Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

Give the apparent false dichotomy they represent, I will probably agree with you.

~~ Paul

They aren't a false dichotomy.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

But I don't see how this directly impinges on the difference/sameness of the objects of perception during hallucination and veridical experience.

Didn't say that it did. It has a huge impact on certain types of visual illusions, though. Hallucinations are simply "internally generated perceptions" that use the same pathways that "normal perception" uses.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ignoring for a moment the inherent dualism in the term aware,....

Dualism is getting like communism was in 60's America. Everywhere you look - lurking dualism.

How can the word "aware" be dualistic?

it is entirely clear that the brain assembles some sort of map. This must be the case, because the chair is not actually part of my brain.

If direct realism is true, there need be no map.

So, if I can be an indirect realist without implying any sort of dualism whatsoever, none at all, nothing over and above brain function, then I'll allow myself to be called an indirect realist.

You're going to find indirect realism is like reductive materialism. It looks like the obvious position to go for but it ends up being a non-starter. It just doesn't make sense.

On the other hand, if I can be a direct realist while still allowing an arbitrarily complex sensory pathway in the brain, then I'll allow myself to be called a direct realist.

Lots of people want to be direct realists. The problem is getting round the explanation of what sort of objects are perceived by the BIV. You've got to be able to refute the argument from hallucination, and it's not so easy to do so. Somehow, you've got to find a way to distinguish the two cases.

 

[Upchurch]

It refers to the things in front of you. If you point at a tree and say "that tree" the object of perception is THAT object. I am trying to work out the ontological status of THAT object.

So, that means the object that is perceived and not the perception of the object?

It is stupid to propose that we could be indirectly aware of objects at all.

By "aware", do you mean "perceive" or "cognizant of".

The reason I ask is that there is a whole slew of material objects that we are cognizant of that we cannot directly perceive. atoms, non-visible forms of light, and magnetic fields, for example. If you mean that "aware" means "cognizant of", then I'm not exactly sure what you mean, but I suspect there are some aspects of psychology (mainly pertaining to the subconsious) that might have issues with your blanket statement.

That's why I used the example of a small lump of rock orbiting a distant star.

I don't know what you are referring to.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wasp,

This problem is well and truly metaphysical. Neuroscience may inform, but in the end there is a metaphysical problem to be navigated.

Geoff.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It is stupid to propose that we could be indirectly aware of objects at all. After all, if we are only indirectly aware of external objects then the things we are directly aware of can't possibly the same objects as the real ones. So we are directly aware of some object (an "intentional object"), but this cannot possibly an object in the external world. Whatever it is, it's not that. It follows that the very idea we could be indirectly aware of objects in the external world at all is non-sensical. You are either directly aware of external objects or you are not aware of external objects at all. This is in fact my own response to indirect realism. It's the first position I would like to eliminate. It makes no sense to speak of indirect awareness of an external object because there's no reason to believe that the external world is in-itself anything like the representations created by human cognitive processes. If it's indirect, then we can't know the true nature of the real thing and so we can't say what it is we are indirectly aware of and therefore it's wrong to say we are indirectly aware of external objects. Instead - we are indirectly aware of whatever-it-is that is external.

I'd like to comment, but I don't understand the difference between direct and indirect realism.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So, that means the object that is perceived and not the perception of the object?

Now I'm not sure what you mean. You sound like you are saying these are two different things - a sort of dualism.

By "aware", do you mean "perceive" or "cognizant of".

I mean aware. I mean objects that seem like they are in an external world.

The reason I ask is that there is a whole slew of material objects that we are cognizant of that we cannot directly perceive. atoms, non-visible forms of light, and magnetic fields, for example. If you mean that "aware" means "cognizant of", then I'm not exactly sure what you mean, but I suspect there are some aspects of psychology (mainly pertaining to the subconsious) that might have issues with your blanket statement.

I don't know what you are referring to.

Look in front of you. THAT monitor. I have no other way of refering to it. If I was in the same room as you, I'd point to it. If I say "Not the object in the external physical world but the one in your mind." then I have answered the question for you and made loads of assumptions along the way.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dualism is getting like communism was in 60's America. Everywhere you look - lurking dualism.

How can the word "aware" be dualistic?

Because some people may be making dualistic assumptions about whatever it is that is aware.

If direct realism is true, there need be no map.

So the chair is an integral part of my brain? Forget my sensory pathways; even the photons hitting my eyes are already a mapping.

You're going to find indirect realism is like reductive materialism. It looks like the obvious position to go for but it ends up being a non-starter. It just doesn't make sense.

Convince me.

Lots of people want to be direct realists. The problem is getting round the explanation of what sort of objects are perceived by the BIV. You've got to be able to refute the argument from hallucination, and it's not so easy to do so. Somehow, you've got to find a way to distinguish the two cases.

The BIV perceives virtual objects presented to its senses. The argument from hallucination exists because philosophers appear unable to consider any neuroscience. Our subjective experience of external objects does not map cleanly onto the properties of those objects. If that means I have to declare myself an indirect realist, so be it.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'd like to comment, but I don't understand the difference between direct and indirect realism.

~~ Paul

If you could give me some more detailed feedback on that post it would help. I need to know what you don't understand about it. That will help me see what you don't understand about the difference between direct and indirect realism. Indirect realism involves some sort of intermediate stage between the real object and what you percieve. Direct realism doesn't. Indirect realism doesn't make a lot of sense (like reductive materialism doesn't) and direct realism is very hard to defend. This has led lots of people to be anti-realists with respect to external objects.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This problem is well and truly metaphysical. Neuroscience may inform, but in the end there is a metaphysical problem to be navigated.

No, it's not. It transmogrifies into a metaphysical problem because a false dichotomy is introduced.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If you could give me some more detailed feedback on that post it would help. I need to know what you don't understand about it. That will help me see what you don't understand about the difference between direct and indirect realism. Indirect realism involves some sort of intermediate stage between the real object and what you percieve. Direct realism doesn't. Indirect realism doesn't make a lot of sense (like reductive materialism doesn't) and direct realism is very hard to defend. This has led lots of people to be anti-realists with respect to external objects.

The problem sentence is:

"Indirect realism involves some sort of intermediate stage between the real object and what you percieve."

The intermediate stage processes are my perception. If you word it your way, there is an implied homunculus. Perceive is a verb, not a noun.

On the other hand, if direct realism says that there is nothing between the object and my experience of it, neither some dualistic homunculus nor any physical sensory pathways, then it is incoherent.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So the chair is an integral part of my brain? Forget my sensory pathways; even the photons hitting my eyes are already a mapping.

Doesn't make much sense, does it?

Remember I'm trying to refute both forms of realism at the moment.

Convince me.

I need some feeback on my objection to indirect realism then.

The BIV perceives virtual objects presented to its senses.

Right. But during veridical perception we somehow directly percieve real objects? Think of it like this: If you just think about the brain, then what is happening in the BIV and the normal perception is exactly the same. The differences are all external to the brain. So if you're going to say that the BIV percieves a sort of "virtual object" or "image" then surely the same applies during veridical experience? Doesn't it? The brain state is identical.

The argument from hallucination exists because philosophers appear unable to consider any neuroscience.

Neuroscience can't help this debate. It might rule out some theories, but it's not going to provide a defence of direct realism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The problem sentence is:

"Indirect realism involves some sort of intermediate stage between the real object and what you percieve."

The intermediate stage processes are my perception. If you word it your way, there is an implied homunculus. Perceive is a verb, not a noun.

So indirect realism is wrong?

On the other hand, if direct realism says that there is nothing between the object and my experience of it, neither some dualistic homunculus nor any physical sensory pathways, then it is incoherent.


~~ Paul

Maybe not. But it's going to take some mental gymnastics to figure out how it could work.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No, it's not. It transmogrifies into a metaphysical problem because a false dichotomy is introduced.

~~ Paul

There is no false dichotomy between the objects percieved by a BIV and the objects percieved by you. The experiences are identical but in one case there exists a real object and in the other there does not. That IS a dichotomy and its undeniable.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Right. But during veridical perception we somehow directly percieve real objects? Think of it like this: If you just think about the brain, then what is happening in the BIV and the normal perception is exactly the same. The differences are all external to the brain. So if you're going to say that the BIV percieves a sort of "virtual object" or "image" then surely the same applies during veridical experience? Doesn't it? The brain state is identical.

Again, watch out for the word perceive. The internal machinery of perception is identical in both cases. However, the BIV is being fed ...

Hang on. Does the BIV have normal human eyes, ears, etc? Or are we feeding signals directly to its nerves?

Anyway, the BIV is being fed simulated inputs, while I am being fed inputs derived via physical processes from physical objects. So we are both receiving signals, not physical objects, but signals with different sources.

So indirect realism is wrong?

Depends whether it's loaded with dualism. Gee, I'm getting a deja vu here.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There is no false dichotomy between the objects percieved by a BIV and the objects percieved by you. The experiences are identical but in one case there exists a real object and in the other there does not. That IS a dichotomy and its undeniable.

The false dichotomy is between direct and indirect realism. That is why I suggested sensory realism.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Simple, knock-down refutation of indirect realism:

1) Indirect realism say we can only be indirectly aware of whatever is in the outside world.

2) If we can only be indirectly aware of it, we have no way of knowing what exactly it is that we are indirectly aware of.

3) Therefore to claim that what we are indirectly aware of is "physical objects in an external world" is silly. The indirectness ensures we cannot know what the nature of the external world is. We'd need direct realism for that.

4) Conclusion : Forget indirect realism - it's dead before it leaves the starting blocks.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The false dichotomy is between direct and indirect realism. That is why I suggested sensory realism.

~~ Paul

It's not a false dichotomy. They are very different. See previous post.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Again, watch out for the word perceive. The internal machinery of perception is identical in both cases. However, the BIV is being fed ...

Hang on. Does the BIV have normal human eyes, ears, etc? Or are we feeding signals directly to its nerves?

The BIV is just a brain. It's having signals fed into its nerve inputs.

Anyway, the BIV is being fed simulated inputs, while I am being fed inputs derived via physical processes from physical objects. So we are both receiving signals, not physical objects, but signals with different sources.

Sounds like non-realism?

It would help if we could eliminate indirect realism on the grounds I specified.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

1) Indirect realism say we can only be indirectly aware of whatever is in the outside world.

2) If we can only be indirectly aware of it, we have no way of knowing what exactly it is that we are indirectly aware of.

The operative word being exactly.

3) Therefore to claim that what we are indirectly aware of is "physical objects in an external world" is silly. The indirectness ensures we cannot know what the nature of the external world is. We'd need direct realism for that.

Why is it silly? The stuff that is not me is called external, and the things out there are called objects. These are just definitions. The indirectness ensures that we have to discover ways of dealing with the indirectness, which we have. But I agree we cannot know what the external word actually is.

4) Conclusion : Forget indirect realism - it's dead before it leaves the starting blocks.

Happy to. That leaves direct realism, which seems incoherent, particularly in light of this argument you just presented. Ta da! Both types of realism trashed. Now how about sensory realism?

~~ Paul