Lockerbie: London Origin Theory

[Rolfe]

Anyway, what's the point in showing that "grey hardshell A" wasn't the second secondary suitcase, if all you've done is present PI/1549 as a new candidate for that role?

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

Please, read the transcript. It's about PI/1549, not about the other seven grey fragments.

Q. Dr Hayes, If you think it's possible that PI/1549 is from the IED suitcase, what is your opinion about the origin of the other grey fragments you've discribed in your report. Would it be possible that these fragments are also from the IED suitcase.
A. Well,... possibly....I don't know. We didn't perform Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry (IRMS) analysis to see if the grey plastic from the fragments is from the same source as the grey plastic from the IED suitcase. To be honest, we didn't perform any analysis at all. We just looked at the fragments and discribed them.
Q. Why didn't you perform these kind of analysis, dr Hayes.
A. Nobody asked us to do so, sir.

 

[Rolfe]

I did read the transcript. You're seeing something I'm missing, I think.

They didn't do anything other than describe what they saw visually, sometimes inaccurately or incompletely, and do a basic match-up to show which parts were bits of the same suitcase. More or less.

They didn't try to figure out where each case had been in relation to the bomb suitcase. If they realised that was Coyle case blasted all over the side of the Schauble case, they didn't say so. They don't seem to have been aware which cases were the ones Bedford loaded at Heathrow and which were the ones that came off the feeder flight. They don't seem to have been aware there was anything unusual or suspicious about the suitcase in the bottom left-hand position.

It's amateur hour. It's pathetic. They should have been strip-mining that evidence for all the inferences they could possibly have dragged out of it, but they didn't.

Your suggestions are in fact suggestions for solving level 10 of the puzzle. Neither the RARDE team nor the police nor the prosecution nor the defence got beyond level 2. Maybe level 3 in the case of the prosecution. Nobody had even got close to understanding the issues in the way that would be necessary to realise that what you are talking about would have been a good idea.

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

A case in which 270 people died, deserves level 12, I think.

 

[Rolfe]

Couldn't agree more.

Hayes had a bunch of other cases on his to-do list at the same time. Animal rights activists who were blowing up scientists' cars. Speaking as someone who was at that time considered to be in the firing line for that treatment, and who actually had the cops round giving advice on how not to get blown up like that, I'd still rather they had put such brain cells as they possessed into the service of the Lockerbie victims.

But then, you have to look at Hayes's record in particular as regards other cases. These people weren't impartial scientists. They saw it as their job to support the police case. Whether they screwed up Lockerbie all on their own initiative or because the police told them what was and wasn't supposed to be concluded from the analysis of the luggage, I don't know.

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

Deleted, sorry

 

[Rolfe]

Somebody needs to split the hairs, because it's blindingly obvious Feraday and his colleagues weren't doing that. I think you are the first person to pay any analytical attention to these orphan unidentified scraps.

Could you tell me where you are reading about PI/1215? Because I can't find any mention of it in the trial transcript.

As regards PI/1459, have you considered that some of the trim of the Samsonite appears to be grey plastic simulated leather with a smaller grain pattern than the main body of the suitcase? Did Hayes consider this?

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

Somebody needs to split the hairs, because it's blindingly obvious Feraday and his colleagues weren't doing that. I think you are the first person to pay any analytical attention to these orphan unidentified scraps.

Could you tell me where you are reading about PI/1215? Because I can't find any mention of it in the trial transcript.

As regards PI/1459, have you considered that some of the trim of the Samsonite appears to be grey plastic simulated leather with a smaller grain pattern than the main body of the suitcase? Did Hayes consider this?

Rolfe.

It is in Hayes notes. I think it is a fragment from another suitcase, not explosion damaged. Forget it.

According to Hayes notes PI/1549 seems to be grey laminated. Maybe he is wrong, but for the moment it's anomalous.

 

[Rolfe]

Do we know the grey fake leather trim on the Samsonite wasn't laminated, I ask myself?

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

A couple of questions, LittleSwan.

Regarding the numbering of the suitcase fragments, I noted earlier that the seven grey fragments nearly all fitted neatly into the numbering sequence of the smaller bits of the bomb suitcase. I thought this added to the weight of supposition that these grey fragments were part of the bomb suitcase. You've been examining these fragments in more detail. Is this a justified assumption?

If so, I note that PI/1549 also fits into that sequence. Again, would that tend to suggest that it's another bit of Samsonite Silhouette?

Second, a question I asked already. As regards PK/139, the lining panel from the Carlsson suitcase, my interpretation of this is that if there had been another suitcase on the floor of the container in front of that case, it would have protected the lining panel from the very severe charring evident in the photo. Is that reasonable? I really can't see how that would have charred like that if the blast had had to get through a floor-level suitcase.

That comment also applies to PD/899, the main chunk of the McKee case. If there was another case in front of that, under the bomb suitcase, why on earth would the worst of the damage have been so clearly at the bottom of the case extending right under the hinge end?

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

OK, this document is not defamatory, so I think I can ask openly in the forum for feedback.

www.vetpath.co.uk/lockerbie/luggage.pdf

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

Regarding the numbering of the suitcase fragments, I noted earlier that the seven grey fragments nearly all fitted neatly into the numbering sequence of the smaller bits of the bomb suitcase. I thought this added to the weight of supposition that these grey fragments were part of the bomb suitcase. You've been examining these fragments in more detail. Is this a justified assumption?

Yes, but the numbering sequence itself doesn't prove the fragments are from the IED suitcase.

Second, a question I asked already. As regards PK/139, the lining panel from the Carlsson suitcase, my interpretation of this is that if there had been another suitcase on the floor of the container in front of that case, it would have protected the lining panel from the very severe charring evident in the photo. Is that reasonable? I really can't see how that would have charred like that if the blast had had to get through a floor-level suitcase.

That comment also applies to PD/899, the main chunk of the McKee case. If there was another case in front of that, under the bomb suitcase, why on earth would the worst of the damage have been so clearly at the bottom of the case extending right under the hinge end?

It's reasonable. The damage to the Carlson case is most consistent with the 3rd position. The damage to the frame of the suitcase suggests that the IED suitcase was not lying flat on the floor.

 

[Rolfe]

Yes, but the numbering sequence itself doesn't prove the fragments are from the IED suitcase.

No, I know it doesn't prove it. However I think it shows it was stuff that was all found in more or less the same place or the same circumstances, which I think is suggestive. That was all.

It's reasonable. The damage to the Carlson case is most consistent with the 3rd position. The damage to the frame of the suitcase suggests that the IED suitcase was not lying flat on the floor.

If you and the RARDE guys are right about the explosion having been up to 5 cm into the overhang area, then it couldn't have been flat on the floor anyway. The left-hand side must have been elevated by at least 8 cm. That's the position I'm going with.

Conversely, if there was a suitcase below the bomb suitcase, surely it would have protected the bottom corners of these two cases? I can't see how the lining panel in the Carlsson case could possibly have been charred like that if there was another suitcase loaded flat against the bottom of the case.

Be a pal and read the pdf for me? Caustic Logic is working on improving the diagrams of the three positions at the moment.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

Well, I think that's it Rolfe.

The document illustrates precisely why, in consideration of all the evidence available, the suitcase seen by Bedford is unarguably the bag that contained the bomb that brought PA103 down.

Of course, much of this evidence was available to the investigation at the time and whether the subsequent apparent ignorance of this, and the lack of any determined analysis of the fragments of baggage recovered and each pieces relation to the explosion, implies monumental incompetence or deliberate obfuscation remains open to debate.

However, it might seem utterly untenable that in light of the determined efforts made by investigators in relation to other aspects of the investigation including the Toshiba radio, the Maltese clothing, the MST timer and flight KM180, that such a glaring sequence of critical pieces of evidence (mysterious introduction of a unknown suitcase in AVE4041, the break-in at T3, Sidhu and Henderson's evidence) can be attributed to simple incompetence.

By February 1989 the investigation were in possession of enough evidence that should have allowed them to concentrate enquiries on a possible/probable introduction of the bomb suitcase at Heathrow Airport. And yet, for some reason, they seemingly chose to wholly ignore and disregard all of this evidence.

Despite their best efforts to continue with this blinkered view of the tragedy and those who they claim was responsible for the bombing of PA103, the onus now lies with the Scottish govt to rectify the injustice served to not just those 270 souls that perished that night, but also the families of those that died, and to Megrahi and his family themselves.

Let's hope everyone doesn't need to wait for another 25 years.

 

[jargon buster]

And yet, for some reason, they seemingly chose to wholly ignore and disregard all of this evidence.

Now you just need to work out what that reason was.

 

[Rolfe]

Well, I think that's it Rolfe.

The document illustrates precisely why, in consideration of all the evidence available, the suitcase seen by Bedford is unarguably the bag that contained the bomb that brought PA103 down.

Seems to. I knew it was unarguable the minute I saw Sidhu's statement, but the rest of it certainly cements the conclusion.

The positioning of both of Michael Bernstein's cases is a bit odd, but then it's not necessarily reasonable to expect someone presumably wired to the moon in the process of setting up mass murder to do everything exactly as you'd expect.

The left-end-up position of the bomb suitcase is also slightly odd, which is maybe why they didn't get it. As LittleSwan said above, though, the condition of the Carlsson case supports that. Carlsson case damage is higher up than McKee case damage. Fancy being able to tell that much detail, but you actually can, once the arrangement of the suitcases is worked out.

LittleSwan said something a bit cryptic in a PM about experimental evidence illustrating that the bomb suitcase wasn't lying flat. Hopefully he will become a little less cryptic about that.

Of course, much of this evidence was available to the investigation at the time and whether the subsequent apparent ignorance of this, and the lack of any determined analysis of the fragments of baggage recovered and each pieces relation to the explosion, implies monumental incompetence or deliberate obfuscation remains open to debate.

Well, it was all available to the investigation. That's where I'm getting it from. I haven't been out scouring the Roxburghshire fields for extra bits.

It's the tenth, today. By my own rules I favour deliberate conspiracy on even-numbered days. Feraday, though, comes over as simply thick. I mean, all that rubbish about only two possible loading positions for the suitcase, and one of them was completely impossible according to the evidence he himself had access to and there was another perfectly possible position he obviously didn't think of. He comes over as a bear of very little brain, certainly on this aspect.

However, it might seem utterly untenable that in light of the determined efforts made by investigators in relation to other aspects of the investigation including the Toshiba radio, the Maltese clothing, the MST timer and flight KM180, that such a glaring sequence of critical pieces of evidence (mysterious introduction of a unknown suitcase in AVE4041, the break-in at T3, Sidhu and Henderson's evidence) can be attributed to simple incompetence.

I don't know. Blind spots happen. They were sitting there putting together AVE4041 jigsaw, and apparently doing it quite well. There's simply no sign that anyone even realised it was possible to put together suitcase jigsaw as well and get useful information out of it. I think if they had tried, we'd have evidence of them having tried.

It seems to me that they, like the detectives working on the same aspect, were hampered by not having been told about the nitty-gritty of Bedford's statements. The detectives at least appear to have known that the bottom-level suitcase was one of the ones loaded at Heathrow, but there's no sign anyone told them there was anything particularly suspicious about it.

They had all these suitcases and bits of suitcase, but there's no evidence they knew who owned any of them unless there were luggage labels on them. And even there, did they know who were the Frankfurt transfer passengers and who were the Heathrow interline passengers? It might have been difficult to know where to start without that.

Carlsson's case is interesting. The detectives couldn't get anyone to identify it as his, for absolutely ages. It's repeatedly hedged around with question marks in the baggage memos. There's a comment somewhere on the net about his girlfriend and his sister both declaring that what they were shown wasn't his. It's quite late on that the Presikhaaf is attributed to him, in Henderson's report, apparently identified by someone he had stayed with in Europe.

However, Carlsson's is the one case, of all of them, which can be positioned with 100% certainty from Bedford's evidence. We know exactly where it was, sitting upright almost immediately behind the IED. The minute you read Bedford's statement together with the flight arrivals data, you know that. Then last month when I finally saw that photo of the Presikhaaf, I could immediately see that's exactly where it had been. The direction it's been hit is unmistakeable. However, there's no note anywhere to suggest that anyone realised that. Complete absence of joined-up thinking.

By February 1989 the investigation were in possession of enough evidence that should have allowed them to concentrate enquiries on a possible/probable introduction of the bomb suitcase at Heathrow Airport. And yet, for some reason, they seemingly chose to wholly ignore and disregard all of this evidence.

Who is "they", though? Who knew about the details of Bedford's statement? Just the same people who knew about Manly's statement, and buried it? Dixon took the statements, but he had nothing to do with the case, he just passed them to Lockerbie. Who saw these statements at Lockerbie, and buried them in Holmes without the important details appearing in any of the briefing summaries that were given to the Scottish cops?

John Orr, Stuart Henderson, possibly Harry Bell. I guess.

Despite their best efforts to continue with this blinkered view of the tragedy and those who they claim was responsible for the bombing of PA103, the onus now lies with the Scottish govt to rectify the injustice served to not just those 270 souls that perished that night, but also the families of those that died, and to Megrahi and his family themselves.

Let's hope everyone doesn't need to wait for another 25 years.

We're right, they're powerful. That's the difficult bit at the moment. But, they work for us, when you really get down to it. We pay their wages. There are certain checks and balances associated with that.

As to why all this happened in early 1989, I can think of at least four possible reasons, but none of them seems adequate to explain what was done. On the other hand, calling it a blind spot is even less credible.

If it was nothing but incompetence, why was the Bedford and Manly evidence buried quite so effectively? Why did Andrew Hardie try to get Bedford to back down in 1990? What the hell was going on with that letter the Met sent to Teddy Taylor in 1996, saying that the Met had investigated and conclusively ruled out Heathrow? That was a complete pack of lies.

Not our problem, really. It was done. We know more or less who did it. It's up to an independent inquiry to find out why.

I'm a bit hazy about whether John Orr is still alive. There may be two John Orrs. Hmmm. You can't defame the dead. But you can't make them talk either.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm going to show off Caustic Logic's stellar new graphics here. The first one is a schematic of the arrangement of the Heathrow-loaded suitcases at the time the bomb went off.

These next ones show the three positions discussed for the bomb suitcase. They still need a tiny bit of work - the handles are showing when it should be the hinge ends, and he's going to add the two upright cases at the back to the third one. I'll replace the images when it's done. But even now, they show the situation very well.

Position 1 was apparently Feraday's preferred one, I suspect because it's the one that doesn't require the suitcase to have been packed asymmetrically. Though he may not have realised that - it may have been a subconscious prejudice he lacked the imagination to recognise and think around.

Impossible. The state of the Coyle case and the "compaction" of the plastic noted in PI/911 can't be achieved in this position. You can't even get the Coyle case flat against the bomb suitcase, never mind with a "relatively immoveable surface" behind it. Also, you can't get the locks anywhere near the Bernstein saddlebag (Bernstein-1 in the top schematic). The lock mechanism was on the corner of the bomb suitcase by the way, not in the middle by the handle. (Of course, that presupposes you know where the Bernstein saddlebag was loaded....)

Position 2 is the position they were pushing at Camp Zeist, which the judges accepted.

Note that this requires the suitcase under the bomb suitcase to be relatively thin. The 22 cm deep case in the diagram is a bit too deep for this to work. I believe the Coyle case was 25 cm deep.... If you go back to Bedford's and Sidhu's evidence, Sidhu in particular said the case he saw in that position was large and looked heavy.

Position 3 is the one supported by all the evidence, the one Feraday didn't think of.

Did the terrorist load it like that, using the Bernstein suit carrier to wedge it in place? Or did it slide up there in-flight when it got bumpy? I suppose we'll never know.

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

I haven't been out scouring the Roxburghshire fields for extra bits.

Well, that might be a good idea.

 

[Rolfe]

Well, the original recovery effort was pretty thorough. And it's nearly 25 years ago now. I think anything that hasn't come to light was probably well buried or hidden. Bottom of a loch or something. Actually, there's probably a fair bit of stuff in that category, and maybe 1% of it would be of evidential value if it was found.

The best place to look might be in woods. They couldn't get stuff that was caught in the canopy of the trees at the time. Much of that has probably come down by now. But it's a huge area and it was a long time ago.

Rolfe.

 

[LittleSwan]

One question.

How many holdalls you think were in the overhang?