or whether there is something out there that I can't observe, which causes their behavior.
Dr. Stupid
That is a metaphysical question. It is also meaningless within my framework. The first mover argument tries to approach "why" questions by creating a chain of causality, where physical objects are caused to behave they way they do by some other things, and those things are caused to behave the way they do by other things, and so on, until you reach the first mover, which just behaves the way it does because it is its nature to do so, and which ultimately causes everything else to behave the way they do.
As I explained to Ian, this idea is flawed because even if you hold that physical objects are controlled by something else, you must still acknowledge the fact that this implies that it is their nature to be controlled by whatever is controlling them. In other words, the entire first mover approach misses the real point, which is that objects behave according to their nature, and causality is the result of interaction between objects. It makes no sense to assign a higher ontological status to something which causes an effect, because everything causes effects in everything else, by means of interaction. There is also therefore no reason to introduce a first mover, because it would really only differ from everything else in that all interactions with it are assumed to be one-way.
So basically, I reject that methodology entirely. Instead, I take the scientific approach, which is to not concern myself at all with metaphysical questions that not only cannot be answered, but cannot even be shown to be meaningful. Instead, I concern myself with constructing the best mathematical models for reality that I can, given the tools I have access to (observation and logic). It makes no difference to me whether the best models for the job are deterministic or stochastic. I will use whatever works. It also makes no difference to me whether the observable objects I am modeling are acting entirely based on their natures, or whether there is something out there that I can't observe, which causes their behavior.
Dr. Stupid
Stimpson J. Cat said:
Er, yup this thread is about metaphysics.
The comment "acting entirely based on their natures" is objective idealism as I understand it.
The words "there is something out there that I can't observe, which causes their behavior" implies some form of illogical -- in fact impossible under your definition -- dualism. As I understand it Subjective idealism offers a bit more of the possibility of some form of interactive dualism.
'Idealism is determinism plus "something random" ' could make sense iff we could come to grips with what *is* random. What is an uncaused cause?
Interesting Ian
Banned
- Joined
- Feb 9, 2004
- Messages
- 7,675
&
Now you’re completely arguing the diametric opposite of what you were arguing before. Following a rule necessitates the actual existence of a rule. But you have denied the existence of such rules and said that behaviour can be simply described by such rules.
Do you understand how vital this distinction is? If you say our behaviour follows rules, then I think this is absurd. We don't follow rules, rather we choose freely. Such behaviour then might be able to be described by rules, although it is not clear to me how arbitrary decisions and arbitrary bodily movements (but not random) can be encompassed by rules.
But I do claim, that even perfect prediction, does not necessitate determinism. It is quite simple. If somebody knows me really well, then they could predict a great deal of my behaviour. They could predict what TV programme I will choose to watch amongst competing options, what food I will choose to eat amongst competing options, where I will choose to go out for the night amongst competing options and so on. But it is utterly absurd to suggest that my behaviour is determined. I make these choices because they are what I want to do. The fact that somebody knows me inside out, and can predict what decisions I will make, does not negate the idea that I could have chosen otherwise.
Two pertinent points to be made here:
a) We have a genuine ability to choose between these competing options, so that even when we choose one option, we could have chosen otherwise.
b) Our environment and the state of our brains influence what we want or choose to do, but ultimately what we choose to do derives from the self. Why is the self as it is? It is an unanalysable existent. Nothing causes the self to be as it is in its essence.
I think that "a” is the sticking point here. I am not maintaining that the vast majority of my decisions cannot in principle be predicted. I’m saying that even though someone could very effectively predict my choices under any given scenario, nevertheless I could have chosen otherwise. But you seem to be maintaining that because ultimately I choose a particular course of action, I therefore had to choose that particular course of action. Now I do not deny that if the universe at any particular instance were repeated, and I felt exactly the same, and with the same brain state etc, then I would make exactly the same decision. Thus suppose I invented a time machine. Suppose I travelled to yesterday, and covertly observed myself carrying out my day-to-day activities. Clearly my “double” would do exactly the same as I remember from doing the same activities myself 24 hours earlier.
But this does not mean to say that I couldn't have chosen otherwise. All it means is that if I am in a particular mental state, and the physical world is in a particular state then clearly I will freely choose to make the same decision. If I did not make the same decision this would mean that there were an element of randomness involved in my choosing. But this does not mean to say, that if I'd been so disposed, I couldn't have chosen otherwise.
To sum up, I simply mean by libertarian free will that I'm not compelled or constrained to act in a given manner, and that, as a necessary consequence of this, I can genuinely choose from a number of competing options. Moreover I even have the ability to choose arbitrarily. Let's say there is 10 options that I can choose from. It is true that of the person really knew me extremely well then they could predict which option I would choose. But I can always be pigheaded about this and choose arbitrarily from the 10 options. This will effectively make my decision unpredictable.
Part of my present mental state certainly. But an intention to behave in a particular manner might suddenly spontaneously arise.
No, you would need to know me inside out, and even then perfect prediction would be impossible (and even if i were completely predictable, this does not establish determinism) It's no good knowing completely a snap shot of my particular mental state at a particular time. I paste in yet again the point I made before.
. . . this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.
I'm afraid I do claim that prediction does not equate to determinism.
Depends on what you mean by "possible". It is "possible" that I could choose not to take the £1,000,000, it's just that I invariably will not do so. But this "possibility" of not doing so is different from the statement that the Earth could possibly deviate from its path around the Sun.
I cannot begin to imagine why you would believe that wanting to do some action does not function as an explanation!??
The chain of causality doesn't go on and on, it stops at the self.I thought you said your position wasn't metaphysical. Anyway, you've already agreed that you have no explanation for why the Earth goes around the Sun, or why we behave as we do. Saying that it's just the way matter behaves is perfectly vacuous. I have provided an explanation of why we behave in terms of intentions. So what's wrong with it? It is also clear, assuming that not all objects in the Universe are sentient, that the behaviour of the Earth in orbiting the Sun is not due to its intentions. Thus the behaviour of sentient beings has a differing origin than from all other objects in the Universe. This seems to me to then refute your metaphysic (i.e materialism).
Stimpson J. Cat
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2001
- Messages
- 1,949
Hammegk,
Among other things, yes. But you asked me about my position, which is not metaphysical.
Asking me "Since you have no metaphysic, how do you answer this metaphysical question?", does not make much sense. The answer is obvious: I don't.
It may be a component of it. But note that I am not claiming that any specific thing is acting entirely based on its nature. On the contrary, I am saying that the entire approach of trying to decide which (if any) things act entirely based on their nature, and which act only partially based on their nature, and partially on outside influences, is fatally flawed. We don't know, and have no way of finding out.
It could be that the behavior of observable things is based entirely on their nature, and their interactions with each other. This would be a kind of metaphysical materialism. I am not endorsing this. It is also possible that there are other non-observable things (hidden variables?) which control observable objects, and that those hidden things behave solely according to nature. It could also be that they are controlled by other things, and so on... None of these options are in any way verifiable. To pick one over the others is nothing more than an exercise in arbitrary dogmatism.
My own position is an epistemological one. I neither know nor care what the answers to these metaphysical questions are, or even whether they have answers. I attempt to construct the most accurate and predictively useful model for reality that I can. Metaphysics never enters into it.
No, it does not. It implies only that the nature of the interaction between the controller and the observable things it controls, are such that the existence of the controller cannot be inferred from the observable behavior of the controlled thing. It does violate some of the axioms of science, but it is not logically self-contradictory.
Remember that the form of dualism which I claim is self-contradictory is the form that claims that non-physical things interact with physical things. This is not the same as saying that unobservable things interact with observable things. Physical things are just things which interact with other physical things (which is why the first type is self-contradictory). Saying that unobservable things interact with observable things, is just a rejection of one of the axioms of science. The unobservable thing is still quite physical.
Of course other people define physical differently, but when they do so, the meanings of those statements are different as well. Some forms of dualism amount to nothing more that the claim that there are things which cannot be described scientifically. This is not a self-contradictory claim. It is just an unjustified claim.
I don't understand the question. Determinism is a mathematical term. Random just means "not deterministic". Stating that reality is or is not deterministic is nothing more than making a statement about how it behaves. It says nothing about what it *is*, or "why" it behaves that way.
Idealism is an inherently metaphysical position. It can never be verified. It can never provide us with any practical information about the World. It cannot be used to make testable predictions. It is no more useful than any other unverifiable explanation you could dream up. So why even bother?
Dr. Stupid
Among other things, yes. But you asked me about my position, which is not metaphysical.
Asking me "Since you have no metaphysic, how do you answer this metaphysical question?", does not make much sense. The answer is obvious: I don't.
It may be a component of it. But note that I am not claiming that any specific thing is acting entirely based on its nature. On the contrary, I am saying that the entire approach of trying to decide which (if any) things act entirely based on their nature, and which act only partially based on their nature, and partially on outside influences, is fatally flawed. We don't know, and have no way of finding out.
It could be that the behavior of observable things is based entirely on their nature, and their interactions with each other. This would be a kind of metaphysical materialism. I am not endorsing this. It is also possible that there are other non-observable things (hidden variables?) which control observable objects, and that those hidden things behave solely according to nature. It could also be that they are controlled by other things, and so on... None of these options are in any way verifiable. To pick one over the others is nothing more than an exercise in arbitrary dogmatism.
My own position is an epistemological one. I neither know nor care what the answers to these metaphysical questions are, or even whether they have answers. I attempt to construct the most accurate and predictively useful model for reality that I can. Metaphysics never enters into it.
No, it does not. It implies only that the nature of the interaction between the controller and the observable things it controls, are such that the existence of the controller cannot be inferred from the observable behavior of the controlled thing. It does violate some of the axioms of science, but it is not logically self-contradictory.
Remember that the form of dualism which I claim is self-contradictory is the form that claims that non-physical things interact with physical things. This is not the same as saying that unobservable things interact with observable things. Physical things are just things which interact with other physical things (which is why the first type is self-contradictory). Saying that unobservable things interact with observable things, is just a rejection of one of the axioms of science. The unobservable thing is still quite physical.
Of course other people define physical differently, but when they do so, the meanings of those statements are different as well. Some forms of dualism amount to nothing more that the claim that there are things which cannot be described scientifically. This is not a self-contradictory claim. It is just an unjustified claim.
I don't understand the question. Determinism is a mathematical term. Random just means "not deterministic". Stating that reality is or is not deterministic is nothing more than making a statement about how it behaves. It says nothing about what it *is*, or "why" it behaves that way.
Idealism is an inherently metaphysical position. It can never be verified. It can never provide us with any practical information about the World. It cannot be used to make testable predictions. It is no more useful than any other unverifiable explanation you could dream up. So why even bother?
Dr. Stupid
"Spontaneously"?
That sounds uncomfortably close to "randomly".
You're free to act according to your intentions. But have you any control over what your intentions will be?
(Actually, saying "you're free to act according to your intentions" is somewhat misleading. In fact, you aren't free not to so act.)
Stimpson J. Cat
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2001
- Messages
- 1,949
Ian,
Saying that the behavior follows some algorithmic rules does not necessitate that the rules exist as anything more than a description of the behavior, as I have already explained. That is one possible meaning of the word "follows", but not the only one, and I have already explained that it is not the one I am using.
In any event, that second quote is taken out of context. That comment was specifically made with respect to the question of whether the mind makes its decision arbitrarily, or for a reason. It must do one or the other, because all "arbitrary" means is "for no reason". The question of the technical mathematical meaning of "determinism" is irrelevant to this argument. The point is that your intuitive notion that your choices are neither inevitable, nor arbitrary, is self-contradictory. Mathematical determinism (the question of whether the behavior can be mathematically modelled or not), does not even enter into it.
Yes, and I have clarified that distinction at least twice now. Determinism just means that the behavior can be mathematically modelled. This is commonly referred to by saying "the behavior follows this set of algorithmic rules". That does not necessarily imply that something somehow "forced" the thing to behave that way. The reason why it behaved that way is not addressed by that statement at all.
Whether it is clear to you or not, the fact remains that either every aspect of our behavior happens for a reason, in which case our choices are inevitable, or there are aspects of our behavior which do not happen for any reason, in which case our choices are (at least to some degree), arbitrary. Either way you notion of free-will goes out the window.
Saying that we "chose freely" is an empty statement, unless you explain how this differs from our choices being inevitable, or arbitrary. Simply stating that they are neither, does not tell me anything. It just seems self-contradictory, because not being inevitable seems to logically imply being arbitrary, and vice-versa.
Then you are not talking about determinism in the mathematical sense. You are talking about something which you have not defined.
If this is the case, then given that you want to make choice A, it is inevitable that you will. Since the fact that you want to make choice A is a fact about your prior mental state, you are saying that your choice inevitably follows from your prior mental state. That contradicts your own conception of free-will.
Also, why did you want to make the choice you wanted to make? If there is a reason, then that mental state followed from a combination of prior physical and mental states (the reasons you wanted to do so). If there is no reason, then by definition, your wanting to make that choice was arbitrary. Again, this contradicts your own conception of free-will.
How you define "determinism" does not even matter. The point is that things either happen for a reason, or they do not. Your conception of free-will requires that they simultaneously happen for a reason, and are not constrained by those reasons. That is nonsense.
No, but the fact that you assert that if the event were repeated, that the same prior state would always result in the same choice, does.
Saying that you could have chosen otherwise, but that it was certain that you would not, is just empty semantics. It does not actually mean anything.
As I said, this is a completely empty statement if you assert that under the same conditions, we would always choose the same option. I might as well say that the Earth could just spontaneously start rotating the opposite way it currently does, but that it never will. That statement does not actually mean anything.
Like I said, all you have done is move the decision making process from the brain, to the self. This changes nothing. The self must still either make the choices it does for a reason, or make them arbitrarily. Saying that nothing causes the self to do what it does, does not change this. It is either the nature of the self to make choices for a reason, or it is the nature of the self to make choices arbitrarily. Nothing else need force it to behave the way it does, in order for my argument to be valid.
I have maintained nothing of the sort. What I have said is that either you had to choose that particular course of action, or the choice was, at least to some degree, arbitrary. I also specifically asked you whether you would ever make a different choice, given the same prior states. Claiming that because you answered "no" to that question, you had to make the choice you made, is quite a bit different than just saying that because you made a specific choice, you had to.
This is exactly equivalent to saying that your choice was inevitable, given the prior state. What you have just stated is that you could not have chosen differently!
But if you had "been so disposed", that would mean your prior mental state was different! Like I said, this just becomes compatibilism. You could have chosen differently if you had wanted to, but since you did not want to, you could not, in fact, have actually chosen differently!
And how would that not be arbitrary? Is there a reason for the intention to spontaneously arise? If you repeated the situation many times, each time with the same physical and mental states some fraction of a second before the choice you made, would intentions to choose differently sometimes spontaneously arise, and sometimes not? If so, how is this, and thus ultimately your choice, not arbitrary?
This implies that your choices are, at least to some degree, arbitrary. If they are not, then there is a reason for everything you do, which means that there is an algorithm that could exactly predict your behavior from prior conditions.
You can repeat this as often as you like, but it is just empty semantics. Either psychological states inevitably follow from prior states, according to same logical rules, or they don't, in which case they are, at least to some degree, arbitrary. You have established the self as the first mover: that which is not caused by anything else, but which causes other things to behave as they do. But all this means is that nothing external to the self constrains its actions. It does not mean that the self's behavior is not constrained, by its own nature, to behave in a particular algorithmic way. And if it is not, then that means that its behavior is, and least to some degree, arbitrary.
You can choose to call this determinism, or not. It makes no difference. The point is that it is still a fact that your choices are either inevitable, or arbitrary. Inventing an immaterial self to make your choices for you, does not allow your will to be any more free than it would be if your choices were made by the brain. All it does is complicate the issue, making it less obvious that your intuitive notion of free-will is not realistic.
I am afraid you are using the word "possible" in a way I have never heard of. To say that you invariably will not do so, sounds to me exactly like saying that for you to not do so is impossible.
I just explained why. It does not actually explain why that specific choice was made. It simply describes the decision making process, by saying that you choose what you want to choose. It replaces the question "Why did you choose X", with "Why did you want to choose X". You still don't actually know why X was chosen.
But where in the self? Why did you want to choose X? Was there a reason? If so, then wasn't the fact that you would want to choose X inevitable? If not, then wasn't it arbitrary?
Now you can either say that you wanted to choose X because..., or you can say that you just did, and that there was no reason at all. If you choose the former, the "why" question just moves to the next link in the chain. If you choose the latter, then you are left with your choice of X being arbitrary.
It's not. That's just the point. I don't even attempt to answer the metaphysical question "why does matter behave that way under those conditions". As far as epistemology is concerned, stating that "this is how matter behaves", is as far as you can go.
No, it is not vacuous. It just is not an answer to the metaphysical question of why things happen the way they do. That is the whole point. I do not even attempt to answer such questions, because I have no way, other than blind speculation, to do so.
What is wrong is that if you cannot provide an explanation for intentions, your explanation does not actually explain anything. All it does is add another layer of complexity to the system.
That conclusion does not follow from the premise. In fact, that conclusion only follows if you also assume that intentions are somehow distinct from the rest of the Universe. You have in no way established this.
1) I have no metaphysic. I am not a metaphysical materialist.
2) It does not even refute metaphysical materialism, because your conclusion depends on your own metaphysical assumption that intentions are somehow metaphysically immaterial.
Saying that the behavior follows some algorithmic rules does not necessitate that the rules exist as anything more than a description of the behavior, as I have already explained. That is one possible meaning of the word "follows", but not the only one, and I have already explained that it is not the one I am using.
In any event, that second quote is taken out of context. That comment was specifically made with respect to the question of whether the mind makes its decision arbitrarily, or for a reason. It must do one or the other, because all "arbitrary" means is "for no reason". The question of the technical mathematical meaning of "determinism" is irrelevant to this argument. The point is that your intuitive notion that your choices are neither inevitable, nor arbitrary, is self-contradictory. Mathematical determinism (the question of whether the behavior can be mathematically modelled or not), does not even enter into it.
Yes, and I have clarified that distinction at least twice now. Determinism just means that the behavior can be mathematically modelled. This is commonly referred to by saying "the behavior follows this set of algorithmic rules". That does not necessarily imply that something somehow "forced" the thing to behave that way. The reason why it behaved that way is not addressed by that statement at all.
Whether it is clear to you or not, the fact remains that either every aspect of our behavior happens for a reason, in which case our choices are inevitable, or there are aspects of our behavior which do not happen for any reason, in which case our choices are (at least to some degree), arbitrary. Either way you notion of free-will goes out the window.
Saying that we "chose freely" is an empty statement, unless you explain how this differs from our choices being inevitable, or arbitrary. Simply stating that they are neither, does not tell me anything. It just seems self-contradictory, because not being inevitable seems to logically imply being arbitrary, and vice-versa.
Then you are not talking about determinism in the mathematical sense. You are talking about something which you have not defined.
If this is the case, then given that you want to make choice A, it is inevitable that you will. Since the fact that you want to make choice A is a fact about your prior mental state, you are saying that your choice inevitably follows from your prior mental state. That contradicts your own conception of free-will.
Also, why did you want to make the choice you wanted to make? If there is a reason, then that mental state followed from a combination of prior physical and mental states (the reasons you wanted to do so). If there is no reason, then by definition, your wanting to make that choice was arbitrary. Again, this contradicts your own conception of free-will.
How you define "determinism" does not even matter. The point is that things either happen for a reason, or they do not. Your conception of free-will requires that they simultaneously happen for a reason, and are not constrained by those reasons. That is nonsense.
No, but the fact that you assert that if the event were repeated, that the same prior state would always result in the same choice, does.
Saying that you could have chosen otherwise, but that it was certain that you would not, is just empty semantics. It does not actually mean anything.
As I said, this is a completely empty statement if you assert that under the same conditions, we would always choose the same option. I might as well say that the Earth could just spontaneously start rotating the opposite way it currently does, but that it never will. That statement does not actually mean anything.
Like I said, all you have done is move the decision making process from the brain, to the self. This changes nothing. The self must still either make the choices it does for a reason, or make them arbitrarily. Saying that nothing causes the self to do what it does, does not change this. It is either the nature of the self to make choices for a reason, or it is the nature of the self to make choices arbitrarily. Nothing else need force it to behave the way it does, in order for my argument to be valid.
I have maintained nothing of the sort. What I have said is that either you had to choose that particular course of action, or the choice was, at least to some degree, arbitrary. I also specifically asked you whether you would ever make a different choice, given the same prior states. Claiming that because you answered "no" to that question, you had to make the choice you made, is quite a bit different than just saying that because you made a specific choice, you had to.
This is exactly equivalent to saying that your choice was inevitable, given the prior state. What you have just stated is that you could not have chosen differently!
But if you had "been so disposed", that would mean your prior mental state was different! Like I said, this just becomes compatibilism. You could have chosen differently if you had wanted to, but since you did not want to, you could not, in fact, have actually chosen differently!
And how would that not be arbitrary? Is there a reason for the intention to spontaneously arise? If you repeated the situation many times, each time with the same physical and mental states some fraction of a second before the choice you made, would intentions to choose differently sometimes spontaneously arise, and sometimes not? If so, how is this, and thus ultimately your choice, not arbitrary?
This implies that your choices are, at least to some degree, arbitrary. If they are not, then there is a reason for everything you do, which means that there is an algorithm that could exactly predict your behavior from prior conditions.
You can repeat this as often as you like, but it is just empty semantics. Either psychological states inevitably follow from prior states, according to same logical rules, or they don't, in which case they are, at least to some degree, arbitrary. You have established the self as the first mover: that which is not caused by anything else, but which causes other things to behave as they do. But all this means is that nothing external to the self constrains its actions. It does not mean that the self's behavior is not constrained, by its own nature, to behave in a particular algorithmic way. And if it is not, then that means that its behavior is, and least to some degree, arbitrary.
You can choose to call this determinism, or not. It makes no difference. The point is that it is still a fact that your choices are either inevitable, or arbitrary. Inventing an immaterial self to make your choices for you, does not allow your will to be any more free than it would be if your choices were made by the brain. All it does is complicate the issue, making it less obvious that your intuitive notion of free-will is not realistic.
I am afraid you are using the word "possible" in a way I have never heard of. To say that you invariably will not do so, sounds to me exactly like saying that for you to not do so is impossible.
Saying that we make a choice because we want to, is like saying that electrons repel each other because they have opposite charges. It sounds like an explanation, but it is really just a description. You then have to ask why we wanted to do it. And on and on the chain of causality goes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I cannot begin to imagine why you would believe that wanting to do some action does not function as an explanation!??
I just explained why. It does not actually explain why that specific choice was made. It simply describes the decision making process, by saying that you choose what you want to choose. It replaces the question "Why did you choose X", with "Why did you want to choose X". You still don't actually know why X was chosen.
But where in the self? Why did you want to choose X? Was there a reason? If so, then wasn't the fact that you would want to choose X inevitable? If not, then wasn't it arbitrary?
Now you can either say that you wanted to choose X because..., or you can say that you just did, and that there was no reason at all. If you choose the former, the "why" question just moves to the next link in the chain. If you choose the latter, then you are left with your choice of X being arbitrary.
It's not. That's just the point. I don't even attempt to answer the metaphysical question "why does matter behave that way under those conditions". As far as epistemology is concerned, stating that "this is how matter behaves", is as far as you can go.
No, it is not vacuous. It just is not an answer to the metaphysical question of why things happen the way they do. That is the whole point. I do not even attempt to answer such questions, because I have no way, other than blind speculation, to do so.
What is wrong is that if you cannot provide an explanation for intentions, your explanation does not actually explain anything. All it does is add another layer of complexity to the system.
That conclusion does not follow from the premise. In fact, that conclusion only follows if you also assume that intentions are somehow distinct from the rest of the Universe. You have in no way established this.
1) I have no metaphysic. I am not a metaphysical materialist.
2) It does not even refute metaphysical materialism, because your conclusion depends on your own metaphysical assumption that intentions are somehow metaphysically immaterial.
Wrath of the Swarm
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Feb 14, 2004
- Messages
- 1,855
And the two most troublesome posters - hammegk and II - still haven't explained what their distinction between material and immaterial is, which is the entire purpose of the thread!
Perhaps I should ask the moderators to lock it, since the discussion is clearly going nowhere.
Perhaps I should ask the moderators to lock it, since the discussion is clearly going nowhere.
Interesting Ian
Banned
- Joined
- Feb 9, 2004
- Messages
- 7,675
It seems to me you have comprehensively failed to understand any of my posts on this free will issue. I intend to make this my last post unless you say anything which I would consider challenges my position.
Yes it does. To follow rules implicitly supposes their existence.
I am not aware that the word "follow" could mean you are not actually following anything.
Yes, but you understand it doesn't mean the same as random?
I'm afraid not as I have already very patiently explained umpteen times.
Right, so I have 10 options. Any of which I can choose depending on what I want. Let's for arguments sake suppose all of them can be mathematically modelled. So determinism is correct. How does this contradict my position??
A reason, or more commonly, a disposition.
No. Not true. I keep explaining to you why this isn't true.
You've said absolutely nothing whatsoever to cast doubt on my notion of free will.
I've already said. We choose according to our intentions or dispositions. This does not mean to say we could not choose otherwise.
I am not required to define it. I have no idea what it could possibly mean if one is denying that physical laws govern the behaviour of physical objects (including people). All you've said is that you have no idea why physical objects, including human beings, behave as they do. You've simply said their behaviour can be mathematically described. I do not understand how this can be described as "determinism". If nothing is determining how can it be described as "determinism"??
And besides, we are not discussing determinism. I was originally defending my conception of free will. You have said nothing whatsoever to cast any doubt upon this conception.
That is meaningless. I'm defining "want" as to behave in a given way. You're in effect saying I do what I do because I do what I do!
No it's not. It's a fact about my present mental state.
Because of me as a person, what I presently feel like etc.
I've repeated this part about 3 times, but you don't listen too good, so I will paste it in yet again.
. . . this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.
As I keep repeating. Your point here is completely a vacuous one. You are saying nothing more than I do what I do because I do what I do. You are defining "determinism" so broadly that one would have to act randomly in order for it to be false. But what have you "won" by making the definition of determinism so broad?
My behaviour is not at all certain. If I decide to choose a number from 1 to 1000, how can you say it is certain that the number I will choose, say 018, is the one I had to choose? Nothing compelled me to choose that number. I chose it arbitrarily. Even someone who knows me inside out couldn't have predicted the number I chose. And even where they can predict my behaviour, as in the scenario where I will take £10 rather than nothing, this cannot possibly have any implications that I had to choose to take the £10, or that I couldn't have chosen to take nothing.
You mean you can't understand my position.
If the Earth started rotating the opposite way then arguably this might falsify the hypothesis that it's behaviour is governed by physical laws. How is one to falsify that my behaviour is governed by physical laws? Whatever I do you will claim it is in accordance with physical laws.
In other words your determinism is unfalsifiable! Actually this ties in nicely with your all-encompassing conception of determinism!
What "I want" is not some sort of external agency compelling me to behave in a given manner! My behaviour is simply an expression of what I want to do. So if I did behave differently it is because I want to. What more could free will possibly mean?? You talk as if I am a hapless slave of my wants, and I cannot act differently from my wants, and therefore I haven't got libertarian free will. But all this is clearly absurd!
And as I said, I don't understand what compatibilism means. OK, compatible with determinism. But if determinism doesn't mean that all things are determined by physical laws, then I have no idea what it means. Seems pretty vacuous to me
Yes, so I choose to do something, and no matter what I chose, you'll claim it was in accordance with physical laws! Your so-called "determinism" is unfalsifiable.
If you maintain otherwise tell me how you would ever falsify this?
Don't you see you are defining your position so that necessarily ones actions are either random or determined. You are not arguing for your stance. You are simply declaring your position to be true by definition!
How can a self be constrained by its own nature?? This is nonsensical! This would mean the self's nature is something distinct from the self!
Nonsense! Under your metaphysic my choices are constrained by physical laws. Ones behaviour is governed by physical laws just as much as the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Under my metaphysic I am not "constrained" by what I want to do!
Well, you claim this, but when faced with the choice, it seems to all the world that I most definitely could decline the million. It's just that I would not want to, so invariably I will take the million.
You cannot say the same situation applies to the Earth going around the Sun! I imagine it would be very clear to most people that me not taking the million, and the Earth reversing its direction, are 2 different types of impossible! Anyway, you need to demonstrate that the meaning of impossible here is precisely the same.
Because of my belief it will initiate a pleasure state of affairs for myself.
No, I can choose not to drink a glass of water even though I am thirsty. It's a choice and therefore by definition is not random.
If the Earth doesn't orbit the Sun because of its intentions, and we behave because of our intentions, this is inconsistent with your position. So do you either say the Earth does in fact have intentions, or do you say that we don't have intentions, or alternatively they are causally inefficacious??
Look, here is a quick experimental proof that determinism is pragmatically self-refuting: If determinism were true, then your brain and body would just do whatever it is going to do anyway, without your having to will it to do things. So, tomorrow morning, when you wake up, you don't have to exert yourself at all. You can just relax, and your body will get up out of bed and have breakfast and go to work -- all by itself! Amazing! Well, I tried this experiment several times and it always failed. My body did not get out of bed. Each time, I eventually had to use my free will to make the body get out of bed.
That's how I know I have free will.
Stimpson J. Cat said:
Yes it does. To follow rules implicitly supposes their existence.
I am not aware that the word "follow" could mean you are not actually following anything.
Yes, but you understand it doesn't mean the same as random?
I'm afraid not as I have already very patiently explained umpteen times.
Right, so I have 10 options. Any of which I can choose depending on what I want. Let's for arguments sake suppose all of them can be mathematically modelled. So determinism is correct. How does this contradict my position??
A reason, or more commonly, a disposition.
No. Not true. I keep explaining to you why this isn't true.
You've said absolutely nothing whatsoever to cast doubt on my notion of free will.
I've already said. We choose according to our intentions or dispositions. This does not mean to say we could not choose otherwise.
I am not required to define it. I have no idea what it could possibly mean if one is denying that physical laws govern the behaviour of physical objects (including people). All you've said is that you have no idea why physical objects, including human beings, behave as they do. You've simply said their behaviour can be mathematically described. I do not understand how this can be described as "determinism". If nothing is determining how can it be described as "determinism"??
And besides, we are not discussing determinism. I was originally defending my conception of free will. You have said nothing whatsoever to cast any doubt upon this conception.
That is meaningless. I'm defining "want" as to behave in a given way. You're in effect saying I do what I do because I do what I do!
No it's not. It's a fact about my present mental state.
Because of me as a person, what I presently feel like etc.
I've repeated this part about 3 times, but you don't listen too good, so I will paste it in yet again.
. . . this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.
As I keep repeating. Your point here is completely a vacuous one. You are saying nothing more than I do what I do because I do what I do. You are defining "determinism" so broadly that one would have to act randomly in order for it to be false. But what have you "won" by making the definition of determinism so broad?
My behaviour is not at all certain. If I decide to choose a number from 1 to 1000, how can you say it is certain that the number I will choose, say 018, is the one I had to choose? Nothing compelled me to choose that number. I chose it arbitrarily. Even someone who knows me inside out couldn't have predicted the number I chose. And even where they can predict my behaviour, as in the scenario where I will take £10 rather than nothing, this cannot possibly have any implications that I had to choose to take the £10, or that I couldn't have chosen to take nothing.
You mean you can't understand my position.
If the Earth started rotating the opposite way then arguably this might falsify the hypothesis that it's behaviour is governed by physical laws. How is one to falsify that my behaviour is governed by physical laws? Whatever I do you will claim it is in accordance with physical laws.
In other words your determinism is unfalsifiable! Actually this ties in nicely with your all-encompassing conception of determinism!What "I want" is not some sort of external agency compelling me to behave in a given manner! My behaviour is simply an expression of what I want to do. So if I did behave differently it is because I want to. What more could free will possibly mean?? You talk as if I am a hapless slave of my wants, and I cannot act differently from my wants, and therefore I haven't got libertarian free will. But all this is clearly absurd!
And as I said, I don't understand what compatibilism means. OK, compatible with determinism. But if determinism doesn't mean that all things are determined by physical laws, then I have no idea what it means. Seems pretty vacuous to me
Yes, so I choose to do something, and no matter what I chose, you'll claim it was in accordance with physical laws! Your so-called "determinism" is unfalsifiable.
If you maintain otherwise tell me how you would ever falsify this?
Don't you see you are defining your position so that necessarily ones actions are either random or determined. You are not arguing for your stance. You are simply declaring your position to be true by definition!
How can a self be constrained by its own nature?? This is nonsensical! This would mean the self's nature is something distinct from the self!
Nonsense! Under your metaphysic my choices are constrained by physical laws. Ones behaviour is governed by physical laws just as much as the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Under my metaphysic I am not "constrained" by what I want to do!
Well, you claim this, but when faced with the choice, it seems to all the world that I most definitely could decline the million. It's just that I would not want to, so invariably I will take the million.
You cannot say the same situation applies to the Earth going around the Sun! I imagine it would be very clear to most people that me not taking the million, and the Earth reversing its direction, are 2 different types of impossible! Anyway, you need to demonstrate that the meaning of impossible here is precisely the same.
Because of my belief it will initiate a pleasure state of affairs for myself.
No, I can choose not to drink a glass of water even though I am thirsty. It's a choice and therefore by definition is not random.
If the Earth doesn't orbit the Sun because of its intentions, and we behave because of our intentions, this is inconsistent with your position. So do you either say the Earth does in fact have intentions, or do you say that we don't have intentions, or alternatively they are causally inefficacious??
I have never heard of the term "metaphysical materialist". By definition, materialism is a metaphysical position. If you dispute this then you do not understand either what metaphysics means, or what materialism means.
Look, here is a quick experimental proof that determinism is pragmatically self-refuting: If determinism were true, then your brain and body would just do whatever it is going to do anyway, without your having to will it to do things. So, tomorrow morning, when you wake up, you don't have to exert yourself at all. You can just relax, and your body will get up out of bed and have breakfast and go to work -- all by itself! Amazing! Well, I tried this experiment several times and it always failed. My body did not get out of bed. Each time, I eventually had to use my free will to make the body get out of bed.
That's how I know I have free will.
Wrath of the Swarm
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- Feb 14, 2004
- Messages
- 1,855
This thread was expressly created so that certain posters could be asked to finally explain the distinctions they had claimed to be making. If they're refusing to do so, but continuing to post to the thread, are they not trolling?
hammegk said:
I surrender. There are no materialists here, since they would be required by logic to agree with those definitions I provided.
Are you all actually illogical dualists, or are you actually Idealists but didn't realize it until right now?