Loss Leader,
- By applying Bayesian statistics, I think that I can essentially prove that I am (and, anyone else who is conscious is) immortal.
Well, mathematical proof is the logical extension of true statements. Other types of proof have lower burdens because the truth of statements cannot be known. Legal proof, for instance, can be as low as a preponderance of the evidence. I'd like to know what level of "proof" you are aiming for.
In this case, I'd expect mathematical proof.
- P(SM|me) = P(me|SM)*P(SM|k)/(P(me|SM)*P(SM|k)+P(me|NSM)*P(NSM|k))
- SM stands for what I assume is the consensus scientific model about personal human consciousness – i.e., we each have only one finite time of existence -- at most.
- “me” is the current existence of my personal consciousness.
- “k” is existing knowledge.
- “NSM” is the complement to SM.
- My estimates:
- P(me|SM) either approaches zero, or is zero.
Here's where you begin to run into trouble. What evidence causes you to think that the chance of your existence approaches zero? You only have one data point: you exist. What you are saying is that if we ran the universe over again from the beginning, the chance that you would exist would be exceedingly small. We don't know that. It's possible that if we ran the universe again, your existence would be a necessary outcome.
We can't run the universe again. So, we cannot make any judgment about your rarity. All we can say is that it is possible for you to exist in this universe.
Now, you then encounter the second problem which is whether you are in any way unique. The chance of you coming to exist may be very small, but the chance of
anyone coming to exist may be a near certainty. Whomever gets to exist may have overcome long odds, but
somebody was going to overcome those odds if not you. So, once again, the probability of any person existing might be 1, even if the probability of that very person existing was very low.
I see no way you could muster any evidence to overcome these problems.
- For P(SM|k), I’m ALLOWING that given our existing knowledge, P equals 99%. (I don’t THINK that it’s nearly that much.)
You think you're being generous, but you're not. "Allowing" odds doesn't mean that there's any reason to accept those odds. Obviously, I cannot argue that there is a 100% chance that the standard model of the universe would produce you. I don't want to make that argument. What I can argue is that we don't know that chance. Speculating about it without evidence is not useful, except maybe to form testable hypotheses. Do you have a testable hypothesis?
- P(NSM|k) is simply what’s left of prior probability after subtracting P(SM|k) – or, 1%.
- Consequently:
- P(SM|me) = (~.0000…1)*(.99)/((~.0000…1)(.99)+(.9)(.01))
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/(~.0000…1+.009)
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1
Make the numbers anything you want. Give yourself a 50% chance of being right. Give yourself a 99% chance. It doesn't matter. What you are trying to do is define an either/or situation where your idea has
some chance of being correct. But the terms are undefined. Assigning them any value is at best premature and at worst impossible.
Lastly, I'll admit that I'm a very poor excuse for a statistician. However, I don't see anything Bayesian in your concepts. Bayesian probability requires assigning a prior probability using knowledge that we now have but did not have before the event took place.
I previously used the example of 9/11. On 9/10/01, many people would never have dreamed that 9/11 was even possible. I certainly never considered it. However, on 9/12, we knew that not only was such an event possible, but that we could have predicted it
had we been looking at the right information. Intelligence agencies weren't communicating; our borders were porous; terrorists can fly planes; planes can be used as huge manned missiles; etc.
You have not shown that we have any information now that we did not have previously.
ETA: After a very quick lesson on Bayesian probability, I understand that a prior probability can be unknown and that it can be set by just plain guessing. However, the posterior probability has to be known. We must have more information between our first guess and our second.
In this case, our second guess contains no more information than that you do exist. Thus, the chance of you existing is 1. It appears that plugging 1 into the equation causes all values to go to 1. On the other hand, plugging 0 into the equation causes all values to go to 0. There cannot have been no chance of an event and the event cannot be predestined.
Since we have only one data point, a prior and posterior probability cannot be computed.