One of the primary conclusions of the Duelfer Report was that Iraq destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile in 1991, and only a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions were discovered by the ISG. And yet this clown keeps pushing the nonsense about the lone sarin shell, which was determined to have come from an Iran-Iraq war-era stockpile and thus almost certain to have been a dud.
Thanks for demonstrating once again that "this clown" knows A LOT more about this subject than you. Thanks for demonstrating that you are either willfully uninformed (i.e, wallowing) or simply dishonest. Because here is what the ISG report actually stated about that sarin shell:
The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist.
Note several things in that statement.
First, they identify the binary munition as "viable" (i.e., it was not "almost certain" to have been a "dud", as you suggest). Indeed, the ISG said the shell contained 40% sarin. Which, btw, is the same concentration as the sarin used in the Tokyo attack … an attack that WMD experts said could have killed thousands had the sarin been more effectively dispersed in the subway system. And it contained the same amount of sarin as was used in that attack … 4 to 5 liters. And by "more effectively dispersed", I just mean doing more than simply poking holes in plastic bags filled with sarin and hoping air currents spread the stuff ... as was done in the Tokyo attack.
And despite that crude dispersal mechanism, the Tokyo attack still killed a dozen people and sent 5000 to hospitals (500 of which actually required hospitalization).
A United States Senate subcommittee later estimated that if the sarin gas had been disseminated more effectively at Kasumigaseki station, a hub of the Tokyo subway system, tens of thousands might have been killed. In other words, what you erroneously scoff at as a "certain" "dud" contained the ingredients to make a frightening terrorist weapon, had those who found it known what it was. Fortunately, they did not, because it was unmarked and therefore looked no different than an ordinary conventional 152 mm shell, and there were millions of those lying around in Iraq … millions. And leaving it unmarked is again something that was deliberately done by Saddam's regime
to hide the CW arsenal from UN inspectors.
So we are back to one of the questions I asked. What are the odds that insurgents would have picked up the only existing viable CW shell in all of Iraq to use as an IED? Because of your agenda, you refuse to answer the question, but clearly the answer is "nil". Probability says there were others. And that's part of the reason the ISG report stated that the shell "raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq". That statement is completely contrary to your uninformed *certainty* about the non-existence of Iraqi CW stockpiles. Fact is, the ISG could not be sure that viable munitions didn't exist somewhere in Iraq's stockpiles before the war. And said so. And part of the reason why is given in the very next paragraph in the ISG report (which you obviously didn't read, or at least didn't comprehend, or willfully chose to ignore):
The scale and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, and weapons markings, and extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF significantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was able to thoroughly inspect. ISG technical experts fully evaluated less than one quarter of one percent of the over 10,000 weapons caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten ammunition depots identified prior to OIF as suspect CW sites. The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout the country may include some older, CW-filled munitions, and ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq.
Did you note that last part, CE? That the "ISG
cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq"? And that's the whole point of my 6 questions to you. Seems to me that the inability of your side of this debate to answer those 6 questions greatly increases the possibility that a "few large caches" of chemical munitions did exist in Iraq before our invasion and were moved out of Iraq before, during or shortly after the invasion … to Syria.
And I'm not done with my response to you on this. The ISG report and those who ran the ISG program also had other things to say that run completely counter to this picture you are trying to paint. I know, you'll say "tl;dr" but that's ok. I'm not actually posting to you but anyone who might foolishly think you had anything of value to say. Here's an example of what I mean:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050427-121915-1667r.htm
The CIA's chief weapons inspector said he cannot rule out the possibility that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were secretly shipped to Syria before the March 2003 invasion, citing "sufficiently credible" evidence that WMDs may have been moved there. ... snip ... "ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war," Mr. Duelfer said in a report posted on the CIA's Web site Monday night.
He cited some evidence of a transfer. "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined," he said. "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation."
But Mr. Duelfer said he was unable to complete that aspect of the probe because "the declining security situation limited and finally halted this investigation. The results remain inconclusive, but further investigation may be undertaken when circumstances on the ground improve." ... snip ... Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place," his report stated. "However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials."
In short, folks, it is dishonest to cite the ISG report as evidence that no viable CW munitions existed or were transferred to Syria. The ISG specifically stated they had reason to believe that a possibility and could not rule it out.
Furthermore, Annex F of the ISG report states that while the "ISG has no information to indicate that Iraq produced more binary Sarin rounds than it declared", "
former Iraqi scientists involved with the program admitted that the program was considered extremely successful". Now there is no denying that Saddam craved WMDs. The ISG report makes this clear. So why wouldn't Saddam have put into production a chemical warhead his scientists said was "extremely successful"? That alone should make you wonder about the contents of all those documents on WMD that Iraq apparently destroyed. Could that have been the paper trail to proving those warheads existed and were moved to Syria?
The ISG report and statements by ISG's head investigators provide so many reasons to suspect that's true. For one, without CW warheads, many of Iraq's weapon system development efforts in 2002 made little sense. With conventional warheads, they would have had little to no impact on any conceivable war Iraq was or soon might wage. Yet, Iraq was spending huge amounts of money (money that should have gone to food, medicines, etc) on those programs, in direct violation of the edicts against development of delivery systems with a range more than 150km. Yet the ISG found complete CAD drawings of such systems dated 2002, long after CE claims they destroyed all their WMD. Saddam was pressuring his scientists to start production of intermediate range missiles and was trying to purchase them from abroad.
In fact, according to the ISG, they found “written evidence of a contractual negotiation” between North Korea and Iraq for the purchase of 1,300 km-range No Dong missiles. Missiles that had no value unless armed with WMD. Iraqi documents indicate that Baghdad made a $10 million down payment in late 2002 for a single No Dong missile but North Korea failed to deliver the missile allegedly “because they were being watched too closely by the Bush Administration”. The ISG also uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000 km- range cruise missile. Clearly Iraq was seriously violating its agreement not to research, develop, test or stockpile long range delivery systems … the very things that would turn a hidden or reconstituted WMD arsenal into an imminent threat. Why'd they do that if they had nothing to put on those missiles?
And if we'd not invaded Iraq in 2003, wouldn't they now FOR CERTAIN be testing or even fielding those systems? And wouldn't they be FOR CERTAIN tipped with WMD? THAT was the ISG conclusion you need to focus on. Not CE's bogus dismissals.
You need to focus on Duelfer telling Congress in 2004 that "
By 2003, Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of months and nerve agent in less than a year or two. ... snip ... What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the use of force and had experience that demonstrated the utility of WMD.
He was making progress in eroding sanctions and, had it not been for the events of 9-11-2001, things would have taken a different course for the Regime. Most senior members of the Regime and scientists assumed that the programs would begin in earnest when sanctions ended---and sanctions were eroding. ... snip ...
A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and intentions remain unanswered, even after extensive investigation by ISG. For example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we definitively answer some questions about possible retained stocks." Not the lies that CE is spinning.
And here's a few more data points for consideration. Data points that show the ISG actually missed quite a lot of what was happening in pre-war Iraq. That the situation was even worse than the ISG concluded. We know this thanks to the tons of documents that Saddam's regime failed to destroy (while we are left wondering what story the ones they did destroy would have told):
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1926630/posts?page=51
Shattering Conventional Wisdom About Saddam's WMD's--What top secret Iraqi files disclose.
November 16, 2007
... snip ...
Saddam Hussein's secret documents are measured by the shelf-mile and stored inside a secure but dusty facility near U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Doha, Qatar, and in several subsidiary sites.
... snip ...
After Saddam's brother-in-law Kemal Hussein defected to Jordan in the mid 1990's and exposed some (but not all) of the numerous Iraqi WMD programs, Saddam started over from scratch on WMD production, using a small and secret cadre of new program leaders. Among the newly-disclosed documents are Saddam's actual tape recordings of the meetings of this special group for WMD.
The National Security Agency has confirmed that the tapes are authentic and that the voiceprints are unquestionably those of Saddam and his elite WMD advisers.
... snip ...
Translating shelf miles of documents, however, may take decades. In the meantime, enough of Saddam's secret files have been translated to illustrate one clear trend over time: through the time of Hans Blix and the run-up to the invasion, Saddam had absolutely no intention of destroying his WMD.
In the last year of his regime, Saddam was in fact still trying to expand his chemical weapons capability. In January 2002, his advisors discussed research into a precursor for Sarin nerve gas. In September 2002, for example, only seven months before the war, Saddam's Military Industrial Commission approved the illegal production of the precursor chemicals used to make Tabun nerve gas. Four days later, another office discussed plans to import a banned compound, phosphorus pentasulfate. The UN had required Iraq to prove that it had destroyed all of its stocks of this chemical, which is a precursor for VX nerve gas. Instead, they were importing more of it. In October 2002, Saddam's Director of Planning ordered more than forty tons of various chemicals which, when mixed together, would make Zyclon B – the poison gas used by the Nazis to kill millions of Jews during the Holocaust. Saddam's scientists appear never to have met a poison gas they did not like.
The secret planning for banned chemical weapons in 2002 was no last-minute decision of desperation on the eve of war. Rather, it typified Saddam's long, well-thought-out plan to deceive the UN – an ongoing project that went back more than a decade. For example, Saddam's intelligence service sent out a memo in 1997 ordering his staff not to destroy any WMD but to conceal prohibited materials, "hide equipment and documents....make sure that labs are cleaned of any traces of chemical or biological substances." That was the real Saddam: hide the WMD documents, clean up the tell-tale evidence.
Beginning in 1998, Saddam’s staff went into overdrive to conceal their illegal WMD programs: "The researchers [sic] that cannot be declared and that is related with the previous prohibited programs of WMD and how to make sure that information about these researchers will not leak to the outside world." Files from 1999, marked “Top Secret”, confirm that the Iraqi army had a "chemical platoon" that was undergoing training in every form of illegal chemical weapons. By 2001, the regime ensured that their chemical platoons had mobile shower vehicles for decontamination. Similarly, the production of mobile labs (which the Duelfer report concluded had ended in 1997) were still being manufactured in 2002.
There can be no doubt that instead of destroying his WMD in 1991, Saddam had a clear intent to revive his WMD production, to expand it and to hide it from the UN inspectors as late as 2002. So where did the stockpile of chemical weapons go in 2003?

(just for CE)