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If Saddam Had Stayed

One of the primary conclusions of the Duelfer Report was that Iraq destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile in 1991, and only a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions were discovered by the ISG. And yet this clown keeps pushing the nonsense about the lone sarin shell, which was determined to have come from an Iran-Iraq war-era stockpile and thus almost certain to have been a dud.

Thanks for demonstrating once again that "this clown" knows A LOT more about this subject than you. Thanks for demonstrating that you are either willfully uninformed (i.e, wallowing) or simply dishonest. Because here is what the ISG report actually stated about that sarin shell:

The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist.

Note several things in that statement.

First, they identify the binary munition as "viable" (i.e., it was not "almost certain" to have been a "dud", as you suggest). Indeed, the ISG said the shell contained 40% sarin. Which, btw, is the same concentration as the sarin used in the Tokyo attack … an attack that WMD experts said could have killed thousands had the sarin been more effectively dispersed in the subway system. And it contained the same amount of sarin as was used in that attack … 4 to 5 liters. And by "more effectively dispersed", I just mean doing more than simply poking holes in plastic bags filled with sarin and hoping air currents spread the stuff ... as was done in the Tokyo attack.

And despite that crude dispersal mechanism, the Tokyo attack still killed a dozen people and sent 5000 to hospitals (500 of which actually required hospitalization). A United States Senate subcommittee later estimated that if the sarin gas had been disseminated more effectively at Kasumigaseki station, a hub of the Tokyo subway system, tens of thousands might have been killed. In other words, what you erroneously scoff at as a "certain" "dud" contained the ingredients to make a frightening terrorist weapon, had those who found it known what it was. Fortunately, they did not, because it was unmarked and therefore looked no different than an ordinary conventional 152 mm shell, and there were millions of those lying around in Iraq … millions. And leaving it unmarked is again something that was deliberately done by Saddam's regime to hide the CW arsenal from UN inspectors.

So we are back to one of the questions I asked. What are the odds that insurgents would have picked up the only existing viable CW shell in all of Iraq to use as an IED? Because of your agenda, you refuse to answer the question, but clearly the answer is "nil". Probability says there were others. And that's part of the reason the ISG report stated that the shell "raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq". That statement is completely contrary to your uninformed *certainty* about the non-existence of Iraqi CW stockpiles. Fact is, the ISG could not be sure that viable munitions didn't exist somewhere in Iraq's stockpiles before the war. And said so. And part of the reason why is given in the very next paragraph in the ISG report (which you obviously didn't read, or at least didn't comprehend, or willfully chose to ignore):

The scale and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, and weapons markings, and extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF significantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was able to thoroughly inspect. ISG technical experts fully evaluated less than one quarter of one percent of the over 10,000 weapons caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten ammunition depots identified prior to OIF as suspect CW sites. The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout the country may include some older, CW-filled munitions, and ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq.

Did you note that last part, CE? That the "ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq"? And that's the whole point of my 6 questions to you. Seems to me that the inability of your side of this debate to answer those 6 questions greatly increases the possibility that a "few large caches" of chemical munitions did exist in Iraq before our invasion and were moved out of Iraq before, during or shortly after the invasion … to Syria.

And I'm not done with my response to you on this. The ISG report and those who ran the ISG program also had other things to say that run completely counter to this picture you are trying to paint. I know, you'll say "tl;dr" but that's ok. I'm not actually posting to you but anyone who might foolishly think you had anything of value to say. Here's an example of what I mean:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050427-121915-1667r.htm

The CIA's chief weapons inspector said he cannot rule out the possibility that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were secretly shipped to Syria before the March 2003 invasion, citing "sufficiently credible" evidence that WMDs may have been moved there. ... snip ... "ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war," Mr. Duelfer said in a report posted on the CIA's Web site Monday night.

He cited some evidence of a transfer. "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined," he said. "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation."

But Mr. Duelfer said he was unable to complete that aspect of the probe because "the declining security situation limited and finally halted this investigation. The results remain inconclusive, but further investigation may be undertaken when circumstances on the ground improve." ... snip ... Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place," his report stated. "However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials."

In short, folks, it is dishonest to cite the ISG report as evidence that no viable CW munitions existed or were transferred to Syria. The ISG specifically stated they had reason to believe that a possibility and could not rule it out.

Furthermore, Annex F of the ISG report states that while the "ISG has no information to indicate that Iraq produced more binary Sarin rounds than it declared", "former Iraqi scientists involved with the program admitted that the program was considered extremely successful". Now there is no denying that Saddam craved WMDs. The ISG report makes this clear. So why wouldn't Saddam have put into production a chemical warhead his scientists said was "extremely successful"? That alone should make you wonder about the contents of all those documents on WMD that Iraq apparently destroyed. Could that have been the paper trail to proving those warheads existed and were moved to Syria?

The ISG report and statements by ISG's head investigators provide so many reasons to suspect that's true. For one, without CW warheads, many of Iraq's weapon system development efforts in 2002 made little sense. With conventional warheads, they would have had little to no impact on any conceivable war Iraq was or soon might wage. Yet, Iraq was spending huge amounts of money (money that should have gone to food, medicines, etc) on those programs, in direct violation of the edicts against development of delivery systems with a range more than 150km. Yet the ISG found complete CAD drawings of such systems dated 2002, long after CE claims they destroyed all their WMD. Saddam was pressuring his scientists to start production of intermediate range missiles and was trying to purchase them from abroad.

In fact, according to the ISG, they found “written evidence of a contractual negotiation” between North Korea and Iraq for the purchase of 1,300 km-range No Dong missiles. Missiles that had no value unless armed with WMD. Iraqi documents indicate that Baghdad made a $10 million down payment in late 2002 for a single No Dong missile but North Korea failed to deliver the missile allegedly “because they were being watched too closely by the Bush Administration”. The ISG also uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000 km- range cruise missile. Clearly Iraq was seriously violating its agreement not to research, develop, test or stockpile long range delivery systems … the very things that would turn a hidden or reconstituted WMD arsenal into an imminent threat. Why'd they do that if they had nothing to put on those missiles?

And if we'd not invaded Iraq in 2003, wouldn't they now FOR CERTAIN be testing or even fielding those systems? And wouldn't they be FOR CERTAIN tipped with WMD? THAT was the ISG conclusion you need to focus on. Not CE's bogus dismissals.

You need to focus on Duelfer telling Congress in 2004 that "By 2003, Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of months and nerve agent in less than a year or two. ... snip ... What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the use of force and had experience that demonstrated the utility of WMD. He was making progress in eroding sanctions and, had it not been for the events of 9-11-2001, things would have taken a different course for the Regime. Most senior members of the Regime and scientists assumed that the programs would begin in earnest when sanctions ended---and sanctions were eroding. ... snip ... A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and intentions remain unanswered, even after extensive investigation by ISG. For example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we definitively answer some questions about possible retained stocks." Not the lies that CE is spinning.

And here's a few more data points for consideration. Data points that show the ISG actually missed quite a lot of what was happening in pre-war Iraq. That the situation was even worse than the ISG concluded. We know this thanks to the tons of documents that Saddam's regime failed to destroy (while we are left wondering what story the ones they did destroy would have told):

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1926630/posts?page=51

Shattering Conventional Wisdom About Saddam's WMD's--What top secret Iraqi files disclose.

November 16, 2007

... snip ...

Saddam Hussein's secret documents are measured by the shelf-mile and stored inside a secure but dusty facility near U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Doha, Qatar, and in several subsidiary sites.

... snip ...

After Saddam's brother-in-law Kemal Hussein defected to Jordan in the mid 1990's and exposed some (but not all) of the numerous Iraqi WMD programs, Saddam started over from scratch on WMD production, using a small and secret cadre of new program leaders. Among the newly-disclosed documents are Saddam's actual tape recordings of the meetings of this special group for WMD.

The National Security Agency has confirmed that the tapes are authentic and that the voiceprints are unquestionably those of Saddam and his elite WMD advisers.

... snip ...

Translating shelf miles of documents, however, may take decades. In the meantime, enough of Saddam's secret files have been translated to illustrate one clear trend over time: through the time of Hans Blix and the run-up to the invasion, Saddam had absolutely no intention of destroying his WMD.

In the last year of his regime, Saddam was in fact still trying to expand his chemical weapons capability. In January 2002, his advisors discussed research into a precursor for Sarin nerve gas. In September 2002, for example, only seven months before the war, Saddam's Military Industrial Commission approved the illegal production of the precursor chemicals used to make Tabun nerve gas. Four days later, another office discussed plans to import a banned compound, phosphorus pentasulfate. The UN had required Iraq to prove that it had destroyed all of its stocks of this chemical, which is a precursor for VX nerve gas. Instead, they were importing more of it. In October 2002, Saddam's Director of Planning ordered more than forty tons of various chemicals which, when mixed together, would make Zyclon B – the poison gas used by the Nazis to kill millions of Jews during the Holocaust. Saddam's scientists appear never to have met a poison gas they did not like.

The secret planning for banned chemical weapons in 2002 was no last-minute decision of desperation on the eve of war. Rather, it typified Saddam's long, well-thought-out plan to deceive the UN – an ongoing project that went back more than a decade. For example, Saddam's intelligence service sent out a memo in 1997 ordering his staff not to destroy any WMD but to conceal prohibited materials, "hide equipment and documents....make sure that labs are cleaned of any traces of chemical or biological substances." That was the real Saddam: hide the WMD documents, clean up the tell-tale evidence.

Beginning in 1998, Saddam’s staff went into overdrive to conceal their illegal WMD programs: "The researchers [sic] that cannot be declared and that is related with the previous prohibited programs of WMD and how to make sure that information about these researchers will not leak to the outside world." Files from 1999, marked “Top Secret”, confirm that the Iraqi army had a "chemical platoon" that was undergoing training in every form of illegal chemical weapons. By 2001, the regime ensured that their chemical platoons had mobile shower vehicles for decontamination. Similarly, the production of mobile labs (which the Duelfer report concluded had ended in 1997) were still being manufactured in 2002.

There can be no doubt that instead of destroying his WMD in 1991, Saddam had a clear intent to revive his WMD production, to expand it and to hide it from the UN inspectors as late as 2002. So where did the stockpile of chemical weapons go in 2003?

:D (just for CE)
 
A Front Page Magazine article? Really? That's your 'ace in the hole'?

Sad...

LOL! The author of that article is John Loftus:

http://www.intelligencesummit.org/speakers/JohnLoftus.php

As a former Intelligence Officer and Justice Department prosecutor, John Loftus once held some of the highest security clearances in the world, with special access to NATO Cosmic, CIA codeword, and Top Secret Nuclear files. As a private attorney, he works without charge to help hundreds of intelligence agents obtain lawful permission to declassify and publish the hidden secrets of our times. He is the author of four history books, three of which have been made into films, two were international best sellers (The Secret War Against The Jews & Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, the Nazis, and the Swiss Banks), and one (Belarus Secret: The Nazi Connection in America) was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize.

A man of some credentials. And by the way ... an old-fashioned Democrat.
 
Except that the CIA said they were operating in Baghdad well before the invasion. And Saddam's regime apparently was even aware of that fact. And the terrorists who were caught plotting to kill tens of thousands of Jordanians (and whole bunch of Americans) in Amman stated they'd met with al-Zarqawi IN BAGHDAD BEFORE THE INVASION to initiate a bunch of plots. And the CIA stated that when Saddam actually caught a member of al-Zarqawi's terrorist cell BEFORE THE INVASION, Saddam himself ordered he be released (over the objections of the Iraqi police who caught him). Nah, al-Qaeda couldn't operate in Iraq before the regime was toppled. :rolleyes:

BAC, get the people referenced at wiki to change their minds:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein_and_al-Qaeda_link_allegations

wiki said:
The consensus of intelligence experts has been that these contacts never led to an operational relationship, and that consensus is backed up by reports from the independent 9/11 Commission and by declassified Defense Department reports[3] as well as by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, whose 2006 report of Phase II of its investigation into prewar intelligence reports concluded that there was no evidence of ties between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

Then come back and try me.


Your attitude is truly amazing. But not unexpected considering your tone in our past discussions. Regardless, what those soldiers found in those camps was very interesting. And if nothing else, it makes one understand why bombing would not have worked, any more than it worked with bin Laden's camps.

I'm stupid. But I can be taught. You'll have to spoon feed me. Use short paragraphs, please, for the best chance of success.

Perhaps. Perhaps not. You just can't know how the domestic and international community would have reacted to a major bombing attack in Northern Iraq. All it would have taken is one vote on the Security Council to have prevented the resolution that Bush used to justify the invasion. It might have interfered with the UN weapon inspections that were upcoming at the time. And as pointed out, it's questionable whether bombing would have worked to prevent a terrorist attack, anyway. It certainly didn't when it was tried previously against al-Qaeda.

Bush didn't want any UN resolutions. He went along to help Blair keep us Brits quiet. When they knew they wouldn't get an actual resolution authorising an invasion, they gave up trying to get one.
 
BAC,
How does this fit into your world?
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/politics/06intel.ready.html?_r=1

A top member of Al Qaeda in American custody was identified as a likely fabricator months before the Bush administration began to use his statements as the foundation for its claims that Iraq trained Al Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons, according to newly declassified portions of a Defense Intelligence Agency document.

The document, an intelligence report from February 2002, said it was probable that the prisoner, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, “was intentionally misleading the debriefers’’ in making claims about Iraqi support for Al Qaeda’s work with illicit weapons.
 
BAC, get the people referenced at wiki to change their minds

LOL! Wikipedia is not exactly an unbiased source, FG.

The consensus of intelligence experts has been that these contacts never led to an operational relationship, and that consensus is backed up by reports from the independent 9/11 Commission and by declassified Defense Department reports[3] as well as by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, whose 2006 report of Phase II of its investigation into prewar intelligence reports concluded that there was no evidence of ties between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

Perhaps not an "operational" relationship, but many portions of the intelligence community did indeed note friendly meetings between the two occurred. And it is very clear that even if Saddam didn't provide al-Qaeda with money (we isn't something that can be said with any certainty), he looked the other way as al-Qaeda operated within his country. Documents discovered in Iraq after the invasion prove this. In fact, those documents suggest even more. For example,

http://www.nysun.com/pf.php?id=29746

March 24, 2006

CAIRO, Egypt - A former Democratic senator and 9/11 commissioner says a recently declassified Iraqi account of a 1995 meeting between Osama bin Laden and a senior Iraqi envoy presents a "significant set of facts," and shows a more detailed collaboration between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

… snip …

The new documents suggest that the 9/11 commission's final conclusion in 2004, that there were no "operational" ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda, may need to be reexamined in light of the recently captured documents.

While the commission detailed some contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda in the 1990s, in Sudan and Afghanistan, the newly declassified Iraqi documents provide more detail than the commission disclosed in its final conclusions. For example, the fact that Saddam broadcast the sermons of al-Ouda at bin Laden's request was previously unknown, as was a conversation about possible collaboration on attacks against Saudi Arabia.

And let me quote wikipedia, if that's the source you insist on, regarding a 2008 Pentagon report:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein_and_al-Qaeda#2007_Pentagon_Inspector_General_Report

entitled Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, based on the review of more than 600,000 Iraqi documents captured after the 2003 US invasion. The study "found no 'smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda."[91] It did note that in the early 1990s "Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives."

The abstract states that, "while these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist–operatives monitored closely... This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a 'de facto' link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust."[93]

Further:

Saddam's security organizations and bin Laden's terrorist network operated with similar aims, at least for the short term. Considerable operational overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the regional groups involved in terrorism. Saddam provided training and motivation to revolutionary pan-Arab nationalists in the region. Osama bin Laden provided training and motivation for violent revolutionary Islamists in the region. They were recruiting within the same demographic, spouting much the same rhetoric, and promoting a common historical narrative that promised a return to a glorious past. That these movements (pan-Arab and pan-Islamic) had many similarities and strategic parallels does not mean they saw themselves in that light. Nevertheless, these similarities created more than just the appearance of cooperation. Common interests, even without common cause, increased the aggregate terror threat.

The report also stated that "captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda." In July 2001, the Director for International Intelligence in the IIS had ordered an investigation into a terrorist group called The Army of Muhammad. The investigation revealed the group "threatened Kuwaiti authorities and plans to attack American and Western interests" and was working with Osama bin Laden. According to the report, "A later memorandum from the same collection to the Director of the IIS reports that the Army of Muhammad is endeavoring to receive assistance [from Iraq] to implement its objectives, and that the local IIS station has been told to deal with them in accordance with priorities previously established. The IIS agent goes on to inform the Director that 'this organization is an offshoot of bin Laden, but that their objectives are similar but with different names that can be a way of camouflaging the organization.'"

:D

Bush didn't want any UN resolutions.

Nonsense. Bush went out of his way to get one. He delayed action far longer than was advisable, militarily, to get one.

When they knew they wouldn't get an actual resolution authorising an invasion, they gave up trying to get one.

Let me just quote what Rumsfeld noted:

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2313

But, think what happened. There were 17 U.N. resolutions. There was unanimous agreement that he had filed a fraudulent declaration. The final opportunity was given with the last resolution, and he didn't take it. He chose war. He didn't do what Kazakhstan did, he didn't do what South Africa did, he didn't do what Ukraine did. He didn't say, come in and look, and see what we have. He was engaged in active deception. We'll ultimately know a great deal about what took place.

And remember what Waxman said back in October 2002?

http://www.house.gov/waxman/news_files/news_statements_res_iraq_10_10_02.htm

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Administration's policy towards Iraq, I don't think there can be any question about Saddam's conduct. He has systematically violated, over the course of the past 11 years, every significant UN resolution that has demanded that he disarm and destroy his chemical and biological weapons, and any nuclear capacity. This he has refused to do. He lies and cheats; he snubs the mandate and authority of international weapons inspectors; and he games the system to keep buying time against enforcement of the just and legitimate demands of the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States and our allies. Those are simply the facts.

Time has run out.

… snip …

War must always be a last resort. In my view, Saddam has nearly brought us to that point. We have tried containment and sanctions over the last ten years, and both have failed. Sanctions hurt the people of Iraq and Saddam did not care about them. Inspections have failed because he has frustrated the inspectors and eventually forced them out of his country four years ago.

We’ve tried surgical strikes on his facilities and no fly zones over large parts of his territory. He has responded by continuing to try to obtain weapons of mass destruction. He has turned the humanitarian efforts to allow oil sales for food into a $2 billion pot of money for weapons.

In light of all this, if the UN does not act, it not only leaves Saddam unchecked but it undermines, perhaps fatally, the purpose of having or supporting a UN in the first place.

If the UN does not or cannot act, the substitute does nothing to compromise the ability of the Congress to authorize the use of force to protect America’s interests - unilaterally if necessary - if we believe it necessary at a later time.

:D

BAC,
How does this fit into your world?
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/politics/06intel.ready.html?_r=1

A top member of Al Qaeda in American custody was identified as a likely fabricator months before the Bush administration began to use his statements as the foundation for its claims that Iraq trained Al Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons, according to newly declassified portions of a Defense Intelligence Agency document.

The document, an intelligence report from February 2002, said it was probable that the prisoner, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, “was intentionally misleading the debriefers’’ in making claims about Iraqi support for Al Qaeda’s work with illicit weapons.

That's not a claim I ever made. So it doesn't affect my "little world". :D
 
LOL! Wikipedia is not exactly an unbiased source, FG.
IronyMeterSplode.jpg
 
Given that, I think Obama should have offered more thanks than he did to Bush during his recent Iraq address.
It would be folly for anyone to thank G W Bush for the policy errors in 2003-2006 that led to the need for the surge in 2007. This "Obama ought to thank Bush for the surge" sound byte from the right wing pundits is one of the dumbest things I have heard in a while. It not even worthy of being called a cherry pick, it's just stupid.
 
It would be folly for anyone to thank G W Bush for the policy errors in 2003-2006 that led to the need for the surge in 2007.

Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006. But what we can say with certainty is that Bush was correct in authorizing the surge despite half of America (the Obama half) being against it. History proves that was the right thing to do. And we can also say that Obama was Stuck On Stupid when he said at a time when the success of the surge was apparent to all, even him, that had he known back in 2007 that the surge would work he still would have been against it. THAT should be the dumbest thing you've heard, DR. Not anything I just said. So I'm right in saying that Obama owes Bush more thanks ... thanks for making the right decision in the face of strong and misguided people like him, because if it had been up to Obama and his misguided supporters, Iraq would very likely now be in much, much worse shape than it is. And who could think that would be a good thing? :D
 
Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006. But what we can say with certainty is that Bush was correct in authorizing the surge despite half of America (the Obama half) being against it. History proves that was the right thing to do. D
Last month my wife backed the car into a tree next to our driveway, shattering the rear window. I took it to the local mechanic to have it repaired. It was the right thing to do.
 
Tell you what, DR.

Why don't you address the OP?

What do you think Iraq and the world would now look like had the US not invaded in 2003?

What do you think it's relationship with terrorists would now be?

What would it's relationship with neighboring countries be?

What would now be our and the world's response to Iraq's behavior?

Address the points I made above about those things.

Think you can do that? In the interest of non-stupidity? :D
 
Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006.
what we do know is what happened and what choices were made. and those choices were poor.
1. there were no wmd, so the reason for the war was false.
2. mission accomplished wasn't actually accomplished.
3. the military action was unfocused and inappropriate.
4. Abu Grab was an embarrassment.
 
Tell you what, DR.

Why don't you address the OP?

What do you think Iraq and the world would now look like had the US not invaded in 2003?

What do you think it's relationship with terrorists would now be?

What would it's relationship with neighboring countries be?

What would now be our and the world's response to Iraq's behavior?

Address the points I made above about those things.

Think you can do that? In the interest of non-stupidity? :D

Didn't you just say?
Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006.
 
1. there were no wmd

No, you don't know that, as I've proven in this thread.

, so the reason for the war was false.

But Iraq having wmd was but one reason for the war. Did you not pay attention during Bush's 2003 State of the Union address?

2. mission accomplished wasn't actually accomplished.

Might it be said to be accomplished now? Didn't Obama say that? And yet, 50000+ American soldiers are still needed in Iraq. American soldiers are still involved in combat and being killed/wounded. And if we are going to hold Bush's feet to the fire for claims like his "mission accomplished" speech, shouldn't we hold Obama's to the fire? For his claims regarding the success of the Stimulus and well being of the economy? For "Recovery Summer"?

3. the military action was unfocused and inappropriate.

That's your opinion. One not shared by the military, by the way.

4. Abu Grab was an embarrassment.

What's embarrassing is thinking that invalidates in any way the premise for invading Iraq. What is embarrassing is your not acknowledging what Abu Ghraib was like under Saddam. We can thank Bush for ending THAT embarrassment too.

:D
 

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