Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[Kevin_Lowe]

I'm thinking that there would be a universal mind that kept everything consistent, with human minds being little islands of universal mind.

Minds are squishy meaty things between animals ears, as far as human experience goes. Not inconceivably vast spaces of bugger all with occasional droplets of free-falling rock and gas in them.

People who talk about a "universal mind" aren't actually talking about a mind of the kind that we have. They're taking a really naive view of what a mind is and saying "Well, how do we know absolutely for sure that there isn't a spooky immaterial mindthingie that is the whole universe?".

If we get to abuse words that badly, then I declare that it is equally plausible that the universe is a carrot.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Kevin,

post 675

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If we get to abuse words that badly, then I declare that it is equally plausible that the universe is a carrot.

I think you're confusing this with the Kumquat Theory of Everything.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

If we get to abuse words that badly, then I declare that it is equally plausible that the universe is a carrot.

What are the attributes of your carrot?

Note that words abuse us, not vice-versa. Remember Witt, and the Tao.



Robin : Keep plodding along. You may have a thought yet.

 

[davidsmith73]

It's called compare and contrast. All we have is our perceptions, and our ability to share those perceptions, via language, to others. Without that, we have nothing.

So we form our understanding of reality through our perceptions, and our understanding of the perceptions of others. And, yes, we miss a lot. We don't know a lot about reality; for example, we don't know how the quantum level works, or what color rocks are on the fourth planet from VV Cephai A, or what ultraviolet patterns exist on the petals of daisies. But we can learn, especially if we accept the communicated perceptions of others.

Other than that, we know nothing about reality. NOTHING.

Are you aware of the assumptions you are making here? I almost agree with your second sentence: all we have is perceptions (notice I left out "our").

So how does that make you conclude that "others" exist and have perceptions too? Indeed to answer that question, you have to understand or realise what perceptions are in the first place. All of that is open to different views, some accept that other physical bodies exists and can have perceptions (dualism), some accept just other physical bodies exist (physicalsim), others accept that all that exists is perceptions (mental monism). So, really, all we know for certain about reality is our perceptions. It has nothing to do with comparing those perceptions with other people because that involves assumptions etc. I would say that mental monism is the safest bet because it doesn't assume other people having perceptions and doesn't deny the existence of perception itself (which is the incoherence of physicalism).

 

[davidsmith73]

Idealism: there is only "mental stuff". (Silly, needs God to make it work and so multiplies entities beyond necessity).

What definition of god are you using here and why is it needed for idealism to work?

Physicalism: there is only "physical stuff". (Woowoos don't like it, but it's simple and it works).

It works fine for everything except an explanation of qualitative experience. That's why I don't like it.

 

[Soapy Sam]

You can carry out brain surgery without a brain anaesthetic. The brain feels no pain.

True, but incomplete. There are no sensory nerves in the outer layers of the brain .

Direct neural stimulation may trigger extremely realistic memories.
Including painful ones.

 

[Z]

Are you aware of the assumptions you are making here? I almost agree with your second sentence: all we have is perceptions (notice I left out "our").

Yes, quite aware. I'm assuming that our perceptions are reliable and consistant, that they provide a fair representation of the external reality, and that other beings capable of having perceptions exist. Otherwise, there's no reason to move beyond solipsism, and only survivability factors can say otherwise.

All of that is open to different views, some accept that other physical bodies exists and can have perceptions (dualism),

Here, I see an error. You're automatically assuming that perception is an inherently immaterial process. Why can't perception merely be sensory input + thought processing? Machines have perceptions.

Otherwise, if I'm forced to abandon the term 'perception' I shall say 'sensation and thought processing'. This fits in quite well both with my experience, and with the possibility that it could be a purely physical process.

I would say that mental monism is the safest bet because it doesn't assume other people having perceptions and doesn't deny the existence of perception itself (which is the incoherence of physicalism).

So how is this different from solipsism?

 

[hammegk]

... Machines have perceptions.

Nice assertion; unfortunately wishful thinking for physicalists with no basis in fact. Maybe you need a startrek perceptometer.

But yes, machines can follow absolutely pre-programmed instruction sets and interact with other objects via -- at macro level -- photon (and graviton??) mediated I/O. And yes, sufficiently sophisticated code can even recode parts of itself.

So how is this different from solipsism?

Assuming solipsism makes things rather irrelevant, so it's more fun to assume otherwise. Either position is also an unprovable assumption.

 

[Robin]

Robin : Keep plodding along. You may have a thought yet.

And if I don't I can always follow your example and resort to inserting random irrelevant physics jargon

 

[Robin]

Minds are squishy meaty things between animals ears, as far as human experience goes. Not inconceivably vast spaces of bugger all with occasional droplets of free-falling rock and gas in them.

People who talk about a "universal mind" aren't actually talking about a mind of the kind that we have. They're taking a really naive view of what a mind is and saying "Well, how do we know absolutely for sure that there isn't a spooky immaterial mindthingie that is the whole universe?".

If we get to abuse words that badly, then I declare that it is equally plausible that the universe is a carrot.

Nothing to say, just thought this post was so good it deserved to be in again.

 

[hammegk]

And if I don't I can always follow your example and resort to inserting random irrelevant physics jargon

Thank Ed a few here don't find all my "irrelevant" physics jargon irrelevant. Neither is it inserted at random. Perhaps you should read some books, educate yourself, instead of wasting your time taking shots at me because you don't understand my remarks. Or continue as you are; no prob for me. I can always use a good laugh.

Nothing to say, just thought this post was so good it deserved to be in again.

Yup, I'm sure Kevin's blather is just your speed.


eta: Perhaps a bit harsh ... you did provide one comment on my ideas I needed to actually consider as having merit. Few here manage that anymore.

 

[cyborg]

Nice assertion; unfortunately wishful thinking for physicalists with no basis in fact.

The fact is that perception is the act of taking sensory data and converting it into a percept.

More than possible with a machine. Both carbon and sillicon ones can do it.

But yes, machines can follow absolutely pre-programmed instruction sets and interact with other objects via -- at macro level -- photon (and graviton??) mediated I/O. And yes, sufficiently sophisticated code can even recode parts of itself.

So what is it exactly you propose you do that a machine doesn't - except machines currently don't have delusions of grandure?

Does idealism propose any rules for this immaterial thought to follow is it just a free-for-all on explaining any particular aspect of human behaviour idealists don't want to analyse? It all sounds to me like at the end of the day you simply don't want to be reduced; damned if you actually can be or not. Just keep on asserting carbon-based machines are fundamentally special for some reason you can't state.

 

[Robin]

Thank Ed a few here don't find all my "irrelevant" physics jargon irrelevant.

The question is - does thought have a basis in physics? If not then any physics point is irrelevant, if so then materialism (or something like it) is true.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

What are the attributes of your carrot?

I don't have to explain that, at least until the immaterialists give us the attributes of their uberMind.

It's a carrot. What's hard to understand about that? You're just in denial. Go ahead and post more nonsense showing off your ignorance of the universal carrot.

Note that words abuse us, not vice-versa. Remember Witt, and the Tao.

That's not a dichotomy, any more than (I waste time/Time wastes me).

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

What definition of god are you using here and why is it needed for idealism to work?

Some omniscient being that has perceived everything there is since the beginning of time. Or a cluster of them that share the duty, or a baton relay of short-term omniscient beings that take it in turns to do the job, or whatever.

It works fine for everything except an explanation of qualitative experience. That's why I don't like it.

It's not so hot at dark matter either, just at the moment. I prefer to give it time rather than invoke the God of the Gaps - historically, gaps keep closing.

 

[hammegk]

The question is - does thought have a basis in physics? If not then any physics point is irrelevant, if so then materialism (or something like it) is true.

Not a bad thought, although trite, stale, and saying nothing about physicalism vs ~physicalism. Physics, math, logic, science work equally well for an objective idealist.


cyborg
My idea of 'perception' requires some level of awareness. If you think your thermostat is aware, I'll just disagree.

Re carbon-based; that may, or may not, be terran specific. I admit, if not carbon based (the chemistry is rather suited for many reason), the possibility of other sentient macrosystems.

As a real long-shot, semicondictor physics based???

 

[hammegk]

I don't have to explain that, at least until the immaterialists give us the attributes of their uberMind.

Of course you don't, and choosing not to is one the more intelligent ideas you've had.

 

[Robin]

Not a bad thought, although trite, stale, and saying nothing about physicalism vs ~physicalism. Physics, math, logic, science work equally well for an objective idealist.

Well the same is true for any sort of idealist metaphysic.

But I didn't ask how well physics works for you. I asked does thought have a basis in physics? (in your philosophy)

 

[Roboramma]

I'm curious (because I don't know, not because I think I do) how the idealist explains neuroscience. Does idealism offer an explanation for the discoveries of neuroscience?
I understand that it is consistent with neuroscience, but what I want to know is if it allows for an explanation. How does the brain affect perception?