Infinitely Powerful

[jjramsey]

Well, we can't say whether or not God enjoys them, but certainly He habitually does evil things.

If that were obviously true, the Problem of Evil would lose all power because the deeds of God would be painfully evident, emphasis on the pain. The Problem of Evil, however, essentially boils down to, "If God is so great and powerful and benevolent, how come he seems to do nothing, even when doing nothing leaves us in our suffering?" The issue then is letting evil happen, rather than causing it to happen. The question then is whether God could possibly have good reason for not intervening. If he does have good reason, it doesn't make much sense to call him evil. If there is no possible reason, that would make him evil, provided that he existed in the first place.

 

[kmortis]

Exactly.

Forgive me for violating Godwin's Law, but suppose God wanted Hitler to commit genocide against the Jews so that they could reap worldwide sympathy and enable them to rebuild Israel? How then could you possibly blame Hitler for his actions, when he was doing God's work?

I say, if a thing is bad by your moral code, then it is bad no matter who does it. You might change your mind if you found out the reasons (or if your moral code changes), but since you can never find out God's reasons, you might as well just call them bad.

Aye, but there's the rub. We MeHums are stuck to adhereing to something approaching a strict moral code to allow our society to survive. Gods are allowed more...flexability in theirs. Definatly a "do as we say, not as we do" thing going on.

 

[Bri]

Forgive me for violating Godwin's Law, but suppose God wanted Hitler to commit genocide against the Jews so that they could reap worldwide sympathy and enable them to rebuild Israel? How then could you possibly blame Hitler for his actions, when he was doing God's work?

If one has free will then one is responsible for one's own actions. Perhaps responsibility is the greater good provided by allowing people to do evil.

-Bri

 

[Tricky]

If that were obviously true, the Problem of Evil would lose all power because the deeds of God would be painfully evident, emphasis on the pain. The Problem of Evil, however, essentially boils down to, "If God is so great and powerful and benevolent, how come he seems to do nothing, even when doing nothing leaves us in our suffering?" The issue then is letting evil happen, rather than causing it to happen. The question then is whether God could possibly have good reason for not intervening. If he does have good reason, it doesn't make much sense to call him evil. If there is no possible reason, that would make him evil, provided that he existed in the first place.

The God you are describing here seems to be pretty powerless. If God is in control, He doesn't just leave us in our suffering. He sends our suffering. Even in common usage, terrible tragedies are called "acts of God". But if, as you suggest, God is just sitting back and letting things play out, then it makes no sense whatsoever to thank God for anything.

Sort of on topic, I was watching the news a few nights ago after the mining tragedy and the bungled message. One of the wives, understandably angry at the media, said "They stole our miracle". It's almost as if she thought God had intervened to save them, but the media caused Him to change His mind. Did all those people who thanked God when they thought that the miners were alive then withdraw their thanks? Episodes like this show how completely illogical some people are in their concept of God.

 

[Tricky]

If one has free will then one is responsible for one's own actions. Perhaps responsibility is the greater good provided by allowing people to do evil.

But if you are acting to fulfill God's plan, then how can you fault anyone for doing so? This is why I earlier defined "evil" as "acting against God's will". But we don't know Gods will. We don't know His plan. Based on what we see around us, we don't know His moral code (or even if He has one). So even by my definition, the word "evil" is meaningless because it refers to things that we do not and cannot know.

 

[David Swidler]

I would think that's where revelation comes in. Once you have such an event (or events), with God's instructions for fulfilling his will (i.e. commandments), there's something to go on.

 

[bruto]

But if you are acting to fulfill God's plan, then how can you fault anyone for doing so? This is why I earlier defined "evil" as "acting against God's will". But we don't know Gods will. We don't know His plan. Based on what we see around us, we don't know His moral code (or even if He has one). So even by my definition, the word "evil" is meaningless because it refers to things that we do not and cannot know.

I'm reminded of a little quotation from Jules Feiffer (source now forgotten):

"Christ died for our sins. Dare we make his martyrdom meaningless by not committing them?"

 

[Tricky]

I would think that's where revelation comes in. Once you have such an event (or events), with God's instructions for fulfilling his will (i.e. commandments), there's something to go on.

What if you receive God's instructions but they involve doing something that you personally find to be immoral?

 

[Bri]

But if you are acting to fulfill God's plan, then how can you fault anyone for doing so? This is why I earlier defined "evil" as "acting against God's will". But we don't know Gods will. We don't know His plan. Based on what we see around us, we don't know His moral code (or even if He has one). So even by my definition, the word "evil" is meaningless because it refers to things that we do not and cannot know.

I would imagine that most theists don't believe that humans actually know God's plan, and therefore could never be required to act to fulfill it. However, most do believe that God has given us instructions for how to live our lives, in addition to providing us with a sense of morality (right and wrong). So to say that we don't know his moral code would be incorrect from that perspective, and even atheists would agree that we generally know the difference between right and wrong. In other words, it is possible that humans are required to choose good over evil, and that God does the "greater good" (which can only be known by God and therefore is God's responsibility).

-Bri

 

[Elind]

The question then is whether God could possibly have good reason for not intervening. If he does have good reason, it doesn't make much sense to call him evil. If there is no possible reason, that would make him evil, provided that he existed in the first place.

That's fine, but since we can't know the justifications, he could just as easily be said he does these things because it pleases him to see people squirm and he leaves Good in the equation as a carrot.

The point is that Good or Evil, makes no difference except to how we prefer to see things. The end result can be called the same in either case.

 

[Tricky]

I would imagine that most theists don't believe that humans actually know God's plan, and therefore could never be required to act to fulfill it.

Then wouldn't you say that they are simply acting on their own plan and then stamping on God's approval without actually knowing if it is in accordance with God's plan?

However, most do believe that God has given us instructions for how to live our lives, in addition to providing us with a sense of morality (right and wrong).

But alas, those who take their instructions from God cannot seem to agree on what those instructions are. Is he giving different, and sometimes conflicting instructions to different people?

But I would disagree that God provides a sense of morality, because atheiest can be moral too.

So to say that we don't know his moral code would be incorrect from that perspective, and even atheists would agree that we generally know the difference between right and wrong.

If atheists agree with theists on what is generally right and wrong, then you'd have to say that those instructions do not come from God.

In other words, it is possible that humans are required to choose good over evil, and that God does the "greater good" (which can only be known by God and therefore is God's responsibility).

But humans can make mistakes about good and bad, even when acting on what they perceive to be God's instructions. Again, I suggest we act (or should act) from our own moral principles. Theists then stamp on the "approved by God" label.

 

[jjramsey]

If God is in control, He doesn't just leave us in our suffering. He sends our suffering.

Yet if it were clear that God did send the suffering, the Problem of Evil would be a nonissue. We'd either be debating whether such a God was really a jerk, or we'd be too intimidated by him to complain. For the Problem of Evil to have a chance to work as an argument against God's existence, the source of the suffering cannot directly be from God but rather must be consistent with a universe without God.

 

[Bri]

Then wouldn't you say that they are simply acting on their own plan and then stamping on God's approval without actually knowing if it is in accordance with God's plan?

If God's plan is for us to choose to do right instead of wrong as many believe, then a person acting in a way that they know to be wrong would certainly be acting against God's plan.

But alas, those who take their instructions from God cannot seem to agree on what those instructions are. Is he giving different, and sometimes conflicting instructions to different people?

What disagreement are you referring to? Are you talking about the differences between say, Christianity and Islam? I'm not sure what that has to do with the Problem of Evil. Even if they are in conflict with each other, one of them could still be correct.

But I would disagree that God provides a sense of morality, because atheiest can be moral too.

I'm not sure what you mean by that. Many theists agree that God created atheists and theists both with morality.

If atheists agree with theists on what is generally right and wrong, then you'd have to say that those instructions do not come from God.

First, why does it even matter where the instructions come from as long as we know the difference between right and wrong? Second, if you believe that knowing right from wrong is inherent to humans, then certainly if God created humans then the instructions do come from God. Finally, many Christians believe that God provided instructions in the Bible as well as an inherent sense of right and wrong.

But humans can make mistakes about good and bad, even when acting on what they perceive to be God's instructions.

Sure, humans are fallible.

Again, I suggest we act (or should act) from our own moral principles. Theists then stamp on the "approved by God" label.

Again, I don't know what that has to do with the Problem of Evil. But if we are created by God and we act according to our own moral principles, then in fact God did provide those principles.

-Bri

 

[Tricky]

Yet if it were clear that God did send the suffering, the Problem of Evil would be a nonissue. We'd either be debating whether such a God was really a jerk, or we'd be too intimidated by him to complain.

No it wouldn't be a non-issue. If it were clear that God sent suffering, people would assume, as many do, that God had a reason to send the suffering. Many would even thank Him for it, as many do, illogical though that is. You might call it "intimidation", but I'm quite sure that many theists would (and do) call it His love.

For the Problem of Evil to have a chance to work as an argument against God's existence, the source of the suffering cannot directly be from God but rather must be consistent with a universe without God.

I disagree. The Problem of Evil is a valid argument against God's existence because it those who believe in God assume that evil/suffering has a source. Observation of the universe tends to show that suffering occurs without any pattern that can be related to a source. Since even theists agree that they cannot know the reasons for the suffering (except for Pat Robertson), that fits the "no God" model much better that the "God-directed" model.

 

[Tricky]

If God's plan is for us to choose to do right instead of wrong as many believe, then a person acting in a way that they know to be wrong would certainly be acting against God's plan.

Not necessarily. They might be simply mistaken about what is right or wrong according to God's plan. They might be acting against it and not knowing it. Would you not agree that some people do things that you consider very immoral in the name of their God?

What disagreement are you referring to? Are you talking about the differences between say, Christianity and Islam? I'm not sure what that has to do with the Problem of Evil. Even if they are in conflict with each other, one of them could still be correct.

It has to do with the problem of evil because we mere mortals cannot determine what God considers evil. Not only do Christians and Muslims disagree, but Christians disagree with other Christians. If one is correct but the other is not, how do you tell? It gets back to my question of how you define evil. I call it "acting against the will of God". It is "suffering" according to jjramsey. What do you think evil is?

I'm not sure what you mean by that. Many theists agree that God created atheists and theists both with morality.

LOL. So atheists get their morality from God, like it or not? If so then the Church is not a source of morality. Are you sure you want to argue that point?

First, why does it even matter where the instructions come from as long as we know the difference between right and wrong?

So you agree that morality is totally unrelated to God.

Second, if you believe that knowing right from wrong is inherent to humans, then certainly if God created humans then the instructions do come from God.

That's kind of begging the question, isn't it? What it distilled down to is "If you believe in that everything about us comes from God, then you believe that morality comes from God." True, but not particularly useful.

Finally, many Christians believe that God provided instructions in the Bible as well as an inherent sense of right and wrong.

But they do not agree about the instructions in the Bible. What I find is that people tend to shape their interpretation of the Bible based on their morality, rather than the reverse.

Sure, humans are fallible.

Very much so. Why would anyone assume that their interpretation of right/wrong was the same as God's?

Again, I don't know what that has to do with the Problem of Evil. But if we are created by God and we act according to our own moral principles, then in fact God did provide those principles.

You would think that if God were providing moral principles, then He'd have a little more consistency in them.

It has to do with the problem of evil because we do not know what evil is. If God is sending that info, then there seems to be a rather severe communication problem.

 

[jjramsey]

No it wouldn't be a non-issue. If it were clear that God sent suffering, people would assume, as many do, that God had a reason to send the suffering. Many would even thank Him for it, as many do, illogical though that is. You might call it "intimidation", but I'm quite sure that many theists would (and do) call it His love.

You just conceded my central point, though, which is that if it were clear that God actually sent suffering, that would be evidence for God, and the Problem of Evil would no longer work as an atheistic argument.

The Problem of Evil is a valid argument against God's existence because it those who believe in God assume that evil/suffering has a source.

Yet many theists would agree with the atheists that the source of evil is an autonomous indifferent universe, which for theists would imply a God who is allowing suffering rather than actively doing it.

Since even theists agree that they cannot know the reasons for the suffering (except for Pat Robertson), that fits the "no God" model much better that the "God-directed" model.

However, it fits equally well with a model of a God who does not routinely interfere. Now if you want to make a probablistic argument from evil, then Occam's Razor is on your side here, since barring other considerations, God is a surplus entity and can be discarded on those grounds. If you want to make a strictly logical argument against evil, then you have a tougher problem, since you now have to not only argue that evil makes it less likely that God exists, but that it is logically contradictory for both God and evil to exist. You have yet to put up anything but a simplistic argument for the latter case.

 

[Tricky]

You just conceded my central point, though, which is that if it were clear that God actually sent suffering, that would be evidence for God, and the Problem of Evil would no longer work as an atheistic argument.

If it were clear that God sent suffering, then all atheist arguments would be moot, wouldn't you say? Again, this is the logical fallacy of "begging the question".
But it is not clear at all that God sends suffering, so the problem of evil is still very much a legitimate argument for atheism, or at least disbelief in some concepts of God, particularly the more common concepts of the God of Christ.

Yet many theists would agree with the atheists that the source of evil is an autonomous indifferent universe, which for theists would imply a God who is allowing suffering rather than actively doing it.

Correct. The problem of evil is only an argument against a benevolent omnipotent God. It says nothing about non-interfering concepts of god(s) such as Deist concepts.

However, it fits equally well with a model of a God who does not routinely interfere. Now if you want to make a probabilistic argument from evil, then Occam's Razor is on your side here, since barring other considerations, God is a surplus entity and can be discarded on those grounds. If you want to make a strictly logical argument against evil, then you have a tougher problem, since you now have to not only argue that evil makes it less likely that God exists, but that it is logically contradictory for both God and evil to exist. You have yet to put up anything but a simplistic argument for the latter case.

Once again, this calls for definitions. If a person says "I believe in God", that really means very little. They could have any sort of idea what God is and any sort of idea what He wants. You have to give your God some descriptions. If you say, "God is Good", then you have to show how that God is good. Does He do good things? Does He do exclusively good things? Does He step in? When does He step in? Does He grant the wishes made in prayers?

If your concept of God is a being who may or may not be good (based on the commonly used definitions of "good"), may or may not be omnipotent, may or may not grant wishes made in prayers, then you really haven't given a very well defined concept of God.

If you give a simplistic definition of God, then any argument against that God need no more specific than the definition.

 

[pgwenthold]

Okay. I'll accept that definition. So evil is then a trade-off. Much suffering in necessary for many good things, and of course, an omniscient God knows that. And if we assume God arranges for things to "come out for the best", then He intentionally creates suffering in some situations for the "greater good". .

Of course, an omnipotent god could create the 'greater good' without having to cause suffering, so I'm not sure why redefining evil helps anything.

 

[jjramsey]

If it were clear that God sent suffering, then all atheist arguments would be moot, wouldn't you say?

No kidding, Sherlock! That is exactly what I was trying to say.

Again, this is the logical fallacy of "begging the question".

It was you who started with the proposition that God was sending the suffering, not merely allowing it. Pointing out where your proposition leads is not begging the question.

The problem of evil is only an argument against a benevolent omnipotent God. It says nothing about non-interfering concepts of god(s) such as Deist concepts.

However, the problem of evil only works if you can show that benevolence must be inconsistent with noninterference. Note, too, that we are not necessarily talking about permanent noninterference, but taking into account whatever God may do with Heaven and Hell.

Of course, an omnipotent god could create the 'greater good' without having to cause suffering

There's no "of course" about that. It is very easy to have a rough idea of what a universe with much less suffering would be like. It is much more difficult, and possibly infeasible, to fully trace out the course of such a universe to see if there are hidden problems.

I'm not sure why redefining evil helps anything.

"Evil" hasn't been redefined. Rather, it was pointed out by me that the argument from evil was basically an argument from suffering. The emphasis is on bad stuff happening, not necessarily if the cause of the bad stuff has a moral component.

 

[Bri]

Of course, an omnipotent god could create the 'greater good' without having to cause suffering, so I'm not sure why redefining evil helps anything.

Not if suffering were somehow for the greater good, for example if it allowed free will.

-Bri