Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff , you have repeatedly stated that your term "objects of perception" refers to real world objects - "the monitor in front of you"- now you say you do not accept that "objects of perception " are physical.

Right. I offered three statements which seemed compatible with materialism. I did not say that I personally believe materialism is true and neither did I say that the objects of perception are physical. I didn't say they weren't, either. I just called them "the objects of perception".

Or is this a wave / particle thing?

Not directly, but that's part of it - and part of why there is no good reason to start all your thinking with "Materialism is true".

 

[roger]

And since I'm posting little snippets, let me say I admire how Geoff is able to keep multiple discussions on track, remembering each person's POV, etc., without it turning into one of those tedious line-by-line, quote-by-quote peeing matches so common in other areas of this board.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

...
So yes, I will view any philosophical discussion from a materialist standpoint and judge it as sense or nonsense accordingly. I doubt this surprises anyone.

"If it contradicts the Bible, then it is wrong."
"It if contradicts materialism, then it is wrong."

I am a freethinker, not a dogmatist.

 

[roger]

Yes, but are you spelling words as they exist in an external world, or words as they exist in your inner experience?

I consider myself a direct speller, but I could be convinced otherwise.

~~ Paul

I'm a perceptual speller.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, I hope my posts are being interpreted as being spirited, not antangonistic.

Understood. I feel no antagonism. A certain degree of astonishment, that is all. I don't really want to insult people either, but I have no choice but to liken the style of thinking to any form of dogmatic religious belief. Personally I have no beliefs that aren't open to revision on the receipt of new evidence. None. I am a freethinker and proud of it.

In any case, have you read Dennett's The Intentional Stance?

Oh yes. I also quoted the first paragraph in an essay I handed in earlier this year :

What is the mathematisation of nature? Is this mathematisation an interesting object of philosophical study?

G.S.Dann

In this essay I am going to argue that the mathematisation of nature to which Husserl refers certainly is an interesting object of philosophical study. Husserl is issuing a warning to the world, so perhaps the best place to start is where the consequences of the failure to heed Husserl's warning are currently most clearly exposed, and that is arguably in the current state of the discipline which calls itself "cognitive science" - a term which might have been applied to Husserl's own philosophy but which instead has come to refer to something so incompatible with phenomenology that one wonders whether a bridge between them could (or should) ever be built.
Cognitive science began as a discipline founded upon the hypothesis that minds were essentially no different to computational processes and it then proceeded to try to understand the mind upon that basis. That this approach is fundamentally in conflict with Husserl is made painfully clear in the opening paragraph of Daniel Dennett's "The Intentional Stance"1. Chapter 1 (entitled, somewhat ironically from a Husserllian viewpoint, "setting off on the right foot") asks that we grant that is reasonable, in this day and age, that we start our enquiries from the commonsense, objective, third person view of the world - and that such an assumption is warranted even if the object of study is the mind. This is the diametric reverse of Husserl's epoché, which insists we reserve judgement on such matters lest it cloud our view of "the things themselves" and distract us with endless unresolvable disputes about ontology and the nature of existence. Specifically, it forces cognitive science to be unable to cope with subjectivity and especially the idea of the subject itself. From that moment onwards cognitive science confidently marches in precisely the opposite direction to phenomenology – always trying to move away from subjectivity and toward the physical world. The result has been the hopeless struggle to reconcile the essentially subjective nature of mind with the objective nature of the mathematised physical world.

I wish to refer to "the things themselves". You won't let me.

Anyway, yes, materialism is based on some axioms. Are you familiar with how to invalidate an axiomatic system? you basically seem to be, as you are using the technique in this thread, albeit in a flawed way.

I have started from a set of statements which make no assumptions about materialism.

In any case, I'll gladly agree that everything I've posted here, both in this thread and in general, is based on "This is the case if materialism is true".

Then it is of no more interest to me than the similar thing done with the Bible.



The whole load of you need to read "Prometheus Rising" by Robert Anton Wilson. With the possible exception of Paul.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

[/I]Geoff the difference is not the claim, but the evidence. Ther is no evidence to support the biblical creation myth.

There is no evidence to support materialism, either. None. Zip. Nada.

However, both Christians and materialists claim that all the evidence supports their view.

Among the evidence of materialism is the internet. How do you know you are not in a vat now? How do you know this is not a Turing Test to see if you have passed QC testing?

There is no empirical evidence that materialism is true. If you think there is, then you are simply wrong. There is none. There may well be an inductive argument against solipsism, which I think is what you may mean.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then I give up. If you want to know what the Bible claims, you have to keep the discussion within the realm of the Bible.

Who said I cared what materialism claims?

If you want to genuinely assess the veracity of the Bible, you must stand outside it. If you want to genuinely assess the merits of materialism, you must also stand outside it. I refuse to put my mind in a straightjacket.

 

[Upchurch]

Who said I cared what materialism claims?

You did when you said you wanted to disprove it.

If you don't care what materialism claims, how do you know that there is no evidence in support of it?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Fine, so we aren't talking about the implications of materialism. We are attempting to derive a coherent metaphysic from scratch.

We were supposed to be having a discussion about realism.

What does this have to do with my concern over the false dichotomy inherent in the definitions of direct and indirect realism?

~~ Paul

Nothing. There is no false dichotomy. There's no other realist positions to be had.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I find Dennett hard to read. Not a difficult writer, but one who seems able to make interesting material seem dull. (By comparison, Dawkins makes rather dull material come alive). The reader is part of the system too of course.

Have we driven JG to the pub in despair at such rampant materialism?

I was having my dinner. The pub sounds good though. This debate is still-born.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And since I'm posting little snippets, let me say I admire how Geoff is able to keep multiple discussions on track, remembering each person's POV, etc., without it turning into one of those tedious line-by-line, quote-by-quote peeing matches so common in other areas of this board.

I'm trying. It's not easy though.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You did when you said you wanted to disprove it.

I have tried to do that many times. I know damned well what materialism claims. I also know what the Bible claims.

If you don't care what materialism claims, how do you know that there is no evidence in support of it?

I know what it claims because I have had a lifelong interest in science, including 3 A-levels and an HND. I know there is no evidence to support it because it is theoretically impossible to support a metaphysical claim with empirical evidence. All you can do with empirical evidence is FALSIFY certain metaphysical claims, and even then only the really bizarre ones.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Nothing. There is no false dichotomy. There's no other realist positions to be had.

You're quite close-minded for a philosopher. You have not addressed my question about what it means to experience something directly. You have not addressed the apparent dualism in indirect realism. I suspect you will not even allow someone to come up with a third sort of realism, because it's not an official philosophical idea.

Oh look, someone snuck in critical realism:

In short, critical realism refers to any position that maintains that there exists an objectively knowable, mind-independent reality, whilst acknowledging the roles of perception and cognition.

Loosen up, man.

~~ Paul

 

[Soapy Sam]

Right. I offered three statements which seemed compatible with materialism. I did not say that I personally believe materialism is true and neither did I say that the objects of perception are physical. I didn't say they weren't, either. I just called them "the objects of perception".

OK . And I called them just "objects" ,because that's what they are.
My monitor was here yesterday.
It is here now.
I assume it was here last night when I was asleep. I take it you make the same assumption. If not, let's hear your alternative.

If I'm correct, the monitor stays here, when I'm not here. At those times, I am not perceiving it, so clearly it is not an "object of perception".

When I do look at it, then it becomes an "object of perception" by your definition.

But are you implying there is some change in the monitor? I say there is not. It is the same monitor. There is only one. At some times it is being watched, at other times not. The thing that changes here is not the monitor, but the watcher.

So monitor and " monitor of perception" are the same. There is only one, which for short I will call the monitor. This holds for all objects.
Perception is a function of the beholder.

Now, it is my opinion / assumption as you will, that when I look at the monitor, I physically change the state of my brain. Proteins move. Currents flow. Ions jump synapses. Part of this forms a pattern- a neural "pattern" which I equate with the monitor, the object which I am quite sure really exists, because I have the receipt.

Lets simplify. Forget perception for a moment. Let's concentrate on the eye. Sitting in a dull room, I look at the monitor and simultaneously look in a small mirror (actually an old hard drive) hanging by it. As I do so, I see my iris stop down in response to light from the screen. Let's say we had an eye attached to the brain in a vat. Would it stop down in this way?
In this case, I think it would.

What happens after the light hits the eye is different in degree, but not in kind. The eye sees the light, the brain perceives the monitor.
I truly don't see (yet again) why you find this problematical. You see this as failure of imagination on my part. I think it is failure of method on yours.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You're quite close-minded for a philosopher.

Not closed-minded, no. There are no other positions to be had because within the realist position there is only two logically possible options. Either you directly experience external objects or you don't. No matter how open-minded I am, I cannot create a third option. It's a yes/no question. If you directly percieve external objects, direct realism is true. If you don't, then indirect realism is true. There is no other option.

You have not addressed my question about what it means to experience something directly.

Perhaps this will help (from wikipedia)

Direct realism is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.

Direct realists sometimes claim that indirect realists are confused about conventional idioms of perceptions. Perception is an exemplar of direct contact with something. Examples of indirect perception might be seeing something in a photograph, or hearing a recording of a voice. Direct realists often argue, contra representationalists, that the fact that one becomes aware of a tree in perception through a complex neurophysical process does not argue in favour of indirect perception. It merely establishes the method, undoubtedly complex, by which direct awareness of the world is secured. Arguing that perceiving a tree directly requires a magical, acausal mirroring of the tree in the mind is akin to arguing that traveling directly to grandmother's requires that one magically appear at her doorstep. The inference from the fact of a complex route to indirectness may be an instance of the genetic fallacy.

Direct realism proposes no physical theory of experience and does not identify experience with the quantum phenomena that are things in themselves or even with the twin retinal images. This lack of supervenience of experience on the physical world means that direct realism is not a physical theory.

You have not addressed the apparent dualism in indirect realism.

Yes I did. That was why I rejected it outright. I thought you accepted that rejection.

I suspect you will not even allow someone to come up with a third sort of realism, because it's not an official philosophical idea.

There's no other logical option.

Do you directly percieve external objects? If the answer is YES then it is YES. Otherwise it is NO. What other answer can you give? YO? NES?

Perhaps this helps: If direct realism is true then P1=P2 after all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK . And I called them just "objects" ,because that's what they are.
My monitor was here yesterday.
It is here now.
I assume it was here last night when I was asleep. I take it you make the same assumption. If not, let's hear your alternative.

That would seem to be a reasonable inference. But we are already drifting away from absolute certainty, especially when one considers the implications of QM. But I certainly accept this is a reasonable thing to believe.

If I'm correct, the monitor stays here, when I'm not here. At those times, I am not perceiving it, so clearly it is not an "object of perception".

True, but you only know it is there via inferential reasoning. This is the lure of direct realism. These sorts of considerations are what leads us all to be "naive realists" to begin with:

http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/naive-realism.php

Naive realism is often confused with direct realism. They are subtly different. Naive realism is the default state we all start out in. Direct realism is the official version i.e. you have to defend it rather than just believe it naturally.

When I do look at it, then it becomes an "object of perception" by your definition.

That would be a direct realist interpretation. Anti-realists would deny this and indirect realists would have trouble answering at all.

But are you implying there is some change in the monitor? I say there is not. It is the same monitor. There is only one. At some times it is being watched, at other times not. The thing that changes here is not the monitor, but the watcher.

So monitor and " monitor of perception" are the same. There is only one, which for short I will call the monitor. This holds for all objects.
Perception is a function of the beholder.

Then you are claiming to be a direct realist. At this point you have to start answering questions about brains in vats, because they are a spanner in the works of direct realism. What do BIVs percieve? Unreal objects? If so, what does this say about direct realism. You might be a BIV.

Lets simplify. Forget perception for a moment. Let's concentrate on the eye. Sitting in a dull room, I look at the monitor and simultaneously look in a small mirror (actually an old hard drive) hanging by it. As I do so, I see my iris stop down in response to light from the screen. Let's say we had an eye attached to the brain in a vat. Would it stop down in this way?
In this case, I think it would.

What happens after the light hits the eye is different in degree, but not in kind. The eye sees the light, the brain perceives the monitor.
I truly don't see (yet again) why you find this problematical. You see this as failure of imagination on my part. I think it is failure of method on yours.

None of this has got anything to do with the problem. This stuff is agreed by everyone. From an empirical viewpoint, what you are saying is correct. But what about QM? How does your account fare after Schroedinger has had a go at it? Suddenly everything isn't so straightforward.

Geoff

 

[Soapy Sam]

What possible relevance has QM to perception?

Perception is a product of evolution of macroscopic (by Planck scale standards) creatures. We are not evolved to perceive quantum effects because they do not affect us in our lives. This is the sole reason QM strikes us as wierd.

To repeat my point about philosophical schools of thought- I am not claiming to be a direct realist. This is what you are choosing to call me.
Let's not get confused about which of us is me and which is you or we'll really be in trouble.

Incidentally, if all the objects not being perceived at any time (and that includes most of the universe) are not where we think they are, then we must suppose they are somewhere else.
But then we should be tripping over them all the time. (Actually, we may be onto something here...) However , it seems reasonable to accept that they stay where put. True, this is inference, but based on the absence of evidence to the contrary.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What possible relevance has QM to perception?

The main reason you think it has no relevance is because you have assumed materialism is true.

Incidentally, if all the objects not being perceived at any time (and that includes most of the universe) are not where we think they are, then we must suppose they are somewhere else.

No, that doesn't follow.

 

[Upchurch]

There's no other logical option.

Do you directly percieve external objects? If the answer is YES then it is YES. Otherwise it is NO. What other answer can you give? YO? NES?

How about: Sometimes?

 

[JayT]

To dream, perchance to awake.

Yes, but that makes certain classes of question forever unapproachable.

True.

It's an unfortunate reality, but some questions simply cannot ever hope to be answered. Your question seems to be in this class.

The real art is to identify such questions and not spend excessive time seeking the proverbial mare's nest - unless you just happen to want to. Not the best reason to proceed, but not the worst either.

Some questions are time independent. That is, no matter how long we seek an answer, the probability of finding the answer remains zero at all times.

Time dependency is the difference between the logical definitions of fantasy and imagination, not to be confused with the dictionary definitions, which have no analytical value.

2000 years ago, landing a man on the moon was an imaginary possibility, not a fantasy. Given sufficient time, the probability of landing a man on the moon increased with respect to time until it finally happened.

2000 years ago, an elephant spinning its tail like a propeller and flying off to Pluto was a fantasy. Today it is still a fantasy. It will be no more possible for that event to occur 200 million years in the future than it was at any other time. The passage of time in no way influences the probability of the event ever taking place. That's why it's a fantasy rather than an imaginary possibility.

When time has no influence whatsoever over the probability of an event or answering a long-held question, then the event or question is a logical fantasy.

Imaginary means eventually possible, but fantasy means totally impossible forever. However, the distinction between them is sometimes hazy at the limits of our perceptions of things and metaphysical philosophies thrive in this hazy region.

The same is true of metaphysical questions. An attempt to answer them is chasing a logical fantasy and the answer will be forever out of reach. So we might wonder if there is any point in asking such questions and seriously hoping for an answer.

It's an interesting endeavour, but in the end it's mostly for naught.

The upside is that while even chasing hopeless fantasies, like Planet-X, the fountain of eternal youth or the edge of the world, we can still make many real useful discoveries along the way.

So persuing fantasies isn't always a total waste and we owe a lot of thanks to many who spent their entire lives chasing them.