This rationale doesn't negate a "soul" directly.
Only because there is no coherent definition given for "soul".
[aside, I have to agree, in terms of emphasis, with Belz on your use of rational and likewise coherent. I know what you mean in your useage but they may turn out to be a sledge hammer to crack a nut and I wouldn't want it to be my nut(or nuts) under the hammer, when it happens]
Yes, it was a clumsy example and my wording was probably poor. It isn't something I've tried to put into words before and I may have made some mistakes. Regardless, it isn't really relevant here.
I am not addressing qualia, I see not requirement for them(indeed I don't know what all the fuss is about). I am addressing "experience" and "subject", both requiring a me.
As I've stated previously, we don't know
how this happens, but we still know it's material.
The squishy bit provides the life, the animus, the me.
There is absolutely no evidence for this. Not for the last of the three, anyway. Of course the organic matter is the source of life, but nowhere has it been shown that life (in the metabolic sense) is a requirement for a "me". "Animus" lacks a coherent definition, so I'm not going to touch on that.
Again, all that we know is that
brains are a requirement for consciousness - meaning consciousness as generally understood.
Are you saying that we know other people are conscious because they exhibit intelligence?
We know other people are conscious because they behave in every way exactly as though they are.
I think you are referring here to your comments on PZ's.
Not exactly. My comments on p-zombies
follow from this, but this is true independently of whether or not you agree with my summary on that subject.
This does not follow, the perfection we experience might only be a local phenomena.
Then we have the
second problem of idealism, which is that it is irrational and will remain that way until evidence is put forth.
Until that time, materialism is the only rational conclusion.
I don't see the relevance.
If there is not and can never be evidence for idealism, then there is no reason to give it any consideration, any more than you would consider the idea that gravity doesn't actually exist and it's all just invisible leprechauns moving things around in such a way that it
looks like gravity.
To argue otherwise is the special pleading fallacy.
There is an assumption in there, this line is irrelevant given my definition of consciousness.
Which has not been shown to be a prerequisite for consciousness as generally understood, and still isn't relevant given that one could imagine that p-zombies are alive.
Simply assuming that p-zombies are machines and therefore are automatically not conscious is circular reasoning.
Well, I am no expert on western idealism, but it strikes me as obvious that all circumstances in this world including human thinking and its results fail to negate the possibility of idealism.
They also don't negate the possibility of gravity leprechauns. But it remains true that, by any functional definition of the word "is", the universe is not idealistic in nature.
It also remains true that, even if idealism is technically coherent, it is not rational.