Hi all, well done on pulling all the info together and offering some perception and clarity to the forensic descriptions given of the blasted suitcases.
I’ve always thought that this particular aspect at the trial was not presented in a particularly clear or coherent manner. The multitude, or cacophony more like, of evidence production numbers that are discussed seems to be unnecessarily complex, or worse contradicted, when given as testimony at Zeist. Providing the actual suitcase description and associated owner in correspondence with all the fragments, as they are discussed, especially in relation to association with other luggage (unnamed and not described) is rather more obscure throughout this part of the court case. Still, in hindsight this aspect isn’t anomalous with regards to evidence that specifically pertained to bags, passengers and events at Heathrow that day.
So, in attributing what is now known of the damage to the legitimate Heathrow luggage that was in AVE4041, and perhaps more importantly the damage sustained by some critical items of Frankfurt luggage, it appears to lend even further weight – if required in light of the other evidence now known about the baggage positioning – that the explosion occurred on the bottom layer of luggage with the primary case having one side raised by about 3inches resting on the junction of frame between the floor and overhang section?
The damage shown by Carlsson’s and McKee’s suitcases appear entirely consistent, positioned as described by Bedford and Sidhu, with a blast impact sustained on their lower suitcase leading edges. And just too low to be compatible with an explosion occurring on a second layer suitcase. Then we have the array of fragments and the damage sustained by Frankfurt baggage some of which included, with varying degrees, intimate or direct contact with Ms Coyles blue Tourister suitcase. I believe it appears that one suitcase, Mr Thomas’s suitcase from Frankfurt, while exhibiting extensive blast damage, also contained significant portions of Ms Coyle’s suitcase embedded within it. Other suitcases of both variety contained fragments of what was considered to originate from Ms Coyle’s suitcase, but an entire frame from the blue tourister had been blasted into a Frankfurt suitcase.
The problem being that if Ms Coyle’s suitcase is still postulated, as was held by the prosecution at Zeist, as being the suitcase that took the position of the original Bedford suitcase, and thus on the floor of the container, it must have been blown to bits from immediately above it. It seems wholly counter-intuitive that significant portion of it would be embedded in a suitcase that was actually above it – and also above the bomb suitcase. The initial energy from the explosion would naturally dissipate in all directions, and thus a bag below this rush of energy seems unlikely to result in portions rushing upwards. However, experiencing explosive forces from below, then it becomes entirely plausible that portions of this suitcase would be found, perhaps substantial sections, in other Frankfurt luggage that was loaded directly on top and around it.
The Crown’s tangled web of deceit is threatening to strangle them.
BTW Rolfe, I did try and download Hayes/Feraday’s test results zip.file from your Lockerbie file page, but the file wouldn't open for me – on various devices.
I wonder too about these intensive efforts led by the Crown to uncover any new evidence in our new-found haven of safety nowadays, Libya. Well, perhaps they will uncover something that supports the Heathrow introduction with complicit Libyan involvement. And there’s seems little reason, and far fewer arguments, that can be offered to reject the incontrovertible evidence of a Heathrow introduction of the bomb that brought down Pan Am 103. Not that this would resolve the questions that remain over the initial investigation and evidence that was presented but contrived, or withheld and never offered to the court. It begs another question about the reasons for the, and I’ll be generous here, apparent ‘failings’ in the initial investigation. Other might not view any reasons quite so favourably.
So, hypothetically, allowing for hindsight and in light of the misdirection the investigation was ushered down, would the primary objective be to protect BAA and Heathrow airport’s reputation not being tarred with the disaster, or if at all possible, conjure a reason – read, some evidence – that would enable blame to be apportioned to Libya? I’d suggest the latter carried the greatest incentive, and although the former would have been uncomfortable for many in the Govt to explain, not to mention the BAA board of directors, if the evidence had indicated Libyan involvement at Heathrow, and had it ever existed, that would have been a bitter but politically (and militarily) acceptable line to follow. The closer you look, the earlier the evidence was being ignored, and people were just itching for things to point to North Africa rather than anywhere else, and especially not Persia. Had it really existed, ever, it would have been undoubtedly viewed as nothing short of manna from heaven, regardless of it’s origin.
It’s often muted that the investigators were just about ready to issue indictments in early/middle of 1989, with Abu Talb and associates, including those in Germany, at the top of that list. The evidence was substantial and plausible after the discoveries during Autumn Leaves. But where was the bag thought to have introduced at this point? The Brits were insisting there was nothing to see at Heathrow and the culprit was a Frankfurt bag, and the German’s were saying Khreesat’s device wouldn’t have got to Heathrow if loaded in Germany, while also keeping all their documentation behind their backs. So, where did the investigation think the bag was introduced at this stage? It has been claimed that a call between Thatcher and Bush around this time laid out the ‘new ground’ the investigation would take.
But was it even earlier than months? Was it in the hours, days and weeks immediately following 103’s fall from the sky?