Is ESP More Probable Than Advanced Alien Life?

[Nonpareil]

Yeah. Bored with you, Nonpareil. This will be my last post responding to you on these matters unless you actually start conversing honestly.

I'm crushed.

I quite have. Either way, insurmountable barriers for any observer to overcome were pointed out

No, they weren't.

Meaningful for what purpose? Meaningful for what choices we make, including about what to accept as likely the case? Sure, your attempt at redefining the playing field is applicable to that. Meaningful for determining what actually is and isn't the case, rather than what's reasonable to believe? Really not applicable.

It's the only applicable definition. Anything else, and you have to admit things like the Death Star as being "real" as well.

Just like before, incidentally, you're missing something very, very important. Why would the whatever in question be undetectable? Still, it's worth remembering that this started out with demonstrable, much as you've tried your best to conflate the terms.

If something is demonstrable, it is necessarily detectable; if something is detectable, it is necessarily demonstrable. You seem to have a serious issue with understanding this.

Either way, how you're using "real" is something of a case in point for how you're trying to get others to agree that the objective is dependent on the subjective.

I'm not, despite your constant attempts to straw man.

Oh, and on the subject of true and false, since I don't plan to continue this discussion, it's worth pointing out that true and false can only be reasonably be considered a dichotomy if the playing field is limited to cases where the value actually applies in the first place, as I had generously granted your statements on the matter. Making a general statement like "If something cannot be shown to be true, it is false." is still nothing short of nonsensical without appropriate qualifiers, though. Applying the statement as it was made to the question "What's for dinner?" for example, should demonstrate that well enough.

Category errors are not a particularly compelling argument.

Too small an effect is the most obvious one, though.

If it's too small an effect to detect, ever, then there's no effect.

If it's something that only can occur somewhere too far from observers to be able to observe anything about it, that's another easy one.

Which is beside the point. You are again confusing practical and theoretical limits.

Then there's the possibilities where an effect is just really similar to other, far more readily demonstrable effects.

"Really similar" does not mean "the same". If it is not the same, then there is necessarily a difference, in which case it is necessarily detectable.

Either way, if something exists, but is not demonstrable, we obviously don't have reason to believe that it actually is the case. We can certainly still have reason to believe that it could potentially be the case, though.

We really don't.

I'm understanding what you've actually said. I'm also understanding what was said that started all this. Remember the "it could exist, but not be demonstrable" bit?

Yes.

It remains incoherent.

 

[Daylightstar]

... Remember the "it could exist, but not be demonstrable" bit? ...

I remember this:

... hence why it's not by definition that it doesn't exist if it's not demonstrable.
...

Can you give an example of something that exists but is not demonstrable (not: demonstrated to exist)?

...
E.T.A.:
Perhaps the bracketed part could be clearer, it means that "not demonstrable" does not equate with "not demonstrated to exist".
Thanks for putting me on to it

The question, after several attempts at asking, is as yet unanswered by you.

 

[Daylightstar]

OKay, let's try this one also:

Either way, if something exists, but is not demonstrable, we obviously don't have reason to believe that it actually is the case. We can certainly still have reason to believe that it could potentially be the case, though.

Could you give an example of this?

 

[Fudbucker]

It needs to be made clear that by "replication" you mean replication by experimenters who don't already believe in the psi hypothesis. Investigators who believe in psi seem to have little trouble replicating each other's results. Yet, for some reason, skeptical scientists rarely or never produce successful replications.

That's totally fallacious. It doesn't matter what the experimenter believes so long as the experiment is done correctly. That's like saying only SuperSymmetry believers should replicate BICEP's gravity-wave results, because any experiments conducted by inflation proponents will be biased towards inflation.

 

[Daylightstar]

... so long as the experiment is done correctly. ...

And there's the rub ....

 

[Dancing David]

That's totally fallacious. It doesn't matter what the experimenter believes so long as the experiment is done correctly. That's like saying only SuperSymmetry believers should replicate BICEP's gravity-wave results, because any experiments conducted by inflation proponents will be biased towards inflation.

I have seen this before as proof of ESP because the negative belief of experimenters causes a ESP damping effect.

 

[Donn]

I have seen this before as proof of ESP because the negative belief of experimenters causes a ESP damping effect.

Damned if you do, damned if you don't. Either way, win you won't.

 

[Slowvehicle]

I have seen this before as proof of ESP because the negative belief of experimenters causes a ESP damping effect.

Damned if you do, damned if you don't. Either way, win you won't.

You mean, "damped if you don't..."

 

[Donn]

You mean, "damped if you don't..."

Brilliant!