Materealism and morality

[HansMustermann]

Well, I don't have enough expertise in computers to understand the analogy. Perhaps you think this is dishonesty, well....

And regarding the other examples, I single privacy, not because this is what we are discussing. I single it out, because I really can't grasp how it can be the logical result of non-private constituents.

Well, ok, sorry then and let's try it again: so for properties A, B, C, D, ... W, X, Y and Z, there's no problem with it emerging from components which individually don't have that property. But you seem to think that the property of something being "private" somehow is more special in that aspect. Why?

 

[RandFan]

Yes, I was joking (see the context).

But you ask the right questions...

Cool, and I for one don't fault you for debating your position. Been there done that and further more I'm not so arrogant as to say I'd never switch back or that I'm absolute in my certainty of my position. Though I seriously doubt that I will ever be switching back. It would take some pretty convincing evidence. As Stephen J. Gould put it, loosely, it would be perverse for me to withold consent at this time in favor of monism.

 

[JetLeg]

Is this an essay question or multiple choice? Sorry, I'm not good at definitions... so you want me to define it without using the word "brain"? How about "the process of your thoughts, feelings, and identity?" Is that good?

That's ok, though you use "process" about which we are debating. What do you think about the use of private ostention to define 'mind'?

Sorry, I think you're actually wrong on that. Occam's razor is *not* a tool used to decide if something exists. In fact I am pretty sure what it is exactly is the idea that, when presented with 2 explanations, the simplest is usually correct. This idea is most commonly used to explain why God is not a good explanation, not necessarily that God does not exist per se.

I'm pretty sure that's right, someone else wanna help me out with that?

Lets forget the classification. I think that because the mind is private, it is _more_ simple that it exists as an entity, than the alternative - that it exists as a property of something non-private. Hard to explain, guess that we have different intuitions.


Let's say that the mind is a property of the brain. Is it a property of the whole brain, or is each thought a property of the local parts that cause it? (Is speech a property of the whole brain, or of Broca's area?)

Yes, that I have feelings. That's the only fact I can think of... I think anything else would be an assumption. For example, I could say that from my perspective pain hurts. But this is not a "fact," this is only true for me. Perhaps for you, pain doesn't "hurt" in the way it hurts for me, right? In fact, perhaps pain doesn't even "hurt" for me, maybe that's just the way I look at it. Maybe if I change my perspective, suddenly it doesn't hurt as much as I thought.

Uh... So when you feel pain, it is not a fact that you feel pain? If X feels feels pain, it is not a fact that he feels pain?

Okay. But part of the process of "mind" is explained by it's constituents, "brain," isn't that right? It's just the "privateness" of this process that you don't think is explained, correct?

Uh... I think that not only. Most of the mind (by introspection) is very strange. Mental images, emotions... What is the link between electrons and emotions? Why do electrons, neutrons, protons that are bound together using different forces cause feelings? Mental images?

(Again, I agree that they cause, but since there is no explanation of how they do it, rather than 'they just do', the analogies of running->legs is horrible. The mind is not an "emergent" property, if it were, then one could explain _how_ does it emerge... )

 

[JetLeg]

Well, ok, sorry then and let's try it again: so for properties A, B, C, D, ... W, X, Y and Z, there's no problem with it emerging from components which individually don't have that property. But you seem to think that the property of something being "private" somehow is more special in that aspect. Why?

Because I _understand_ why the property emerges from its components.


And knowing what the physical components are (electrons, neutrons, protons) and more or less what are the types of interactions among them (physical forces), I faiil to understand _why_ would privacy emerge out of it...


F=(Q1*Q2/R^2 ) * PRIVACY ????



You know, just think of it. Try to imagine _how_ do physical objects give rise to private experience...

 

[JetLeg]

Cool, and I for one don't fault you for debating your position. Been there done that and further more I'm not so arrogant as to say I'd never switch back or that I'm absolute in my certainty of my position. Though I seriously doubt that I will ever be switching back. It would take some pretty convincing evidence. As Stephen J. Gould put it, loosely, it would be perverse for me to withold consent at this time in favor of monism.

I prefer to discuss and not to debate.

 

[RandFan]

Let's say that the mind is a property of the brain. Is it a property of the whole brain, or is each thought a property of the local parts that cause it? (Is speech a property of the whole brain, or of Broca's area?)

Good questions and while there are no concrete answers we are moving closer. First let's establish that this is part of what is known as the "binding problem". Sadly the term is itself somewhat controversial but I think it helpful to understand it to get a grap of exactly what the problem is.

Jet, have you read Ramachandran's "Brief Tour of Human Conscience"?

Are you familiar with Clive Wearing? If you get a chance I recomend watching all of the videos you can on him.



We seem to learn most about the mind based on the problems that arise due to organic damage of the brain.

 

[RandFan]

I prefer to discuss and not to debate.

Understood and I myself often make a distinction between the two but in point of fact I don't see much difference when the discussion is centered around a disagreement.

A debate is an intellectual process meant to establish a definite proposition. If in our discussion you state premises in order to establish one or more propositions then we've debated whether we call it that or not.

Still, that's a bit pedantic and a semantical argument so I'll let it go.

We'll stick with discussion.

 

[L The Detective]

Perhaps privacy is the effect of some objective entities.

Yes, I don't see any reason why not.

But what materealists usually do is not say that it's an effect, but say that its like.... running to legs. Or flight to wings.

With this I can't agree, since I understand how legs cause running, but don't understand how objectivity causes privacy.

So to be clear... what you are saying is, you don't understand how the objective world could cause "private experience." And because you don't understand how it could happen, therefore your position is that it is impossible. Have I summarized your position correctly?

 

[L The Detective]

That's ok, though you use "process" about which we are debating. What do you think about the use of private ostention to define 'mind'?

Yep, I use the word process. But it seems like, no matter how we define it, we're gonna end up using a term either you or I don't like. I'm not sure what you mean by "private ostention," what is "ostention?"

Lets forget the classification. I think that because the mind is private, it is _more_ simple that it exists as an entity, than the alternative - that it exists as a property of something non-private. Hard to explain, guess that we have different intuitions.

If you think so, then I guess I'd have to question how you are using the word "simple." The reason I think "property" is a simpler explanation is because it has less requirements than "entity." It's a more direct explanation, whereas saying the mind is a separate "entity" posits the existance of a separate entity. The explanation still works, but it's more complicated and creates more questions. So, if you think this is simpler, in what way are you using the word "simple"?

Let's say that the mind is a property of the brain. Is it a property of the whole brain, or is each thought a property of the local parts that cause it? (Is speech a property of the whole brain, or of Broca's area?)

Possibly either? I'll defer to somebody who knows more about neurology.

Uh... So when you feel pain, it is not a fact that you feel pain? If X feels feels pain, it is not a fact that he feels pain?

To him it is, yes. If he tells me he feels pain, can I say it is a fact that he feels pain?

 

[RandFan]

...I think it helpful to understand it to get a grap of exactly what the problem is.

Get a grip dude.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Like I said, so far I cannot present a formal argument why something private can't be a property of something non-private. It just makes no sense to me. But I'll think of it. The arguments I have presented are arguments why something private can't be a _process_ of something non-private. Because a process has to be explained in terms of its constituents. And also, why it can't be an "emergent" property - because for something to be an emergent property, the explanation of why it emerges has to be found amongst the constituents.

Hans has done a good job correcting you on this, but so did I when I very patiently described the idea of emergent properties. You really should spend some time reading up on the concept.

What is it about sodium ions that makes sodium chloride have the properties of table salt?

What is it about a cell in the wall of a blood vessel that gives the circulatory system the properties it has (of delivering oxygen and nutrients to cells throughout the body and carrying away their waste products)?

What is it about the atoms in the metal forming the engine case in your car that gives it the properties of a car (the ability to go, stop, turn, carrying you and your stuff around)?

The emergent properties are those that don't exist at lower levels of organization.

There is no reason why something material can't give rise to subjective experience.

Also, to repeat for the umpteenth time, even if that were a problem for materialism, there's nothing about dualism that resolves it. To use your very flawed approach on dualism, you could say, "Something private can't be a property of something non-private, including non-material 'substance.'"

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Because I _understand_ why the property emerges from its components.

I don't think you do.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Huh? Why?

Why is the approach you've been using called solipsism? Because it is--that is the way the convention of language works. The conventionally agreed upon meaning of the term solipsism describes your approach.

Look, you're rejecting the findings of neuroscience that have amassed a wealth of evidence that shows that what we call the mind (the collection of specific mental processes) including things that are purely subjective experiences arise from physical process of the brain for the simple reason that scientists have to rely on self-reporting of the subjective experience and cannot directly share the experience of another. In other words, you think all these subjects could be lying when they report subjective experience, and they could just be p-zombies who only SAY they have subjective experience and really don't.

That approach is called solipsism. From the Wiki entry:

Solipsism is the philosophical idea that "My mind is the only thing that I know exists." Solipsism is an epistemological or ontological position that knowledge of anything outside the mind is unjustified. The external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist.

As I've pointed out, there's nothing in any of your arguments for dualism that gets around this same problem. (Just saying the mind is some other non-material substance doesn't. Neither does saying the mind is an effect of the brain but a separate entity.) So why ignore this mountain of empirical evidence?

The best thing you're trying (and not succeeding) at arguing for is that dualism is possible (that it is not internally self-contradictory). Yet you've offered no empirical evidence for it. So why should anyone dismiss the wealth of neuroscience evidence and accept another system that has no support and doesn't even resolve the problem that you perceive with neuroscience?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Let's say that the mind is a property of the brain. Is it a property of the whole brain, or is each thought a property of the local parts that cause it? (Is speech a property of the whole brain, or of Broca's area?)

As I've said several times, the "mind" is a term for a collection of mental processes.

Some of those processes are localized to specific sites and structures in the brain, and some are not. Some are wholly dependent on certain structures (the hippocampus for processing memory), but also rely on other brain tissue. Also, we know the brain is plastic--that some functions may be taken over by other structures when the primary structure is damaged. (Some--not all.)

Also, as with much of science, the evidence doesn't come in one nice neat package. There is evidence, for example, that the basal ganglia are essential for proprioception --the sense, by the way, that can get goofed up and cause the subjective experience of an OBE or AS (autoscopy--seeing one's own body as if it were outside the self).

I mention OBE and AS, because these experiences were held to be evidence of the conceivability of a disembodied mind and therefore as a bit of empirical evidence for dualism. Now we know it to be merely a result of neurological processes.

 

[AWPrime]

Because the mind has the property of being private. No one can feel your pain. Only you can.

That is until people invent neural interfaces.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

That is until people invent neural interfaces.

That might not ever be possible (or practical) for the simple reason that there is a lot of variation even in non-neural anatomy (you might see a blood vessel anastamosis in one location on one person, but past another anatomical landmark in another person), but much moreso with neuro-anatomy.

The way we make neural connections is in part based on feedback, so in involves the experiences of the individual. In other words, we're all "wired" a bit differently. Even if you could locate the same exact synapses in two individuals, there's no telling that causing them to fire in exactly the same pattern would result in the same subjective experience.

It's the same issue as I said with the mind-reader. No matter how near you get to reading the mind, your subjective experience is still your own, and you have no way of knowing for certain that it ever lines up with another's. There was a time when the thought of what we can do with MRIs and EEGs would have been considered "mind reading".

ETA: Imagine Spock doing a vulcan mind-meld. He's basically having an experience (his own subjective experience) that seems like he's sharing another person's subjective experience. That other person could report that he too felt the shared subjective experience. But they could both just be misinterpreting their own distinct subjective experiences. Neither one has any way of knowing for certain that what he experienced from his own point of view was in fact sharing another's subjective experience.

See above, about my childhood speculations on the idea that we might all perceive colors in a different way, but all the associations and blendings and stuff change right along with it, so outwardly it works just fine if I simply assume "orange" looks orange to you just as it looks orange to me. Science doesn't mind making that assumption. Solipsism doesn't get us anywhere.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

To clarify, in science, there is no big hangup on what JL thinks is a problem--that we can never feel what another person feels. It doesn't matter.

A substantial part of the practice of medicine addresses subjective experience. We don't have to feel what someone else is feeling to have a good understanding of how the process of feeling things works. Anaesthesiologists can make sure you don't feel pain during a surgery. With epidurals, they can basically turn off the subjective experience of sensation in certain anatomical regions.

Most eye exams rely on self-reporting of subjective experience. (You know--"Which is better lens 1 or lens 2?") Same with hearing tests.

This issue of subjectivity (or "privacy") is simply no problem to a materialist approach. Nor does it do anything to argue in favor of a dualist approach.

 

[HansMustermann]

Actually, that mention of medicine just gave me another idea: by the same token, nobody else can have exactly your disease. Even a simple flu, may kill someone, but may not even bother someone else. Even a simple hole in a tooth can result in a septic shock (via abscess) or various chronic diseases because of those bacteria or nothing whatsoever. A HPV infection can result in a wart, or (if another mutation also happens) in a cancer, or nothing.

Hey, JL, does that make health a separate thing from the body?

 

[L The Detective]

I almost wish that this could be a conversation just between me and Jet, except that you guys are all so much smarter than me and have so much valuable stuff to add. But it sort of bothers me when I feel like I'm part of the crowd ganging up on someone. I makes me kinda wish I could take my turn being the "crazy person" in this forum, in some thread where everyone is questioning me, but I don't want to be a dishonest sock puppet and I can't think of a science-related topic that I have a controversial opinion on... even my politics are too middle of the road.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Actually, that mention of medicine just gave me another idea: by the same token, nobody else can have exactly your disease. Even a simple flu, may kill someone, but may not even bother someone else. Even a simple hole in a tooth can result in a septic shock (via abscess) or various chronic diseases because of those bacteria or nothing whatsoever. A HPV infection can result in a wart, or (if another mutation also happens) in a cancer, or nothing.

And most symptoms are subjective experiences--especially things like pain, aches, dizziness, weakness, fatigue, etc.

Hey, JL, does that make health a separate thing from the body?

For that matter, is "life" or "living" a logically separate entity? If it's not merely a process, function or property of a living thing, then what's the difference between a dead body and a living person?

(NB traditional dualists actually once thought that a dead body weighed less than a living once because some mysterious substance leaves the body at death.)