Materealism and morality

[JoeTheJuggler]

This is not hard. Electromagnetic force. It is the electromagnetic force that repels atoms aside, and therefore it is the electromagnetic force that is eventually responsible for the transportation of you and your stuff.

Sorry--you're wrong. The electromagnetic forces within the atoms that comprise a car is not what gives a car the ability to transport me and my stuff around.

I can't explain the concept of emergent properties better than I have, yet it's obvious you still don't get the idea. I think it's up to you do do a little more reading on the subject.

 

[RandFan]

What is your most radical example from daily life of properties that everyone would agree that they are emergent???

Mine would be flight. There is no flight to be found in a wing or a feather or the wind.

 

[RandFan]

Jet, reading through the last page it would seem to me that you are being a bit obtuse. I doubt it's a conscious effort on your part but emergent property is hardly a controversial concept. What specifically are you hung up about it?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Mine would be flight. There is no flight to be found in a wing or a feather or the wind.

Or lightweight skeletal systems.

An excellent example.

(Nice "seeing" you again, RF.)

 

[RandFan]

Or lightweight skeletal systems.

An excellent example.

(Nice "seeing" you again, RF.)

I have to duck out from time to time. It's the nature of what I do. I've had to leave months at a time. It's always good to be back.

 

[L The Detective]

Jet, reading through the last page it would seem to me that you are being a bit obtuse. I doubt it's a conscious effort on your part but emergent property is hardly a controversial concept. What specifically are you hung up about it?

I think he would probably say that he understands why putting wings and feathers and wind together would allow for flight, but he can't understand why putting chemicals and whatnot together in his brain creates "privateness/subjectivity."

Which I think is another way of asking, why do I exist inside my brain, why aren't I just a P-zombie? He knows that everything about his subjective experience is basically defined by his brain, but that doesn't answer the question "Why am I in this brain? How did I get here?"

 

[RandFan]

I think he would probably say that he understands why putting wings and feathers and wind together would allow for flight, but he can't understand why putting chemicals and whatnot together in his brain creates "privateness/subjectivity."

Which I think is another way of asking, why do I exist inside my brain, why aren't I just a P-zombie? He knows that everything about his subjective experience is basically defined by his brain, but that doesn't answer the question "Why am I in this brain? How did I get here?"

Yes, but, if I understand him correctly, he's pointing to the constituent parts of the brain and saying there's no mind there. How can the constituent parts of an electrochemical computer, parts that clearly have no private experiences, give rise to private experiences?

If so then the question is wrong.

I should know. It's a question I used to ask, a lot. To better understand the question I recommend Searle's Chinese Room experiment. I have my own version that I think is better but it's not on the web and there is no source material, commentary or criticisms of my thought experiment because, well, I'm not Searle.

We could, in theory, replicate the human mind via Searle's Chinese Room. If we did that, would it have private experiences?

 

[quixotecoyote]

Yes, but, if I understand him correctly, he's pointing to the constituent parts of the brain and saying there's no mind there. How can the constituent parts of an electrochemical computer, parts that clearly have no private experiences, give rise to private experiences?

If so then the question is wrong.

I should know. It's a question I used to ask, a lot. To better understand the question I recommend Searle's Chinese Room experiment. I have my own version that I think is better but it's not on the web and there is no source material, commentary or criticisms of my thought experiment because, well, I'm not Searle.

We could, in theory, replicate the human mind via Searle's Chinese Room. If we did that, would it have private experiences?

I know that Searle said he was opposed to dualism, but I can't help but think that the 'intentionality' he wants the room to support is just a reframed version of it. On the one hand, he's saying that consciousness depends on physical-chemical brain states, but on the other hand he claims that an exact replication/simulation of those physical-chemical brain states lacks intentionally and therefore consciousness.

He strikes me as desperately grabbing for a scientific reason to maintain some sort of magical element.

 

[JetLeg]

Yes, but, if I understand him correctly, he's pointing to the constituent parts of the brain and saying there's no mind there. How can the constituent parts of an electrochemical computer, parts that clearly have no private experiences, give rise to private experiences?

L The Detective's put it much much better.

I do not "point to the constituent parts of the brain and saying there's no mind there".

There is no ability to fly across the ocean in a wing of a plane, and in the jet engine of a plane, I agree.

But the issue is that we understand _why_ when we combine them, the result is such a one that can fly over the ocean. Once we know the constituents, and the interactions between them, we can actually predict what will the whole behave like. Right?

Now with brain-mind, I try to think what type of interaction among atoms/molecules/neurons would lead to a _private_ experience.

(On privacy : pain exists, doesn't it? But only you can feel your pain. I cannot. And nobody else can. This is different from your physical leg... I can see your leg. And so can you. And so can L. You have no "special access" to information on your leg. And so it is with your brain. But no so with private phenomena).


A good model would look at the consituents and _explain_ why, by which interactions among them, they lead to the behaviour of the whole system. Right? There is nothing mystical in that a plane can fly, but a wing cannot.

Well, I try to think what type of interactions between _non private_ phenomena would logically lead to private phenomena... And it escapes me.

 

[JetLeg]

I think he would probably say that he understands why putting wings and feathers and wind together would allow for flight, but he can't understand why putting chemicals and whatnot together in his brain creates "privateness/subjectivity."

Which I think is another way of asking, why do I exist inside my brain, why aren't I just a P-zombie? He knows that everything about his subjective experience is basically defined by his brain, but that doesn't answer the question "Why am I in this brain? How did I get here?"

Yup. Almost.

There are two types of emphasis that can be made : one can look at his own self, and ask "What is it? Why am I in this brain? How do I get here? ". This approach concentrates on the concept of the "me", the "self".


Another approach is not to look at what is called "self", but to look at specific instances of mental phenomena. Emotions, mental images. What I did in the thread was more like looking at a specific _emotion_ I had, and ask "Well, why is this weird colourless, shapeless thing caused by electrons, protons and neutrons? What is the link between the constituents and the whole structure?".

Do you see the difference? I think both approaches are reasonable, but so far I have used the second and not the first, if you look at the posts I have made.


Tibetan Buddhists for example agree pretty much with the second, but they wouldn't use the first approach, since they don't believe that a "self" exists.

(And again-> I am not claiming that there is no causal link between the brain and the mind. The evidence shows that. What I am saying is because I don't understand _how_ the link proceeds from non private phenomena to private phenomena, I am ready to call it a cause, but not an "emergent property", I denounce the analogy of flight&running as the mind. )

 

[JetLeg]

Ok, I don't feel this thread is going to new directions.

Does anyone have points that have not been raised?

Does anyone have links he thinks are relevant?

(RandFan, thanks for the links).

 

[L The Detective]

Okay... if that's the case, aren't you kind of beating around the bush? If you were a "P-Zombie," you would still have "private experiences," in the sense that you would still hypothetically act the same way, and your brain would still have thoughts/feelings/ideas which we know exists as motivating factors to explain your behavior. And these would all be private. The difference is that they wouldn't be "experiences." So what you're really talking about is "experiences," not "privateness." Am I correct?

 

[JetLeg]

Okay... if that's the case, aren't you kind of beating around the bush? If you were a "P-Zombie," you would still have "private experiences," in the sense that you would still hypothetically act the same way, and your brain would still have thoughts/feelings/ideas which we know exists as motivating factors to explain your behavior. And these would all be private. The difference is that they wouldn't be "experiences." So what you're really talking about is "experiences," not "privateness." Am I correct?

No, no, no.


A p-zombie (at least, my p-zombie) would still act the same way, but action is not private. His brain would look the same, but brain is not private.

Thoughts/feelings/ideas/pain are private, and it is those that my p-zombie would lack. He would still have the brain correlates of thoughts/feelings/ideas/pain. But he wouldn't have "experiences".


It seems that "experiences" are private by their nature, seems that one cannot experience what another does. So the distinction you try to draw between "experiences" and "privateness" seems a false one to me.

 

[HansMustermann]

So, just to make things clear, if I removed the hands off a clock, would its state become private?

 

[JetLeg]

So, just to make things clear, if I removed the hands off a clock, would its state become private?

I am not sure where you are going with this.

If you would remove the hands off a clock, I would say his state would become non-existant.

If you remove the parts of a thing, then there is no more thing, right?

 

[HansMustermann]

It would still ring at a certain hour. You just wouldn't know what hour it thinks it is.

 

[Belz...]

I have to duck out from time to time. It's the nature of what I do.

So, you're a superhero or a vigilante during some periods of the year ?

 

[RandFan]

But the issue is that we understand _why_ when we combine them, the result is such a one that can fly over the ocean. Once we know the constituents, and the interactions between them, we can actually predict what will the whole behave like. Right?

With hindsight and modern understanding, it's really difficult to get a visual image of what a mystery flight really was before our understanding of aerodynamics. Keep in mind that they search for understanding dates back before Leonardo Da Vinci.

Now with brain-mind, I try to think what type of interaction among atoms/molecules/neurons would lead to a _private_ experience.

Much like Da Vinci tried to think what type of interaction among wings, feathers and air would lead to flight.

He couldn't answer the question. That he couldn't answer the questions was not reason enough to assume that there were fairies or ghosts holding up birds.

(On privacy : pain exists, doesn't it? But only you can feel your pain. I cannot. And nobody else can. This is different from your physical leg... I can see your leg. And so can you. And so can L. You have no "special access" to information on your leg. And so it is with your brain. But no so with private phenomena).

Well, not quite. People have mirror neurons that fire when they see someone in pain and feel pain but I understand your point.

We may well someday be able to record private experiences.

A good model would look at the consituents and _explain_ why, by which interactions among them, they lead to the behaviour of the whole system. Right? There is nothing mystical in that a plane can fly, but a wing cannot.

There was a time when it was believed that flight was "mystical". That's a very important point you need to keep reminding yourself. Flight was for a long time a great mystery. Many great minds could not solve it.

Well, I try to think what type of interactions between _non private_ phenomena would logically lead to private phenomena... And it escapes me.

And Da Vinci tried to think what interactions between wing, wind and feathers would logically lead to flight and he couldn't do it.

I'll repeat my earlier contention, questions are never answers. That Da Vinci couldn't understand the dynamics of flight enough to explain flight didn't justify positing angels to lift birds into the air.

More importantly, if we do posit a homunculus and Cartesian theater, it doesn't explain how the homunculus perceives. It's a recursive problem. That fact was the most important turning point in my abandoning dualism.

I can't imagine how a spirit (soul) could lead to private phenomena and I doubt you can either. You are holding the non-physical explanation for private phenomena to a lower standard. That's not reasonable.

 

[RandFan]

So, you're a superhero or a vigilante during some periods of the year ?

I'm both, I go by the name of zero sum.

 

[L The Detective]

A p-zombie (at least, my p-zombie) would still act the same way, but action is not private. His brain would look the same, but brain is not private.

Thoughts/feelings/ideas/pain are private, and it is those that my p-zombie would lack. He would still have the brain correlates of thoughts/feelings/ideas/pain. But he wouldn't have "experiences".

It seems that "experiences" are private by their nature, seems that one cannot experience what another does. So the distinction you try to draw between "experiences" and "privateness" seems a false one to me.

Well, maybe you're right. However, it just occurs to me that "private" things apart from "experiences" can exist, so maybe it's more direct for you to simply talk about "experiences," rather than "privateness." Does "private" to you mean "we can't experience it," or "we can't know it?" If you mean "we can't experience it," then what you're really talking about is experiences, right? If you mean "we can't know it," then technically a P-Zombie's inner workings are private, because we can never know if it is a P-Zombie, so in that sense it has information that we can never know.

I mean, I agree with you that experiences are by their nature private, but is it really the "privateness" that is bothering you, and not the fact that you have experiences in the first place? Is it really just about the fact that you have information that others supposedly can't know?