Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not a false dichotomy. They are very different. See previous post.

I didn't say that are the same, I said they are a false dichotomy. There are other possibilities.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I didn't say that are the same, I said they are a false dichotomy. There are other possibilities.

~~ Paul

There is one other possibility : anti-realism with respect to external objects.

There aren't any other positions. First, there is only realism and non-realism. These are mutually exclusive. Then realism is split into direct and indirect. There's no fourth position. Well, there's disjunctivism but let's not go there.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The operative word being exactly.

That word isn't operative at all. Take it out.

Why is it silly? The stuff that is not me is called external, and the things out there are called objects. These are just definitions.

Perhaps they are bad definitions.

The indirectness ensures that we have to discover ways of dealing with the indirectness, which we have. But I agree we cannot know what the external word actually is.

Then we cannot know what it is we are indirectly aware of.

Happy to. That leaves direct realism, which seems incoherent, particularly in light of this argument you just presented. Ta da! Both types of realism trashed.

That was easier than I expected.

Now how about sensory realism?

~~ Paul

It's indirect realism with a new name.

 

[JayT]

Governor of the State of Confusion

... What the debate boiled down to was that most of the people in the thread wanted to defend direct realism - the claim that the objects of perception really are the external objects - but this turns out to be easier said than done. The brain in the vat is the biggest problem.

Yes indeed. It is a rather sticky argument. A brain in a vat, without eyes and ears can get very confused sometimes. My pet brain sure does.

Being too logical is just as confusing to me as not being logical enough.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Wow...According to Soapy Sam, I am violating a law! Cool...

SS, is that "every philosophical...", or merely the ontological discussions? Do you have a source (I'm happy to search for myself, I ask only to save time) for this law and the context in which it is given?

M

http://www.phespirit.info/montypython/oscar_wilde.htm

Eejit.
Still- I can't actually think of a way to discuss anything without a shared set of assumptions about reality. I reckon most people here would equate that set with materialism.

 

[LW]

3) Therefore to claim that what we are indirectly aware of is "physical objects in an external world" is silly. The indirectness ensures we cannot know what the nature of the external world is. We'd need direct realism for that.

So, being "silly" is enough proof to refute a metaphysical position... Hmm, I wonder what other metaphysical positions I could refute using that standard.

4) Conclusion : Forget indirect realism - it's dead before it leaves the starting blocks.

I would agree if I could be certain that the words mean same thing to both of us. But the other thread showed me that our word usage is completely different and we don't understand each other. So I do not dare to agree nor disagree with your direct and indirect realism positions.

But meanwhile, I have a parable:

About ten years ago I was on my way to my summer job when I noticed that on the way there was a really funnily-shaped birch. It growed normally for about half a meter, then made a sharp turn downwards, and finally a curve back up. In effect, the tree had made a loop. I mentioned my girlfriend about it.

Fast-forward time several years. My girlfriend mentioned me one day that she had walked past the same tree and she agreed that it was really funnily-shaped.

Fast-forward time to last spring. I was sitting and conversing with my friends when one of them mentioned that he had walked past a really funnily-shaped tree one day. He then described the shape and told where it was. And it was the very same tree that I had seen nine years before.

In case someone of you gets interested and wants to see this funny tree, it is located on the intersection of Turvesuontie and Kehä I at Espoo, on the South side in the small wedge between two bicycle roads. Unfortunately, you can't distinguish the tree from the Google maps image of the intersection, only the three big firs that surround the birch.

[Edited to add: I walked past the tree again two weeks ago. It still looks funny.]

 

[roger]

LW, clearly you dreamed all of those conversations.

 

[Mercutio]

Geoff--I just noticed that you have me down for a "no" to question 2. This could be misinterpreted. I am not at all saying "no, there is no external world...yadda yadda yadda", I said that the question could not be answered, that we cannot know with certainty whether or not there is such an external world.

I also said that the question was irrelevant, but that's just me.

 

[CFLarsen]

Wrong.

We are all a figment of Geoff's imagination.

 

[Upchurch]

Now I'm not sure what you mean. You sound like you are saying these are two different things - a sort of dualism.

It would only being dualism if I simultaneously asserted the reality of both the object and my perception of the object. I'm just trying to distinguish what you mean.

And, yes, they would be two different things irregardless of your perspective.

When you say "object of perception", are you using "object of" in the same sense that one talke about the "object of my affection"? i.e. that thing that is the focus of my affection. Or are you refering to the mental construct composed of perception input that represents object in your mind?

It's a bad analogy, but are you refering to the chair (physical object) or the picture of the chair (the mental construct of the physical object)?

I mean aware. I mean objects that seem like they are in an external world.

Wow, that completely sidestepped my question. Let me try again. When you say "aware", are you referring to "receiving sense data on" or "having knowledge of"?

Look in front of you. THAT monitor. I have no other way of refering to it. If I was in the same room as you, I'd point to it. If I say "Not the object in the external physical world but the one in your mind." then I have answered the question for you and made loads of assumptions along the way.

If you have no other way of refering to it, maybe you need to think this through some more.

 

[JayT]

As the Reality Turns

Wasp,

This problem is well and truly metaphysical. Neuroscience may inform, but in the end there is a metaphysical problem to be navigated.

Geoff.

That creates problems, at least for scientific factualists like me.

It becomes a purely philosophical conjecture because science can't really address metaphysical assumptions in any meaningful way. But then, it was never meant to, since that's not part of the job description of science.

Philosophical debates don't tend to solve any real problems and generally only lead to further endless debate in a continually shifting and expanding maze of thought, which seems to be the case here.

I was hoping it was a problem that could at one point be resolved one way or another, but it doesn't appear to be that kind of problem. Many of the definitions involved are purely abstract and inconsistent which makes the problem all the more irresolvable.

It's hard to navigate in a world defined in terms of imaginary coordinates.

I think it inspires some interesting thoughts and sometimes such thoughts lead to brilliant insights, but I don't think any realistic answer is forthcoming in this case.

No harm in fascinating philosophical recreations - like video games of the mind.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

http://www.phespirit.info/montypython/oscar_wilde.htm

Eejit.
Still- I can't actually think of a way to discuss anything without a shared set of assumptions about reality. I reckon most people here would equate that set with materialism.

Yes, but that makes certain classes of question forever unapproachable.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It would only being dualism if I simultaneously asserted the reality of both the object and my perception of the object. I'm just trying to distinguish what you mean.

I'm not neccesarily splitting them into two. But your question does. I have only one way to tell you what I mean. Point to an object and say "that thing". I cannot then go on to tell you whether I am talking about a "perception of an object" or "an object of perception" without presupposing your answer. I don't know what you mean by "perception of an object".

When you say "object of perception", are you using "object of" in the same sense that one talke about the "object of my affection"? i.e. that thing that is the focus of my affection.

Yes, I am talking about the sensory versions of that - otherwise known as "intentional objects".

Or are you refering to the mental construct composed of perception input that represents object in your mind?

That question presupposes indirect realism.

It's a bad analogy, but are you refering to the chair (physical object) or the picture of the chair (the mental construct of the physical object)?

That question also presupposed indirect realism. And I have just provided a knock-down refutation of that position:

1) Indirect realism say we can only be indirectly aware of whatever is in the outside world.

2) If we can only be indirectly aware of it, we have no way of knowing what exactly it is that we are indirectly aware of.

3) Therefore to claim that what we are indirectly aware of is "physical objects in an external world" is silly. The indirectness ensures we cannot know what the nature of the external world is. We'd need direct realism for that.

4) Conclusion : Forget indirect realism - it's dead before it leaves the starting blocks.

Wow, that completely sidestepped my question. Let me try again. When you say "aware", are you referring to "receiving sense data on" or "having knowledge of"?

"Sense data" seems to imply indirect realism. I don't mean "having knowledge of".

If you have no other way of refering to it, maybe you need to think this through some more.

I have no choice but to start in that way. It is that thing that I am trying to examine. If we already tag it "real object" or "sense data" we have presupposed our answers.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wrong.

We are all a figment of Geoff's imagination.

No, you can't be a figment of my imagination. I would never have imagined up anyone with such little of interest to say. Why bother?

 

[Soapy Sam]

P1.Q1 Does the material world exist independently of our perception?
A. Yes conditional that we accept that evidence is channeled via the senses. -eg we think the world existed billions of years ago, but we do so because we study fossil evidence with our senses. I take sensory data to be real. Otherwise, the discussion is meaningless.

Q2. Can we perceive the external world?
A. What do you mean by "perceive"?
Perception is a multi stage process. I have a backside, conveniently arranged to hold my legs on. When I sit down, I am aware of said backside compressing under my weight. I am likewise aware of the chair which is providing the object against which I push. I have not seen the chair, but know it is there, as I have not fallen on the floor and my backside knows what a chair feels like.
Is this what you mean by perceive? Senses detect the effects of a real world object and alert the mind to it's presence?

Yes, I can tell my bottom exists. It is therefore not independent of my perceptions. In fact, it's hard wired to my brain.

So I can happily answer yes to both initial questions. Not for the first time, I find your logic is simply wrong.


p37 Sounds like you are agreeing with Roger. There are tables and chairs and there are perceptions of tables of chairs and these are not the same thing.

Both of you are expressing a view called "Indirect Realism".

- Geoff. It is possible IR embraces anything from the above view to the belief that the moon is made of Brie. I do not know. Please bear in mind that if IR is a broader view than you have stated, it is probable that people here who may accept the above statement do not necessarily accept the rest of the IR package.

p43.I thought that might happen. Nevertheless, the position you've described is indirect realism, as did Upchurch.

There you go. You are telling people they are followers of a school of philosophy, when they probably have never heard of it.

1) We percieve objects (tables, chairs, etc....). We will call these "the objects of perception"
Lets just call them "objects", eh? It avoids confusion.

2) There is a world, external to humans (it existed before we evolved, it exists when we aren't looking), which is made of things like tables and chairs. Even with a materialistic definition of "mind", this would still be true, since there are no tables and chairs inside our skulls.
I agree with Earthborn. Given a billion objects to pick from, you unwisely chose two man mad ones. Still I accept the general point.

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

Everyone happy with that?

Absolutely not. 2 and 3 are contradictory. (There are no tables and chairs inside our skulls. / The tables & chairs we perceive and the tables & chairs in the external world are the same.) Clearly they can't be the same as the external ones, as there are no tables in our skulls.


There is only one table. What is in your head or mine is a neurochemical object which approximates another neurochemical object you have learned to equate with the existence of a table. If you were simply not paying attention, or you had left your specs at home, you might misidentify the table as a desk, or a sofa. The sofa in your head need not map onto the table at all. Ask any policeman how reliable witnesses are.




The problem is this:

The brain in the vat (BIV) seems to be aware of objects also.
The problem is this: There is no brain in a vat. We have no idea what it would perceive, but I'm prepared to bet it would use neurons to do it.

Direct realism : The claim we can directly percieve external objects.

Indirect realism : The claim we only indirectly percieve external objects, and that what we directly percieve is something like "sense data" or "mental images".

Please, you are a philosopher; - "i" before "e", except after "c".

ETA- I apologise for this. You make the error only occasionally so it's likely a typo. Also I've lost track of whether you were quoting someone else here.


p97 Brains are only a side-issue. I am interested in the nature of the objects of perception.
You are interested in furniture? Any particular period?

p100 Right, so it seems that direct realism has to be false. Your position is therefore one of anti-realism with respect to external objects. We can never actually percieve the self-existing objects in the external world because they are independent of perception and we only know our perceptions.
This is Zenoistic flannel, distorting a concept to create apparent paradox where none exists.
There are objects. This is your own statement #1. The only way we can know that there are objects is by perceiving them. Perception is the response of a nervous system to the operation of physics- just like the thermometer, but much more complex in the feedback and control machinery. There may be invisible pink unicorns all over the place, but we have not perceived those. We can, however, imagine them.

p132 Neuroscience can't help this debate. It might rule out some theories, but it's not going to provide a defence of direct realism.

If you keep saying this, eventually your eyes will stay crossed. Neuroscience ignores the debate because the debate is banal and irrelevant.

Geoff, for Pete's sake, sit up and smell the reality. People perceive things. If philosophers dream up schools of thought about how they do so, then find internal contradictions in those schools of thought, it tells us precisely squat about perception. It tells us something , perhaps, about philosophers.
The only way to understand perception is by detailed study of the 3 billion years-in-the-development machinery that does it. That machinery is neurochemical. There are many, many mysteries about the mechanism, but playing with words will solve none of them.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That creates problems, at least for scientific factualists like me.

I know.

It becomes a purely philosophical conjecture because science can't really address metaphysical assumptions in any meaningful way.

Agreed.

But then, it was never meant to, since that's not part of the job description of science.

Agreed. Although scientific information can inform metaphysics as I hope to show later. But first we must dispense with the usual attempts to defend realism.

Philosophical debates don't tend to solve any real problems and generally only lead to further endless debate in a continually shifting and expanding maze of thought, which seems to be the case here.

We've only just started.

I think it inspires some interesting thoughts and sometimes such thoughts lead to brilliant insights, but I don't think any realistic answer is forthcoming in this case.

I don't give up so easy.

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's indirect realism with a new name.

If you are stubbornly sticking to the false dichotomy that philosophers have created, then there's nowhere to go. They have created the false dichotomy because they refuse to look at neuroscience.

~~ Paul

 

[Upchurch]

I'm not neccesarily splitting them into two. But your question does. I have only one way to tell you what I mean. Point to an object and say "that thing". I cannot then go on to tell you whether I am talking about a "perception of an object" or "an object of perception" without presupposing your answer. I don't know what you mean by "perception of an object".

Your revised OP (I'm referring to the three points) presupposes some form of materialism where the chairs and tables have existence independent of the observer. If that is not the case, please try to be more clear.

That question presupposes indirect realism.

I'm only working with what you are giving me.

Perhaps it would help to start over and be very specific with your position. Go into as much gory detail as you like to fully express the argument you are trying to make here.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Sam

The problem is this: There is no brain in a vat. We have no idea what it would perceive, but I'm prepared to bet it would use neurons to do it.

I tend to agree. But I'm surprised you think this. Surely if the same signals are being fed to the brain then the same brain state will follow and the same subjective experience will follow that. Nearly everybody accepts this. (although I don't)

 

[roger]

The problem is aways back, where Geoff said he would not accept how we realists say the mind works. So he ends up dismissing a caricature of what we mean.

It's a pointless thread. He directly challenged my request that a materialist description of how we perceive the world be criticized purely in terms of materialist assumptions. There's no possible way to communicate in this situation.