Lockerbie: London Origin Theory

I think there was a swathe of tip-bits leaking out of the investigation during 1989, and undoubtedly some of this would have been someone, perhaps low-level in the investigation, hearing snippets here and there.

Johnston may well have had someone involved in the early part of the investigation who was privy to some of this kind of info. It was Johnston remember who earlier in '89 had, on his radio show, claimed that a bag belonging to a US agent on PA103 had been carrying the bomb. I think he'd heard about McKee's bag. Or his source had I should say.

This on air revelation resulted in a few Whitehall officials demanding to know where he'd obtained such info. Would he tell Thatcher herself if taken to Downing street I think he mentioned in TMDC.

So, just a few months later Johnston appears now to have sourced information with regards to Patricia Coyle and Karen Noonan's bags. From his same source perhaps? Given that it was public knowledge that the investigation was hunting a bomb suitcase, and someone inside the investigation was hearing about the damage sustained to Patricia's bag and Karen's clothing.

No wonder Johnston never provided an exclusive on his radio show about the other suitcase being examined due to its damage: a brown Samsonite suitcase, since neither the investigation, nor Johnston could attribute that bag to an actual passenger's name!

Hello.

Ah, so Sidhu was immediately after Bedford at the FAI. 3 days immediately after.
 
Bedford on Friday, Sidhu on Monday. There were other witnesses in between. Sahota was before Sidhu I think - I imagine they were moving chronologically through the events. I have the Monday transcript, but not the Friday one.

The Grauniad says Bedford said there were security bands round all the cases. That's the first time I've seen that information. It's not in any of his statements. It's an obvious thing to ask him, but it looks as if nobody bothered until the FAI. I'm still not even sure what these security thingies were. Stickers or bands? Though I do know they were just kept in a nearby drawer and anyone could have swiped a handful.

I think the fact that nothing ever leaked out about the Bedford suitcase during the first six months is one more thing that shows they didn't consider it at all.

Rolfe.
 
If you had spent as much time on establishing that Megrahi wasnt the one who planted the bomb as opposed to where the bomb was in the plane baggage hold then Im pretty sure you could have got him released years earlier.

PS, When was Megrahi last mentioned in this thread?
 
Last edited:
I wonder if you are deliberately misunderstanding, or simply leap in with an irrelevant coment when you've nothing better to do?

This thread is about the evidence for the Lockerbie bomb having been introduced into the baggage container at Heathrow airport between 4.15 and 4.45 on the afternoon of 21st December 1988. It's now moved on to discuss the police cover-up of this evidence, and the subsequent Crown cover-up of the police cover-up.

This has nothing at all to do with Megrahi, who was verifably in Tripoli between 4.15 and 4.45 on the afternoon of 21st December 1988.

Rolfe.
 
This has nothing at all to do with Megrahi, who was verifably in Tripoli between 4.15 and 4.45 on the afternoon of 21st December 1988.
Bingo.
Great then Megrahi couldnt have done it, we have verifiable evidence that it was impossible for him to have planted the bomb.

Now it begs the question, Why are you concerned about a suitcase sandwich?
Are you interested in clearing Megrahi or establishing who was responsible for the Lockerbie bombing?

They are two totally seperate issues.
I was under the impression your motives were to clear Megrahi, if you think you can establish who planted a bomb on the plane if it wasnt him via an internet forum then thats fine.
Good luck with it.
 
Last edited:
jargon buster, as you are well aware with your dealings with the FMOTL/OCPA folks, one can make a huge number of claims but it's the evidence that counts. Ergo, it is one thing to claim the bomb was introduced at Heathrow (thus clearing Megrahi), quite another to prove it.

The counter claim is that the bomb came in on the PA103A feeder flight from Frankfurt. To now that has been the explanation accepted by the courts. It take a lot of effort to overturn such an accepted explanation, even to the point where this thread is still in the "Conspiracy Theories" area along with 9/11 truthers and the FEMA death camps. Hence it's necessary to get into the minutia of baggage handling and loading procedures, what suitcases came in from where, and the damage patterns of individual suitcases in the aftermath of the explosion.

Rolfe and the Justice for Megrahi committee, with the support of people here at the JREF, are trying the equivalent of re-writing history. It can be done, but it's not easy.
 
Jargon Buster, I'm not responsible for your impressions. Maybe if you actually understood this thread rather than just jumping in and trolling occasionally, your impressions wouldn't be so off the mark.

Rolfe.
 
Ergo, it is one thing to claim the bomb was introduced at Heathrow (thus clearing Megrahi), quite another to prove it.


I think this is the part that hasn't quite been realised, possibly because my explanations still need work. It has been recognised as probable that the bomb was introduced at Heathrow for over ten years now, but because probable isn't the same thing as definitely, it was always possible for officialdom to ignore it.

Dredging up the evidence that was concealed from the court has shown that the bomb was introduced at Heathrow, to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. It requires special pleading of the parallel universe variety to claim otherwise, as Buncrana observed. This is the point that requires an airing in public.

Of course that evidence wasn't secret. Quite a lot of people were aware of it, but hadn't realised its significance. Putting already-existing peices in a new pattern takes time and effort.

The object of the exercise is to show that the Official Version for how Pan Am 103 came to fall out of the sky is wrong. The fact that that clears poor Megrahi is more of a by-product than anything else. It's not the reason for the investigation. Who actually did it? I think that's up to the police, as and when they finally realise they need to stop chasing shadows in Libya and Malta and figure out who was in London that day nearly 24 years ago.

Good luck with that.

Rolfe.
 
Last edited:
By the way, I think I realised why Orr said there were seven items in the container. This was late March 1989. The baggage handlers had established that there were seven items, in the reconstructions carried out in January. I don't think they realised as early as March just how the timing of the arriving flights affected whether luggage was in the container or not, or how the recovery position confirmed this.

Even assuming they had the details of the incoming flights pretty quickly (which I imagine they did), they had 17 interline passengers. They knew about the three cases that didn't go on the flight quite quickly too. I think it may have taken longer to establish for sure that a fair number of the passengers didn't check in any luggage. But even supposing they did know about that, there were still 11 potential interline suitcases.

Here's an updated version of the interline passenger table, in strict order of actual arrival according to the statement Buncrana identified.

Passenger | Flight | From | Landed | No of items
Nicola Hall|SA234|Johannesburg |06.46|1*
Bernt Carlsson|BA391|Brussels|11.06|1
Charles McKee|CY504|Larnaca|14.34|2
Matthew Gannon|CY504|Larnaca|14.34|1
Ronald LaRiviere|CY504|Larnaca|14.34|0
James Fuller|LH1628|Hannover|14.51|0
Louis Marengo|LH1628|Hannover|14.51|0
Gregory Kosmowski |BD777|Birmingham|15.07|0
Robert Fortune|BD108|Amsterdam|15.18|0
Elia Stratis|BD108|Amsterdam|15.18|0
Michael Bernstein|BA701|Vienna|15.35|2
Arnaud Rubin|BA395|Brussels|16.15|1
Joseph Curry|BA603|Pisa|16.21|2
Peter Peirce|BA603|Pisa|16.21|3*
James Stow|BA729|Geneva|16.34|0
Daniel O'Connor|CY1354 |Larnaca|16.43|1*
Richard Cawley|BA941|Dusseldorf|16.57|0
*three cases which didn't travel on PA103

Down as far as Bernstein is what was actually in the container. (They knew Nicola's case wasn't in it though.) Look at Rubin, though. His flight arrived too late for his case to go in the container, but that wouldn't have been immediately obvious. It was only gradually, as they figured there were five items loose-loaded at the last minute, and then of course that Rubin's suitcase had no explosives contamination and was found on the ground in the place where items from the rear of the plane ended up that Rubin's suitcase was classed with the too-late group.

It's possible nobody thought it through in as much detail as that while they were still doing the luggage reconciliation, but actually it would have been quite reasonable for Orr to have believed in the "seven cases" thing at that stage, based on the reconstructions. Henderson's report showing there were only six legitimate items probably wasn't compiled until a fair bit later. (This probably explains Mowat's "six or seven" comment, because Henderson had produced his report by then. Once again, one simply marvels that Mowat didn't get it.)

That still doesn't excuse the ignoring of the "mysterious appearance" and "brown Samsonite" parts by Orr in March though.

Rolfe.
 
Last edited:
I'm trying to get into Orr's mind in the first eight months or so of the inquiry, because I think he's the key person controlling the direction, and that's the period when things that could have should have gone right, went wrong. After 17th August or whenever the exact date was that they were shown Fuhl's original analysis of the Erac printout and the connection to KM180, we know what they were thinking.

Last week of December 1988 he's pretty confident the bomb was on the feeder flight, simply because it was in AVE4041.

First week of January 1989 Bedford's statement reveals there were suitcases from the interline shed on the bottom of the container, and that there was something funny about the provenance of the two at the front. No sign of Orr revising his earlier assessment.

Second week of January 1989, Bedford repeats his statement that the two cases at the front appeared while he was on his break. He also describes one or both as brown Samsonite hardshells. No sign of Orr revising his earlier assessment.

Late January 1989, baggage handlers carry out reconstruction of the container loading and all appear to agree there were seven items in it when it left the interline shed.

Continuing forensic examination of recovered luggage identified a number of blast-damaged suitcases and other bags. Mid-February 1989 Hayes notes that the "primary suitcase" appears to be a brown hardshell. (Not sure how soon they confirmed it was actually a Samsonite.)

Late March 1989 Orr announced that on the balance of probabilities the bomb was in the Frankfurt luggage, not one of the seven cases loaded in the interline shed. This was before Indian Head. He seems to have got the "seven cases" bit from the reconstruction exercise, as the reconciliation of the recovered baggage was not sufficiently advanced to have revealed there should only have been six items there. If anyone thought about it at all, they probably assumed Arnaud Rubin's case was in the container.

He seems to have got the "probably Frankfurt" from the observation that of the 14 blast-damaged cases identified at that stage, most of them were Frankfurt items. First, there were 25 blast-damaged items in the end, so 14 is early days. But second, that is a total non-sequitur. There were only a few Heathrow items, spread across the bottom of the container, and the blast was at the interface between the Heathrow and Frankfurt layers. The proportion of Frankfurt and Heathrow items in the blast-damaged category is irrelevant to the issue. (If the blast had been a lot higher and all the blast-damaged items had been of Frankfurt origin it would have been a slam-dunk, but not in the situation that actually pertained.)

April 1989, the forensics guys go to Indian Head and blow up stuff in a way almost as unlike what happened to PA103 as they can manage. Five trial containers, all different, only one with the bomb on the floor and that test went wrong. Anyone who thinks that was conclusive is kidding themselves. It appears to be an exercise in getting the desired result.

Also April 1989, the BKA find the remainder of Khreesat's bomb stash, screw up (again), and Sonntag is killed. They figure out more about Khreesat's triggering devices, and realise that one of his bombs would have had to have been loaded at Heathrow. They come back to Orr et al. and urge serious consideration of a Heathrow loading.

Feraday takes a look at this and comes up with nine possible ways a Khreesat device could have been loaded at Frankfurt and still exploded over Lockerbie. The favoured one seems to be a malfunction on the feeder flight, which is fairly senseless. On this basis the Germans are sent away with a flea in their ear. How this reasoning excludes a Heathrow loading is never explained.

The assessment that the bomb was on the second layer never seems to have been conclusive, merely a balance of probabilities and "best guess" sort of thing. You can't just ignore something as suspicious as what Bedford saw on the basis of a balance of probabilities. But they did.

"Pay no attention to that brown Samsonite behind the curtain!"

Rolfe.
 
Last edited:
Rolfe, I'm adding comments to your latest post from the point of view of someone coming late to the thread, and why these people can find this thread very confusing. Although I'm not sure what can be done to reduce said confusion.

I'm trying to get into Orr's mind in the first eight months or so of the inquiry, because I think he's the key person controlling the direction, and that's the period when things that could have should have gone right, went wrong. After 17th August or whenever the exact date was that they were shown Fuhl's original analysis of the Erac printout and the connection to KM180, we know what they were thinking.
Orr: I'm assuming he's the lead investigator.
17 August: That would be August 1989?

Last week of December 1988 he's pretty confident the bomb was on the feeder flight, simply because it was in AVE4041.

First week of January 1989 Bedford's statement reveals there were suitcases from the interline shed on the bottom of the container, and that there was something funny about the provenance of the two at the front. No sign of Orr revising his earlier assessment.

Second week of January 1989, Bedford repeats his statement that the two cases at the front appeared while he was on his break. He also describes one or both as brown Samsonite hardshells. No sign of Orr revising his earlier assessment.

Late January 1989, baggage handlers carry out reconstruction of the container loading and all appear to agree there were seven items in it when it left the interline shed.

Continuing forensic examination of recovered luggage identified a number of blast-damaged suitcases and other bags. Mid-February 1989 Hayes notes that the "primary suitcase" appears to be a brown hardshell. (Not sure how soon they confirmed it was actually a Samsonite.)
Who's Hayes?

Late March 1989 Orr announced that on the balance of probabilities the bomb was in the Frankfurt luggage, not one of the seven cases loaded in the interline shed. This was before Indian Head. He seems to have got the "seven cases" bit from the reconstruction exercise, as the reconciliation of the recovered baggage was not sufficiently advanced to have revealed there should only have been six items there. If anyone thought about it at all, they probably assumed Arnaud Rubin's case was in the container.
Was it?

He seems to have got the "probably Frankfurt" from the observation that of the 14 blast-damaged cases identified at that stage, most of them were Frankfurt items. First, there were 25 blast-damaged items in the end, so 14 is early days. But second, that is a total non-sequitur. There were only a few Heathrow items, spread across the bottom of the container, and the blast was at the interface between the Heathrow and Frankfurt layers. The proportion of Frankfurt and Heathrow items in the blast-damaged category is irrelevant to the issue. (If the blast had been a lot higher and all the blast-damaged items had been of Frankfurt origin it would have been a slam-dunk, but not in the situation that actually pertained.)

April 1989, the forensics guys go to Indian Head and blow up stuff in a way almost as unlike what happened to PA103 as they can manage. Five trial containers, all different, only one with the bomb on the floor and that test went wrong. Anyone who thinks that was conclusive is kidding themselves. It appears to be an exercise in getting the desired result.
That or just screwing up.

Also April 1989, the BKA find the remainder of Khreesat's bomb stash, screw up (again), and Sonntag is killed. They figure out more about Khreesat's triggering devices, and realise that one of his bombs would have had to have been loaded at Heathrow. They come back to Orr et al. and urge serious consideration of a Heathrow loading.
BKA? First time I've encountered this.In context it appears to be a non-British intelligence or police unit, probably German. (Definitely German, see next paragraph.)

Feraday takes a look at this and comes up with nine possible ways a Khreesat device could have been loaded at Frankfurt and still exploded over Lockerbie. The favoured one seems to be a malfunction on the feeder flight, which is fairly senseless. On this basis the Germans are sent away with a flea in their ear. How this reasoning excludes a Heathrow loading is never explained.
Feraday? Up to now the focus has been on Orr. (I agree on the strange rationalisations put forward as to why an atmospheric trigger would not have exploded between Frankfurt and London, but worked when the plane took off from London.)

The assessment that the bomb was on the second layer never seems to have been conclusive, merely a balance of probabilities and "best guess" sort of thing. You can't just ignore something as suspicious as what Bedford saw on the basis of a balance of probabilities. But they did.

"Pay no attention to that brown Samsonite behind the curtain!"

Rolfe.
(No further comments on the contents of the post.)

A general question about the bombing: do we know if PA103 was specifically targeted? If so, that would require the bomber at Heathrow to target that particular interline shed, have a lucky break on a slow day when the loader disappears to go for tea, and slip the bomb suitcase unnoticed into an almost empty container.

If it wasn't specifically targeted, did the bomber get lucky in putting the suitcase into a transatlantic flight? Or was that area of Heathrow for such flights, so putting a bomb into a luggage container would be certain to get an international flight?
 
Last edited:
Rolfe, I'm adding comments to your latest post from the point of view of someone coming late to the thread, and why these people can find this thread very confusing. Although I'm not sure what can be done to reduce said confusion.


Fair enough. Some of this is in that pdf document, actually.

Orr: I'm assuming he's the lead investigator.
17 August: That would be August 1989?


At the beginning, Detective Chief Inspector John Orr was head of the Lockerbie investigation. In the later stages it was a different senior cop called Stuart Henderson. (Not to be confused with Detective Constable Derek Henderson who did the final report into the baggage reconciliation. There are at least two Gilchrists in there as well, just to confuse everyone further.)

17th August 1989 (or close to it) was the day when the BKA, the German cops, finally showed the Scottish cops Bogomira Erac's souvenir printout of the luggage loading for PA103A, which contained an entry that could be linked to KM180, the flight from Malta they decided had carried the bomb. After that they headed for the Med and never looked back.

Who's Hayes?


Thomas Hayes, PhD, head of the labs at RARDE in the early part of the investigation. Looked at a lot of the recovered debris single-handed, and made his notes on loose-leaf paper. Was one of the scientists heavily criticised by the May report into the IRA bombing miscarriages of justice; I think he was instrumental in getting the Maguire Seven put away on false evidence. He "retired" from RARDE in late 1989 and retrained as a chiropodist. Go figure.



No. It got in too late. However, it's almost certain the investigators didn't know that in early 1989. There were 11 cases could potentially have been in the container, but the baggage handlers said seven were actually in there. It might have been quite a few months before Derek Henderson figured out that in fact there were only six legitimate bags in there and the other five (starting with Rubin's) had been loaded elsewhere.

That or just screwing up.


The mood music coming out of RARDE is very very suggestive of people who know that "bomb on second layer" is the required answer.

BKA? First time I've encountered this.In context it appears to be a non-British intelligence or police unit, probably German. (Definitely German, see next paragraph.)


Bundeskriminalamt. The West German police force.

Feraday? Up to now the focus has been on Orr. (I agree on the strange rationalisations put forward as to why an atmospheric trigger would not have exploded between Frankfurt and London, but worked when the plane took off from London.)


Allen Feraday, another RARDE "scientist", who took over from Hayes as head when he retired. He only had an ONC or something and really wasn't the expert he's often touted as being. RARDE seem to have been rather inclined to produce the results the police wanted, shall we say. q.v. the Maguire Seven and a few other cases.

A general question about the bombing: do we know if PA103 was specifically targeted? If so, that would require the bomber at Heathrow to target that particular interline shed, have a lucky break on a slow day when the loader disappears to go for tea, and slip the bomb suitcase unnoticed into an almost empty container.

If it wasn't specifically targeted, did the bomber get lucky in putting the suitcase into a transatlantic flight? Or was that area of Heathrow for such flights, so putting a bomb into a luggage container would be certain to get an international flight?


No idea, really. It's usually assumed the bomber wanted to target a transatlantic flight full of Americans, but that's about it.

The interline shed was arranged by airline, and every afternoon all afternoon the only remaining Pan Am flight was 103. That container habitually hung around there all afternoon having odd bits and pieces put into it at irregular intervals. Let's just say the staff were a bit underemployed in the afternoons.

If the bomber knew about that container, and the fact that it was habitually there, it was an absolute gift. It's possible someone on the inside at Heathrow supplied the information. There were staff from all airlines and of all nationalities in and out of there all the time.

I think the bomber was lucky in finding the container unattended, however I suspect plan B was to present the suitcase for x-ray, hope the radio-cassette player didn't trip any alarm bells, and then put it in the container. Assuming the bomber was dressed in the overalls of a baggage handler from another airline.

That's pure supposition though. There was no police inquiry into the possibility of that happening, so we don't know what they'd have found if they'd investigated.

Rolfe.
 
(This article is not available online - fully reproduced here from a document viewer in interests of public debate.)

The Sunday Times (London) said:
December 17 1989, Sunday

Lockerbie - the final reckoning; Air disaster

BYLINE: DAVID LEPPARD and NICK RUFFORD

SECTION: Issue 8627.

LENGTH: 3472 words

The first big clue was so tiny it could have been blown away in a breeze. It might well have remained hidden for ever, or been cast aside as insignificant.
But from the moment, three weeks into the Lockerbie inquiry, a policeman picked up a little piece of printed circuit board which had fallen on to the floor from a shattered luggage pallet, investigators were on their way to solving the mystery of who had carried out the biggest act of mass murder on British territory.


The discovery happened as they were painstakingly reassembling the fuselage of flight 103, the PanAm jumbo jet blown to pieces on December 21 last year over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people.

It was a crucial piece of evidence in what has become the biggest international criminal investigation of all time, a trail that has stretched across three continents and 52 countries.

It has involved more than 5,000 British police, dozens of American FBI officials, the German federal police, forces in Sweden and Malta, and Western and Middle East intelligence agencies. The British inquiry alone has cost Pounds 7.75m.

The trail began with the piecing together of millions of tiny pieces of debris from 845 square miles of Scottish countryside, some collected from as far as 80 miles away along the east coast of England. If the explosion had occurred just minutes later, vital clues would have fallen into the sea and been lost forever.

The wreckage was taken to a huge hangar at the Ministry of Defence's central army depot at Longtown, near Carlisle. It was here that the crucial piece of circuit board was found.

ALL POLICE work is a combination of dogged determination and flashes of insight, and the Lockerbie investigation has had both in good measure. That the investigation was masterminded by the Dumfries and Galloway police, Britain's smallest force, was initially criticised by the intelligence community. But it was the plodding work of these men, allied to the brilliance of Alan Feraday, Britain's foremost forensics expert that laid the basis for success.

Feraday works with a small team at the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment at Fort Halstead, near Sevenoaks, Kent. He has spent 34 years studying the murderous consequences of bomb attacks, and for the past decade has been at the forefront of the secret fight against terrorism. It is his experience of IRA bombs that has provided him and his team with the skill of identifying bombers from the debris of their outrages.

Because of the sensitivity of his work, Feraday's own life is shrouded in mystery. He travels to work in a hire car which he changes each week. He lives with his wife somewhere in the Home Counties but even some of his closest colleagues do not know where.

(For these security reasons, The Sunday Times has decided not to publish Feraday's picture.)

It was his forensic work that helped police trap the IRA gang that killed 11 people with a bomb in Hyde Park in July 1982.

Lockerbie was, however, his greatest challenge to date: to piece together an elaborate jigsaw through the most extensive and detailed forensic work ever carried out. It was to Feraday that the Scottish police sent the tiny scrap of scorch-marked circuit board.

Nobody doubted that a bomb had destroyed flight 103 but Feraday's first job was to show how it had been done. The force of an explosion had lodged the fragment of circuit board in a corner of the pallet's framework. Feraday sent detectives to Japan to discover where the fragment had come from. They struck lucky at the headquarters of the Toshiba Corporation in Tokyo. It had belonged to a Toshiba 8016 radio cassette player.

Back in Britain, Feraday's men were at work on the luggage pallet. They found tiny traces of the high explosive materials known as Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (PETN) and RDX, cyclonite.

These are the two constituents of Semtex-H, a high performance plastic explosive produced by a company called Synthesia in Pardubia, a small town near Semtin in Czechoslovakia.

Semtex-H is supposed to be used exclusively for mining, quarrying and civil engineering. But because it is odourless, lightweight, easy to conceal, malleable and extremely powerful, it has become a favoured weapon of terrorists.

In months of similar, painstaking work, the Feraday team began to discover more blast-damaged bits of wreckage. There were the scorch marks on pieces of a loudspeaker grille, for instance further confirmation that the bomb had been in a radio.

By February, Feraday was sure that the Toshiba had contained 350 to 400 grammes of Semtex-H. The next task was to discover the suitcase that had contained the bomb, and where it had been placed in the cargo hold. Only then would they know at which airport the bomb had been placed on the plane and have any hope of finding the culprits.

GUIDED by signs of scorching the police eventually gathered 27 parts of a suitcase, including one piece as small as a fingertip, from a five-mile-square area at the centre of the search for debris. On one piece of blast-damaged material, Feraday detected a faint roseate pattern. Matching this by chemical analysis with a piece of golden brown plastic, he then identified the suitcase lock, which had been recovered more or less intact.

Feraday concluded that the suitcase which had contained the bomb was made by Samsonite.

Staff at Samsonite's headquarters in Denver, Colorado, confirmed the model was a copper-coloured System4 Samsonite Silhouette 4000.

So far Feraday had identified the bomb and knew the type of suitcase: now he had to discover where it had been placed in the plane. That could only be discovered by blowing up jumbo jets with similar bombs in similar suitcases. In all, he needed 10 jumbo jets. He turned for help to the FBI, which organised an astonishing series of test explosions at an American naval base.

Feraday built 10 real bombs, each similar to the one used over Lockerbie. They were exploded inside the cargo hold of old jumbo jets which had been packed with luggage in a copycat version of PanAm 103. The tests showed that the Samsonite suitcase had been placed in luggage on pallet number AVE 4041 at station 14L, on the port side of the fuselage.

That pallet had contained luggage from Frankfurt along with luggage 'interlined' from other flights into Heathrow from other airports, such as Cyprus and Paris.

The exact centre of the explosion was 35cm from the floor of the container, and 50cm from its open side. Feraday knew, therefore, that the Samsonite case must have been on the second layer of luggage, away from the outer skin of the pallet. It was that conclusion, probably the most brilliant piece of forensic detective work in the inquiry that pointed the investigation in the direction of one airport Frankfurt. Either the bomb originated there or it had come from another flight into Frankfurt, and been transferred to flight 103.

Among the debris from the crash stored at the huge warehouse which acted as the Lockerbie property store, police had recovered a pair of man's pyjamas, a man's jacket and two pairs of trousers. They appeared an unexceptional assortment of passenger luggage. But they all showed the tell-tale scorch marks, and fibres from this clothing matched those fused into the inner lining of the Samsonite case.

Feraday was particularly curious about two items. One was a blue cotton Babygro babysuit labelled Malta Trading Company. Officers had already been to Malta to interview the makers of the babysuit. But the Babygro was sold at dozens of outlets throughout Europe and it was impossible to trace the purchaser.

Another clue was a pair of blast-damaged chequered trousers labelled Yorkie Trading Company 0005. But the whereabouts of Yorkie was a mystery. It was not until another remarkable breakthrough by the police several months later that the true significance of these items was to emerge.

WHILE Feraday was working away at Fort Halstead, the 88 officers carrying out the police inquiry under Detective Chief Superintendent John Orr, who had been co-opted from his job as joint head of Strathclyde CID, were still struggling for leads.

Inquiries at Frankfurt airport, Heathrow, Cyprus and in 50 other countries had still failed to ascertain three basic facts. How, where and by whom had the Toshiba bomb been put on board?

Newspaper reporters, unaware of Feraday's work, began to write stories that the inquiry was grinding to a halt for lack of evidence. Although angrily denied by senior Lockerbie officers, privately many detectives began to feel demoralised. Their inquiry seemed to be in danger of petering out.

WHAT was not made public at the time was the fact that the British police were at odds with their German counterparts, who refused to admit that the bomb had slipped through Frankfurt security. Yet the Germans had themselves discovered the strongest evidence to link the bomb to Frankfurt airport.

Their information undisclosed at the time to the British stemmed from a series of raids in October 1988 on flats in Frankfurt and Neuss, part of an operation codenamed Herbslaub, or Autumn Leaves.

Israeli intelligence had tipped off the Germans about the movements of Palestinian extremists whose target was thought to be an Israeli handball team on tour in Europe.

They identified a man called Hafez Dalkamoni, 44, of unknown nationality. However, it was known that he was in charge of the European section of the Syrian-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Dalkamoni, it would later emerge, was at the centre of a complex network of three Palestinian families, some of whom lived in Uppsala, Sweden.

In early autumn, officers from the German federal police, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), began observing Dalkamoni's flat in Isarstrasse and photographing his meetings. On October 13, he was joined in Frankfurt by a middle-aged Jordanian also well known in international intelligence circles, Marwan Khreesat. He was a veteran bomb-maker with a history of attacks on civilian aircraft.

Khreesat travelled to Germany on the instructions of Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the PFLP-GC, to lend his bomb-making expertise. While under surveillance, the men mingled with the crowds of shoppers in Kaufhalle, a busy shopping mall in Neuss, buying batteries, switches and glue. From another department store they bought mechanical and digital clocks.

It was also clear from intercepted telephone conversations that a big event was being planned. One call from Khreesat, believed to refer to the design of the bomb, said: 'I've made some changes to the medication. It's better and stronger than before.'

The German police became concerned that things might have been running out of control and decided to act. On October 26, they raided 12 apartments in six German states. In one, in Frankfurt, they found an arsenal which included an anti-tank gun, mortars, rifle grenades and five kilos of plastic explosive.

The German police arrested both Khreesat, the bomb-maker, and Dalkamoni, in Neuss. Inside their car, a green Ford Taunus, they discovered a Toshiba radio cassette player packed with explosive. Significantly, it also contained a barometric device designed to trigger at altitude.

What followed was either a display of startling ineptitude by the German authorities, or a complex and sinister conspiracy which misfired. The answer to this question will never be known, but its consequences were disastrous.

Khreesat was held for only two weeks and released, despite an international warrant for his arrest for the El Al bombing in 1972.

Officially, it was claimed there was insufficient evidence on which to hold him. But the conspiracy theory suggests that Khreesat was a double agent and had tipped off the German police in the first place. Khreesat vanished and is now in Jordan. Dalkamoni, however, was charged with the bombing of military trains carrying American troops.

German police were delighted with their operation and thought they had foiled a terrorist attack. But they had overlooked a vital piece of information. Khreesat had disclosed that he had built not just the one bomb found in the Ford Taunus, but five. It was not until April, following an anonymous tip-off, that the German police raided the basement of the fruit and vegetable shop in Neuss belonging to Dalkamoni's brother-in-law. Inside they found two radio tuners and, afterwards, a television monitor.

The items were not immediately identified as bombs and were left unattended for several days on a desk at BKA headquarters in Mechenheim. One later exploded while it was being examined, killing a German bomb disposal officer.

It was not until February this year that a report on operation Autumn Leaves was finally given to the Scottish police. It contained a detailed description of the bombs, the bomb-makers and the terrorist cell. But buried in its pages was a fact which was to prove more significant still to the investigators. The German police, during their surveillance of Dalkamoni, had noted a white Volvo with a Swedish numberplate outside his flat.

The driver, who was arrested, later confessed to running an illegal aliens racket. His name was Mohammed Al-Moghrabi. His sister, Jamila, came from a family of Palestinian terrorists ..and she was married to a Palestinian terrorist living in Sweden, Muhamed Abu Talb.

THE British police's anger at German unhelpfulness turned into a fury on August 16 with the unannounced arrival at the Lockerbie incident control centre of a parcel from the BKA headquarters in Meckenheim.

It contained a computerised baggage loading list of all passenger bags put aboard PanAm 103A, the first leg of the flight at Frankfurt. The Scottish police had asked for this information in January only to be told first that it was not available and then that it had been destroyed. Eight months later they had the information that married up with the mystery Babygro and the check trousers.

In any investigation of this nature 'unaccompanied' baggage is of prime importance. The list showed that a bag had been transferred on to the American jet from Air Malta flight KM180 which had left Valletta at 8.50am on the day of the disaster. Yet none of the 39 passengers on the Malta flight had transferred with it. Attached to the list was a BKA report dated February 12.

'We were absolutely staggered, ' one British security source said. 'The list was obviously a crucial piece of evidence. Hundreds of thousands of pounds of taxpayers money have been spent sending officers all over the world carrying out needless inquiries when all the time the Germans knew we should be looking at Malta.'

At the beginning of September Detective Chief Inspector Harry Bell flew to Malta to ask Malta Trading Company for a list of all Babygro outlets on the island. In his briefcase Bell carried photographs of all the items which Feraday had linked to the suitcase bomb.

Malta Trading is based on the San Gwaan industrial estate. There, quite by chance, Bell noticed a sign outside another factory. It read: Yorkie Industrial Clothing. The mystery surrounding the check trousers was over. Bell showed a picture of the trousers labelled 0005 to Alex Calleja, Yorkie's director, who confirmed his factory had made them. The number 0005, he said, meant they were fifth in a batch of five he had recently made. Calleja told Bell he had sold them to Tony Gauci, who runs a small boutique called Mary's House in Tower Road, Sliema.

Bell drove immediately to Tower Road, walked briskly into the shop and introduced himself. Gauci recognised the picture of the trousers and agreed he had bought them from Yorkie.

But could he recall his customer and when he bought them? Gauci remembered well: it was at the end of November last year, and the man was of Libyan appearance in his forties, well dressed, clean-shaven and with a swarthy complexion.

He seemed to buy the clothes indiscriminately. Gauci said that in addition to the chequered trousers he had sold the man a blue Babygro, a pair of pyjamas, another pair of trousers, and an old jacket which he had been trying to get rid of for years. As he was about to leave the man saw that it was raining and asked to buy an umbrella.

Back in Scotland, five umbrellas had been recovered from the Lockerbie debris. Until that moment the police had not taken any real notice of them. But after hearing from Bell they were re-examined. One of them showed signs of blast damage. It was taken immediately to Fort Halstead and within hours Feraday was able to prove that fibres of the blue cotton Babygro had been fused into it. Gauci's story was confirmed.

When Bell returned to Scotland later that week the entire 88-strong Lockerbie investigation team was hastily assembled for his briefing. The team, he told them, now had their strongest link so far to the bombers. They had a witness, immediately put under armed guard, who would be prepared to identify a man who was irrevocably linked, through the clothes, to the bomb. If they could find that man, and persuade him to talk, they would be in a position to identify and find the Lockerbie bombers.

THE Maltese connection was to prove interesting for another reason. Scottish officers discovered that a PPLP-GC cell was operating from a front company called Miska Trading, which owned a bakery on the island. Intelligence reports showed that members of Dalkamoni's cell in Germany had frequently visited the bakery.

At the same time officers had begun to unravel a complex network to link the German bomb flat with a group of suspected terrorists who had been rounded up in Uppsala, Sweden.

Even before Lockerbie, the BKA (German police) and SAPO (Swedish police) had been running a joint operation aimed at arresting two terror cells in their respective countries. The link between the two countries was Mohammed Al-Moghrabi, previously arrested in Frankfurt as part of operation Autumn Leaves.

German intelligence reports showed that Moghrabi, one of a family of Palestinians with a long track record of terrorist outrages, had stayed with Dalkamoni at the flat at the same time as Khreesat had been building his Toshiba radio bomb. He had driven there in car belonging to Marten Imandi. Imandi was standing trial with Moghrabi's brother-in-law, Abu Talb, on terror charges in Stockholm.

Examining the SAPO files Lockerbie detectives discovered that Talb had visited Malta between October 19 and 26. An interview with Jamilla, Talb's 28-year-old former wife, revealed that he had travelled to Malta 'to buy clothes'.

The SAPO file also refers to an air ticket from Malta to Stockholm recovered after a police raid on Talb's Uppsala flat on May 18. The ticket was dated November 26. It indicated that Talb was on the island when the clothes were bought from Tony Gauci on November 23, 1988.

The trail to Talb was so strong that exactly one year later, on November 23, 1989, the Lockerbie team applied through the Swedish foreign office for a warrant to raid Talb's apartment. When the warrant was executed a week later police seized more than 200 items of clothing. These included a large batch of clothes which had been bought in Malta. They have now been flown to the island where Tony Gauci, the boutique owner, is examining them to see if Talb had been in his shop.

When the application was made in court to remove the clothes from the country, Talb was formally named as a suspect 'in the murder or participation in the murder of 270 people'.

A detailed examination of the PFLP-GC cell in Germany and its links to a cell in Malta and the suspected Palestinian terrorists in Sweden has convinced the Scottish police that the conspirators will be found among those groups.

Tomorrow, in a stark interview room at a high security prison somewhere in the south of Sweden, Scottish detectives will quiz Talb about the bombing for the first time.

They have left the interview with Talb until the last possible moment, just three days before he is due to hear the verdict of his trial for bomb outrages on American and Israeli targets in Scandanavia and Holland. He and the three other men charged with him will hear that verdict on the very day one year ago that flight 103 fell out of the sky.

'We have cracked about 80% of this case, ' one security source said last week. 'But the remaining 20% is one big black hole.' Alan Feraday, Harry Bell and the rest of the Lockerbie team are hoping that, tomorrow, Talb will finally fill in that hole.

Additional reporting by Lars Persson in Stockholm, Mark Whittet in Glasgow, and Helen Davidson in London.


I make no apology for posting that whole article as it appeared in the week leading to the first anniversary of the Lockerbie disaster.

It’s a fascinating and compelling account of the Lockerbie investigations progress for a number of reasons. Not least as the co-writer of this piece, David Leppard, was to later pen his own account of PA103, On the Trail of Terror (April 1991).

Leppard, as clearly suggested in this article, has his own inside-line to the heart of the investigation, where a close relationship has developed between the writer and Allan Fereday, forensic ‘scientist’, working for RARDE. However the article is curious for a few strange inaccuracies contained especially in light of this cozy relationship between ‘crime-writer and crime-fighter’.

These early confusions could perhaps be simply oversights, misinterpretations, and then relayed by the writer or some details have not been explained clearly by the investigator to Leppard. First there seems a little confusion as to how AG145, the fragment of circuit board that fell out from behind the AVE4041 identification plate, was discovered. This fragment, determined from a Toshiba radio, was actually found by Thomas Claiden of the AAIB, not a policeman as stated.

The fragment from the timer PT35 that was apparently found in a badly damaged shirt-collar, was however discovered by a policeman.

At the time of this article however, the full knowledge of origin of PT35, being from MEBO and part of an exclusive Libyan order, remained unknown and its origin was still being hunted by investigators, even although Fereday had had the damn thing sitting in his lab 7months of 1989! Nevertheless, it was only in September ’89, allegedly, that Fereday thought PT35 could have some bearing on the PA103 explosion. Therefore come this article by Leppard it had not yet been identified. Perhaps that’s the simple explanation of the confusion.

I also note that at this point Leppard makes reference to, obviously elicited from Fereday’s examinations, the estimations made with regards to the position of explosive device. “The exact centre of the explosion was 35cm from the floor of the container, and 50cm from its open side.” That’s approximately 13.5 inches from the container floor, and 20 inches from the outer side, which again is somewhat different from the initial estimations made by Fereday – and the AAIB – and distances which was subject of some discussion at the Zeist trial.

More interestingly however, while listing the incredible forensic discoveries made by Fereday, I note that Leppard alerts his readers to the actual model of the Toshiba radio used in the explosion: “It had belonged to a Toshiba 8016 radio cassette player.”

This is no less than eight months after Fereday, according to his notes on pages 51-56, was sifting throught the various pieces of black fragments of radio and speaker mesh, and he had already got his hands on not just the Toshiba RT-SF16 manual, but had also ordered the control sample in order to make the comparisons.

I quote the timeline, taken from the various witnesses’ testimonies at Zeist, provided by Caustic Logic:

LockerbieDivide said:
•June 18: DI Williamson claims in a letter to SIO Henderson that Feraday discovered the ”potentially most important” PT/30 this day examining PK/2128 [Leppard 207] Either way, it was shown to fit the same Toshiba board as AG/145 did (all labeled together in a prosecution photo). Clearly RT-SF16.
•June 30: Feraday notes: "On the 30th of June 1989, some explosively damaged paper fragments [PK/689] were received at this laboratory, thus conclusively establishing which of the seven models of the Toshiba radio had been employed in the Lockerbie bomb.” He meant May 11. “It's a mistake that I made when I wrote the reports," he explained under questioning, "because sometimes items would come and go to the laboratory several times.”



So, yet another simple mistake? This time regarding the actual model of radio used? Or, as some might have inferred, none of those discoveries made regrading the identification of the Toshiba RT-16SF actually took place at that time in May and June 1989 (along with the much disputed PT35b, the shirt collar etc etc) and that page 51-56 were re-integrated into the notebook by Fereday at some later point other than the May and June 1989 that the notes now showed?
 
Last edited:
Sorry, that above post is in the wrong thread! :o

Still, another article to mull over.

Los Angeles Times said:
January 17, 1989, Tuesday, Orange County P.M. Final

WORLD;
BOMB POSITION LOCATED ON JET

BYLINE: From Times staff and wire service reports

SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 1; Late Final Desk

LENGTH: 157 words

DATELINE: LOCKERBIE, Scotland

Police investigating the bombing of a Pan Am jetliner last month that killed 270 people said today they have identified the baggage compartment where the explosive was hidden, information that would reveal when it was planted.

Authorities also know the names of passengers aboard Flight 103 whose luggage was packed in the baggage container and their backgrounds will be checked, police said.

But Detective Chief Supt. John Orr refused to say if the plastic explosive was smuggled on board in Frankfurt, West Germany, where the Pan American World Airways flight originated, or at London's Heathrow Airport, where the flight and baggage changed planes to a Boeing 747.

"I may have an indication as to where the baggage . . . came from but I don't think it would be helpful here at this time to be specific about it," said Orr, who heads the inquiry in the Scottish village of Lockerbie where the plane fell from the sky Dec. 21.



The New York Times said:
January 18, 1989, Wednesday, Late City Final Edition

Luggage Holder in Pan Am Bombing Found

BYLINE: By STEVE LOHR, Special to the New York Times

SECTION: Section A; Page 5, Column 1; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 401 words

DATELINE: LONDON, Jan. 17


The police investigating the explosion that destroyed a Pan Am Boeing 747 over Scotland last month said today that they had identified the luggage container in which the bomb was placed.

They said the luggage container, recovered from 10,000 items of debris found by crews searching the Scottish countryside, could be an important clue in solving the disaster, which killed 259 people on the plane and 11 on the ground on Dec. 21.

Identifying the luggage carrier and its location in the plane should help the police determine where the bomb was put on Flight 103, the group of passengers whose luggage contained the bomb, and which baggage handlers were most likely to have had access to that luggage, the police said.

''We have now identified the baggage container within the aircraft in which the explosive device was placed and substantial forensic and reconstructive work is being undertaken in this regard,'' said Detective Chief Superintendent John Orr, who is heading the police inquiry.

Detective Chief Orr said the investigation was making ''good progress,'' but he declined to say more about the container that held the bomb, including where it was on the plane or where it had been loaded.

The Pan Am flight started in Frankfurt on a Boeing 727 and its passengers transferred to the jumbo jet in London, where they were joined by additional passengers, all flying to New York.

Detective Chief Orr, who made today's announcement at a news conference in Lockerbie, the Scottish town where much of the airliner debris landed, was joined for the first time by a member of the West German police.

His presence fed speculation that investigators were now focusing on Frankfurt as the place where it seemed most likely that the bomb was planted. But neither Detective Chief Orr nor the West German officer, Helge Tepp of the Federal Criminal Office, would comment on that point.

Bonn's Role in Inquiry

''We are carrying out detailed and thorough investigations in Germany,'' Mr. Tepp said, without elaboration. For his part, Detective Chief Orr said, ''I now know several things I did not know two and a half weeks ago, but I am not going to mention what they are.''

Detective Chief Orr noted that the international inquiry had amassed more than 3,000 witness statements and that the Scandinavian police, in addition to American and West German investigators, were working on the case.


Los Angeles Times said:
February 16, 1989, Thursday, P.M. Final

WORLD;
RADIO-CASSETTE HID FLIGHT 103 BOMB

BYLINE: From Times staff and wire service reports

SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 1; Late Final Desk

LENGTH: 116 words

DATELINE: LOCKERBIE, Scotland


The bomb that blew up Pan Am Flight 103 on Dec. 21 was planted in a radio-cassette player and was probably loaded on the plane in Frankfurt, West Germany, the detective heading the investigation said today.

Chief Supt. John Orr refused to describe the size of the recorder, and he said it is not certain that the bomb was put aboard in Frankfurt, where the flight originated. But answering reporters' questions, he said "the balance of probabilities" points to Frankfurt rather than London, where the New York-bound flight changed jets and took on new passengers. All 259 people on board the plane and 11 people on the ground were killed when the Boeing 747 exploded over Lockerbie.



In spite of all the evidence we know now that was being collected, Orr's erring on 'balance of probabilities' should, to any rational reader, sound insane. Here's why.

John Orr would have, and most certainly should have, known by this stage of the investigation that Heathrow's airside security at Terminal 3 had been breached in the early hours of 21st December 1988.

Orr's investigation had now concluded that AVE4041 contained not just Frankfurt luggage, but also a small number of Heathrow interline luggage.

Forensic investigators had now discovered that the bomb had been contained in a 'brown samsonite' hard-shell suitcase.

Orr's investigation had now taken statements from a host of Heathrow security workers and baggage loaders. One statement of which should have rasied alarm bells in any genuine investigation: a baggage loader witnessed an unusual appearance of a 'brown samsonite' suitcase in the interline baggage container.

Another Heathrow baggage handler, critical to the investigation, as he was the last loader to deal with AVE4041, and view its contents before, during and after its loading, provided statements that the bag seen by Bedford remained in the position described throughout this process.

Forensic and Air Accident investigations were varying in their estimations of the exact location of the explosion within 4041. Nevertheless, everyone (even the German's) were in absolute agreement that the expolosion had occurred in the lower left-hand corner, perhaps the base, perhaps not quite, of 4041. Exactly where Bedord had seen a brown Samsonite suitcase.

So, again, on Orr's apparent conclusion based "on the balance of probabilities"??!!

What? The balance of probabilities is screaming THIS BROWN SAMSONITE SEEN RIGHT HERE!!!
 
Last edited:
Following this thread and several others related, occasionally posting and attempting to absorb the rather impressive load of continually evolving information sources and inevitable conclusions has me begging the question-

Did the perpetrator(s) surveil the interline shed, for how long, and in what manner before allegedly placing the Samsonite in the container?

I understand there appears to be zero evidence extant other than the Samsonite 'floating' in and laying down in the container of its own accord, but I haven't seen any postulation on the mechanics of getting the Samsonite from the outside of the Interline shed inside and into 'Position Perfect' to effect damage enough to tumble the aircraft from the sky.

I recall someone a long time ago discussing the actual state of the interline shed, and asking if photos existed, but I cannot recall if they ever surfaced.

Surely any discussion regarding a Heathrow introduction could offer some attempt to explain how Joe Terrorist (a.k.a. Talb?) could waltz in and nonchalantly place a bomb in a container. Even back in 1988, with security being rather porous, it wasn't neccesarily apparent to the casual traveler.

If I had wanted to introduce an object onto an aircraft, I wouldn't have had a clue how to go about it, so my first thought is that the entire baggage loading system at Heathrow would have to be examined, and the weakest point in the system exploited, which it seemed to be.

Mid to late afternoon, low volume of baggage, idle/inattentive handlers, etc.
Seems like the bag was placed on just the right flight at just the right time.

Is there any evidence/leads out there that tracks the Samsonite back out of the container and out of the interline shed?

Anything? Anyone? Bueller?
 
Last edited:
So, rather than just ask questions, here's a first go at speculating.

The perps have someone on the inside, as a baggage handler, for some other carrier than Pan-Am, whom they have co-opted in some fashion, perhaps through blackmail or ideology.

The smart terrorist wouldn't have allied themselves with Pan-Am, given the rain of investigative scrutiny they might have surmised the baggage handlers would be under following the crash (as it turned out, they needn't have worried so much), so better to perhaps plant or co-opt someone from a larger carrier, perhaps British Airways or Lufthansa.

With that sorted out, we turn to getting the bomb suitcase from the mode of conveyance to the airport, presumably a vehicle of some type, into the interline shed itself.

Two methods present themselves. Check it in through the regular process, at a specific time, and have the bag intercepted by your 'inside man' and taken directly to the container. One could even have the inside man ready with an appropriate Pan-Am tag ready to be affixed to the Samsonite (was there evidence a tag was even present on the Samsonite?). The issue with this is that a 'passenger' of some sort had to check it in, and if you were planning this, would you want to risk a general check in?

The second method is to say to your baggage handler pal- "Look, I'll take care of getting the bag to position 'X' in the Interline shed by 'X' hour. After that, its up to YOU to get it into the container and into the proper position." So, you cut the lock to access the interline shed, and place the bomb bag in the rendezvous position. The next day, your baggage handler accomplice, after making several pass throughs of the interline shed over the course of the afternoon, sees the unattended container and with relative ease, places the bomb bag exactly where he was told to by you.

So the baggage handler has his alibi if he's spotted, as he isn't hand carrying anything IN to the interline shed, as I would bet that would attract some attention. You, as the planner, would be relatively safe, as you never took anything OUT of the interline shed. What investigator, after discovering the cut lock, would have imagined a bag would have been ADDED to the inventory in the shed? Even had you been discovered exiting the interline shed, you would have been empty handed, so what would security have done with you? Asked you a few questions and then released you?

Your baggage handler accomplice could have already scouted the interline shed access area, and pointed you to the best time to cut the lock, and introduce the bag to the shed. After all, as the mastermind, wouldn't you want those inside details to be taken care of by someone who;
a) was recognizable as someone who belonged there
b) had proper credentials
c) knew baggage handling procedures inside and out
d) could make small improvisations in the plan, if need be
e) had knowledge of proper baggage placement, minimizing the bag 'sticking out' as something that needed to be re-handled

The last point is key, because had you packed the bomb in the suitcase for maximum effect, wouldn't you want to minimize the risk of it being noticed as a 'mispacked/misplaced' bag and be moved at the last moment?

Feel free to expose every flaw you can see in these purely speculative scenarios.
 
The problem with a lot of this, Snidely, is that there seems to have been no investigation at all of the possibility that a rogue bag was introduced at Heathrow. The reason we know how difficult/impossible it would have been to get a suitcase on KM180 is that they actually investigated the process. Given Bedford's statement of 3rd January, you'd think someone would have asked some questions, but I see no sign of this.

I wanted to know where Kamboj and Parmar were while Bedford was away, and what they were doing, and whether they were keeping an eye on the container, and whether they saw anyone else hanging around. No specific questions to that effect seem to have been asked of them. All we have is a blanket agreement among the lot of them that anyone that looked more or less right could have gone where he liked and put a suitcase anywhere he liked.

I agree there was inside knowledge. I think the terrorists knew about that container sitting there all afternoon, sometimes unattended. Iran Air had a presence in Terminal 3, for example. They didn't need to participate, just pass on the information and point people in the right direction. That's something else that should have been investigated, but apparently wasn't.

I think the break-in, if it wasn't just a coincidence, was the way the suitcase was introduced into the airside area. Getting it in like that, leaving it somewhere it would be overlooked, and withdrawing, would avoid anyone having to carry it through airside security next day, which for all they talk about lax security would surely have been unwise.

I think the terrorist, whoever he was, was wearing overalls of a loader-driver of an airline other than Pan Am. Could have been a genuine employee, or simply someone like Abu Elias in appropriate overalls. There were apparently a couple of thousand airside passes unaccounted-for, so presumably they got hold of one. I think one way or another, a terrorist was loose airside, looking as if he had every right to be there, and he had the suitcase.

I imagine the case would have had a tag directing it on to PA103, but since the route of introduction was the interline shed, it could have been any airline. This was in the days when a lot of airlines, especially the smaller ones, used handwritten tags. How hard could it be? It could have been nicked from practically anywhere.

Suitcases normally entered the interline shed on the conveyor from outslde, and found their way on to the carousel. If that route had been used by the terrorist, the suitcase wouldn't have appeared mysteriously, and Bedford would have loaded it himself in the normal way. However, that wouldn't have suited the plan, because the suitcase was packed so that it had to be placed a certain way round. Thus, the terrorist would be planning to place it himself.

So far as I can tell, there was no particular reason why someone shouldn't have simply carried the case into the shed by hand. That would avoid the necessity for grabbing it off the carousel before one of the Pan Am staff saw it. I suspect, as you said, the terrorist may have made a few nonchalant passes during the afternoon until he found the container unattended. However, nobody seems to have asked if they saw anyone loitering in the shed that day.

I think the terrorist got lucky, and plan A proved feasible. He found the container unattended, and was able to arrange everything to his satisfaction. I think plan B might have been to pick a moment when Bedford wasn't there, and if Kamboj and/or Parmar were still vigilant, present the thing boldly for x-ray, as if it was something that had found its way into a different airline's sphere of influence by mistake. Then, if the radio disguise held up OK, just pick it up and put it into the container as a loader-driver would be expected to do. However, I'm speculating, as this doesn't seem to have happened.

Even if the radio had aroused suspicions, well, it wasn't his suitcase, he had to get back to his own job, if Kamboj needed to call for security to take a closer look, he was out of there before anything escalated.

It wasn't a dead cert, but it was a plan with a reasonable prospect of success.

Rolfe.
 
Last edited:
Wow, Buncrana, you've been digging. You know, I think one of the things that big article demonstrates is what a sloppy journalist Leppard was, and how he was prepared to print "facts" that were sheer guesswork - often just made-up details to save him from having to find out what the real detail was. That's apparent in his book too of course.

The "policeman" finding the Toshiba chip is the least of it. It didn't happen while they were putting the plane back together, it happened while Claiden was putting the baggage container back together.

He says, if the explosion had happened "just minutes" later, the clues would have fallen into the sea. Well, only if you allow half an hour to be "just minutes" I suppose. And I think that's the Minch, not the Atlantic.

TEN Jumbo Jets! What is he smoking? They didn't even have one. They had to use a DC10, because that was all that was available. It didn't take the baggage containers and some of them had to be loaded on their sides. They only set off five bombs, not ten. And as far as I know they set at least some of them off simultaneously, to make best use of the plane they had.

He's wrong further down, in that Bell followed up the Babygro on Malta much earlier, in March, but hadn't been able to find out anything useful. In September it was Yorkie and the trousers they were chasing down.

So when it comes to the make of the radio, or the measurements, I'm hardly expecting him to be accurate or to be presenting the most up-to-date information. I do find it interesting though that the very first guess is right on the floor of the container (OK, I'd guess six inches from that sketch), then it suddenly shoots up to 18 inches, then in this article it's 14 inches, and eventually it sort of bottoms out at 10 inches.

So overall, I vote Leppard the incompetent journalist rather than shenanigans. That of course illuminates the interpretation of the book, which we already know has errors in it, at least one absolutely egregious. I rather suspect that some of the discussion about Orr and the Bedford suitcase is Leppard's own rationalisation, and in fact nobody ever discussed the attitude of the investigation to that suitcase with him in the first place.

Rolfe.
 
That second lot of articles is interesting, because Orr is less gung-ho than he was in December about Heathrow being in the clear. However, the mood music is still all about Frankfurt.

This "balance of probabilities" thing is insane. This is a major terrorism inquiry. You don't brush aside any possibility just because it's not the most probable one. You follow up everything that is even remotely possible. But, incredibly, the lead Orr was ignoring was the most glaringly probable of the lot, as you say.

I think that by mid-January Orr was aware there was a possibility the bomb might turn out to have been in a Heathrow interline passenger's luggage. I think he would have been able to handle that. Bear in mind that most of the early inquiries were focussed around legitimate passenger luggage - Patricia Coyle, Khaled Jaafar. Even the bag-switch theory involved a legitimate suitcase being substituted. (There would have been no reason to do that. If Roland O'Neil or anyone else had wanted to get something on that plane, all he had to do was to add it to the pile - the luggage wasn't counted. Far easier than trying to walk away with a substituted item. But switches was the name of the game for a while, thanks to Aviv.)

What Orr never did was consider that an unaccompanied suitcase might have been introduced right there in the interline shed, despite Bedford's evidence presenting that as an obvious probability. Is it possible that an entirely unaccompanied item didn't occur to them until they saw tray 8849?

I recall O'Neil and others at Frankfurt being asked if they could have carried a suitcase into the departure gate baggage store. I don't recall anyone at Heathrow being asked anything specific as regards getting a suitcase in there.

This is a complete train wreck.

Rolfe.
 
I agree with you about Leppard and his propensity for getting some finer details incorrect, but I’m just not sure who is more careless, him or Feraday.

Leppard also appears to have been furnished with far more information regarding evidence of a ‘computerized printout’ from Frankfurt, and the leads being followed-up in Malta, than was provided to Sheriff Mowatt at the FAI which was conducted nearly a year after Leppard’s article.



It is utterly astounding really. We have initial statements taken from dozens of workers who were involved, directly or in-directly with Pan American departures and specifically PA103, from Heathrow that day. DC Adrian Dixon, Knox and McGrath took all the early statements from Kamboj and Bedford.

(*In statements below Kamboj/Camjob are the same loader)

Sulakash Kamboj said:
[…] Earlier in the afternoon John Bedford had brought into Interline a metal tin into which PA103 baggage was to be placed. I did not place any baggage in the PA103 tin on that day. I don’t know if the Cyprus Airways suitcase was one of the ones that went in this tin.


However, three days later, DC Dixon takes another witness statement which gives a conflicting account of not just the loading of bags but a serious discrepancy over two particular bags that appeared between 1600 and 1640 in AVE4041. Pieces of this baggage container were, at this stage, being reassembled in a hanger in Longtown, near Lockerbie. The damage sustained indicated that AVE4041 had housed an explosive device of some kind.



John Bedford said:
[…] I went to see Peter Walker in baggage build up leaving Camjob in Interline. I returned at about 1640. Camjob told me two further suitcases had arrived for PA103 which he had put in the tin.

I looked inside the tin and saw the suitcases that I had put in the tin still in the same position. Lying on their sides in front of the other suitcases. They were hard suitcases the type ‘Samsonite’ make.

One was brown in colour and the other one if it wasn’t the same colour it was similar. In size there took up the remaining base area of the tin. These two suitcases were the last to be into AVE4041 from the Interline area.


The following day.

Amarjit Sidhu said:
[…]Tommy wanted me to take this container and fill it up with New York luggage coming off the 727. Normally John Bedford would do this himself but I understand the incoming 103 was late arriving had John went home leaving with container with some Interline bags on it. I believe Tommy told me this.

When I got to the container the plastic curtain was rolled up and I could see 5 or 6 bags in there. I seem to recall that there were 2 large black suitcases lying on the front section of the container. I don’t recall which way the handles were facing. Behind them were 3 or 4 suitcases, not bags, standing upright edge on with the handles presumably uppermost. I don’t recall the colour of those.

[…] I recall that the JFK baggage had to be unloaded from the 727 very quickly as we only had about 15minutes to get this baggage transferred to the 747.

Sandy and I filled up the container on top of the baggage which was already in there.

Then…


Amarjit Sidhu said:
[…] I was asked to clarify the point about the description of the two suitcases lying flat at the front. I may have previously referred to them as black but really I should have said dark coloured because I didn’t pay any particular attention to them.

I took the container out to the 727 and positioned it at the bottom of the rocket so that bags could be put straight in. I undid the curtain and saw the same bags inside in the same position because they didn’t have room to move about. I did not reposition any of these bags and didn’t need to because of the position they were in already. Dave Sandhu didn’t touch the bags either.


Now, one thing Bedford and Kamboj (and the other security worker Parmar) are not entirely sure of was exactly how many bags were loaded into 4041 before, and then after, John Bedford went for his break at around 1600. About ‘four, five or six’ items are alluded to, even 7 at one point, but neither has to, as part of their job, log or note any such procedure, and neither can recall exactly the bags that came through. 7 Bags is also referred to by the Mets John Orr in March 1989.

Kamboj does also make a reference at one point to ’10 bags’ in total. However, this includes 5 bags that arrived at the Interline shed after Bedford had finished, which normally would have went into the interline baggage tin, but none of these bags did end up in 4041 as Bedford had already taken the container over to the build-up baggage shed when he’d finished at 1700hrs.

The flight 103A from Frankfurt was nearly 40mins late getting into Heathrow and arrived on block at 1738. Had it arrived on time then Bedford would have loaded those 5 late bags into the container. As it was, these late bags were loose loaded at the rear of the plane. The five late bags that arrived after Bedford had finished belonged to Rubin, O’Connor, Curry and Peirce, and witness statements suggest there was a bit of confusion in the rush to try and get everything onto 103. Rubin and Curry’s bags were recovered without damage that would be consistent with being in AVE4041. O’Connor’s and Pierce’s bags were somehow left behind in the melee and found at Heathrow the next day


However, as Rolfe has already illustrated, the bags that we know were loaded into container AVE4041 – matching incoming flights, times and passengers, with evidence presented at Zeist – then 6 items of legitimate luggage were loaded. Portions of all these known passenger’s luggage, with varying degrees of damage, were presented at Zeist. Carlsson, McKee, Gannon and Bernstien were Interline Heathrow and their bags were recovered.

Bedford had described, and illustrated to investigators in early January by way of reconstruction, how he would have loaded AVE4041. Matching passenger’s baggage with their arrival times at Heathrow allows you to determine how these bags would have been placed in the container by Bedford, and subsequent damage sustained supports the baggage loader reconstruction and thus the conclusions of approximate bag positioning in the container.

From left to right along the rear of the container, handles up. That would facilitate about 6 suitcases. That is what Bedford describes before taking his break. He returns 20mins later to discover the container now has two suitcases at the front of the container, flat on their bellies, handles facing towards the cases at the rear. And of these two ‘new’ cases, the left one, was as he states above, “…suitcases the type ‘Samsonite’ make…..One was brown in colour.”


So, by early January, AVE4041 is already clearly of a prime concern to investigators, and DC Dixon of the Met police has gathered enough information to conclude that anything of note or unusual about this container is worth looking more closely into: such as the discrepancy by Bedford and Kamboj over possible bags loaded between 1600 and 1700 into AVE4041, and the appearance of possibly two bags, one of which is noted as a ‘brown Samsonite’, in this container which is currently under intense scrutiny.

So, what happened? Not much it seems. A few more statements, and investigators were seemingly content to rest on the fact that while there was some Heathrow origin luggage in AVE4041, and indeed that two cases were lying on their sides covering the floor area, they were satisfied to conclude that because the explosion might have been slightly higher than the depth of a suitcase, it wasn't for Heathrow to concern itself. Furthermore, given the bulk of the bags in that container were Frankfurt origin, it could then be announced on the ‘balance of probabilities’ the primary suitcase had travelled from that airport.


What were DC Dixon and his colleagues doing exactly? From the statements, in the immediate aftermath of the bombing it looks as though a team of about 14 were assigned to gather statements from the relevant Heathrow staff involved with that day’s activities around PA103. Of that main team, it appears that Dixon, Knox, Robson, McGrath and Downey took the bulk of the statements. And of that, Dixon, McGrath and Knox dealt with Bedford, Kamboj and Sidhu. Clearly, these three were Heathrow staff of particular importance and interest given their direct involvement in loading AVE4041, and this is reflected in the fact that multiple statements are taken from these individuals.

Remember, little more than a week since PA103 fell from the skies, AVE4041 has been earmarked as critical to the investigation. By New Year, if not publicly, it is well known within the investigation that they are looking at an IED in container AVE4041 as the cause.

So, what were this relatively small team investigating doing exactly? Obviously with hindsight it may be somewhat simplistic to say, well, as an investigator, you’ve been offered a red flag, and inexplicably, you’ve missed it. With the reams of statements coming from fourteen different Police investigators, all to be sifted through, carefully, perhaps points of interest can be missed or some piece of information not realised for the importance it carries, until a more complete picture is formed.

However, an even bigger red flag for investigators was about to present itself.

Statements from all Heathrow staff are concluded by early February. The key points are already in the possession of the team, and especially Dixon, Knox, McGrath who all dealt with the three men who had direct and some of the last contact with the bags and loading of AVE4041. Discrepancy over the bags that were loaded, who actually put them in AVE4041, and two in particular have drawn attention from one loader who remembers one suitcase arriving mysteriously being a ‘brown Samsonite’. Did the Heathrow team know about the breach of Heathrow security? We don’t know as this aspect seems to have been buried by someone from the time it happened until 2001.

Meanwhile, word from forensics and the reconstruction of AVE4041 is that the explosion may have been about 10 inches, perhaps slightly more, maybe not, above the container floor. Undoubtedly though, it is evident that the explosion occurred in the bottom left corner, near the overhang, of AVE4041.

Then, by mid-February 1989, forensics are examining various pieces of a suitcase that exhibited damage consistent with having experienced explosive force from within. By mid-to-late February 1989 word from inside the investigation was that a ‘brown Samsonite’ was responsible for carrying the explosive device. By this time Feraday and Orr are determinedly asserting the bomb was either too high from the base to be Heathrow origin, or that as the majority of bags originated at Frankfurt, and therefore the bomb likely arrived from there.

Dixon, Knox and McGrath had accumulated enough between them that they should have been banging desks about what they had gleaned. It hardly needs Colombo does it? Which passenger did Bedford’s brown Samsonite belong to? Why the discrepancy over how that bag got into 4041? Get it confirmed there and then whether this bag could have been, or definitely wasn’t, moved? Knowing all these answers, of course, despite all the claims as to the point of explosion being an few inches outside this obvious initial candidate, would have simply presented a huge problem to Heathrow, for the UK security services and Government, while perhaps also bringing into question the Met’s head John Orr’s position.

What happened then? Not at lot it seems. Indeed, nothing at all happens at Heathrow, and certainly Bedford, Kamboj, Parmar and Sidhu do not supply any further statements until late 1989 when the police show up at Heathrow again. A reduced follow-up team of about 5 officers, seemingly led by DS Russell of Strathclyde Police, are sent to Heathrow in late 1989 and early 1990 to clarify details of some of the earlier statements provided. The officers go back to Bedford, Kamboj and Sidhu, because obviously, it is perfectly apparent to the investigation that these witnesses, and their testimony, if called for, will be critical to determining how and where this bomb was introduced into baggage container AVE4041.
 
Last edited:

Back
Top Bottom