Materialism and Immaterialism

[BillHoyt]

Randomness can surely be defined positively.

Actually, it can't.

Neither can a firm demarcation line be drawn. A sufficiently complex deterministic process is indistinguishable from randomness. IIRC, any system of just three differential equations can exhibit this behavioral complexity. This indistinguishability also underlies the ability to design PRNGs.

 

[Interesting Ian]

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Wrath's request for a definition of free-will was directed at Ian and Hammegk, in response to their claim that it exists, and is neither deterministic, nor random (nor any combination thereof).

The first problem being that this is not a definition of what free-will is, but rather what it isn't. The second problem being that under any conventional mathematical definition of "random" and "deterministic", this is self-contradictory.
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I rather think you need to demonstrate this "contradiction".
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See above. The mathematical definition of "random" is "not deterministic".

Hmmm . .just replied to the above. As I said, this is both false and a negative definition. I should also stress that you cannot use mathematics to define away free will.

If, when you say "free-will is neither random nor deterministic", you are using this definition, then your statement is self-contradictory.

The definition of randomness you have provided is incorrect. Randomness doesn't mean what you think it means. We know this because even if we do not have free will, we could have done so. So we're not actually talking about the question of whether we have free will or not. In order to refute me you must show free will is logically impossible, or that the concept of it is internally inconsistent.

Now, I don't know what you mean by the mathematical definition. Obviously I agree that in the realm of mathematics there is only the possibility of randomness or being determined. But we're discussing the real world here.

If you have some other definition in mind, then you need to present it before we can possibly address your claim about free-will.

It's the absence of any order or pattern. If we're talking about say, a wholly random occurrence, this means that previous states of the Universe offer absolutely no guide whatsoever as to whether this event would or would not take place.

Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random. Is it therefore determined? Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2, might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws, from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Now this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to either have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.

 

[hammegk]

It is deterministic.

Thanks, Stimpy.

Could you add a bit more of your thinking? For example, how are advanced waves travelling backwards in time deterministic?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

What's to add? It's deterministic. Are you implying that it isn't?

And where are you answers to the questions at hand? We're waiting...

 

[Interesting Ian]

That is the formal mathematical definition, but that is not relevant.

But are these people who so define it saying this definition applies outside of mathematics as well i.e in the real world?? If so then what do they say about free will??

I was asked for my opinion on the matter, and I gave it. That is the only definition for random that I know of. If you have an alternative definition in mind, for which your claim about free-will is not self-contradictory, then please present it.

I just did in my previous post!

quote:
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That's a negative definition anyway.
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That is perfectly fine, because "random" refers to a type of process, and not a specific process. When I say that something is random, I mean only that it is not deterministic. Nothing more, and nothing less.

How can behaviour which exhibits purpose be random??

When you attempt to define a specific process, like free-will, only by saying what it is not,

I've given positive definitions. It simply means mental "causality". Basically it is the capacity of a self to have thoughts and behave accordingly. In other words the concept of free will is intimately interwoven into the notion of the self.

 

[BillHoyt]

How can behaviour which exhibits purpose be random??

The "purpose" of the evolutionary process is for the critters to survive and multiply. Most of the process drivers are random. There is no inherent conflict unless you are overloading the definition of "purpose."

 

[hammegk]

What's to add? It's deterministic. Are you implying that it isn't?

Yeah, actually it sounds like an assertion rather than a fact, so I asked for clarification. We are also moving close to another question, viz. "Is 'what-is' actually the math itself?" Is math material, or immaterial?

And where are you answers to the questions at hand? We're waiting...

As previously mentioned, I've gone down the 100% road as far as I choose to at this time. SFAIC, the topic has moved to deterministic vs random. Unfortunately, just another problem in Wittgenstein's morass, huh?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

See above. The mathematical definition of "random" is "not deterministic".
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Hmmm . .just replied to the above. As I said, this is both false and a negative definition.

The term "false definition" is a non-sequitur.

I should also stress that you cannot use mathematics to define away free will.

I have done no such thing. I have asked you to define what you mean by free-will. Since the definition you provided is self-contradictory using the only definition of random that I know of, I have asked you to define what you mean by "random".

If, when you say "free-will is neither random nor deterministic", you are using this definition, then your statement is self-contradictory.
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The definition of randomness you have provided is incorrect. Randomness doesn't mean what you think it means. We know this because even if we do not have free will, we could have done so.

Could have done what? I don't understand this statement at all.

So we're not actually talking about the question of whether we have free will or not. In order to refute me you must show free will is logically impossible, or that the concept of it is internally inconsistent.

And in order for me to do that, you must provide a coherent definition of what you mean by free-will.

Now, I don't know what you mean by the mathematical definition. Obviously I agree that in the realm of mathematics there is only the possibility of randomness or being determined. But we're discussing the real world here.

Neither the term "deterministic", nor "random", in their mathematical senses, can be applied to the real world. We can only claim that the real world can be mathematically modeled by such systems.

If you have some other definition in mind, then you need to present it before we can possibly address your claim about free-will.
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It's the absence of any order or pattern. If we're talking about say, a wholly random occurrence, this means that previous states of the Universe offer absolutely no guide whatsoever as to whether this event would or would not take place.

Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random.

So your definition of random is "completely unpredictable"? If so, then I agree that something can be neither deterministic, nor completely unpredictable. For example, any stochastic dynamical system.

Is it therefore determined? Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2, might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws, from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Now this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states.

I've got news for you, that isn't how we treat the physical world, nor has it been for about a century now.

Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to either have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.

Since your definition of "random" is simply "completely unpredictable", stating that free-will is neither deterministic nor random just means that it is neither completely predictable, nor completely unpredictable. This can be said to be true of anything in the real world.

The real question is, how does your free-will differ from any other stochastic dynamical system, such as, for example, the brain?

That is the formal mathematical definition, but that is not relevant.
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But are these people who so define it saying this definition applies outside of mathematics as well i.e in the real world?? If so then what do they say about free will??

No, they are saying that when we mathematically model the real world, our model must either be deterministic (in the mathematical sense), or random (in the mathematical sense, meaning non-deterministic), or a composite of deterministic and random systems interacting with each other.

This is true of any mathematical model, regardless of whether it is a scientific model based on empirical observations, or some metaphysical model that you have invented.

I was asked for my opinion on the matter, and I gave it. That is the only definition for random that I know of. If you have an alternative definition in mind, for which your claim about free-will is not self-contradictory, then please present it.
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I just did in my previous post!

I just went back and looked through the thread. I cannot find the post you are referring to. The only post in which you have made any attempt to define "random", is in the post you made after I posted the above request.

That is perfectly fine, because "random" refers to a type of process, and not a specific process. When I say that something is random, I mean only that it is not deterministic. Nothing more, and nothing less.
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How can behaviour which exhibits purpose be random??

By your definition, it can not. By the mathematical definition, it can do so very easily. Just examine any stochastic dynamical system.

When you attempt to define a specific process, like free-will, only by saying what it is not,
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I've given positive definitions. It simply means mental "causality". Basically it is the capacity of a self to have thoughts and behave accordingly. In other words the concept of free will is intimately interwoven into the notion of the self.

Ok. That is a positive definition. Now please explain how the above is not compatible with the claim that the mind is a physical brain process? You have claimed that under materialism, there can be no free-will. Why? What about materialism indicates that the brain cannot have the capacity to have thoughts, and behave accordingly?

I would say that the definition of free-will you have provided so far, is completely compatible with materialism, and with the hypothesis that the mind is a set of brain processes. Please explain why you think that this cannot be the case.


Hammegk,

It is deterministic.
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Thanks, Stimpy.

Could you add a bit more of your thinking? For example, how are advanced waves travelling backwards in time deterministic?

Temporal causality, meaning that events in the future being completely determined by events in the past, is only one type of determinism. All deterministic means is that the behavior can be described in terms of some mathematical algorithm. That algorithm need not obey any conventions about time directionality.


Dr. Stupid

 

[apoger]

apoger: Thanks for another demonstration of the futility and sterility of "critical thinking" when used to erect stumbling blocks rather than as a method of further inquiry. Damn semantics.

If you can show me an example of me creating a "stumbling block" I will humbly apologize.

In the meantime you are the one who has refused to back up his definitions, closed discussion, and now tried to reflect your own shortcomings on me and/or "critical thinking".

Isn't it the point that if A does not ensure at 100% certainty ~A, the logic is at best suspect for our "physical" universe?

Does my 100% comment above make any sense to you?

No.
Perhaps you could put it in context, define "A", or explain yourself in clear and simple terms.

Indeed, I must ask what this has to do with your claim that materialists/atheists/scientists require a 100% certainty that god does not exist.

Perhaps it would help if you would answer a question rather than pose new questions in response? I submit that this is your method of erecting "semantic stumbling blocks".

To me, the current discussion of determined vs. random is approaching the free-will problem from a new direction.

I find the current discussion fascinating.

However just because the conversation has taken an interesting new turn, does not absolve you from the responsibility of backing up your prior claims.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The "purpose" of the evolutionary process is for the critters to survive and multiply. Most of the process drivers are random. There is no inherent conflict unless you are overloading the definition of "purpose."

I should have said is purposeful.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
The definition of randomness you have provided is incorrect. Randomness doesn't mean what you think it means. We know this because even if we do not have free will, we could have done so.
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Could have done what? I don't understand this statement at all.

I mean it is conceivable we have free will. You need to show why it's inconceivable.

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So we're not actually talking about the question of whether we have free will or not. In order to refute me you must show free will is logically impossible, or that the concept of it is internally inconsistent.
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And in order for me to do that, you must provide a coherent definition of what you mean by free-will.

I've done so numerous times. It's the idea that the self (ie substantial self) has some influence in determining our behaviour.

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Now, I don't know what you mean by the mathematical definition. Obviously I agree that in the realm of mathematics there is only the possibility of randomness or being determined. But we're discussing the real world here.
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Neither the term "deterministic", nor "random", in their mathematical senses, can be applied to the real world. We can only claim that the real world can be mathematically modeled by such systems.

Well yes you can claim it. Now why don't you try mathematically modelling an individual's behaviour and see how successful you are.

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If you have some other definition in mind, then you need to present it before we can possibly address your claim about free-will.
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It's the absence of any order or pattern. If we're talking about say, a wholly random occurrence, this means that previous states of the Universe offer absolutely no guide whatsoever as to whether this event would or would not take place.

Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random.
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So your definition of random is "completely unpredictable"?

No. By wholly I meant where we cannot ascribe a probability.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I mean it is conceivable we have free will. You need to show why it's inconceivable.

I don't think it is inconceivable at all, at least as you have explained it so far. But then, you have not yet explained what makes your conception of free-will incompatible with materialism. Materialism has absolutely no problem with processes which are neither deterministic, nor "wholly random", as you put it. Nor does materialism have any problem with our ability to have thoughts, and act upon them, or with the fact that we have the ability to make decisions whose outcome cannot be absolutely determined by looking at the previous state of the Universe.

Neither the term "deterministic", nor "random", in their mathematical senses, can be applied to the real world. We can only claim that the real world can be mathematically modeled by such systems.
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Well yes you can claim it. Now why don't you try mathematically modelling an individual's behaviour and see how successful you are.

This is currently being done. Sure, we don't have anything even close to a complete model yet, but then again, we do not have anywhere near enough information yet to construct one either.

It should be pointed out, though, that while materialism holds that it should be possible to construct such a model, simply pointing out the fact that we do not yet have one, does not demonstrate that this is not possible.

It's the absence of any order or pattern. If we're talking about say, a wholly random occurrence, this means that previous states of the Universe offer absolutely no guide whatsoever as to whether this event would or would not take place.

Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random.
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So your definition of random is "completely unpredictable"?
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No. By wholly I meant where we cannot ascribe a probability.

How is that not completely unpredictable? If a wholly random process is one to which we cannot ascribe a probability, then how is it not completely unpredictable? If previous states of the Universe offer absolutely no guide whatsoever as to whether the event would or would not take place, how is that not a completely unpredictable event?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
I've done so numerous times [defined free will]. It's the idea that the self (ie substantial self) has some influence in determining our behaviour.

And people have asked numerous questions about this rather loose definition, in order to refine it. For example, what is the "mechanism" by which the self makes its decisions? And, what does it mean to have completely free choice of decision in one instant and make a decision in the next?

I think you should try to resolve the charming ambiguity.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Is it therefore determined? Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2, might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws, from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Now this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states.
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I've got news for you, that isn't how we treat the physical world, nor has it been for about a century now.

Please don't nitpick. We both know that determinism doesn't accurately depict the world, and we both know that this is completely irrelevant. Please address my points.

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Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to either have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.
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Since your definition of "random" is simply "completely unpredictable",

Well no it's not. I don't even understand what you mean by this phrase. If something had a 99.9% chance of occurring, how would it be completely unpredictable?? I mean random in the normal sense that subject to the probabilities of the respective outcomes, the actual outcome is "arbitrary". Thus if such an identical event were repeated an infinite number of times the outcomes would be in the proportions of the respective probabilities.

BTW, do you really think discussing randomness is fruitful in discussing the issue of free will. I really don't think it is myself. It's the concept of determinism we should be discussing.

stating that free-will is neither deterministic nor random just means that it is neither completely predictable, nor completely unpredictable. This can be said to be true of anything in the real world.

The real question is, how does your free-will differ from any other stochastic dynamical system, such as, for example, the brain?

I have no idea what a "stochastic dynamical system" is. Free will differs from the brain in that it is neither determined, nor random, nor a combination of the 2.

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That is the formal mathematical definition, but that is not relevant.
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But are these people who so define it saying this definition applies outside of mathematics as well i.e in the real world?? If so then what do they say about free will??
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No, they are saying that when we mathematically model the real world, our model must either be deterministic (in the mathematical sense), or random (in the mathematical sense, meaning non-deterministic), or a composite of deterministic and random systems interacting with each other.

Well obviously, but that begs the question of whether we can mathematically model the real world. How would you, for example, mathematically model my responses to you??

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I was asked for my opinion on the matter, and I gave it. That is the only definition for random that I know of. If you have an alternative definition in mind, for which your claim about free-will is not self-contradictory, then please present it.
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I just did in my previous post!
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I just went back and looked through the thread. I cannot find the post you are referring to. The only post in which you have made any attempt to define "random", is in the post you made after I posted the above request.

Yes, that's the post I was referring to.

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When you attempt to define a specific process, like free-will, only by saying what it is not,
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I've given positive definitions. It simply means mental "causality". Basically it is the capacity of a self to have thoughts and behave accordingly. In other words the concept of free will is intimately interwoven into the notion of the self.
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Ok. That is a positive definition. Now please explain how the above is not compatible with the claim that the mind is a physical brain process?

I've already explained. I'll paste it in for your convenience:

Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random. Is it therefore determined? Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2, might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws, from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Now this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to either have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.

You have claimed that under materialism, there can be no free-will. Why?

Where have I claimed this? It's not the same type of free will because our choices are inevitable. Obviously we have free will in the sense we can choose to do what we will (subject to the obvious caveats). But it is a bit strange that my freely made choices should just forevermore simply coincide with physical laws. To say the least this is rather unlikely!

What about materialism indicates that the brain cannot have the capacity to have thoughts, and behave accordingly?

A different subject not relevant to this discussion.

I would say that the definition of free-will you have provided so far, is completely compatible with materialism,

Read it again, the part I pasted in. Besides, it can't be because I have presupposed the falsity of materialism in my argument, and this presupposition is vital to my argument.

 

[BillHoyt]

I should have said is purposeful.

I think you're still overloading the definition. What I said about evolution is still true when one substitutes "is purposeful."

 

[Interesting Ian]

And people have asked numerous questions about this rather loose definition, in order to refine it. For example, what is the "mechanism" by which the self makes its decisions? And, what does it mean to have completely free choice of decision in one instant and make a decision in the next?

I think you should try to resolve the charming ambiguity.

~~ Paul

I paste in the explanation I gave to Stimp. Let me know if you have any problems with it.

Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random. Is it therefore determined? Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2, might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws, from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

Now this just leaves the tricky question of whether our behaviour is psychologically determined. Certainly I choose as I want to do. So in this sense my actions are determined by my desires. But are my desires inevitable? I would suggest this is only so if we treat the psychological realm in the same way as we do the physical realm, so that future psychological states follow on inevitably from past psychological states. Now, I feel that this can be seriously questioned. Psychological states cannot be described using information (as, from the perspective of my metaphysic, you would only be describing the neural correlates), and I would seriously question whether we can provide any incorrigible rules whereby a future psychological state will proceed inevitably from a past psychological state. But this does not mean to say that a given psychological state is random. It does not mean to say this because we constantly define ourselves, what we are, what we desire and so on. In other words we constantly mould ourselves. Not that anything outside ourselves moulds us, but rather it is of the essence of the substantial self that even though it has causal powers, it is not itself caused by anything, but is rather an unanalysable existent (indeed, it is the only ontologically self-subsistent existent). Because of this, in choosing whether to either have eggs and bacon for breakfast, or porridge for breakfast, this choice can genuinely been made in the now, so to speak.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I think you're still overloading the definition. What I said about evolution is still true when one substitutes "is purposeful."

Evolution has no purpose.

 

[BillHoyt]

Evolution has no purpose.

You're confusing end goal or design intention with "purpose." You are overlaying the end goals / design intention connotations of teleology on the denotation of "purpose."

The purpose of evolution is for the critters to survive.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You're confusing end goal or design intention with "purpose." You are overlaying the end goals / design intention connotations of teleology on the denotation of "purpose."

The purpose of evolution is for the critters to survive.

That's what purpose means. A goal in mind or intention.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Obviously our behaviour is not wholly random. Is it therefore determined? Let's suppose the existence of an immaterial substantial self which has "causal" powers. If this is so a complete physical description of the Universe at time T2, might not be able to be derived by the application of any physical laws, from a complete physical description of the universe at time T1. In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things.

You've added an agent outside of the natural world, then said that the natural laws cannot describe our decisions. Obviously true, if I completely ignore the issue of how the agent interacts with the natural world. However, your last sentence should be amended:

In this case our behaviour is neither random nor is it physically determined, nor a combination of these two things, from the viewpoint of the natural world.

Which leaves us nowhere. I still want to know how that charming agent works.

This all sounds heavily dualistic.

~~ Paul