Proof?
This could be true. You can't prove it and I can't disprove it. I also can neither prove nor disprove you are here because you are being forced to.
The reality is this simple:
1. Skeptics are paid to be here.
2. Skeptics are forced to be here.
3. Skeptics are here because they suffer from serious mental deficiencies or conditions which prevent them from processing facts and coming to sensible, reasonable conclusions.
If I were you, I would do everything I could to avoid being accused of being here for reason number 3.
Rationals know why they are sane.
Conspiracists don't know why they are nuts.
What recent studies indicate:
Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. 2011
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science...91886911001036
Abstract
Surveys indicate that belief in conspiracy theories is widespread. Previous studies have indicated that such beliefs are related to agreeableness, low levels of self esteem, certain negative attitudes towards authority, and paranoia. The current study investigated the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs, paranormal belief, paranoid ideation, and schizotypy, in a study involving 60 females and 60 males aged 18–50. Sex differences were found in paranormal belief, with females scoring significantly higher than males in spiritualism, precognition, psi, and overall paranormal belief. Partial correlations controlling for sex showed that conspiracy beliefs were significantly and positively correlated with paranormal beliefs, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Confirmatory analysis revealed a best fit model to explain conspiracy beliefs that included schizotypy and paranoid ideation, but not paranormal beliefs. These findings suggest that paranoid ideation and schizotypy are strongly associated with belief in conspiracy theories.
_________________________________________________
Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale, 2013.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3659314/
One robust finding to emerge from the limited existing literature is that individuals who endorse one conspiracy theory tend to endorse others, including unrelated theories (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), fictitious theories made up by psychological researchers (Swami et al., 2011), and even mutually contradictory theories (Wood et al., 2012). In total, these findings suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories is not exclusively a result of rational evaluation of the evidence relating to each specific conspiracist claim; rather it appears there are stable individual differences in the general tendency to engage with conspiracist explanations for events. This trait has been termed “conspiracist ideation” (Swami et al., 2011).
A conspiracist belief can be described as “the unnecessary assumption of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable” (Aaronovitch, 2009)