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Infinitely Powerful

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No. What "things" are impossible? Logically impossible "things." Why? Because logical impossible "things" aren't actually things.

Some Christians don't accept that limitation for their God - their God can do anything even the impossible so he can create a rock so heavy he can't lift it whilst still being able to lift it. Logic does not constrain God in those definitions.
 
Some Christians don't accept that limitation for their God - their God can do anything even the impossible so he can create a rock so heavy he can't lift it whilst still being able to lift it. Logic does not constrain God in those definitions.

If God is not so constrained, then one cannot rationally discuss God, and there is no point in making arguments for or against his existence. That's a non-starter.
 
Because we were talking about Christians' assumptions about prayer, and Christians obviously assume there is a God.
And I am pointing out that in the case of prayers, that assumption is not supported by evidence.

For the sake of this discussion, the important part about heaven is that it would mean that this universe with its suffering isn't all there is. A God who has a pleasant afterlife planned is at least potentially more benevolent than one that doesn't.
Sure, that's a nice thought. Everybody likes pleasant things. But it makes no sense. The only way things could be perpetually pleasant in heaven is if nobody had any free will to do evil things. Who here would choose to live without free will? Does your concept of heaven allow for it's inhabitants to do bad (or evil) things?

No. What "things" are impossible? Logically impossible "things." Why? Because logical impossible "things" aren't actually things.
As has been pointed out time and time again, logic has nothing to do with possibility. Logic merely indicates internal consistancy. If one of your assumptions is that supernatural things exist, then any logic that follows that assumption will not require that things obey natural law.

Your examples of "impossible things" tend to include definitions that contradict each other, such as "invisible pink..." That contradiction only holds as long as you accept the premise that colors cannot be invisible. However, I know people who believe in colored auras which cannot be seen by most people. Because of their definitions, "invisible pink..." is not illogical.
 
If God is not so constrained, then one cannot rationally discuss God, and there is no point in making arguments for or against his existence. That's a non-starter.

But it is one of the definitions some Christians use, in fact I would say it is the original definition - the idea of limiting God came about precisely because of the "problem of evil".
 
But it is one of the definitions some Christians use, in fact I would say it is the original definition - the idea of limiting God came about precisely because of the "problem of evil".

Except that if you use that definition, then there is no point in discussing the problem of evil. Once you've denied that the law of noncontradiction holds, then you can prove any proposition.
 
Except that if you use that definition, then there is no point in discussing the problem of evil. Once you've denied that the law of noncontradiction holds, then you can prove any proposition.

Yet many Christians scholars weren't happy with that outcome, they felt that God couldn't be so different from humans (after we were created in his image) etc. so they sort ways to explain what they could observe eg evil in the world that God did not seem to prevent or care about and came up with the idea of limiting God - eg he couldn't do the impossible. Then it is possible to come up with excuses/reasons for why evil exists - it's man's nature/original sin/great good from some suffering/infinite reward no matter how much suffering and evil you'd been subjected to and so on.
 
Your examples of "impossible things" tend to include definitions that contradict each other, such as "invisible pink..." That contradiction only holds as long as you accept the premise that colors cannot be invisible. However, I know people who believe in colored auras which cannot be seen by most people. Because of their definitions, "invisible pink..." is not illogical.

Except all that means is that one is using "invisible pink" to mean "invisible or pink". Notice that you wrote that you know people who believe in colored auras which cannot be seen by most people. That means that those auras are supposedly not invisble to certain people, and it's those certain people who ascribe colors to auras. If the auras were supposed to be invisible to everyone, then no one would assign them colors.
 
Bri, though I think you're in a better position than some theists, I think there are still a couple of rough spots in your ideas. I'm willing to accept the idea that God doesn't want to sweat the petty stuff, the little doctrinal differences, etc. But this brings us back to the question of who is lying. Numerous religions claim revelation and divine authority for very specific and stringent doctrines, often involving the eternal punishment and damnation of heretics and infidels, and often enough the suggestion that they should be killed on earth. Obviously if God does not actually care about docrines, and does not seek religious wars, ethnic cleansing, genocide, slavery and persecution, either some of those revelations are false or God is lying. Assuming the former, this makes just about all religious doctrines suspect, and introduces the possibility that all organized religions are founded on lies. This could produce a kind of reverse spin of Pascal's wager, in which atheism, being the most obviously doctrine-free option, becomes the best bet, because if nothing else, it guarantees that at least you have not acted on lies.

First of all, these are certainly not my ideas (I seriously doubt I'm the first to come up with any of them). That said, I also doubt that anyone is lying. Undoubtedly some religions are simply wrong in various respects, particularly where they are in direct conflict with another religion. Of course, that doesn't preclude the possibility of one or more of them being right.

-Bri
 
Yet many Christians scholars weren't happy with that outcome

IIRC, the outcome "if that the law of noncontradiction holds, then you can prove any proposition" was shown by a Scottish philosopher who I think was roughly contemporary with Hume, so that postdates Aquinas, etc. Sorry, I don't remember the philosoper's name.
 
Except all that means is that one is using "invisible pink" to mean "invisible or pink". Notice that you wrote that you know people who believe in colored auras which cannot be seen by most people. That means that those auras are supposedly not invisble to certain people, and it's those certain people who ascribe colors to auras. If the auras were supposed to be invisible to everyone, then no one would assign them colors.
Not necessarily, because they also redefine "see". To them, you can see with your mind, not just your eyes. It makes sense to them, after all, you can think of the color pink, can't you? So all you have to do is convince yourself that when you think you are seeing an aura, you are in fact seeing it. So you "see", it is quite possible to make illogical things logical simply by changing the assumptions.
 
To avoid this problem many Christians scholars have come up with the idea of the "greater good" (which is not the same as utilitarian concept of good), what their argument of "greater good" ends up meaning is: "God is good, if it looks as if God isn't good it's our lack of comprehension that is at fault."

The concept of "greater good" doesn't really mean what you indicated. The idea is that some good things are "more good" than other good things.

Perhaps humans having the ability to choose between right and wrong is better than a complete lack of human suffering.

-Bri
 
This is true for an Aquinas style limited omnipotent God (e.g. can only do that which is not impossible) but isn't true for a Descartes unlimited omnipotent God (e.g. can do anything including the impossible).

We've already discussed this. If God can do the illogical, then why would you ever expect it to result in anything logical? If you want to go that route, then you cannot use logical proofs such as the Problem of Evil to disprove the existance of such a God. I don't think you want to go there, or else you've already lost the argument.

-Bri
 
The concept of "greater good" doesn't really mean what you indicated. The idea is that some good things are "more good" than other good things.

Perhaps humans having the ability to choose between right and wrong is better than a complete lack of human suffering.

-Bri

I agree you put it better but still they end up from that concept right back at the class of reasons "We can't understand the mind of God". (Which your second reason also fits within.)
 
Yet many Christians scholars weren't happy with that outcome, they felt that God couldn't be so different from humans (after we were created in his image) etc. so they sort ways to explain what they could observe eg evil in the world that God did not seem to prevent or care about and came up with the idea of limiting God - eg he couldn't do the impossible. Then it is possible to come up with excuses/reasons for why evil exists - it's man's nature/original sin/great good from some suffering/infinite reward no matter how much suffering and evil you'd been subjected to and so on.
In a way, this is probably an attempt to correct a bit of overreaching by the post-Jesus Christians. Pagan gods and indeed the God as described in the old testiment are just packed full of human foibles and downright nastiness. I mean, what kind of creature would kill babies because of the actions of their fathers? But the God of Christ is a god of love, so they toned down his nastiness as far as they could, even to the point of saying that He was perfect and perfectly moral. But the result of trying to make their god "bigger and better" than every other god was that they made him into a self-contradiction, which, as you point out, they have later tried to correct. Unsuccessfully, IMO.
 
We've already discussed this. If God can do the illogical, then why would you ever expect it to result in anything logical? If you want to go that route, then you cannot use logical proofs such as the Problem of Evil to disprove the existance of such a God. I don't think you want to go there, or else you've already lost the argument.

-Bri

I don't think you can use logic to prove any god exists whether that god is constrained or not. I'm just trying to make sure people don't forget which definition they are arguing about and therefore which arguments can be used to support it or not. :)
 
Not necessarily, because they also redefine "see". To them, you can see with your mind, not just your eyes.

That's hardly a redefinition. It is perfectly coherent to say that one saw something in a dream, even though one isn't really using one's eyes.
 
We've already discussed this. If God can do the illogical, then why would you ever expect it to result in anything logical? If you want to go that route, then you cannot use logical proofs such as the Problem of Evil to disprove the existance of such a God. I don't think you want to go there, or else you've already lost the argument.

-Bri
The "problem of evil" is a logical syllogism based on the standard definitions of "omnipotent", "omnibenevolent" and "evil". If you start with the definitions that omnipotent means he "can do anything", "omnibenevolent" means he "wants all good" and evil means "against God's will" then you can show that such a concept violates it's own premises and is therefore illogical. If you go back and change the definitions of the words, you are creating a completely separate syllogism. When "wanting all good" is changed to "wanting the greatest good" and evil is defined as "something that Gods will allows because it is necessary" and "omnipotent" means "can do lots of things, but not anything", then the conclusions become quite different because the premises are different.
 
That's hardly a redefinition. It is perfectly coherent to say that one saw something in a dream, even though one isn't really using one's eyes.
Then you admit that "invisible" and "pink" are not contradictory. Meet my unicorn.

The problem is that you must maintain the same definition throughout your logic. You can't say "I can see the invisible" and then say "by 'see' I mean 'imagine'". I can see right through that ploy.
 
Then you admit that "invisible" and "pink" are not contradictory.

Nope. I can't see an invisible unicorn even in a dream.

The problem is that you must maintain the same definition throughout your logic. You can't say "I can see the invisible" and then say "by 'see' I mean 'imagine'".

I'm not saying that "by 'see' I mean 'imagine'." I'm saying that at least one common definition of seeing involves a visual perception, regardless of whether there is actually sensory input to the eyes.
 

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