I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[PixyMisa]

Great, 'couse in a question about what would material be under idealism one would hope that at least the consideration of material got in there somewhere.

So if we do take material under idealism to be thought then we end up with 'Thinking is a thought process'. Say what about information, doesn't that get in there somewhere?

Yes. No. Maybe. There is no single statement - and few coherent statements - on that from the idealism side of things.

If you look at my posts above you'll find I wasn't leaving out anything, and specifically remarked on the need for such informational structures (in an informational universe) that we would ascribe as material. In fact I even did so in a response to annnnoid, probably a response to the very post of which you remark. So perhaps you could be a bit picker. Heck, I've got no skin in the game so if you are really that interested in not having a conversation about it, than neither of us need bother.

Okay. But saying that it's an informational process, in this context, is more wrong than it is right. It's a material process, exactly as we would understand material processes if matter weren't just information (whatever that means). The idea that matter is information Does. Not. Change. Anything. Materialism is still true and idealism is still false.

 

[The Man]

Yes. No. Maybe. There is no single statement - and few coherent statements - on that from the idealism side of things.

OK, so at least a "few" that even you would consider coherent. Someone interested in an actual discussion might even pick one, perhaps the one they felt was most coherent, most relevant or both and, you know, talk about it.

Okay. But saying that it's an informational process, in this context, is more wrong than it is right. It's a material process, exactly as we would understand material processes if matter weren't just information (whatever that means). The idea that matter is information Does. Not. Change. Anything. Materialism is still true and idealism is still false.

You sure the universe isn't primarily just ellipses?

As I tried to express before, an informational universe makes both conciseness and material (along with just about everything else) just information processing.

Yes.

That's OK, I don't mind you, in text, considering your own statement "is more wrong than it is right" in whatever context you want.

Again, with material as just information then a material process is just an informational process, explicitly. Asserting that "is more wrong than it is right", in whatever context you would like to imagine, just asserts "The idea that matter is information" "is more wrong than it is right" in that same context.


Once again I ain't arguing what ontology might be correct just what aspects they each assert.

Since an ontology represents what one considers the fundamental nature of the universe what changes with a change in ontology is, well, what one considers to be the fundamental nature of the universe. For a change in monistic ontology it is fundamentally one thing that changes. For idealism it is consciousness or thought that is primary, material and information would be aspects of that. For materialism it is material that is fundamental, consciousness and information would be subsequent to, or properties of, that. For an informational universe or monistic informationalism, information would be primary and material as well as consciousness would both be results of that, or different configurations of that, information.

To use your own example of quantum mechanical interpretations, while those interpretations have particular differences that does not necessitate those differences to be detectable. Of coarse it doesn't necessitate that they be undetectable either, the numbers may actually be different at some scale or in some specific applications. What changes with a change in the interpretation considered is where you might look for those potential differences. In the many worlds interpretation, for example, all states in superposition are achieved. So what one would try to look for would be indications of the existence of those other world states.

In the holographic principle there is at least asserted the potential for detectable differences at the appropriate scale. So if one of our spatial dimensions is just information (and then thus different from the other two) we might expect the numbers to be different. Similarly an informational universe might have detectable consequences at the appropriate scale, depending on how, and if, it is formulated.


You referred to naive idealism on this and the other thread. Indicating that there is a form of idealism that you would consider less, well, naive. In this thread you asserted you called it "informational idealism", again indicating that it has fundamental elements you would consider idealistic, but then asserted it is just materialism. So evidently your non-naive idealism is just materialism, unless of course your informational idealism is fundamentally idealistic. Again someone actually interested in discussing alternatives to materialism might discuss those fundamentally idealistic aspects of their non-naive idealism.

 

[PixyMisa]

OK, so at least a "few" that even you would consider coherent.

There are forms of idealism that are identical to materialism. Those are coherent, but redundant.

There's naive idealism, which holds that mind is what exists, when what we observe is minds, plural and distinct. That's not coherent.

There's forms of idealism that try to handwave their way from pure mathematics to human consciousness while dismissing all observations of everything, ever. Those are lazy nonsense.

Pick one.

That's OK, I don't mind you, in text, considering your own statement "is more wrong than it is right" in whatever context you want.

Context actually matters. Your context makes your statement wrong.

Again, with material as just information then a material process is just an informational process

Wrong. It is a material process. It is not "just" anything.

Since an ontology represents what one considers the fundamental nature of the universe what changes with a change in ontology is, well, what one considers to be the fundamental nature of the universe.

The idea that the material is information is not a change in ontology. That's the point. Nothing changes.

To use your own example of quantum mechanical interpretations, while those interpretations have particular differences that does not necessitate those differences to be detectable.

No. The point is that they don't have differences. The calculations are identical no matter what interpretation you choose.

Of coarse it doesn't necessitate that they be undetectable either, the numbers may actually be different at some scale or in some specific applications.

No. Never. That's not what an interpretation is. That would be a different theory.

You referred to naive idealism on this and the other thread. Indicating that there is a form of idealism that you would consider less, well, naive. In this thread you asserted you called it "informational idealism", again indicating that it has fundamental elements you would consider idealistic, but then asserted it is just materialism.

It is materialism.

So evidently your non-naive idealism is just materialism

Essentially, yes. The universe is material, so any view of it as not being material is naive at best.

 

[The Man]

There are forms of idealism that are identical to materialism. Those are coherent, but redundant.

There's naive idealism, which holds that mind is what exists, when what we observe is minds, plural and distinct. That's not coherent.

There's forms of idealism that try to handwave their way from pure mathematics to human consciousness while dismissing all observations of everything, ever. Those are lazy nonsense.

Pick one.

No one asked you what you think about different forms of idealism.

Again the question was what would material be under idealism with regard to information. Dance around it all you want, but that just gets your legs tired.

Context actually matters. Your context makes your statement wrong.

What exactly do you think is the context I was using (here's a hint it was explicit in the original question and different from the question reiterated above)?

Wrong. It is a material process. It is not "just" anything.

OK, so what is a material process other than just a material process? Again in a universe that is just information, material is just information and a material process is just an informational process. Now one could discuss the hierarchy of dependencies for those processes, and I have. However given your apparent propensity to just pick out single lines, ignoring evidently both text and context alike, indicates again an actual discussion does not seem your intent. Again, you needn't bother as I won't be bothered

The idea that the material is information is not a change in ontology. That's the point. Nothing changes.

A neutral monism is "a change in ontology". Again it is the ontology that can change. While "The idea that the material is information" doesn't necessitate such a change in ontology it doesn't preclude it either. Some, like yourself, still assert infomationalism as materialism. While others assert it as idealism. All I have done is put forth, in accordance with the topic of this thread, is the alternative of monistic infomationalism as a neutral monism. That's the actual point.

No. The point is that they don't have differences. The calculations are identical no matter what interpretation you choose.

No, the point, and that I made, is that they do have differences. Whether those differences have physical implications we can detect is the question.

No. Never. That's not what an interpretation is. That would be a different theory.

Who said that's "what an interpretation is"? Actually it would be observation that would be different than the "theory". Perhaps even a theory that incorporates the existence of the other world states that matches observations better.

Heck, if you just don't know the difference between an interpretation, a theory, and an observation don't try to blame it on anyone else. Though I guess it is my fault for expecting you to understand those differences with out having them explicitly laid out. However, again, given your apparent propensity to just pretend to address singular lines while repeating your same assertions. I don't see that making those distinctions explicit would have changed anything.

It is materialism.

So the name "informational idealism" is deliberately misleading?

Essentially, yes. The universe is material, so any view of it as not being material is naive at best.

There, you see, that wasn't so hard, you don't feel there is any non-naive alternate to materialism. Short, sweet and to the point. Your contribution to the thread is complete. Encapsulating the gist of everything you have said here and easily repeatable should anyone feel the need. So no need for the pretense at discussion for that simple repetition.

 

[Belz...]

Again the question was what would material be under idealism with regard to information.

Pixy's answer, as far as I understand, is that even idealists can't say.

 

[tsig]

No one asked you what you think about different forms of idealism.

Again the question was what would material be under idealism with regard to information. Dance around it all you want, but that just gets your legs tired.




What exactly do you think is the context I was using (here's a hint it was explicit in the original question and different from the question reiterated above)?



OK, so what is a material process other than just a material process? Again in a universe that is just information, material is just information and a material process is just an informational process. Now one could discuss the hierarchy of dependencies for those processes, and I have. However given your apparent propensity to just pick out single lines, ignoring evidently both text and context alike, indicates again an actual discussion does not seem your intent. Again, you needn't bother as I won't be bothered



A neutral monism is "a change in ontology". Again it is the ontology that can change. While "The idea that the material is information" doesn't necessitate such a change in ontology it doesn't preclude it either. Some, like yourself, still assert infomationalism as materialism. While others assert it as idealism. All I have done is put forth, in accordance with the topic of this thread, is the alternative of monistic infomationalism as a neutral monism. That's the actual point.







No, the point, and that I made, is that they do have differences. Whether those differences have physical implications we can detect is the question.




Who said that's "what an interpretation is"? Actually it would be observation that would be different than the "theory". Perhaps even a theory that incorporates the existence of the other world states that matches observations better.

Heck, if you just don't know the difference between an interpretation, a theory, and an observation don't try to blame it on anyone else. Though I guess it is my fault for expecting you to understand those differences with out having them explicitly laid out. However, again, given your apparent propensity to just pretend to address singular lines while repeating your same assertions. I don't see that making those distinctions explicit would have changed anything.



So the name "informational idealism" is deliberately misleading?



There, you see, that wasn't so hard, you don't feel there is any non-naive alternate to materialism. Short, sweet and to the point. Your contribution to the thread is complete. Encapsulating the gist of everything you have said here and easily repeatable should anyone feel the need. So no need for the pretense at discussion for that simple repetition.

Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything materiel?

 

[Fudbucker]

Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything materiel?

Good question. Information existing without some physical substrate would be idealism.

 

[The Man]

Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything materiel?

Nope, but if material is just information then your question simply becomes 'Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything informational.' Now we might ascribe material as a particular type, structure, or organizational form of information but that doesn't preclude other types, structures, or organizational forms of information that we would not ascribe as material.


The wavefuction of a quantum mechanical system would be a good example, while not independent of material (specifically the material of the system in question) it is not in and of itself considered material. While some interpretations and physicists consider the wave function to be just representative of information in the mind of the observer others consider it to have a physical existence. So while we don't find information independent of material, at least as a recording substrate, we do find information that is not inherently dependent upon the material media used to record it.

 

[The Man]

Good question. Information existing without some physical substrate would be idealism.

If that physical substrate is itself just information, what then? Under idealism that physical substrate would just be some aspect of mind or thought.

 

[Fudbucker]

If that physical substrate is itself just information, what then?

How can information be a substrate for information? Seems like we run into an infinite regress.

Under idealism that physical substrate would just be some aspect of mind or thought.

Right.

 

[tsig]

Nope, but if material is just information then your question simply becomes 'Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything informational.' Now we might ascribe material as a particular type, structure, or organizational form of information but that doesn't preclude other types, structures, or organizational forms of information that we would not ascribe as material.


The wavefuction of a quantum mechanical system would be a good example, while not independent of material (specifically the material of the system in question) it is not in and of itself considered material. While some interpretations and physicists consider the wave function to be just representative of information in the mind of the observer others consider it to have a physical existence. So while we don't find information independent of material, at least as a recording substrate, we do find information that is not inherently dependent upon the material media used to record it.

If? Basing an argument on 'if' is basing it on speculation.

What do you mean " material is just information"? Are you suggesting that ideas in the human mind generate matter?

 

[Belz...]

Nope, but if material is just information then your question simply becomes 'Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything informational.'

Which is a fine way of eliminating the question, don't you think ?

 

[marplots]

Do you have any examples of information existing independent of anything materiel?

Sure, "before" comes first, and then "after."

Or, "there is no greatest number."

These are informational statements that don't require material referents.

 

[The Man]

If? Basing an argument on 'if' is basing it on speculation.

Yep, an informational universe is currently just speculation, as is the holographic principle.

What do you mean " material is just information"?

That material, if not reality itself, is fundamentally just information.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics#Quantum_information_theories

Are you suggesting that ideas in the human mind generate matter?

That would actually be idealism.

While an informational universe would assert that what we perceive as matter is largely a construct of our perceptions or mind it does not preclude that information from having an independent structure that we could ascribe as material. In fact it would be that structure that results in such a perception.

 

[The Man]

Which is a fine way of eliminating the question, don't you think ?

No, not really, as the gist of the question remains, which I tried to address.

 

[Fudbucker]

Yep, an informational universe is currently just speculation, as is the holographic principle.



That material, if not reality itself, is fundamentally just information.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics#Quantum_information_theories




That would actually be idealism.

While an informational universe would assert that what we perceive as matter is largely a construct of our perceptions or mind it does not preclude that information from having an independent structure that we could ascribe as material. In fact it would be that structure that results in such a perception.

I don't see how "pure" information can exist. It has to have a substrate of something other than information (either "thought", in the case of idealism, or "matter" in the case of materialism).

 

[The Man]

How can information be a substrate for information? Seems like we run into an infinite regress.

Under an informational universe there would be nothing to regress to other than information. In that context it could only be structural or how the information is organized. Earlier in the thread I made the analogy of a communication protocol. It would be how we make sense of (or have evolved to make sense of) packages of information. Otherwise it is just noise or apparently random perturbations.

 

[The Man]

I don't see how "pure" information can exist. It has to have a substrate of something other than information (either "thought", in the case of idealism, or "matter" in the case of materialism).

Well, what is just 'thought' in the case of idealism? Would that be some type of information? Heck, I don't see how "pure" information can exist either and as noted before both an informational universe and just the holographic principle are still just speculative. However, if the history of scientific development has taught us anything, it is that the universe just don't care what we can or can not see.

 

[Fudbucker]

Well, what is just 'thought' in the case of idealism? Would that be some type of information? Heck, I don't see how "pure" information can exist either and as noted before both an informational universe and just the holographic principle are still just speculative. However, if the history of scientific development has taught us anything, it is that the universe just don't care what we can or can not see.

That's true:

"Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it."

- Niels Bohr

 

[The Man]

Pixy's answer, as far as I understand, is that even idealists can't say.

Sorry, I missed this one Belz..

One of Pixy's answers was that there were few coherent statements on the subject. While perhaps somewhat facetious, it did indicate at least a few statements on the matter that even Pixy would consider coherent. While that evidently just means 'redundantly materialistic', it would still have at least been something to discuss that they do say on the subject and that even Pixy would consider coherent.