Iran Nuclear Agreement

[Ziggurat]

That's an irrelevant comparisson

You made it, not me.

According to your 'logic' warplanes have no chance of hitting each other because of their high speed.

I made no such claim.

Huh, 'ballistic'? You mean thingies that operate under F=M*g and s= g*t*t/2, these nice parabolic curves, without adaptive control?

No, I do not mean that they cannot have adaptive control. But they do follow largely ballistic trajectories. One of the consequences of that is that they move bloody fast, much faster than non-ballistic missiles. Including the Exocet.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

This is a cool report. I am going to read it as soon as I have a chance.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

On ASBMs:

p.21

Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the “second island chain.” One area of investment involves combining conventionally-armed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe, C4ISR for geo-location and tracking of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships. As described in an authoritative 2004 article for the Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions.” This capability would have particular significance, as it would provide China with preemptive and coercive options in a regional crisis.

On conventional ballistic missiles for Taiwan deterrence and ASBMs:

From the executive summary:

Regional Conventional Strike. • Since 2000, China has continued its build-up of conventional ballistic missiles, building a nascent capacity for conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes against Taiwan into what has become one of China’s primary instruments of coercion, not only of Taiwan but of other regional neighbors. In 2000, China’s SRBM force was limited to one “regimental-sized unit” in southeastern China. China has expanded the force opposite Taiwan to seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 missiles, and is augmenting these forces with conventional medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and at least two land attack cruise missile (LACM) variants capable of ground or air launch. Advanced fighters and bombers, combined with enhanced training for nighttime and overwater flights, provide the PLA with additional capabilities for regional strike or maritime interdiction operations.

On satellite navigation and guidance:
p.26
Navigation and Timing: China is pursuing multiple possibilities for satellite navigation independence. Currently, the PRC uses the U.S. global positioning system (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, and its own BeiDou-1 (regional) systems for navigation. The BeiDou-1 system consists of three satellites and serves both civil and military purposes. The Beidou-1 system will be replaced by a BeiDou-2 system (expected to be operational in 2011) that will become a regional complement to the worldwide BeiDou-2/Compass system expected to be operational in 2015-2020.


Now, this could just be fear mongering from the DoD in order to convince congress to invest in more military capital despite Gates' stated preference for a more low-tech military. But there's probably something to this.

 

[GreNME]

TNo they have not, because the US has a preference to pick a fight with third rate adversaries. Against a serious enemy like China, Russia or Iran (that has Russian Sunburn rockets) the Navy will experience what 'Gary Brecher' has predicted: carrier going belly up in the straight of Hormuz.

"You just sunk my carrier."

Except for all those carriers sporting the phalanx anti-missile systems.

Welcome to reality, Holocaust denier.

 

[Darth Rotor]

That 515 m/s isn't a limit on lateral velocity, it's a limit on velocity. Any velocity. The limits were chosen specifically to prevent the use of civilian GPS receivers in ballistic missiles. Since I think the designers knew what they were doing, I suspect those limits will achieve that purpose.

I'll take your word for that, and need to get a peak at the terminal velocity of a GBU-31 before I comment further. If your TBM warhead is shaped like a GBU-31, I think its terminal velocity will tend to be the same. GBU-31 is a GPS guided weapon that I am rather familiar with, in particular its exceptional effectiveness and accuracy. Not convinced those "safeguards" are fool proof, nor hack proof.

And 1940's US tech could produce a nuclear weapon from scratch. Iran can't match 1940's US technology on their own, they had to buy stolen designs. And the F-14's which they have are also 1970's designs, but they can't make replacement parts for them either. Why would you expect them to be able to match us in ballistic missile technology when they can't match us in anything else?

They don't have to make it themselves. There are a lot of places they might buy it, under the radar. Hmm, how did Pakistan get the bomb? Hmm, let's look at the tech explosion in China, and then look at how Chinese morals and ethics in international affairs play out in Africa.

It's a jungle out there. We can't assume tech stasis on the part of our enemies, unless we are dying to get hit with tech surprise when we need it least.

No, Iran need not generate it from scratch, the tech is out there. All that's needed is making a deal.

DR

 

[theprestige]

This is a cool report. I am going to read it as soon as I have a chance.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

On ASBMs:

p.21
[qimg]http://img263.imageshack.us/img263/4759/missilec.png[/qimg]
Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the “second island chain.” One area of investment involves combining conventionally-armed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe, C4ISR for geo-location and tracking of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships. As described in an authoritative 2004 article for the Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions.” This capability would have particular significance, as it would provide China with preemptive and coercive options in a regional crisis.

On conventional ballistic missiles for Taiwan deterrence and ASBMs:

From the executive summary:

Regional Conventional Strike. • Since 2000, China has continued its build-up of conventional ballistic missiles, building a nascent capacity for conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes against Taiwan into what has become one of China’s primary instruments of coercion, not only of Taiwan but of other regional neighbors. In 2000, China’s SRBM force was limited to one “regimental-sized unit” in southeastern China. China has expanded the force opposite Taiwan to seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 missiles, and is augmenting these forces with conventional medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and at least two land attack cruise missile (LACM) variants capable of ground or air launch. Advanced fighters and bombers, combined with enhanced training for nighttime and overwater flights, provide the PLA with additional capabilities for regional strike or maritime interdiction operations.

On satellite navigation and guidance:
p.26
Navigation and Timing: China is pursuing multiple possibilities for satellite navigation independence. Currently, the PRC uses the U.S. global positioning system (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, and its own BeiDou-1 (regional) systems for navigation. The BeiDou-1 system consists of three satellites and serves both civil and military purposes. The Beidou-1 system will be replaced by a BeiDou-2 system (expected to be operational in 2011) that will become a regional complement to the worldwide BeiDou-2/Compass system expected to be operational in 2015-2020.


Now, this could just be fear mongering from the DoD in order to convince congress to invest in more military capital despite Gates' stated preference for a more low-tech military. But there's probably something to this.

Of course there's something to this: China is working on cutting-edge, next-generation, anti-ship missiles that mate ballistic launch vehicles to sophisticated warheads sporting very advanced technology terminal guidance systems.

It's the obvious next step. It's also obviously not operational yet. For China, which is spearheading the technology for its own reasons.

What's not at all obvious is that Iran is anywhere close to developing missile systems with comparable technology (nor the independent satellite-based guidance system China's missiles will be relying on). What else is not obvious is that Iran will be in a position to buy substantial numbers of such missiles (assuming China even cares to sell them) any time in the near future.

Extrapolating from a Chinese R&D program that has yet to produce a confirmed operational prototype, to an Iranian strategic antiship ballistic missile arsenal, is kind of lame.

 

[Ziggurat]

They don't have to make it themselves. There are a lot of places they might buy it, under the radar.

Possibly. But there aren't many countries which could both develop GPS guidance and which would be willing to sell it to Iran. The two obvious choices are Russia and China. I don't Russia trusts us enough to spend any real resources making military GPS systems (they're working on their own equivalent). China's the most likely source, but they're still trying to work out their own missiles, I don't think they're at the point where they can credibly market such weapons abroad. And not even Iran is going to buy expensive weapons without some sort of test record that they work as advertised.

Hmm, how did Pakistan get the bomb?

I don't know about the bomb specifically, but I know they stole their centrifuge designs from Europe. And subsequently sold them to Iran.

It's a jungle out there. We can't assume tech stasis on the part of our enemies, unless we are dying to get hit with tech surprise when we need it least.

I'm not suggesting we do. But anti-ship ballistic missiles from Iran are not a serious threat at this point in time. Hell, China is still in the process of developing them, for a strategic use rather different from what Iran faces. Most of the pentagon discussion about that threat is in terms of what could happen in the future, not what would happen today, and between then and now there is time for us to improve our defenses too (Aegis + Standard, for example).

Iran would be much better off trying to swarm us with lots of small boats and conventional anti-ship missiles than trying out. Which would pose a danger, to be sure, but we already have defenses against those threats and they don't spell automatic doom for a carrier group.

 

[Darth Rotor]

I'm not suggesting we do. But anti-ship ballistic missiles from Iran are not a serious threat at this point in time.

I am not the moron discussing that, I was the guy chatting with you about GPS guided TBM's going after land targets, specifically the Israeli MoD. The problem of terminal velocity is still to be resolved for me. I either will or won't. Someone else will or won't.

Iran would be much better off trying to swarm us with lots of small boats and conventional anti-ship missiles than trying out. Which would pose a danger, to be sure, but we already have defenses against those threats and they don't spell automatic doom for a carrier group.

As I will not again waste my time on a maritime warfare discussion -- thanks to the amount of rubbish I encountered last time, a few years back - y'all play on without me. 9-11 idjitstigator isn't even amusing.

DR

 

[Slayhamlet]

lol at Iran being a serious enemy like China or Russia. Holocaust deniers do say the darnedest things.

 

[Darth Rotor]

lol at Iran being a serious enemy like China or Russia. Holocaust deniers do say the darnedest things.

Control of the Straits of Hormuz isn't a laughing matter, until Oil is no longer the critical resource for second and third wave economies. That makes Iran of more than passing interest.

Location, location, location.

DR

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Of course there's something to this: China is working on cutting-edge, next-generation, anti-ship missiles that mate ballistic launch vehicles to sophisticated warheads sporting very advanced technology terminal guidance systems.

It's the obvious next step. It's also obviously not operational yet. For China, which is spearheading the technology for its own reasons.

What's not at all obvious is that Iran is anywhere close to developing missile systems with comparable technology (nor the independent satellite-based guidance system China's missiles will be relying on). What else is not obvious is that Iran will be in a position to buy substantial numbers of such missiles (assuming China even cares to sell them) any time in the near future.

Extrapolating from a Chinese R&D program that has yet to produce a confirmed operational prototype, to an Iranian strategic antiship ballistic missile arsenal, is kind of lame.

Welcome back Zhukov.

I never said Iran had them.

I initially suggested Iran might have a strategic purpose behind building up a conventional ballistic missile capability outside of just delivering a nuclear warhead. You called me nuts and, as I recall, said that conventional ballistic missiles had gone the way of the dodo.

I posted this report as I felt it was relevant to the discussion people were having about Chinese missile capabilities.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Possibly. But there aren't many countries which could both develop GPS guidance and which would be willing to sell it to Iran.

What do you make of the sources above stating the Shahab-3 uses GPS? Is the Federation of American Scientists a credible source?


ETA:
Improving Accuracy: The flight-tested Shahab-3 is believed to use an outdated Chinese navigation system with a circle error probability of 3,000 meters. However, there have been attempts to upgrade or replace this system.28 Longer-range missiles using this guidance system would be even less accurate since accuracy decreases with range. Most ballistic missiles employ inertial navigation systems (INS), which allow guidance without resorting to external sensing or measurement. During the boost phase, the missile makes flight corrections based on guidance system inputs to actuators (or other devices) controlling various thrust vectoring modalities. There are some reports that suggest that the Shahab-3 guidance systems have been enhanced with the addition of a Global Positioning System (GPS).29 Such a system would also more accurately establish the missile’s position at launch, thus potentially improving its circular error probability to 190 meters.30 However, many in the analytical community doubt the use of GPS guidance in Iranian missiles.
http://inesap.org/node/93

 

[Slayhamlet]

Control of the Straits of Hormuz isn't a laughing matter, until Oil is no longer the critical resource for second and third wave economies. That makes Iran of more than passing interest.

Location, location, location.

DR

Sure, no doubt. But Iran's strategic position and ability to disrupt vital trade wasn't really what 9/11Denier was talking about, was it?

 

[Ziggurat]

What do you make of the sources above stating the Shahab-3 uses GPS? Is the Federation of American Scientists a credible source?

Credible in the sense that they aren't making stuff up, sure. But I can't really speak to their accuracy regarding weapons systems they don't actually have access to. The Wikipedia page has no mention of GPS, for example, and while I don't consider Wikipedia definitive, that suggests that GPS capabilities are at least not a given.

Iran has a history of talking up weapons systems that they don't actually deliver, so it wouldn't surprise me in the least if they said they had GPS guidance even if they didn't. I've found some google search results suggesting that they obtained their guidance system from the Chinese (whom I said would be the most likely source), so maybe they did, but I can't find any reports that Iran ever demonstrated that they have the thing working. So I'd classify GPS guidance on Iranian missiles as unknown.

As for Chinese-developed GPS systems, the Chinese would certainly be able to get around the altitude and velocity limits that we impose on civilian gps. But it's not clear if they can get around the military encryption. And that matters, because the civilian GPS signals can be jammed without too much difficulty (the military signal can be too, but not as easily). So even if we didn't turn off the GPS signal, Israel might still produce the same effect. And they've certainly got the electronics expertise to develop GPS jammers.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

So even if we didn't turn off the GPS signal, Israel might still produce the same effect. And they've certainly got the electronics expertise to develop GPS jammers.

Interesting. Does their ability to jam the GPS signal in the region depend upon the system being GPS proper, or could they also jam the GLONASS (if the Iranians were using it?)

 

[Ziggurat]

Interesting. Does their ability to jam the GPS signal in the region depend upon the system being GPS proper, or could they also jam the GLONASS (if the Iranians were using it?)

Any signal can be jammed, GLONASS is certainly not immune. The difference probably becomes one of range: how far away can they jam the signal? The farther they can jam it, the less guidance any missile will have. Not every system is equally susceptible, and while I know the civilian GPS is easier to jam than the military signal, I don't know how GLONASS compares. I wouldn't be surprised if it's harder than civilian GPS, though. GPS has also been around longer, so the requirements for jamming might be better understood, but that's really just speculation on my part.

 

[Darth Rotor]

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8963529

According to this news story, internal Iranian debate has put the damper on an agreement being reached any time soon. The enrichment deal with Russia does not seem to please Iran's government.

Senior Iranian lawmakers rejected on Saturday a U.N.-backed plan to ship much of the country's uranium abroad for further enrichment, raising further doubts about the likelihood Tehran will finally approve the deal. The UN-brokered plan requires Iran to send 1.2 tons (1,100 kilograms) of low-enriched uranium — around 70 percent of its stockpile — to Russia in one batch by the end of the year, easing concerns the material would be used for a bomb.

DR

 

[WildCat]

Interesting. Does their ability to jam the GPS signal in the region depend upon the system being GPS proper, or could they also jam the GLONASS (if the Iranians were using it?)

In a perfect world they'd be able to hack the signal so that it tricks the missiles into thinking that Tehran is Tel Aviv.

 

[FireGarden]

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8963529

According to this news story, internal Iranian debate has put the damper on an agreement being reached any time soon. The enrichment deal with Russia does not seem to please Iran's government.

DR

Not entirely. It sounds like they're wary of paying in advance.

Kazem Jalali, another senior lawmaker, said Iran wants nuclear fuel first before agreeing to ship its enriched uranium stocks to Russia and France even if it decides to strike a deal.

[...] The lawmaker said France has reneged on previous agreements and that Tehran doesn't trust Paris.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1031/p02s04-usfp.html

Iran, insisting that Western countries have not lived up to deals reached in the past, suggested that it fears the uranium would never return. So it's indicating that it may demand a step-by-step exchange – of a portion of the uranium for the return of another portion suitable for use in a Tehran research reactor.

I don't get why it has to be Iran's Uranium which is enriched to 20%

Why not give them the fuel they need and ask for payment in the low enriched uranium? It seems to achieve the same effect: Iran's LEU stockpile will be reduced in return for the MEU (which is mixed in an alloy, making it harder to weaponise -- somehow).

Is it impossible to provide the required fuel by the end of the year?

 

[GreNME]

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8963529

According to this news story, internal Iranian debate has put the damper on an agreement being reached any time soon. The enrichment deal with Russia does not seem to please Iran's government.

DR

Thanks for the update, DR, and for getting the topic back on subject.

-----

I don't get why it has to be Iran's Uranium which is enriched to 20%

Why not give them the fuel they need and ask for payment in the low enriched uranium? It seems to achieve the same effect: Iran's LEU stockpile will be reduced in return for the MEU (which is mixed in an alloy, making it harder to weaponise -- somehow).

Is it impossible to provide the required fuel by the end of the year?

It might actually be. The process takes a few months to produce, so if we don't have a ready supply now there could very well be the manufacturing overhead in time along with the operational and logistical overhead.

Actually, I think sending them MEU fuel rods with a dampening alloy mixed in (to reduce weaponizing feasibility) is a great idea. I wonder if it's been floated as a possible compromise? That would certainly give the Western powers involved in the process a stance of beneficial leverage-- harder to complain when one gets what one is directly asking for.

 

[Oliver]

Just in ...

http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1126198.htmlIAEA: We found 'nothing to worry about' at secret Iran nuke site
Head of UN nuclear watchdog: Uranium enrichment site is 'bunker to
protect things' in case Natanz is bombed.