AAIB appx F said:
"The lack of direct blast damage […] on most of the floor panel in the heavily distorted area suggested that this had been protected by, presumably, a piece of luggage. […] This supported the view that the item of baggage containing the IED had been positioned fairly close to the floor but not actually placed upon it.” [5]
Or perhaps, items of clothing and an assortment of other items contained within the primary suitcase? Bear in mind that Claiden was neither an expert on, or received training in explosives, but an engineer with expertise on aircraft failure.
It is an interesting point that Ashton raises in respect of the precise location concluded by Claiden. The AAIB's conclusion of 10" wasn't primarily deduced by damage sustained within AVE4041, but in fact due to the damage, and in particular a small hole, that was observed in the adjacent container AVE7511. The diagram used to explain and illustrate the explosive damage, which for a reason I've yet to see explained, concentrates on the 'blast damage to skin' but opts for the calculations on the outer point of this area. This was used to construct the location of the primary explosion rather than perhaps implying the weakest point in the aircrafts fuselage at the point of detonation.
It's perhaps also worth noting Hayes had, in January 1989, concluded the large portion of suitcase inner lining found (PK/1310A) was from
Hayes said:
"the lower side of a suitcase, compressed and fractured in a manner suggesting it was in contact with a luggage pallet's base and subjected to explosive forces from above."
And so, returning to Claiden and the AAIB report and calculations.
The two black lines added are mine. The critical 2" calculation, which implied the primary device had detonated just into the overhang section, was determined by the lack of blackening, pitting and damage sustained by the frames (below) that had held together AVE4041.
It was these two crucial dimensions arrived at, the 2" overhang and 10" from the base, that allowed the whole investigation to disregard Heathrow, and thus Bedford's brown samsonite, as the potential primary suitcase.
Here we see the floor of AVE4041 after reconstruction.
We can see the extensive damage sustained by the floor area in almost the exact position Bedford witnessed the mysterious brown samosnite and as I suggested earlier, the dynamics of additional bags being loaded, the container being put into position on the aircraft itself, and the takeoff and journey could all potentially result in unanticipated movement of baggage once completed and loaded for the journey.
I think this has also been argued before, or certainly been mentioned by Caustic Logic, that Claiden's reconstruction which included the portion of base floor - the bottom left corner section partly adjoining the section marked 'G' - may well have been positioned incorrectly. Its fit certainly appears to be inconsistent with the other sections torn and replaced together.
This together with the diagrams illustrating the outboard/overhang section of AVE4041 (posted previously above) seems to suggest that while the explosion was most violently felt along the lower section of the container, it was perhaps somewhat protected by the items in the primary suicase, the base of the container and the aircraft body itself giving some element of resistance, while the explosion found the overhang edge and the curved skin of fuselage the weakest point to cause the distruption that ultimately led to the aircraft disintegration.
Additionally, amid all this there is also the assertion that the trial loading of the suitcase was incorrect.
The boxed tape recorder, said to contain the bomb, would have been placed along the side of the suitcase, as oppose to at the back-spine of the suitcase as shown above. Which, if the boxed recorder was, as thought placed along the side of the suitcase, places the device once again perhaps an inch or two closer to the determined detonation spot in the container.