Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We cannot know this, either. He may have all sorts of other, unknown-to-us assumptions, as you have assumptions about him which you claim are merely stripping away other assumptions. We can suppose all we want to, but I don't think we can be certain about what Stone Age Dude thinks.

I will stipulate to this, and you may choose your dinner.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now, do you agree with the above statement?

Yes and no.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No way, man. One of these threads, without the benefit of alcohol?

The discussants may partake of alcohol to grease the conversation. In fact, my guess would be that Virgin Mary would also partake of alcohol, in her quest to understand what it is like to have sex.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Zen koan? Screw that.

Not your (overflowing ) cup of tea, huh?

It's a matter of mathematical semantics and nothing more. If you disagree you don't understand mathematics. If you read more into it than there is to it you don't understand logic systems. The answer is an infinite number of 9s. There ends the conversation.

No, that's where the contemplation of "an infinite number of 9s" begins.


BTW, after looking at Paul's discovery of "critical realism", please be advised it's interactive dualism pretending no one will notice.

 

[Upchurch]

Yes and no.

~~ Paul

That's what I'm sayin'

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's what I'm sayin'

No you aren't. You are saying you do not understand what I mean by "that tree". You are actually claiming that unless I specify "mental image of tree" or "materialistic interpretation of tree" you can't answer. I mean PHENOMENAL tree.

And NO, "phenomenal" doesn't assume anything. It means "the phenomena itself". Materialists will say it is material. Idealists will say it is an idea. Only Upchurch is saying "What it?"

Do you understand the difference? You are claiming you don't even percieve anything requiring a metaphysical intepretation. What you are saying is not clever, Upchurch. It is completely stupid. Nobody denies the existence of the phenomena requiring an explanation. Except you, that is.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Okay. You're not getting it. Let's take some baby steps here.

"sjkios dnnkwok arkdsjl qqies ab"

The above statement makes absolutely no assumptions at all. The words mean absolutely nothing. There is no correct pronunciation. There is no metaphysic that can be applied to them. It has no context whatsoever.

Now, do you agree with the above statement?

It's not a statement. It's a random string of symbols.

Upchurch, the only metaphysical assumption you need to make in order to be able to say "I perceive is a tree." is this one:

There is a reality. I percieve something.

This is undeniable, and no other assumption is required.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

BTW, after looking at Paul's discovery of "critical realism", please be advised it's interactive dualism pretending no one will notice.

Hey, interactive dualism should get some respect. Look here:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/...ve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16459024&dopt=Abstract

With the collapse of the psychoanalytic and the behaviorist models, and the failure of reductive biologism to account for mental life, psychiatry has been searching for a broad, integrative theory on which to base daily practice. The most recent attempt at such a model, Engel's 'biopsychosocial model', has been shown to be devoid of any scientific content, meaning that psychiatry, alone among the medical disciplines, has no recognised scientific basis. It is no coincidence that psychiatry is constantly under attack from all quarters. In order to develop, the discipline requires an integrative and interactive model which can take account of both the mental and the physical dimensions of human life, yet still remain within the materialist scientific ethos. This paper proposes an entirely new model of mind based in Chalmers' 'interactive dualism' which satisfies those needs. It attributes the causation of all behaviour to mental life, but proposes a split in the nature of mentality such that mind becomes a composite function with two, profoundly different aspects. Causation is assigned to a fast, inaccessible cognitive realm operating within the brain machinery while conscious experience is seen as the outcome of a higher order level of brain processing. The particular value of this model is that it immediately offers a practical solution to the mind-brain problem in that, while all information-processing takes place in the mental realm, it is not in the same order of abstraction as perception. This leads to a model of rational interaction which acknowledges both psyche and soma. It can fill the gap left by the demise of Engel's empty 'biopsychosocial model'.

Ed, if only reductive biologism hadn't failed!

~~ Paul

 

[cyborg]

Not your (overflowing ) cup of tea, huh?

Mixing mathematics spuriously with random philosophical systems?

Well we've all seen how well that panned out for Geoff.

No, that's where the contemplation of "an infinite number of 9s" begins.

NO IT DOES NOT.

You don't understand mathematical semantics and I claim my five pounds.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What happens if we agree that we perceive something? Can we move along? Where are we going?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Critical realism is not a theory of perception. It is Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of "Universal Self-realisation."

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What happens if we agree that we perceive something? Can we move along? Where are we going?

~~ Paul

Everyone agrees to this except Upchurch.

You are currently trying to invent non-existent philosophical positions regarding perception.

As it stands, nobody is offering a defence of direct realism against the BIV argument. If you perceive objects, what does the BIV percieve?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What happens if we agree that we perceive something? Can we move along? Where are we going?

~~ Paul

Everyone agrees to this except Upchurch.

You are currently trying to invent non-existent philosophical positions regarding perception.

As it stands, nobody is offering a defence of direct realism against the BIV argument. If you perceive objects, what does the BIV percieve? This was your question, Paul.

 

[Upchurch]

No you aren't. You are saying you do not understand what I mean by "that tree". You are actually claiming that unless I specify "mental image of tree" or "materialistic interpretation of tree" you can't answer. I mean PHENOMENAL tree.

And NO, "phenomenal" doesn't assume anything. It means "the phenomena itself".

Okay, you're still not getting it. It does make assumptions. It assumes phenomena. It assumes tree. It assumes differentiation of one phenomena from another.

I'm not saying that they are not good assumptions, but they are still assumptions.

As I said before, I do see the monitor right in front of me. I also understand what my assumptions are inherent in that conclusion.

 

[Upchurch]

Just because this new smilie is so appropriate for this thread:

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Okay, you're still not getting it. It does make assumptions. It assumes phenomena. It assumes tree.

NO IT DOES NOT.

You do not have to "assume phenomena" because the phenomena are what are in front of you. And you do not have to assume "tree" because the phenomena in front of you is the thing called "a tree".

It assumes differentiation of one phenomena from another.

Total Rubbish. It assumes nothing of the sort. What differentiation? You mean the differentiation between "tree" and "rock"????? Nope, that isn't assumed either. There is a tree. There is a rock. The tree is not the rock. Where was the assumption?

I'm not saying that they are not good assumptions, but they are still assumptions.

And what you are saying is a pile of unintelligable nonsense. There are NO assumptions.

As I said before, I do see the monitor right in front of me.

Then what on earth is the problem? Just take this one sentence all on its own and do not impose ANYTHING else on top of it. That is all you need to do.

I also understand what my assumptions are inherent in that conclusion.

What are those then, Upchurch?

When you make the statement "I percieve a monitor" EXACTLY what assumptions are required?

"I percieve something": ***NOT*** an assumption.
"It looks like a monitor": ***NOT*** an assumption.

Do you need to assume it is material or mental? Why on earth would you need to do that?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

It's not a statement. It's a random string of symbols.

Upchurch, the only metaphysical assumption you need to make in order to be able to say "I perceive is a tree." is this one:

There is a reality. I percieve something.

This is undeniable, and no other assumption is required.

"I perceive a tree!"

How do you know it is a tree?

"Okay, I perceive a brown woody thing with leaves!"

How do you know it is really a brown woody thing with leaves?

"Okay, I perceive an object distinct from its surroundings!"

How do you know this distinction is real?

"Okay, I perceive stuff!"

Doesn't the very verb "perceive" carry baggage?

"Okay, I experience sensation!"

How do you know that this "I" is not in itself an illusion?

"Okay, sensation is experienced!"

You're still assuming a subject.

"Okay, sensation is!"

That will do for now.

"I conclude from this that there are immaterial woo-woo neutral particles and Being=zerofinity!"

Bad Geoff!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You are currently trying to invent non-existent philosophical positions regarding perception.

This sentence stands as an exemplar of close-minded hegemonic metaphysics.

As it stands, nobody is offering a defence of direct realism against the BIV argument. If you perceive objects, what does the BIV percieve? This was your question, Paul.

LCC realism would say that the BIV perceives objects via a different causal chain. Got a problem with that? I should think not, since causal chains aren't ruled out in direct realism.

You do not have to "assume phenomena" because the phenomena are what are in front of you. And you do not have to assume "tree" because the phenomena in front of you is the thing called "a tree".

This is all very well and good for us, but the person with Balint's syndrome does not necessarily perceive a tree. So you need to make the assumption of normal brain function. Oops, that shouldn't have anything to do with a metaphysic, should it?

~~ Paul

 

[Upchurch]

What are those then, Upchurch?

When you make the statement "I percieve a monitor" EXACTLY what assumptions are required?

"I percieve something": ***NOT*** an assumption.
"It looks like a monitor": ***NOT*** an assumption.

What Kevin said, only with monitors instead of trees.

Do you need to assume it is material or mental? Why on earth would you need to do that?

No, I don't have a need to make assumptions, just a need to be honest about them.

 

[Upchurch]

"Okay, I perceive stuff!"

Doesn't the very verb "perceive" carry baggage?

"Okay, I experience sensation!"

How do you know that this "I" is not in itself an illusion?

"Okay, sensation is experienced!"

You're still assuming a subject.

"Okay, sensation is!"

Reminds me of a similar conversation I had with hammagk, who finally rejected the "I" as given and then later claimed I had only inadvertently brought him to that conclusion and that that wasn't the point I was trying to make all along.

I don't get no respect. I tells ya, no respect.