Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[cyborg]

My idea of 'perception' requires some level of awareness. If you think your thermostat is aware, I'll just disagree.

Oh, so now we're just going to shift into some fuzzy concept of being aware now? Unless you'd care to actually pin it down?

At least you're not signaling our carbon-based machines as the only one's possible of sentience now.

 

[davidsmith73]

Yes, quite aware. I'm assuming that our perceptions are reliable and consistant, that they provide a fair representation of the external reality, and that other beings capable of having perceptions exist. Otherwise, there's no reason to move beyond solipsism, and only survivability factors can say otherwise.

So how can you justify the certainty of your previous statement that all we can know of reality must come from comparing our perceptions to those of others? It depends on your definitions of reality

Here, I see an error. You're automatically assuming that perception is an inherently immaterial process. Why can't perception merely be sensory input + thought processing? Machines have perceptions.

Otherwise, if I'm forced to abandon the term 'perception' I shall say 'sensation and thought processing'. This fits in quite well both with my experience, and with the possibility that it could be a purely physical process.

I was just outlining the various views on the relationship between consciousness and the physical. I wasn't proposing that dualism is correct. Also, "perception", as you seem to be using the word, is not really the thing that most philosophers of consciousness regard as the fundamental issue dividing the materialists, dualists and idealists. Rather, it is phenomenal experience. I agree that "sensation and thought processing" can be defined as a physical process, and I think that is compatable with all views. But it is not the aspect of experience that causes physicalism its problems.

So how is this different from solipsism?

I'm not sure. Perhaps you should tell me! I'm not at a stage to elaborate much further on my view, although I welcome discussion on mental monism. Having said that, I'm not at all convinced that anyone has given good reasons why idealism/solipsism doesn't work. That's not to say that I don't fully grasp these isms either!

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Rather, it is phenomenal experience.

But what does this mean?

We do not seem to assign pain and pleasure values to our experiences consciously. Such attributions appear to be entirely subconscious, and we may discover the attribution by conscious reflection.

If you imagine that "experience" consists in the feeling of what happens, then the real job devolves onto explaining feelings. Largely this consists in explaining motivational states, emotional states, pain and pleasure. Since we do not decide consciously how to make these ascriptions (it must be done subconsciously) or how to deal with them once they are made, the ascriptions are not going to consist in conscious thought-stuff.

If you were going to design a system to motivate some entity to do something in order to survive, would you want that system to think about conscious options, which take time, or act subconsciously, which is much quicker? If suconsciously, then how is the system going to work? It cannot use conscious thought for the motivation -- that takes too long. Motivation, pain, pleasure, etc. are the tags we place on experiences (they constitute the experience part of the happening) so that we can act quickly, subconsciously. We don't know how the system works, but there must be a difference between pain and pleasure for survival value. It has to show as something. Why not what we call "feelings"?

 

[cyborg]

I seem to recall a study on showing how the conscious experience of performing certain actions and such must infact be an after effect of a decision already made since the signals to effect the actions had to occur before the conscious experience happened. Is anyone here familiar with this?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There are various studies on that issue, Cyborg. I'll see if I can find one.

The idea is that the decision to perform an action is nonconscious, especially when it is a learned psychomotor action. Then once the action begins, it comes into awareness Blindsight is the extreme example, where the action never comes into awareness at all.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

See the Delay Test section of:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness#Delay_test

Also see:

http://www.consciousentities.com/experiments.htm#decisions

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, Libet's experiment. That is one part of the puzzle as it relates to motor action. And this points to what I think consciousness actually is -- namely a means of comparing a map of the world to a map of "us" viewing the world and the relationship of the two in our navigation of the world. We have numerous "unconscious" (or subconscious) processes that help us to interact with our environment, but we have this super-map which consists in seeing how the world is and how we react to the world. That is the point behind my meta-"mirror neuron" example, which is admittedly crude and a bit silly, but I think it gets that point across.

 

[cyborg]

See the Delay Test section of:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness#Delay_test

Also see:

http://www.consciousentities.com/experiments.htm#decisions

~~ Paul

Cool. This has a lot of stuff relating to a series of TV programs I saw that investigated conciousness with the main thrust being looking at some of the fascinating effects caused by stroke and other brain damage. It's all certainly evidence that would certainly point towards the sort of map Wasp is talking about and clearly shows that such a map is clearly able to be distorted.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Or think of a simpler example -- absence or complex partial seizures. Consciousness is lost briefly in both conditions because of the peculiar firing of sets of neurons. If consciousness depended on microtubules, I don't see how such seizures could even be possible. If someone wants to answer that it is the presence of this type of syncronous neuron firing that is the problem, then explain how simple partial seizures are possible -- consciousness is maintained.

 

[hammegk]

Well the same is true for any sort of idealist metaphysic.

NIMNSHO. Subjective idealism, to me, is dualism in disguise.

But I didn't ask how well physics works for you. I asked does thought have a basis in physics? (in your philosophy)

The relationship between logic/math/physics/etc and 'what-is' is to me the deepest mystery.

I'd choose 'thought' as primary. Should a physicalist believe logic/math/physics/etc are material?

I'm curious (because I don't know, not because I think I do) how the idealist explains neuroscience. Does idealism offer an explanation for the discoveries of neuroscience?
I understand that it is consistent with neuroscience, but what I want to know is if it allows for an explanation. How does the brain affect perception?

For me, what is perceived as 'matter' is the result of, dare I say, more highly organized thought. As the complexity of organization increases, so does --in neural/body configurations -- cognitive awareness of perception.

Oh, so now we're just going to shift into some fuzzy concept of being aware now? Unless you'd care to actually pin it down?

Lot's of folks have been and continue to consider perception and awareness and at some higher level cognitive awareness. Sorry, I can't pin it down either.

At least you're not signaling our carbon-based machines as the only one's possible of sentience now.

Since my position could also be stated as 'sentience exists', we agree

cy: Did my previous comments above offer a bit more clarity of my position?



On the delayed choice/reaction studies; the cognitive *you* is the result of processing. In idealism, the basic sentience is at root level, not in the treetops, if you see what I'm saying. Human sentience is the most complex and highest in the tree we know of.

 

[cyborg]

Meh.

 

[cyborg]

I hope a mod is sorting this crap-up out...

 

[cyborg]

Second, goddamn try...

Lot's of folks have been and continue to consider perception and awareness and at some higher level cognitive awareness. Sorry, I can't pin it down either.

Then it's rather disengenious to complain about wishful thinking by using wishful thinking.

Since my position could also be stated as 'sentience exists', we agree

Then I fail to see why you made such a fuss earlier about life/non-life and carbon/non-carbon based machine distinctions if as a fundamental property of existence sentience just springs into action in certain structures at the appropriate moment that the right conduit for it is acheieved.

cy: Did my previous comments above offer a bit more clarity of my position?

Not really.

 

[Roboramma]

For me, what is perceived as 'matter' is the result of, dare I say, more highly organized thought. As the complexity of organization increases, so does --in neural/body configurations -- cognitive awareness of perception.

I'm having a bit of a hard time following, so excuse anything superfluous. Anyway, does any of this offer an explanation of neuroscience?

What I mean is, is idealism able to say why (specificially) someone would lose certain langauge related abilities if a certain section of his brain was damaged? Or does it just remain neutral about such explanations?
That is, while it may accept that the brain is related to thought, does it have any explanation for why a specific part of the brain is related to a specific component of thought?

Along similar lines, is there an explanation for why increasing complexity (in brains I assume you mean) leads to increasing cognitive awareness?

 

[hammegk]

Second, goddamn try...

Sorry, but I don't have an answer.

Then it's rather disengenious to complain about wishful thinking by using wishful thinking.

I suspect when I state that for an objective idealist "what exists" could also be termed "wishful thought" you won't like that either.

Then I fail to see why you made such a fuss earlier about life/non-life and carbon/non-carbon based machine distinctions if as a fundamental property of existence sentience just springs into action in certain structures at the appropriate moment that the right conduit for it is achieved.

It's a pretty good question from your viewpoint, and I doubt I could ever answer it to your satisfaction at a purely human-intellect level.

However, for me it's tied to the Strong Anthropic Principle in general, and for us terrans, rna/dna as well.

From t=0 this universe, the progression began to unfold. Zero entropy to quark/boson stew, cosmology and QCD element formation, galaxies, etc through QED chemistry, on to the info density of rna/dna.

Perhaps rna/dna can be replaced by other chemistry, but chances are slim sfaik. I've mentioned as wild speculation an alternate 'organized-thought-machinery' based on semiconductor physics.

What I mean is, is idealism able to say why (specificially) someone would lose certain langauge related abilities if a certain section of his brain was damaged? Or does it just remain neutral about such explanations?

An idealist just agrees with neuroscience results. SFAIK, mapping a specific ability to a specific area or areas does not answer 'why' either, other than being built as it is, that's how various areas offer control for various things.

That is, while it may accept that the brain is related to thought, does it have any explanation for why a specific part of the brain is related to a specific component of thought?

Not that I know of, other than the standard attempts by science to piece it together.

Along similar lines, is there an explanation for why increasing complexity (in brains I assume you mean) leads to increasing cognitive awareness?

An interesting question as to why brains have become more complex. I could say Thought is wishful; what will a physicalist say? Abiogenesis, Neo-Darwinism and luck of the draw.

 

[cyborg]

Sorry, but I don't have an answer.

That was not refering to you.

I suspect when I state that for an objective idealist "what exists" could also be termed "wishful thought" you won't like that either.

Not really, but it does reinforce my view that you're basing your metaphysics on what you want from reality rather than what it might be.

It's a pretty good question from your viewpoint, and I doubt I could ever answer it to your satisfaction at a purely human-intellect level.

Can I get a translation?

Perhaps rna/dna can be replaced by other chemistry, but chances are slim sfaik.

RNA/DNA doesn't have anything to do with cognition per se.

 

[chriswl]

However, for me it's tied to the Strong Anthropic Principle in general, and for us terrans, rna/dna as well.

From t=0 this universe, the progression began to unfold. Zero entropy to quark/boson stew, cosmology and QCD element formation, galaxies, etc through QED chemistry, on to the info density of rna/dna.

Fast forward a few thousand years and couldn't we have conscious machines (silicon, nanotech, whatever) believing in their own version of the anthropic (cyberthropic?) principle. It turned out that humans, like apes were just a stepping stone on the way to the final destination of a maximally sentient universe, as we build Dyson spheres to collect the energy from our stars and use it to power the computers which all extra-solar matter is being converted into (I don't believe this, but then again I don't believe in the strong anthropic principle either).

 

[davidsmith73]

But what does this mean?

example: redness

We do not seem to assign pain and pleasure values to our experiences consciously. Such attributions appear to be entirely subconscious, and we may discover the attribution by conscious reflection.

If you imagine that "experience" consists in the feeling of what happens, then the real job devolves onto explaining feelings. Largely this consists in explaining motivational states, emotional states, pain and pleasure. Since we do not decide consciously how to make these ascriptions (it must be done subconsciously) or how to deal with them once they are made, the ascriptions are not going to consist in conscious thought-stuff.

I don't understand the relevence of this at all. I don't agree that phenomenal experience consists in the feeling of what happens.

If you were going to design a system to motivate some entity to do something in order to survive, would you want that system to think about conscious options, which take time, or act subconsciously, which is much quicker? If suconsciously, then how is the system going to work? It cannot use conscious thought for the motivation -- that takes too long. Motivation, pain, pleasure, etc. are the tags we place on experiences (they constitute the experience part of the happening) so that we can act quickly, subconsciously. We don't know how the system works, but there must be a difference between pain and pleasure for survival value. It has to show as something. Why not what we call "feelings"?

Again, you've lost me as what this has to do with phenomenal character of experience. You seem to be defining pain, pleasure etc as a behaviour. This is not correct IMO.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

example: redness

An abstraction? A generalization? No one experiences "redness". We experience red objects. "Redness" is an abstraction created by our ability to generalize.

I don't agree that phenomenal experience consists in the feeling of what happens.

Then what does it consist in? An abstraction? If we can't define the terms we can't discuss this.

 

[cyborg]

Then what does it consist in? An abstraction? If we can't define the terms we can't discuss this.

Ambiguity seems to be the refuge of those who wish to engage in speculation about these matters rather than investigation.